Action of 1/7 Queen's at Villers-Bocage

[John D Salt]

As the 60th anniversary of the action described falls today, I thought I'd post the following account of 1/7 Queen's action at Villers-Bocage, written by its CO. It is transcribed from PRO document WO 171/1368, 1/7 Queen's War Diary.

All the best,

John.

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THE ACTION BY THE 1/7TH BN. THE QUEEN'S REGIMENT, AT VILLERS BOCAGE

At 1500 hrs 12 June the Bn were placed under Command of 22nd Armd Bde which was ordered to move round the right flank of 30 Corps. The object of this quick move was to capture the high ground North West of VILLERS BOCAGE by attacking it from the West as little or no progress had been made from the North.

This move was made possible by the Americans who were advancing rapidly on the right flank of the Div towards CAUMONT.

The Bde moved off at 1600 hrs with 4 CLY leading followed by the Bn. The route was along a series of very narrow and twisty third rate roads and the dust raised by the Armd Vehs was blinding. However, very good progress was made and every available hour of daylight was used. During the move contact was made with the Americans advancing towards CAUMONT. Only light opposition was encountered by the leading Regt but the Armd Recce Regt reported enemy tanks at and various localities held by the enemy on our left flank which we had by-passed. By 2230 hrs the light was beginning to fade and the Bde Comd ordered the Bde to form a rapid leaguer for the night. Due to the congestion on the one narrow road this took some time and it was 0100 hrs before the Bn Leaguer was complete and the troops had had a meal, the first for a good many hours.

On 13 June the advance continued at 0530 hrs and by 1000 hrs the 4 CLY had reached VILLERS BOCAGE, passed through the town and were getting on to their objective, the high ground North West of the village, when the first serious opposition was encountered. This was the sudden appearance of several Mk. VI. 'Tiger' tanks.

In the meantime the Bn had debussed and was preparing to take up a firm base position on the high ground East of the village when orders were issued at once to move into VILLERS BOCAGE itself and cover its main exits.

The carriers and A tk guns moved off at once, the leading coy encountered a German Staff Car and two motor-cycle combinations which suddenly appeared from a side track. The leading platoon suffered some casualties and when the car and combinations had been ditched and the crews taken to the fields where they commenced sniping.

These had to be dealt with before the Coy could move on. Three prisoners were taken and the remainder dispersed. On arrival in the village contact was made with the reserve Sqn of 4 CLY. It appeared that the leading Sqns west of the town were facing serious difficulties by overwhelming numbers of 'Tigers'.

A plan was then made to send up one of our coys with the reserve Sqn to do to their assistance but it was found impossible to get through to them and the plan had to be abandoned. While these arrangements were still being made a Tiger was seen moving down the main street and blew down a house at the corner of the square where the 4 CLY and the leading Coys were gathered. This caused some confusion and the troops were ordered to get into the houses and use their PIATs whilst the Cromwells and our six-pounders covered all approaches into the high street. Further tanks both Tigers and Mk. IV's appeared in the main street and some particularly fine work was done by Major French and a party from 'C' Coy and Capt Beard and a party from the Carriers in stalking these tanks through the side streets and houses and tackling them with PIATs and Sticky Bombs. This period of tank hunting went on for about two hours by which time at least one Tiger and one Mk. IV in the main street had been knocked out. Having made certain that the enemy tanks in the main street had been well and truly bottled up, Coys were ordered to get into the original dispositions to cover the approach into the village. This was found to be a most difficult task as personnel of Coys had got very scattered throughout the houses in the village. In the meantime 'A' Coy were sweeping the ground in the further outskirts and were directed on the railway station.

Further reports of tanks approaching from the North, West and South were received throughout the afternoon. 'A' Coy meanwhile had encountered infantry opposition on the further face of the village and were pinned to the ground while a small armoured battle raged for some time. Bn 6-prs in the area of the station had acquitted themselves well and claimed four tanks, all Mk.VI Tigers knocked out and two hit without apparent damage. By the late afternoon the enemy tank threat had been smashed and the serious problem now was some pockets of infantry attempting to work their way through into the village. 'A' Coy had been driven back from their original positions and there was a large gap between the South and North Western edge which was not covered by any of our Coys and there was no Coy available to do it.

