Article - Fighting in woods

[s bakker]

Well here is another article for you to picture those harsh battles in the woods in CE and LD.

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Combat in Woods

When attacking in woods, the Germans usually divide the are into company sectors. The Germans stress constant reconnaissance to discover the most weakly manned enemy position. This reconnaissance is carried out, even though company strength becomes temporarily reduced. Reconnaissance patrols usually move clockwise from their original position. The company commander reviews the reconnaissance reports in detail with his platoon and section leaders.

The company usually deploys in wedge formation when advancing. In order to achieve surprise, the Germans often leave the roads and advance cross-country.

As soon as the point of the wedge of the company is in sight of the enemy, the Germans creep forward to close-combat range, always keeping contact with adjacent and supporting units. The company then storms the enemy's position, using greatest possible number of hand grenades, pole charges, and close-combat weapons. The advance elements attempt to break into the hostile position as deeply as possible, the body of the wedge widening the penetration on both sides. The company commander then decides whether to roll up the enemy position on the more important flank or to hold the ground until reinforcements arrive before commiting the attack.

Each platoon details at least one observer, armed with an automatic weapon, to neutralize enemy treetop snipers. The Germans believe that bursts of fire, rather than single shots, are necessary to deal effectively with such snipers.

The Germans consider fighting in wooded areas as the primary task of riflemen and machine gunners, since the employment of heavy-support weapons often is impossible. The Germans occasionally dismount heavy machine guns and use them as light machine guns. Antitank guns of small caliber and light infantry howitzers sometimes are brought forward manually, and when indirect fire is not possible they engage targets directly. Light mortars are employed individually. From Finnish troops, the Germans learned a successful method of using mortars in woods. The mortar observers, accompanied by a telephone operator, move with the advanced element. The line back to the mortar crew is exactly 200 yards long. One man is detailed to see that the line does not get hung on the way and as far as possible runs in a straight line. When the advanced element contacts the enemy, the observer judges the distance from himself to the target and adds the 200 yards to the mortar range. Bracketing of fire for adjustment is considered too dangerous because of the close proximity of friend and foe.

When the Germans leave a woods or have to cross a large clearing within the wooded area, the troops work themselves close to the edge of the woods. Then all the men leave the woods simultaneously, rushing at least 100 yards before seeking cover.

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This will be the last 'article' i'm posting for a while .......

Grtz S Bakker

[Dschugaschwili]

Well, let's see what I can take from this article while defending Riesberg.

Dschugaschwili

[mike_rockley]

Is there any mention of canister rounds ( tank ) and interlocking arcs in the texts that you are reading. Also what about there individual fire and movement from contact and movement from their f.u.p's.

[Mattias]

Say, Bakker, what are your sources for all these articles?

M.

[s bakker]

Mattias,

Well these snippets are all from the book " Handbook on German military forces" an amercan amry book about weapons and tactics used bt the Germans in WWII, written in 1944.

This book was later declassified and published 'as is' by the Louisiana State University Press.

The tactics articles can also be found on MOON;s website at; http://www.gamesofwar.de/FrameSet1.html

Check it out !

Grtz S Bakker

PS: mike_rockley; what are f.u.p's ?

PPS: Dschugaschwili; i feared you would

[This message has been edited by s bakker (edited 02-24-2000).]

[tss]

I'd like to point out that while German infantry in general had good tactics, their performance in large forests (when I say 'large' I mean the large forests of East Front, with forests covering some tens of thousands of square kilometers or more) left much to be desired.

In general, German soldiers were afraid of deep forests. Most of the Germans had not encountered that kind of terrain (heavy pine

and fir woods scattered with marshes) and so they were not experienced in moving (and living) in them. In addition, their Russian enemies were accustomed to the forests and knew how to move there without leaving traces and how to set up ambushes efficiently. In short, forests in East Front belonged to Russians except in Eastern Karelia where Finns patrolled.

Some years ago I read a telling quote by General Dietl who commanded the Lappland Army of Germans. I don't remember the exact words but it went something like this: "The large forests filled us always with dread. When our columns had to enter one of them we were always on our nerves waiting for sudden ambushes. When we reached the edge of the forest I always felt relieved."

Now some observations for the article:

The Germans stress constant reconnaissance to discover the most weakly manned enemy position

Agreed. In forests one has to patrol constantly as it is the only way to discover the enemy (aerial reconnaisance is very limited).

In order to achieve surprise, the Germans often leave the roads and advance cross-country.

I think this statement reflects most the state of American forest-fighting at the time of writing, since for example Finns and Russians took it for granted that one should _never_ attack along a forest road. (You can advance along it but if you meet resistance you outflank it).

As soon as the point of the wedge of the company is in sight of the enemy, the Germans creep forward to close-combat range, always keeping contact with adjacent and supporting units.

Most of the Karelian combats were decided in the first 30 seconds of the fight, the one who managed to ambush the enemy from close range winning it.

The Germans consider fighting in wooded areas as the primary task of riflemen and machine gunners, since the employment of heavy-support weapons often is impossible.

I disagree. Fighting in wooded areas is the primary task for SMG gunners. As the combat ranges are very short, machine guns and rifles have limited utility. The most important support weapon is a light mortar (around 50 mm).

When the Germans leave a woods or have to cross a large clearing within the wooded area, the troops work themselves close to the edge of the woods. Then all the men leave the woods simultaneously, rushing at least 100 yards before seeking cover.

That's a very efficient way to kill a lot of your own troops if there is a hidden ambush on the far side of the clearing. The correct way is to send first a couple of scouts to check the other side, then send a squad or two to cover the advance, and finally rush all other troops over the clearing as fast as possible.

