billbindc

I numbered the above to simply my response (hope that's ok!): 1. Two things...I said "basic unity" and meant that precisely. There will be ups and downs, fractures, etc but the essential set of interests shared by NATO has certainly been clarified. You are correct that China is using Russia which was my point about the instrumentality of the authoritarian bloc. 2. I agree that China will adopt a more oblique approach. That's a good thing! We do not need another nose to nose destabilizing military confrontation and China vs US/Japan/Aus/etc would be *much* worse than this one so far. 3. I agree that we haven't solved for China at all. If you ask around this town, the very first thing you hear is that Russia is an unwanted sideshow and China is the real opponent. I think that's self evident. But China has quite significant problems including severe economic issues to resolve, a demographic transition of epic proportions, flaccid political and economic returns for all the Belt and Road money spent, absolutely collapsing opinion globally, etc, etc. China has money and manpower...for now. We'll see in 20 years.

My take: I strongly agree that this a proxy war but (as in the Cold War I), what we imagine to be a solid bloc is really just a collection of more or less capable autocracies with shared interests and strong internal competition. The current iteration is a reversal of the last round in that China is now clearly the senior partner with global heft while Russia is the localized variant which believes it has less to lose and so exercises less restraint. What that means in practical terms is that the relationship between the two is highly instrumental and less coordinated than it may appear to us. In this case, Russia was set on a course of revanchism with Ukraine. China was agnostic to that course *as long as it didn't harm Chinese interests*. That is why Putin informed Xi and that is why Putin framed the Ukraine invasion as a "special operation" and that is also why he planned for it to be over in a couple of weeks. China had been doing $10 billion dollars a year in trade with Ukraine and was not on bad terms with the Ukrainian oligarchs. Xi didn't sign off on anything he expected to damage that. So where does that leave China and Russia? First off, yes China gets to scoop up tons of technical intelligence about Western military capabilities but what it is gathering must be quite sobering to them. They are learning that even reasonably well trained Western proxy armies fighting on home turf with decent morale and at the far end of the aggressor's supply line are quite difficult to beat. They are discovering that top down militaries with little large scale experience face an intense combat learning curve. They are watching the Western democracies reawaken to their military power, their basic ideological unity and a new found willingness to forego trade when the geopolitical stakes rise far enough. Second, China has realized that its most significant ally is an inept rentier state run by degenerate geopolitical gamblers and there simply isn't anyone else in Eurasia who is a likely and useful ally in a conflict with the US/EU/Japan. And that is why China is staying on the sidelines. Internal Chinese state propaganda is loudly pro-Russian and had rolled out what was clearly a long planned campaign to denigrate the West and glorify Russian operations. Yet look at what Putin is not getting: arms, aid or real political support on the international stage for the invasion. You can bet that it was promised when he met Xi...with the unspoken proviso that such was dependent on a quick success. In short, yes it is a proxy war but not against a bloc that has anything more to it than a series of shared interests and virtually zero soft power. PS: Forgot to mention: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-05-04/eu-aims-to-target-russia-s-global-oil-sales-with-insurance-ban Shipping insurance folks of my acquaintance are saying that the big Chinese shippers of Russian oil/gas were already going to let current contracts with Moscow lapse but also were looking into how to drop them immediately if they couldn't ensure cargoes. A further salutary lesson to the PRC that the global economic structure is designed in such a way that the West has a multitude of tools to generate severe costs on challengers.

https://twitter.com/JominiW/status/1521700041601302529/photo/1

It will be a faction led by Sergei Patrushev most likely. He is a hardliners hardliner and someone Putin would have had trouble crossing before this all began. Now? He's an elder FSB statesman in an excellent position to criticize how this 'special operation' was conducted. If you are coup curious, don't look towards the liberal end of the spectrum at this point. Russians are still in the delusional phase of the process and the important components of the system are far more likely to gravitate towards a hardliner who can putatively get it right than a liberal saying Russia's blown it as a system and a country.

The absolute best thing you can read right now on the internal dynamics and coup possibilities in Russia right now: https://puck.news/putin-vs-his-oligarchs/?utm_code=julia%40puck.news

This is that rare thing; a quite thorough explanation of doctrine, history and practical experience. Thanks.

The funds may be tweaked a bit but it's vanishingly unlikely that Ukraine doesn't get this money.