During the course of the day the remainder of the Armd Bde still on the high ground behind us had been fighting their own battles against further tanks to the North East and South West in addition they had considerable trouble with snipers from tree-tops. In fact the whole situation was a very confused one with fighting going on all around and behind one.

By 1800 hrs small infantry elements had worked their way round to within close proximity of the tanks of 4 CLY. Bn HQ was almost pinned to the ground and the road leading into the village from the remainder of the Bde was under quite heavy Arty fire which knocked out a complete detachment of the Mortars and "brewed up" a carrier.

A decision had to be made as to whether we could hold the village that night or not; without further infantry Coys it did not appear possible and the Bde Comd issued orders for the Bn and Sqn 4 CLY to withdraw onto the high ground West of the village from where we had started that morning and there join up in a firm base position with the remainder of 22 Armd Bde.

This withdrawal was successfully carried out covered by the 4 CLY it attracted a certain amount of shelling along the road but casualties were very few.

The forward edge of the new positions was based on the line of a sunken track running across the front, both flanks were covered by tanks of the 5 R. Tks whilst further behind was the 1/5 Queens and in the middle was 5 RHA and Tac Bde HQ.

The two main troubles were that fields of fire were restricted from about 50 to 100 yards and the enemy occupied high ground on three sides of the position.

About 1000 hrs 14 June it became clear that enemy infantry were feeling their way forward through the thick cover towards our two leading Coys. Both mortars and Arty were used with good effect. By 1100 hrs a definite attack had materialised on the left forward Coy ('C' Coy) and a small arms battle of great intensity raged for the next two hours with the MGs of the tks lending valuable assistance. The mortars and 5 RHA were continually in support switching from one area to another and meeting every call for fire with speed and intensity and accuracy.

At one stage matters looked serious when one platoon was overrun and there appeared to be a danger of the left flank being turned but 'C' Coy counterattacked using sten guns and grenades and restored the situation. Bn HQ was within 20 yds of the front line and would have been in great danger of being over run if 'C' Coy had not secured the left flank. The reason why Bn HQ displayed such courage in being so close to the front line was that it was the only place where they were not overlooked from the flanks.

'C' Coy in particular fought a very fine action that day and despite their weariness their tails were very much up. They had fought a square fight and very definitely driven the Hun off with heavy loss.

At about 1600 hrs orders were received from Bde that the whole Bde was to withdraw that night to link up with the rest of the Div.

Shortly after orders had been issued for this night withdrawal the enemy put in a heavy attack on the rear of the Bde Box with two Bns of infantry and supported by about 30 Mk. VI Tigers. Tac Bde HQ, 5 RHA, and 1/5 Queens were mainly involved though the Bn had for the first time that day some quite heavy shelling of the area.

In addition 'A' Coy on the right were engaged with infantry patrols. This action lasted about an hour when the enemy gave up leaving a number of Tigers "brewing up" merrily around the Bde box. This action delayed the plans for the withdrawal and it was half an hour after midnight before the first unit was leaving. Our two forward Coys ('C' and 'D') found the rearguard with a Sqn of 5 R.Tks. They remained in position until about 0200 hrs when the Coys climbed on to the tanks and came back to the new positions some five miles further North.

These two days of the 13th and 14th June will, no doubt, be remembered by all those who took part in the action. We delivered a heavy blow on the 2 Px Div which was forced to fight us whilst en route to another objective. The Bn knocked out four Tiger Tanks with it's 6 prs and shared two more with 4 CLY. In addition two were damaged by infantry tank hunting parties.

The myth that the Tiger was invincible has now been exploded.