- Tommi

[Pixman]

Funny, Napoleon's men and leaders felt the same way 130 years before. Why do people insist on invading Russia?

Pixman

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Fact is the enemy of truth. - Don Quixote

[s bakker]

Thanks for giving some interesting insights on this article Tommi. Maybe you could give some snippets (or links to) accounts of eastern karelian battles to give furhter insights on effective forest warfare ?

Grtz S Bakker.

[Guest Seimerst]

One of the favorite Russian tactics for taking on the Germans in those deep forests were to prepare their fighting positions facing to the rear. The idea being that carefully prepared positions facing rearward and perfectly camoflaged from the front gave them the best possible situation. The Germans would move past the positions and the Russians would open fire in a devastating ambush and shoot them in the back. They would be protected from any of the German supoorting fire nor could the Germans spot the fighting positions.

Much, much later the U.S. Army, when GEN Dupruy was in charge of the TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command), he tried to get the army to adapt what became the "Duprey fighting position" that was a modification of the above procedure. The foxhole had a protective berm to the immediate front and a field of fire out the sides at a 45 degree angle. Those positions were to be sited so that each fighting position's field of fire overlapped with the adjacent one setting up an interlocking kill zone with the soldiers protected by the berm to the front. It failed because soldiers were not psychologically hardened enough to have the discipline not want to know what was happening to their immediate front. In practise they would make a small "spy hole" in the berm so they could watch for themselves instead of trusting to their buddies on their right and left to keep their front clear of bad guys and then the spy hole got enlarged should they need to fire to their immediate front. Another good idea when you draw it on paper but fails to take human behavior in conbat into consideration.

[Hakko Ichiu]

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tss:

In general, German soldiers were afraid of deep forests. Most of the Germans had not encountered that kind of terrain (heavy pine

and fir woods scattered with marshes) and so they were not experienced in moving (and living) in them. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>

Ironic when you consider that in the good old days of fighting the Romans, the Germanic tribes were renowned and feared for their ability to fight in their impenetrable native forests. Read Tacitus for some good examples of this. Put the Romans right off their lark tongues in aspic, I can tell you.

Ethan

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Das also war des Pudels Kern! -- Goethe

[tss]

Why do people insist on invading Russia?

Well, I think it's an image thing. Nowadays you can't be considered to be a "Real Dictator" unless you have been beaten in Russia...

Maybe you could give some snippets (or links to) accounts of eastern karelian battles to give furhter insights on effective forest warfare ?

I'm going to write an article about "the wilderness war" in Viena and Onega but I haven't had the time to do that yet and it will take at least a couple of weeks before I have. Meanwhile, I've borrowed some 3 kg of books from a library to refresh my memory. Unfortunately, they all are in Finnish so I can't give any generally useful pointers.

In particular, I found three accounts of one Soviet partisan trip behind Finnish lines in July-August 1942, two from Finnish side and one from Soviet side. To make a long story short, the Soviets sent a 700 man partisan brigade to destroy the HQ of Finnish II Army Corps. The patrol was way too large and it was soon detected (it is not possible to move in groups larger than 50 men without leaving large trails). The maneuver battle lasted for a full month with Finnish pursuers and Soviet partisans playing cat-and-mouse in the vast uninhabited wilderness. In the end only some 120 partisans managed to escape to their own lines. Finns lost 37 KIA, 1 MIA, and 81 WIA.

The partisan units that fought in Karelia were elite army formations composed of volunteers and not a poorly-armed collection of civilians and broken army units like in occupied Ukraine and Byelorussia.

- Tommi

[mike_rockley]

F.u.p is a forming up point.

After contact with the enemy , the bosses appraise what they have to do to clear the enemy from their feature. They do some recky's and find a suitable location and leave a bunch of guys their to protect the F.u.p.

While fire support is still pouring in ( contact is still being made but no fire and movement ) guys all form up in an extended line with decent spacing drop packs and leave the f.u.p.

I reckon the German soldiers considered open ground, roads, clearings, rivers all obstacles. I don't understand why they would move all their blokes across a field. One well set gunner would cause alot of damage, the beaten zone for these guns ripp.

I find it hard to look at the maps because 50% of the map is an obstacle.

[tss]

I don't understand why they would move all their blokes across a field. One well set gunner would cause alot of damage, the beaten zone for these guns ripp.

The theory behind that is that in forest battles stealth is essential. The longer your forces are in open the more probable is it that they are detected. If your side doesn't have a complete air superiority, a recon plane might spot them, or maybe spotters in nearby hills could notice them and form up an ambush somewhere along the march direction. In forest, the one who sees the enemy first most likely wins the battle.

Like I wrote before, a mad dash over the clearing is not the Right Thing either. You have to send small patrols to recon the other side before crossing.

- Tommi

[mike_rockley]

Yeh totally agree. Anything that affects momentum of a patrol or places risk is an obstacle.Basiclly their is no cover or concealment in open ground.

[tss]

I wrote: Some years ago I read a telling quote by General Dietl who commanded the Lappland Army of Germans. I don't remember the exact words but it went something like this: "The large forests filled us always with dread. When our columns had to enter one of them we were always on our nerves waiting for sudden ambushes. When we reached the edge of the forest I always felt relieved."

I found the quote, or at least part of it again. It was not by Dietl but by Colonel-General Lothar Rendulic. The actual words were: "I always breathed easily when the forest walls on both sides of the road endend and we emerged to open ground. But these moments were rare and the open spaces were short."

- Tommi

[mike_rockley]

Sounds like these Generals had death wishes, that last quote sounds like he's moving along a road asking to be brassed up.