Montgomery's scientists book-asking for a piece of information

[pamak_1970]

Hello everybody,

I came here cause I recall there were certain members who owned this magnificent book which unfortunately I don't have any more, so maybe somebody can help me trace a piece of information from inside the book.

I recall there was a certain study inside examining the effects of artillery fire on wire communications. It was a case study of artillery bombardment on German positions and the authors calculated a rule of thumb about the intensity of fire necessary to disrupt wire communications after an hour of bombardment.

If I recall correctly, they had the size of the area under bombardment and the tons per hour of ammunition expended in order to destroy wire communication in an hour. Can somebody give me these figures- approximate size of area under fire and ammo expenditure?

Thank you

[Affentitten]

JonS is probably your best bet. But I do recall what you are on about and will have a dig in some of my old journals.

[Stalins Organ]

One copy of the book was available on Abe Books until a minute ago... if no-one else answers I'll let you know in a couple of weeks

[JonS]

this magnificent book which unfortunately I don't have any more

Oh, wow. I can't imagine letting go of this now

But you're right. Report No.22 (The effect of artillery fire on enemy forward defensive positions in the attack on Geilenkirchen (Operation CLIPPER)) and No.26 (Fire support in Operation VERITABLE (effect on forward defensive positions)) both cover line cutting by artillery fire.

I'm off to see some Christmas decoration with the kids now. More later.

[pamak_1970]

Oh, wow. I can't imagine letting go of this now

But you're right. Report No.22 (The effect of artillery fire on enemy forward defensive positions in the attack on Geilenkirchen (Operation CLIPPER)) and No.26 (Fire support in Operation VERITABLE (effect on forward defensive positions)) both cover line cutting by artillery fire.

I'm off to see some Christmas decoration with the kids now. More later.

Perfect!

Take your time.

By the way, the worst thing was that I didn't let this book go. It was lost together with my suitcase in one of my trips. Now try to imagine that! :mad:

[JonS]

The reports are a bit difficult to summarise without giving a misleading or wrong impression, so I'm going to try and focus on this:

.. a case study of artillery bombardment on German positions and the authors calculated a rule of thumb about the intensity of fire necessary to disrupt wire communications after an hour of bombardment.

If I recall correctly, they had the size of the area under bombardment and the tons per hour of ammunition expended in order to destroy wire communication in an hour. Can somebody give me these figures- approximate size of area under fire and ammo expenditure?

Neither report is really looking at that, although both do mention it. Instead both reports are looking at morale and how it's affected by artillery density and duration. It is sort-of inferred that loss of wire communication has an effect on morale since it directly affects commander's ability to C3.

That said, from Report No.22:

Attack A (7 SLI)

Weight of fire: See Note 1 below

Enemy Cohesion: "Line communications out at an early stage. Coy Comd held down by fire away from Coy HQ throughout engagement."

Attack B (5 Dorsets)

Weight of fire: 184.5 tons over a bit less than 4 hours, at over 1.5 tons per 100 yards square.

Enemy Cohesion: "art and flanking comms broken at an early stage. Coy Comd known not to have moved about on account of fire."

Attack C (1 Worcesters)

Weight of fire: See Note 1 below

Enemy Cohesion: "No special infomation."

Attack D (5 DCLI)

Weight of fire: See Note 1 below

Enemy Cohesion: "No special infomation."

Note 1: "[these] attacks ... took a rather different form. ... successive areas were bombarded for only 20-40 minutes with weights ranging from 1/4 to 1 ton per 100yd square. ... The disruptive effect on the enemy in all the areas in the path of these attacks appears to have been considerable - line communications were cut, one commander was cut off from his company throughout the action, a platoon was unable to take up a new position, and so on. ..."

[JonS]

from Report No.26:

Summary of Main Conclusions:

1. a density of 650-1300 Field and Medium shells per kilometre square succeeded in cutting all line communications in the forward defences. (see para.13)

Para.13. All PW, including a number of signallers, confirmed that line communications were cut throughout the preliminary bombardment area within 1-2 hours of the start of shelling. This gives a figure of 650-1300 shells (25-pr and 5.5") per kilometre map square to effect complete line cutting in areas of fairly elaborate earthwork defences. As far as could be seen, line was laid on the ground, or supported on trees and was not dug in.

[pamak_1970]

Right on target!

This is exactly what I was looking for.

I really appreciate that you took the time to browse the reports to find what I asked for. You are my Santa Clause, lol.

Have a happy holidays!

[Affentitten]

It was my understanding that although these reports were written, they were never actually utilised in any subsequent fire plan. Naturally wireless comms made the concept redundant a few years afterwards anyway.

This link has some of the nuimbers for weight /effectiveness of fire.

[JonS]

well, Veritable was - almost - the last big fire plan of the war, so that's not so surprising.

In a more general sense though, I believe you're correct. The OR guys struggled throughout the war to gain much traction in a number of places. Stand out exceptions are Fighter Command, and the Atlantic Campaign against the U-boats. But Bomber Command resolutely ignored them, 2nd TAF rejected the findings (or vigourously massaged them to suit the desired findings) while the Army supported the presence of the ORS', but didn't do much to implement the conclusions.

Although, to be fair, many of the reports that No.2 ORS produced weren't really capable of being implemented in any useful way. The went to France with no particular programme, on the expectation that they'd research things they found interesting or thought might be useful - in other words, they were almost doing research for its own sake. So we end up with reports like "times to unload gliders during VARSITY", or "the effects of artillery firing from LCTs on the foreshore defences at Normandy", and conclusions - from an analysis of British tank losses in June and July - which recomend that any increase in load carrying be devoted to mounting a larger gun, rather than increasing armour thicknesses. All good stuff, and fascinating to read about 60 years later (and which provide a clear view on what would be otherwise completely opaque) but really, what were 21st Army Group supposed to do with any of that? They couldn't redesign the Horsa gliders and they didn't conduct any more airborne ops anyway. They never - AFAICT - again lashed artillery to the decks of landing caft for an amphibious assault (although that was done in Burma). And it's not like they could send all their tanks back to the factories to be redesigned in line with the ORS findings. And even the design and production branches couldn't really do much with it - the Centurion was all but complete as a design, and the Cheiftan wouldn't see the light of day for another 20 years.

[pamak_1970]

Thank you for the link. Yes, I was aware of it and it is a useful source of information. Regarding the OR studies, their results regarding the effectiveness of airpower on ground targets naturally weren't welcomed in the air force. On the other hand, the last used OR to quantify results, like the effectiveness of AA fire and there are some very interesting studies in this area. They set the foundations for what was called "flak analysis" which was used by the bomber command to pick the best avenues of approach or the size and seperation between air formations to minimize losses.