The Bn experienced its first enemy counter attack, which was driven back at a heavy cost to the enemy. The result of that has shown that if every soldier stands firm and fights hard with all his weapons he has nothing to fear in the Hun.

Our casualties in the two days fighting were eight officers and one hundred and twenty other ranks, sufficient indication that the fighting was hard.

D.S.GORDON.

Lieut Colonel,

Comd. 1/7th Bn Queen's Royal Regt.

In the field,

18 June 1944.

DSG/wlm

[JonS]

Thanks John.

[rexford]

"The myth that the Tiger was invincible has now been exploded."

Interesting that British troops held such an opinion, since 6 pdr anti-tank guns in North Africa had knocked out one of the first Tigers met in combat.

Experiences in Italy and Tunisia probably resulted in the feeling that Tigers were impossible to knock out.

The most recent experience is sometimes the one that sticks in the mind even though a little research disproves the opinion.

[Herr Kruger]

Excellent read! Thanks for posting that!

[Other Means]

thanks John. quite edifying. even though for the time the British army had great C&C, it still gives a flavour of how confused such fighting was.

interestingly no mention of any column of Shermans destroyed. do i have the wrong action, is it a myth or was the information not available?

[Andreas]

On arrival in the village contact was made with the reserve Sqn of 4 CLY. It appeared that the leading Sqns west of the town were facing serious difficulties by overwhelming numbers of 'Tigers'.

Cromwells, not Shermans.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Other Means:

thanks John. quite edifying. even though for the time the British army had great C&C, it still gives a flavour of how confused such fighting was.

If you will permit me to zoom off on a bit of tangent, there was some dissatisfaction with infantry communications (as distinct from command and control, but C2 relies on the thrid C) as discuseed in WO 232/77, "Communications within the Infantry Battalion" which quotes "Lessons from Battle" by the Staffordshire Yeomanry, Aug 1944:

"2. Bad Infantry Communications. These are without exception deplorable. There is the general defeatist attitude amongst infantry that their communications are bound to fail once the battle starts. The attitude is justified as they always do. The result is that the plan has to be too rigid, and once troops are committed it is impossible for them to adjust themselves to the enemy's reactions. The whole system of infantry communications seems to require a complete overhaul."

As a cavaryman and a reservist, doubtless the author felt freer to comment than perhaps a professional infantryman would.

Originally posted by Other Means:

interestingly no mention of any column of Shermans destroyed. do i have the wrong action, is it a myth or was the information not available?

You have the right action (although, as Andreas has already pointed out, most of the tanks were Cromwells). 1/7Q were fighting in the town of Villers-Bocage itself, and a Queen's 6-pdr (whether 1/5Q or 1/7Q I don;t recall) is generally believed to have bagged Wittman's Tiger there, some time after the Sharpshooters and the Rifle Brigade got into trouble on the road to Point 213. The action by the Sharpshooters and Rifle Brigade is referred to in the account, but not in detail ("serious difficulties"). Each unit would have been on its own command net, so I doubt that each would have known much about what was happening to the other.

Having said that, many of the accounts of Wittman's action are, without doubt, very highly over-coloured, and I would recommned "Villers-Bocage Throught the Lens" as the most accurate and detailed account ever likely to be published, which goes a long way towards dispelling the mythological aspects of the Wittman story.

On another side note, the popular confusion between Tigers and Mk IVs wearing Schuerzen was explained as follows in PRO document WO 171/336, "30 Corps "G" War Diary":

"2. ENEMY METHODS

(i) In the sector just NW of CAEN an enemy Mk IV tk has been captured disguised as a Tiger with skirts of sheet metal. This practice has been reported before from the ITALIAN front."

Oooh, those wicked, sneaky Germans!

All the best,

John.

[Andreas]

Excellent stuff John. Got any more? Oh, and have a look at Der Kessel. I named the scenario thinking of your distinguished military career, defending hillocks in Surrey.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Andreas:

Excellent stuff John. Got any more?

