billbindc

How do we know Jake Sullivan has anything to do with this discussion? This could just as easily have been a Pentagon analysis or any of 20 other agencies involved. I have my issues with Sullivan but generally speaking, the idea that everything is an out growth of Sullivan's foreign policy outlook or chops is just not on. This is a large, complex effort not the sandbox of the NSC adviser.

Whatever she's doing, she provoked Democrats into making it clear they would vote to keep Johnson in the Speaker's chair...so she just made Ukraine aid more likely.

I would strongly suggest anyone who thinks this level of push/pull between the US and Ukrainian liaisons is excessively disfunctional should go back look at what it was like in the Allied high commands in WWI and WWII. Alliances are hard. Hard questions have to be asked and long term possibilities must be hashed out. Making the sausage always looks ugly and in war triply so. It's a sign of Ukrainian strength, not weakness, that the US clearly *isn't* calling the shots and a sign of US trust in the Ukrainian government that it isn't trying harder to do so.

First, US support has not completely broken down. $3 billion is being disbursed now and another $300 million is shortly to follow. In addition, while there is a deadlock now doesn't mean it will continue as long as Biden is in the WH and the Senate remains non-crazy. At this very moment, a motion to vacate has been tendered on Johnson and it's quite likely that the price of Dem support to keep him in place is going to be a clean vote on Ukraine aid. To say the "US does nothing" isn't just extremely not factual...it actually hurts your argument in DC because the MAGA folks can point to that sort of talk and say "See? Whatever we do is never going to be enough". I feel and sympathize with your frustration but the old saw about babies and bathwater applies. And to the original point, a big spike in energy prices *would* make the job of Ukraine aid deniers *easier*. It would be strategic malpractice to pretend otherwise.

The idea that American analysts shouldn't be doing stringent cost/benefit analyses of whether the temporary effects of drone strikes on Russian refineries might be less important than avoiding a price spike that delivers Trump to the WH and Putin an outright victory is absurd. In addition, we should not assume much about this revelation since we have absolutely no idea of what the context of the conversations were. And of course, by the time anyone reports that aspect of the story attention will have moved on.

The replacement issue cuts several ways. Clearly no consensus pick worth the risk to the boyars has arisen to challenge Putin. But at the same time, Putin has not been able to launch any real sort of purge against the elements of the state that with varying degrees of passivity watched Prigozhin's cooption of and near takeover of the security and military apparat. Zolotov still sits atop the Rosgvardiya despite ample evidence that he knew what was coming and did not order his troops to intervene. The GRU/FSB/MIC and state officials who were similarly aware are still happily in place. Zolotov even got Wagner's heavy weapons. Dyumin continues to run the Tula government. This is one of those cases where application of a Western standard does lead us to a bad conclusion. We think 'well, he did make a lot of people vote for him and he did face down a rebellion so he must have legitimacy' and it's just not true. It's especially not true in a very specific to Russia way a la 1905 to 1917. We possibly just haven't seen the second act yet.

Please keep this conversation going. It's illuminating.

I agree with much of this which is why I disagree with the way in which the 'election' has been framed both as the thing itself and the interpretation of the result. As Anne Applebaum pointed out in the last day or so, much of Western media actually pretended that it was a plebiscite in the way we understand voting to mean. It clearly was not but rather a propaganda exercise in both legitimizing Putin at home and to a lesser extent delegitimizing voting abroad. To my mind, that's virtually the only real conclusion one can take from the event. What we do know about Russia is that it is an autocracy that suffers from the crisis of legitimacy that all autocracies labor beneath which is both why the war began and why, so far, it hasn't ended. But we also know that every Russian revolution has been the child of an unsuccessful war. If we are going to look at deep rooted cultural mores, I think I'd start there.

We have actual evidence that without 22 million fake votes, Putin would have hit 51% and there was intense coercion and very low turnout. That almost certainly means he would lose a fair election. These guys aren't magic. They are sordid, often fumbling, siloviks.

More grist for the Russian election mill: This means in effect that the Russian authorities had to drop 22 million votes in to get the number they wanted. Which in turn means that after all of the coercion, propaganda and maneuvering Putin was only going to get 51% of those who actually showed up to vote. What would it be in a free and fair vote? Probably somewhere we've always known Putin's bedrock is...in the high 30's.

There is plenty of evidence that there is a disconnect between the claimed topline numbers for Putin and what Russians actually want and clearly that disconnect is driven by coercion: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/18/world/europe/putin-russia-election.html As to whether or not Putin would seize on the legitimacy of a real and decisive popular mandate, it's worth keeping in mind that victory in Ukraine can only be achieved in the capitols of the EU and in Washington DC where the image of Russia as a repressive dictatorship of the silovik-tariat is extremely useful to those demanding aid be given to the Ukrainian government. He would grab such and advantage with both hands if he could.

