Twisk

When talking about a "frozen conflict" why does that also need to be a low violence conflict? WW1 and WW2 were "existential" and lasted for 4 and 6-4 years respectively with many millions dead. The conflict could freeze as is with a positional conflict across Eastern Ukraine. Just without the Ukrainian Army making major assaults. A Ukraine that did not engage in an offensive this summer could reasonable handle an avdiivka or Bahkmut. While still slamming Russian critical assets with long range precision fires and raids.

Yes. Lets get back on track. So it looks Avdiivka might become this winters Bahkmut. From a Western perspective Bahkmut was a huge waste of life for little success. However, it seemed to absorb Ukrainian military power for several months and allow Russia the time to fortify the rest of the line stymieing Ukrainian attacks the summer. Avdiivka might become that for the Ukrainians this winter. Russia has been studiously avoiding a major direct commitment of its entire population to the war. So my guess is that the Russian population at-large can largely ignore the war outside of whatever economic impacts it might have. While the men fighting it are engaging it as a transactional relationship. Even the prisoners were offered their freedom in return for fighting in Ukraine.

I don't see why that would make sense? People regularly move content from one "game" to another so it would stand that each CM game has some sort of shared functional base. Combat Mission as a whole must know how to fire an ATGM so when it comes to Cold War I-TOW you wouldn't need to code ATGMs from scratch but add the needed stats for the M90A1. So both a fresh game and a module are adding new content of roughly the same sort. The difference is that the module is plugging into an existing CM purchase. but this seems only important from a consumer POV. CW - units (models, stats, formations) - textures - maps - campaigns/scenarios FR - units (models, stats, formations) - textures - maps - campaigns/scenarios The only new thing I can think of is that CW has DPICM.

When talking about major anti-drone systems being a waste I wonder how much of this is an over focus on land warfare due to this being a ground war and also a ground simulation forum. A laser based system seems like it would be very useful in a naval context and within the U.S. military context naval capability is huge. After all the putative "next war" for the U.S. being a naval/air/strategic war in the Taiwan Strait. With all the advances in drone usage if you removed the nuclear umbrella NATO would roll over Russia in a matter of months and it would only take that long because NATO wouldn't be rushing things. And even without drones a NATO (SEATO?) invasion of mainland China would probably approach Operation Downfall scales. Again not saying that the discussion about land warfare usages isn't useful or interesting to read. But a lot of the discussion seems to be eliding the naval requirements. Granted I don't know much about naval warfare but it seems the requirements to win Coral Sea 2.0 would be significantly different than the 6th Battle of Karhkov or the 3rd Invasion of Iraq.

Related to the current Russian attacks we are seeing them making a high effort at a point that is relatively well defended and that Ukraine has had control of for years. So while on a map it looks easy to pinch off the Russians are stepping into the same sort of attack they forced Ukraine to step into near Tokmak. The question that brings up is why not attack near Tokmak? Attacking in that sector would likely be easier and also result in a solid political victory (look as we rolled up Ukraine's breakthrough). That they didn't seems to reinforce the thought that they don't have true reserves and more importantly seems to say something about Russia's ability to move and maintain large forces in the Kherson - Tokmak area. Namely that they are unable to. With that in mind I think the Ukrainian raids across the Dnepr might have big payoffs if Ukraine can continue to step them up. Its essentially a Ukrainian opportunity to strike from where they are well supplied and Russia has difficulty doing so.

Did we not just watch a video where the "so what" was the drone crew being tracked and killed? Like you might have some points but you are talking about it as if you we didn't just watch the UAV recovery guy and whoever else was in that structure turned to mince meat.

I've not been following the news much lately but I think it depends on Ukrainian reserve depth. What sticks out to me is that the 47th Mech. Brigade has apparently been engaged since early June. Fighting first through the initial lines and most recently liberating Robotyne. Maybe I am not thinking about it correctly but it seems astonishing that 5 battalions (3 mechanized, 1 tank, 1 assault) has been able to sustain itself throughout nearly 4 months of fighting. - Are there rotations I am not seeing? - Are Ukrainian replacement systems able to fill up the unit while in combat this effectively? - Are Ukrainian losses in fact relatively small so that a single brigade could be engaged for 4 months? - Is this an advantage of Western equipment (vehicle losses are heavy but manpower losses are lighter)?

To be true you would need to have many tests of both CM and many example of real life and then compare them. Not just one video.

I don't think that is how it works and latin doesn't make it more ture

But this isn't CM? To do this you must provide example of someone complaining and then this video but this video alone is nothing.

Is this really showing a bad opinion for what it is though? Its a real video and not even the game.

Russia has also seemed to have been enabling this strategy through its profligate use of manpower, ammunition, and hardware in 2022/early 2023. Had Russia committed an actual operational pause and integrated its mobilized and prisoner manpower into its forces properly I don't think Ukraine would be seeing any real success right now. I think it points to a level of disbelief that Russian high command has for Ukraine's competency and ability to fight at a roughly even keel.