Well, if you insist, I suppose I can regurgitate some more random curiosities peripheral to the V-B battle. I can't recall how many have been seen before; at least on I have posted to a usenet group before. I shall put them in separate posts in this thread.

Originally posted by Andreas:

Oh, and have a look at Der Kessel. I named the scenario thinking of your distinguished military career, defending hillocks in Surrey.

Ummm, Mr. Punctuational-Picky thinks it should be "Queen's" rather than "Queens". I had a terrible time convincing the Post Office that my old address was "4, Queen's Drive", rather than "4 Queens Drive", the latter being presumably an utterance intended to imply that all the other queens can afford a chauffer.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

[snips]Well, if you insist, I suppose I can regurgitate some more random curiosities peripheral to the V-B battle.

The following snippets suggest differing views as to the outcome of the V-B battle:

"Dated 15 Jun 44

From :- Comd 30 Corps

To :- Comd 7 Armd Div

Hearty congratulations on successful actions yesterday. You have dealt 2 Pz the hell of a smack. A major contribution to the general plan. Well done all ranks."

[source: PRO document WO 171/619, 22 Armd Bde War Diary.]

"An officer PW from 2 Panzer Division remarked rather caustically to one of our interrogators "It's about time the 'Wüsten-mauser (Desert mice) realised that they're no longer operating in the desert with those tanks of theirs"."

[source: PRO document WO 171/336, 30 Corps 'G' War Diary.]

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

[snips]Well, if you insist, I suppose I can regurgitate some more random curiosities peripheral to the V-B battle.

The following is from PRO document WO171/336, War Diary of 30 Corps "G" for June 1944, and reports the fate of one of the Cromwell CS tanks lost at Villers-Bocage.

"Appendix 'B' to & AD Intsum 30

REPORT ON CROMWELL TANK WITH GERMAN MARKINGS.

Found 4 Jul 44 at 905657 Recovered by an Armd Div REME and inspected BRETTEVILLE L'ORGUEILLEUSE 923720 5 Jul 44.

1. Type Cromwell CS Mk IV (95mm gun)

2. Markings (a) German cross on front and side of turret

( British markings painted over with cam paint but the following clearly visible:

T187761 (= number of tank)

1 LCT

3. Condition Penetrated in eight places by what looks like 17 pdr but NOT set on fire. REME reports that NO KO'd Cromwells handled have been set on fire.

4. Modifications

(a) Cupola previously reported as German is definitely British.

( German wireless aparatus (thought to be an inter-comm aparatus only).

5. Amn Confirmed that some German amn for main armament was in the tank.

6. Documents Following found in tank:

Identification: 12 SS Pz Div

FPN : 59043 A

7. General Tank definitely did not belong to the Div that found it. No information available as to who knocked it out or when.

(Source: 8 Corps IS No. 11)

COMMENTS: This tank was lost at VILLERS BOCAGE on June 13."

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

Well, if you insist, I suppose I can regurgitate some more random curiosities peripheral to the V-B battle.

Someone mentioned operation "Wild Oats" in another thread, and it might be of interest to have the meat of the op order for this operation, which was intended to occur concurrently with the move along axis PERCH. The following are taken from PRO document WO 171/392, 1 Abn Div War Diary.

First, the notes on GOC's verbal orders - Operation "WILD OATS" (dated 11 Jun 44)

"INTENTION

1. 1 Airborne Div will prevent enemy from withdrawing from CAEN 0268 in the direction of EVRECY 9259 and in conjunction with 7 Armd Div will destroy him wherever he is found

METHOD

2. 1 Para Bde with under comd

1 A/Tk Bty

1 Para Sqn RE

16 Para Fd Amb

One Sec Pro

will drop on DZ A (see Trace 'A') and:

(a) seize areas A and K for subsequent glider landings (see Trace 'A' attd).

( seize area NW of EVRECY and east of ODON River 9161.

© be prepared to operate in conjunction with 22 Armd Bde (7 Armd Div) in area BOUGY 9161 - GAVREUS 9161.