Does Putin have a base of support? Sure. So did Saddam and any number of other dictators but it's precisely wrong to imagine the show they just put on reflects what it is. A pre-secured 85% vote isn't a reflection of strength, it's an obvious attempt to tighten the lid on a pressure cooker. I mean seriously folks...if Putin had a large majority of natural voters who would vote for him do you really think he'd pass on the legitimacy that sort of result represents? Of course not. I know it's tempting to point and say "See...Russians are intrinsically bad and that's what this vote shows us" but if you do, be aware you are indulging in the kind of thinking that you hate when you see it on the other side.

I wouldn't call it a sham election either...because I wouldn't call it an election. It was a propaganda exercise. As to fair, well...

In a potentially kinetic environment, who would you prefer to have your six: 1. Germany 2. France 3. UK (edited choice 1)

I don't have a Telegraph sub so I can't read the article but while Macron's shift is surprising...LePen's is far more surprising still. If I were a betting man, I would throw some kopecks on the square that says that the French government came into possession of some information regarding Moscow's efforts to undermine the government that shocked and that information exposed the LePen and her cohorts in such a way that they had to make a swift and decisive choice. Watch this space.

It is a weird artifact of the current analytical milieu that while everyone has an opinion about the dire effects of loss in Ukraine on the West, nobody spends much time thinking about what a loss would mean for Russia. It's especially odd when we have a recent example of what happens to a post Soviet era successor regime that fails in absorbing a neighbor. I'm talking about, of course, post Gulf War Iraq. Putin might hold on. He might manage to stave off further dissolution of state. But the general situation would be a parlous existence of continued sanctions, hostile and well armed neighbors, continued demographic decline and the political evaporation of the Russkiy Mir. In fact, this is exactly what will happen in pretty much every outcome except a decisive victory for Moscow. Russia must stay on offense for many of the same reasons Germany did in WWI and if it loses is likely to in a similar way.

If your feelings are that strong then please use the link provided above to call every Representative you can. Thanks.

Love it. Thank you.

I don't think describing an actual reality is 'getting too domestic'. Trump and his acolytes have made it clear that should he win, Ukraine...and indeed Taiwan...is on it's own and the pressure he is putting on Congress to stymie aid is proof of it. If you want Ukraine to win, get out there and help make it happen. ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The Senate-passed Ukraine aid package has been put up for a discharge petition today. If it reaches 216 signatures, it can be brought to a vote even against the Speaker's opposition. == As of 12 March == Total signatures: 169 (out of 216 needed) Needed signatures remaining: 47 Democrat signatures: 169 (with 44 remaining). No Republicans have signed yet. We assess: Republican Reps are waiting to see how many Democrats sign before they make a decision. Current top priority: CALL YOUR REPRESENTATIVE! -- If they haven't signed yet - urge them to sign the discharge petition (H.Res. 1016) to bring Ukraine aid (bill H.R. 815) to a vote. -- If they've already signed on - ask them to reach out to their colleagues to encourage them to sign. You can check your Rep's status at: http://bit.ly/discharge815 Now that the working day is over, we can start intensively circulating the shortlist of Democrats who have not yet signed the discharge petition. This graphic is based on the data at http://bit.ly/discharge815. Both that list and this graphic are by @community4Ukraine. #call4ukraine Reposts welcome - no credit required. Community for Ukraine

Per our earlier conversation, I think this gives a good sense of how willing the House is to defy the former guy when something is really popular:

The thing to understand right now is that the Speaker already has no authority. His sole leverage is that nobody wants to go through another debac-tacular leadership election again. And with Buck's retirement and NY23 coming up, the Republican margin will be down to 1 vote for a while. It will then go back up to...2. So, there is little Johnson can do to punish recalcitrant members and plenty they can do to ruin his day, every day. The inescapable fact the derives from the above is that there is no plan or agreement. Johnson is a cipher...and Trump's cipher at that...in the House. He has no party loyalty to rely on (as Jefferies does) and his team is made up of pols who have more experience, cliques that support them, etc (i.e. Scalise, Jordan). What plan there is, is simply to stymie aid as long as possible because that's what Trump wants. Thus, the discharge petition. To the vote, that the discharge petition is even happening tells you it has legs and in this case there are actually two (one from a Democrat and one from a Republican) but it is a hard road to travel and it takes time. How would the vote go? You probably lose about 10 to 15 Democrats but you also probably gain 70 to 100 Republicans. If the vote were a secret ballot, you probably would get 150 plus. Ukraine aid is that rare thing...it is truly popular and bipartisan. If they get the discharge to the finish line, it almost certainly passes...Johnson be damned.

"Lawmakers are discharging a special rule from House Rules. Process slightly faster than discharging legislation from a standing committee. Only 7 legislative days to pass for discharge, rather than 30 days to discharge a bill." https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/724415/how-a-little-used-parliamentary-maneuver-could-decide-the-fate-of-ukraine-funding/?unlock=3941GNX9JJY9R4NM

In this case, it's less a question of what the Speaker can do to slow it down (he's already doing that) and more a question of the time it takes to get the petition fully filled out.

Correct. And it has been a risky step to take given the politics of aid in the US House.