Steve and The_Capt both highlighted a bit from ISW about Ukrainian intentions to continue their offensive over the winter. I think the reason for this is that they are very aware that any pause will lead to having to break open the line again. So keeping up offensive momentum even in poor weather is better than pausing. The penny packet style attacks supported by artillery (and the DPCIM windfall) might also be setting Ukraine up for a situation where they will have sufficient combat power to keep this up for more months.

When looking at U.S. (Western) implementation of lessons learned I feel that the real places to be watching are the Navy, Airforce, and maybe the Marines. The theoretical peer conflict would be against China and that fight would be heavily geared towards naval combat unless something happened vis-a-vis Vietnam or India. We've likely all seen the Marines attempting to shift away from small Army to something more geared towards modern warfare. There really isn't a peer conflict that would lead with army forces that I can think of. If, for example, Russia suddenly had no nuclear weapons the war would be measured in months if not weeks and most of that time would be prepositoning forces.

Contextually I think it points out Russia's continued imperial existence as opposed to the U.S.'s federal one. In the U.S. someone from Florida and Washington are equal and the civilian population has internalized that. You couldn't run a war by only drafting Florida men. Politically it would be a non starter. However, in Russia you can go outside of the core and draft men and send them off to die. They aren't Russian although they are under Russian rule.

This aligns with The Capt's post and my images. If Ukraine is able to reach Tokmak they will put nearly 90 kilometers of the land bridge under fire. And while that won't stop the flow of supply it will create a dead zone where any large concentration are at risk.

Are we sure that Putin ordered the killing? Wagner is in a weaker position but it creates a situation where the top level Wagner people may become fearful for their lives and feel forced to take action. If you are a layer under Prighozin do you feel safe? What if you are 2 people down the chain of Wagner? Why would someone who has a stake in Wagner feel safe?

In the GOG versions they are numbered. My download link has them (I think) https://we.tl/t-Xs5T3IDRkn

They are also on GOG https://www.gog.com/en/games?query=combat mission&order=desc:score on sale too for $4. @SonsofUltramar you werent clear about what files you wanted so here are the generic in-game audio backgrounds https://we.tl/t-Xs5T3IDRkn

Yea, I think its easy to view the land bridge as a particularly large piece of land but it doesn't take that much to start to cut it by fire. Which I think speaks to the reason for the Russians defending forward so much. Currently they can still traverse the area by rail and can house supply in a fairly concentrated manner throughout the length of the land bridge. But its only a matter of 25-30km for that to no longer be true. Once Ukraine achieves that the bridge comes under fire of the relatively more numerous HIMARS (compared to Storm Shadow or other options). The marshaling yards at Melitopol come under fire. Even more weight will be placed on Russia's truck fleet. And Ukraine opens up its strategic options. I might be getting too "lines on a map" but compare the option Ukraine had to what it could have if it took Tokmak and solidified lines along natural boundaries. This presumes a certain amount of Russian abandonment of nearby areas as Ukraine gets closer to Tokmak. But Ukraine goes from essentially having a set of "into the teeth" options to being able to put Russia into a defensive dilemma.

The ISW bit about trucks is fairly short but this aligns with what I was talking about in regards to taking Tokmak. The drive from Melitopol to Mariupol (the two nearest rail depots if Tokmak is gone) is nearly 200km. And theoretically it should be under observation and fire from Ukraine (although given the distance perhaps infrequently). This would put greater strain on Russia's ability to link its two sides of the land bridge. Given the distances involved I would assume that actually hitting individual trucks (convoys?) would be relatively rare. I've not seen much evidence of Ukraine hitting trains. However, it would mean that there would be about 100-150km where Russian forces really couldn't have a marshaling point for supplies and would need to run end to end without stop. Edit: I put this together real quick showing the additional range https://imgur.com/a/zXIHsVl I measured 80km from a bit back so its roughly 65km from the line of contact. But you can see how it can degrade Russia's ability to move and keep supplies through a significant portion of the land bridge that is currently "safe". Obviously not as good as physically interdicting it but it would effectively require Russia to keep any larger stores of supplies on one side or the other of the bridge.

I mentioned this pages ago but the Ukrainian offensive reaching Tokmak alone I think would be significantly damaging to the Russian hold on the land bridge. It further limits Russian movement across the land bridge to roadways (mainly the M14 through Melitopol), forces them to use trucks, and effectively denies their ability to do so without risking interdiction by long range Ukrainian fires. It also puts Melitopol under fire which is likely a major hub for freight. So with Tokmak under control any Russians the west of Melitopol would need to run a gauntlet to reach the east and vice versa. It damages Russian interior lines. https://imgur.com/a/Z0jm73g

I feel like I am pointing out the obvious here but listen to any other first person combat audio. That isn't the sound of a close range gunshot.

Within the next 6 months or so I think this will be one of the biggest additives of western armor to Ukraine. While the frontline troops and command make mistakes they won't pay for it with as much blood as they would using Russian vehicles.