(d) provide one company for occupation of ESQUAY 9460 and protection of Div HQ, until released.

3. 4 Para Bde with under comd

2 A/Tk Bty

4 Para Sqn RE

133 Para Fd Amb

One Sec Pro

will drop on DZ E and:

(a) seize area about Pt 112 9561 and approaches from CAEN.

( be prepared to operate with 22 Armd Bde (7 Armd Div) in area around BARON 9462.

4. 1 Airlanding Bde with under comd

One pl 9 Fd Coy RE

181 A/L Fd Amb

will land in LZ H, move to conc area about ST MARTIN 9760 and:

(a) seize and hold area ST MARTIN 9760.

( be prepared to operate in wooded area MELTOT 6862 - BULLY 6959.

© recce and picquet crossings over the River ORNE within area BULLY-ETAVAUX 0062.

[Paragraphs 5 to 12 snipped; mention is made of using 30 Corps artillery in support]

TIMINGS

13. 0330 hrs 21 Ind Para Coy land.

0420-0510 hrs Parachute force lands.

0530-0630 hrs Glider force lands.

DATE

14. The operation may be required to take place on 13 Jun or it may be postponed to a later date. The operation will not take place on 13 Jun without confirmation from Comd Second Army, who will make his decision not later than 1900 hrs 12 Jun.

ALTERNATIVE OPERATION

15. It is possible that the Div may be required to land and operate in an area east of CAEN instead of according to the above plan..."

The option of ordering "Wild Oats" is not one that I have seen much mention of in histories of the Normandy campaign. It might make for some interesting "what-if" scenarios.

The Divisional War Diary contains the following messages from 1 Abn Div Tac HQ to various recipients, with date-time.

"121027 TAC 26. SECRET. WILD OATS postponed 24 hrs. all preparations will be completed by tonight. Ack.

131308B TAC/30. SECRET. WILD OATS postponed further 24 hrs. All Ack. All inf.

14 1030 TAC35. SECRET. WILD OATS postponed 24 hrs. gliders will be unloaded at 141200 and reloaded by 151200. containers will NOT repeat NOT be loaded until further orders are received from this HQ. Ack. all infm

15 0045 TAC 38. SECRET. operation WILD OATS at present suspended but may be called for at 48 hrs notice. no glider landing till further orders. orders ref unsealing of camps follows. orders for unloading containers and return of parachutes later. Div HQ rear infm Recce Sqn. Div HQ main infm CRE ADMS and all transit camps. all infm

17 1700 TAC 49. SECRET. WILDOATS is dead. Div to remain at three days notice. ACK. all infm"

If one considers the build-up of tension in anticipation of a drop, and the emotial effect of being repeatedly stood-to then stood-down, I think one can perhaps understand a little better why 1 Abn Div were so determined to go to Arnhem, no matter what, by September of 1944 (after having had, IIRC, 16 drops planned then cancelled).

All the best,

John.

[Andreas]

That would have been a bloodbath with a very uncertain outcome. Ouch.

Thanks for posting these. I never heard of this proposed operation before.

[Other Means]

thanks John, is there any materials avaiable from 22nd Armd Bde & 4 CLY about the V-B engagement. ISTM that as they would bear the brunt of the armoured fighting they would have more details on what actually happened.

and could anybody tell me what 4 CLY is? is it an armoured company?

{edit - found it 4th County of London Yeomanry. thanks anyway}

[ June 19, 2004, 10:14 AM: Message edited by: Other Means ]

[Andreas]

4th Battalion, The County of London Yeomanry

A Yeomanry regiment is a territorial cavalry regiment.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by Other Means:

thanks John, is there any materials avaiable from 22nd Armd Bde & 4 CLY about the V-B engagement. ISTM that as they would bear the brunt of the armoured fighting they would have more details on what actually happened.