I'm not sure I'd call a sea change in say, German/Finnish/Swedish/Polish/etc strategic postures and the American role in that process "Fortress America" court politics. Quite the opposite. But putting that aside, it seems pretty important what actual policy makers and those who advise them are saying not a Luttwak, who is a poseur pretending to be a player. The US is committed to this fight and Putin isn't going to be able to name an interlocutor and walk away. That's simply not how significant conflicts without clear solutions end in the real world. Edited to add: And that last point is extremely crucial to what we talk about here. There is no obvious out for Putin or Ukraine. Both are too committed to stop and both have options to exercise to continue the fight and profound motivations to do so. That means Ukrainian counter offensives, Russian mobilization and probably at least another year of conflict with more opportunities for potential escalation.

A couple points: 1. Russia has to take it first and isn't showing the ability to get to Sloviansk much less the Donets/Dnipr. 2. I would strongly suggest following what folks at Brookings/German Marshall Fund/SAIS/etc are saying. They reflect official opinion in Brussels/DC pretty well and the explicit word is that only Ukraine decide when to quit. Russia has taken such an extreme and incompetent course that there's simply no alternative but to castrate their military power now or plan on having to do it again three years from now. 3. Ah, Luttvak. Let's just say a guy who wrote a book called "The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire" and another called "The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire" wherein his theses are completely unsupported by any archaeological, textual or historical evidence is not the guy you should be putting much trust in. He's a clever dilettante and not much more.

Be wary of the story and the source but in case it's true, Nikolai Patrushev is exactly who you don't want in power in Moscow. In character and paranoia, he's another Andropov.

I think the most pressing issue for that moment will be "who can we deal with that can actual deliver on an agreement." It's going to have to be someone with ties to Putin's Kremlin who knows how to operate in that space but also someone who has been off the board for a while. I could easily see one of that type coming back, Deng Xiaoping style.

I wouldn't put much stock in Medvedev. He's been trying to stay relevant by out blithering the blithering idiots on Russian state tv, his constituency was always solely Putin and the source of his power, such as it was, was always from servicing that constituency. He's a cipher, not an operator. If we all make it to a post-Putin world, I'm betting on a return of one of the semi-disgraced. Vladislav Surkov or Sergei Ivanov were smarter guys who ran afoul of the boss...probably simply because they both plausibly looked like they could take over someday. https://www.rferl.org/a/medvedev-liberal-to-bellicose/31818941.html#:~:text=Medvedev%2C who owes his political,sense in negotiating with them.

The key thing to note is that Gerasimov felt like he needed to be there in the first place. Equivalent to Mike Mullen coming down to personally supervise retaking Fallujah.

My general feeling it that, like the #WindsofChange dude, any "there I was...in the Congo" folks are probably horse****.

That video is from 2014 or there abouts. Be wary of Telenko. Some of his stuff is quite good but lots of it is pretty risible. His recent thread on the state of the Russian nuclear forces is dorm room weed session bad.

As a Marine of my acquaintance with lots of command experience in that theater once put it to me "Anyone who was part of the surge in 2009 knew is was hopeless even then and if they tell you different they are bull****ting themselves or you."

I'm fairly sure that Gerasimov's previous performance is being argued as a reason not to single him out for special treatment.

I think it's pretty safe to discount the idea that the Putin regime will take the path of wisdom in any course.

Moldova, on paper, is pretty defenseless. It's not much of a stretch to imagine Putin thinks he can complicate Ukrainian and NATO plans if he's able to escalate tensions there. It's pretty small beans relative to the big war happening farther east but if you're Vlad, right now you are casting about for pretty much anything that might help somehow.

Clearly a GRU op.

If anyone can direct me to what, in practical logistical and economic terms, the bombing at Bryansk accomplishes I'd appreciate it.

What's going to be interesting (read 'super dangerous') is how Putin reacts when that breakpoint is reached.

It's worth noting that Russian message coordination is no more free of general ineptitude and freelancing than anything else within the regime. Putin is certainly the locus of power but that in and of itself means that off brand messaging can leak in wherever he isn't putting his personal attention onto a problem. Personally, I put little stock in what the Russian military is saying except insofar as it reveals what they think they need to tell Putin and themselves.

If you look up the guys at defensepriorities.org you will find a salad bar of the opinions that would have been policy. It's simply who was in the room before late January, 2021.

There is a conversation out there about the end state Putin needs to stay in power and a fear that therein lies the potential for use of nuclear weapons to finish it on terms that Russia can live (sic) with. Personally, I don't see any way in which nuking Kyiv doesn't multiply rather than simplify Russia's problems but given the isolation and opacity of Putin's decision making process it can't be entirely ruled out.