German offensive potential

[coe]

So in the past it seems that the Germans were rather successful on defense on a very tactical level, but sustained rather large losses on the local offensives at least in Normandy and when doing those stand fast orders and then during the general retreat as well as to heavy bombing and artillery (which might account for their large losses despite saying they were great on defense).

So I would like to know, what you all think, if the Germans knew that Normandy was the invasion and thus committed to the battle in earnest all the resources available in whatever style it chose - maneuver or the hold the allies where they were defense: if the Germans were still capable of carrying out successful offensives which might lead to recovery of more ground than lost, sustainable penetrations which would lead to allied withdrawals over a large distance, with more losses to the allies than axis troops. or were the forces in France simply not capable to such a task even if concentrated etc.

[Kingfish]

Define what you mean by "committed to the battle in earnest all the resources available in whatever style it chose".

Does this mean just having 21st Panzer released to the beaches as soon as the first reports of Airborne landings came in to 7th Army HQ? Or do we go so far as to have II SS Pz Corp awaiting the Americans off Omaha?

[JasonC]

The only thing that makes any difference is if they commit a regular stream of reinforcement and replacement to the west, to make good their losses.

The required numbers are 500 fresh tanks and 100,000 men per month, forever.

The force sent to Normandy was adequate to hold in Normandy. No razzle no dazzle required. But it was not adequate to stand up to 2 months of hammering without significant reinforcement or replacement, and hold.

A stock can't beat a flow.

In the real deal, the reason they could not do this was the destruction of Army Group Center, which was of course timed to coincide with the allies opening the long awaited second front in France.

Once attrition hammering quartered the armor originally sent, and bled the front line infantry in Normandy low enough to create weak spots along the line (which that reduced armor could not plug), the allies inevitably broke through. If the tank losses had all been made good, and the infantry as well (particularly in the American sector in the latter case), they could have continued to hold.

It does not improve things to withdraw into the interior. Longer lines help the allies, as they have superior overall force and superior mobility. They concentrate in vulnerable spots more easily, not less. Also, beach supply was limited, but as ports fall the overall allied thruput rises.

Nor could the Germans conduct operational razzle dazzle with any hope of success, in the interior. Half the army was static infantry or rail and horse dependent. The allies had complete control of the air and ungodly tac air conducting armed recce against soft transport behind the German lines. Falaise shows what happens when the whole German army had to move at once and could not stage those moves over time, at night, etc.

So their best chance was to hold not at the beaches but behind them but still on a limited length of front. Which they did, tolerably well, as long as they remained strong enough. They were not able to maintain it because they got essentially no armor replacements. In infantry, additional forces trickling in from Brittany was about it - maybe 25k replacements otherwise, for the whole 2 month battle.

They needed about 8 times that to hold.

[coe]

to hold?....hmmm well do you mean holding as the allies advance 3 miles and the maybe lose a mile on a counterattack so that the advance happens slowly? I'm talking about the ability to literally hold the allies in place or actually take new ground and hold it (i.e. lets say counterattack and drive the allies back beyond the start line and hold for an appreciable amount of time.). Not just slowly give ground.

Interesting stats I heard in another post - the allies lost less AFVs then the Germans did in 1944-1945?

[JasonC]

Allies no, Americans yes. The Russians lost far more than the Germans did against them. In the west, the Germans barely outscored the allies with both US and commonwealth sectors included - and failed to do so at all on the US sectors alone.

There better stats against the Brits reflect two distinct periods - tons of armor opposite them in Normandy on the defensive, and a high rate of loss on both sides, after which the Brit armor faced little and still lost to PAK and infantry weapons etc, without being able to "score", itself.

In contrast, the US faced piecemeal armor in Normandy, several unsound operational and tactical scale counterattacks, and massive later armor use that exchanged off but let the US score etc. There was some tactical offensive employment in Normandy, but no operational offensive use against the Brits.

German armor was singularly less effective attacking than defending, at this stage of the war and against the western allies. When driven right into the middle of a defense, a Panther is no great shakes. Put it 1-2km away and keyholed, showing only frontal armor, and it is pretty tough.

[ October 06, 2006, 01:02 PM: Message edited by: JasonC ]

[coe]

interesting - why do you suppose the russians with purportedly better tanks than the western allies kept losing more. And I do agree that german tanks were far less impressive on the offense against the Western allies...do you suppose if Allied tanks used in a similar type of offense (lets say against anotehr allied unit) in a similar way would have been worse off?

[JasonC]

The Germans used their armor for defense on the eastern front, more consistently. Russians weren't as rich logistically and because of it their firepower arms weren't as coordinated with the tanks. Their tactics were much more expensive as a result.

As for the fragment "do you suppose if Allied tanks used in a similar type of offense (lets say against anotehr allied unit) in a similar way would have been worse off?" - since it isn't a sentence, I am sorry, I can't make hide nor hair of it.

Tank technical specs never mattered very much, as is easily seen from the negative correlation between having the better tanks and winning campaigns. Operational factors dominate tactical ones.

[coe]

hmm let me rephrase that.

you said German tanks weren't so good on the offense against the western Allies.

Now lets put the same number of Western Allied tanks in the same situation as the German tanks were in when they attacked. i.e. lets assume a whole bunch of allied soldiers (with equipment) defected and now were attacking the Allied units.

Your thoughts on how the attacking "defectors" would have done compared to the Germans (particularly the tanks)