[snips]

I can't lay my hands on my copies at the moment, but IIRC the 4 CLY and Rifle Brigade war diaries are quite uninformative as to detail of the action. As so many of A Sqn and A Coy had been made prisoners, there was little detail to be recorded at the time the diary was written up. This is a common problem with war diaries; as a WW2 veteran once put it to me, "The trouble with being in a war is that nobody tells you what's going on". As another example, the entry for 6th June 1944 in the war diary of 6th Green Howards makes no mention of any particual exploits by Stan Hollis (CSM of D Coy), the only man to win the VC on D-Day.

I have come across a one-page report on 7th Armoured Div given by the GOC, General erskine, at 19:45 hours on 13th June 1944. Give me a few minutes to transcribe it, and I'll add it to the collection; again, it gives little impression of having suffered the colossal defeat V-B is usually portrayed as by Tiger groupies.

All the best,

John.

[John D Salt]

Originally posted by John D Salt:

[snips]I have come across a one-page report on 7th Armoured Div given by the GOC, General erskine, at 19:45 hours on 13th June 1944.

Here we are. I have preserved the errors in the original, such as saying "VILLERS TRACY" when he apparently means "TRACY BOCAGE", and saying "Queens" when he means "Queen's".

All the best,

John.

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REPORT ON 7 ARMD DIV

Given to LO by Gen. ERSKINE 1945 hrs 13 Jun 44

22 Armd Bde entered VILLERS BOCAGE without opposition early this morning. They pushed on to the high ground just behind and lost five tks to a tk gun fire.

1/7 Queens cleaned up VILLERS BOCAGE of snipers. The position then began to worsen with enemy attacks starting from the South. TIGER tks penetrated into VILLERS BOCAGE but were driven out.

11 H recced all routes South from VILLERS BOCAGE but were not able to make progress.

Brigadier 22 Armd Bde asked for further inf for holding tk and inf attacks which were now starting from the South, starting on the 213 feature and warming up all the way round South of VILLERS BOCAGE up to TRACY BOCAGE feature and round to the West of it.

1/5 Queens were sent up to 22 Armd Bde to help hold the posn and arrived there at about 1600 hrs. In these attacks 4 CLY lost 20 tks. The remainder of the regt joined 1/7 Queens in the town of VILLERS BOCAGE where there was very confused there, and on pt 174 during the afternoon. It seemed as if TRACY BOCAGE and VILLERS BOCAGE might be isolated and in fact they were about 1600 hrs. The GOC decided to concentrate everything on TRACY BOCAGE feature 174. That is now being successfully carried out. This pt 174 dominates the village. The Div attacking has been identified by means of PW as the 2nd SS Pz Div. The axis of supply is precarious as there are small gps of enemy operating on the left flank some of which have had to be silenced by artillery fire. 5 RHA have actually been under small arms fire while manning their guns.

Troops now on the VILLERS TRACY feature are as follows –

4 CLY

5 R Tks

2 Bns Queens

8 H less one sqn

5 RHA

Bty M 10s.

A number of enemy tks have been knocked out including TIGERS, the exact number is not known.

In the area of GRANVILLE 7664 there are –

1 R Tks

1/6 Queens

3 RHA.

It is possible that these forces may have to be used to clear the axis or to relieve the forces at VILLERS TRACY. Therefore inf are needed to attack over this ground and relieve these forces should it become necessary for them to proceed to VILLERS TRACY or to clear the axis.

Patrols of 11 H are reported at following map references –

740596 760602

740585 773565

750588 786578

760620 795590.

The intention tomorrow as regards 11 H is to employ them towards the South in the area bounded by, on the right 73 Grid and on the left rd VILLERS BOCAGE – AUNAY SUR ODON. My intention tomorrow is to hold VILLERS BOCAGE.

[source: WO 171/336, 30 Corps "G" war diary.]

[Other Means]

thanks again John. i think this illustrates the fact that such losses were not seen as unusual nor unsupportable. indeed it seems accepted that this will happen as part of a general advance.

quite a different picture from Whittman stopping the allied advance single handed.