billbindc

The thing you won’t hear much in the analysis of the Biden administration is how unlike previous administrations this one is on Russia. For starters, they figured out that Putin was going to invade Ukraine, decided that the US was going to support Kyiv and began relentlessly pushing European allies *in April* of 2021. Why different? It’s not just the level of pre-planning, it’s also that Biden uniquely among recent American presidents had absolutely zero misconceptions about VVP, the strategic understanding of what a fallen Ukraine would mean and what a policy guy I know calls “**** it” old man energy. He’s a 78 year old guy who isn’t trying to set up some post Presidential foundation or get rich or whatever. He is just doing Ukraine right with all the tools at his disposal. He’s certainly an older guy but if this is what old guys who trip on sandbags are like, I’ll take it.

Perhaps reread my previous post and also consider how much of the aid Congress would have approve without assiduous staff work, politicking and planning by 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. You can like or not like Biden but to pretend he or his administration isn’t responsible for our so far quite successful Ukraine policy and aid is absurd. “The Emperor has no clothes and it really sucks that he’s kicking our ***” is what the Russians are saying. I don’t know about you, but I generally go in the opposite direction of whatever copium there are snorting.

Actually, the President can do quite a bit without immediate and express Congressional approval if the authorities already exist. You know, like all that aid to Ukraine. So no, you are not a political student and you are very wrong.

Oh I don't know. He has been good enough on his feet to arrange the destruction of the Russian military with only 4% of the US military budget, thoroughly pantsed the GOP on the debt limit fight and Americans 25 to 54 are working at their highest rate since 2001. If that's not fit, I'll take more unfitness please.

Notable that Utkin calls himself "Commander" of Wagner given that he founded it (after Slavonic was crushed) directly under Putin's control.

A successful push over the river even just to Perekop would effectively cut off the Crimean peninsula and a follow on offensive to Berdiansk or Mariupol might just bag most of the Russian army to the west of that point. Russian GLOC are based on a few main roads and singular rail lines across the front. It would be audacious but that sort of operation solves some big complications and plays against Russian vulnerabilities.

Seriously folks…we are talking about a demonstration strike against a rabid aggressor with less tonnage than one or two of the thousands of bombs dropped every day in WWII. I know it’s tempting to make discussions of the war about us….but it isn’t about us.

And this: https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/89851

Sure, but Kori Schake is not making the argument that the effect of F-16's is political...she is claiming Biden is too weak or afraid to send them when they would have fairly immediate military effects. It's a profoundly bull**** argument aimed at finding a way to attack the WH to appeal to MAGA world while retaining mainstream credibility.

This is entirely on point:

I pour scorn upon Kori Schake. She makes the usual mistake of treating F-16's as a deus ex machina despite the obvious issues of assimilation, training and logistics. She discusses American aid to Ukraine without once mentioning that the WH has to arbitrage Chinese potential aid to Russia in response. She somehow manages to descry Biden's lack of boldness when the entire structure of international and American support was begun and relentlessly pursued by this administration 8 months before the war began. That article isn't analysis...it's politics. And from the cheap seats at that. And a note on F-16's: https://plus.thebulwark.com/p/what-f16s-will-and-wont-do-for-ukraine

Indeed I can.

The pith: Russia is not a mobilized state like Imperial Japan or Nazi Germany and is not fighting a declared war. It sold the conflict with the idea that it was a 'special military operation' that wouldn't impinge on the day to day lives of an apathetic population. A large drone attack on Moscow isn't a military move, it is directly undercutting the regime's credibility on the war. This was Girkin's immediate reaction as well.

Budanov in the last two days said he would retaliate for Russian strikes on Kyiv. Of course Ukraine did this and the attack on the Kremlin was proof of concept. Some of the drones have already been identified as UJ-22's. My thesis has been for a while that the war on the Russian side has become primarily about retaining or gaining power in Moscow. This is nothing more or less than a Ukraine shaping operation on that front.

The salinity took a drastic change in 2014 and then solidified over 6 years of frozen conflict. Somehow, the FSB didn't notice it or simply bought their own propaganda. https://news.gallup.com/poll/180110/ukrainian-approval-russia-leadership-dives-almost.aspx

What's really interesting is that we would not have made many of conclusions about conditions within Ukraine before the invasion happened. Russia had spent decades running extensive information and influence operations in Ukraine before this war. There was plenty of evidence that significant state level actors were suborned (see Medvedchuk, Victor), that parts of the the Ukrainian intelligence services were doubled (https://www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-double-agent-russian-invasion-fsb-intelligence-operatives/), etc. Moscow certainly believed it had night vision. The big question is why all of that effort didn't work or suddenly came to nothing when push came to shove. The simplest answer is that while Russia was operating in a conspiratorial fashion, the actual politics/reactions of normal Ukrainians was a freight train going in the opposite direction.

Absolutely. That said, the AKP engineered the vote totals by a couple of points up for Erdogan and two to three down for Kiricdaroglu so don't feel too badly about being wrong on this one.

I've been propounding a thesis on this for the last couple of months. Forgive me if this lacks clarity as I'm still thinking it through but essentially, it comes down to 'live by grey zone tactics, die by grey zone tactics". Putin was used to working on the margins of Western attention. The methodology was to always aggress in an indirect way or where the costs/benefits to oppositional powers weren't in line. Georgia, Crimea, meddling in Ukrainian politics, etc were always kept to levels that didn't challenge Western interests enough for any decisive intervention. Russia always matched those efforts with investments, influence campaigns and economic pressure to help tip the balance in their favor. But the aggressions where applied were always intense and decisive (i.e. Syria, Georgia, 2014 Ukraine). The 2022 invasion inverted that whole structure. Putin decided to drop the grey zone tactics and try to run the table in Ukraine. This time, the influence, investment and economic pressure were also applied but at no more intensity than Russia had done in early, far less significant endeavors. The aggression was direct and directly challenged the security of virtually every stronger power in the world with the possible exception of China. And yet, the grey zone mentality still showed itself. Russia just tried to apply it to the actual military action. The invasion was under resourced in military terms and instead rested on multiple layers of subversion, bribery and subterfuge. This was obviously completely inadequate for purpose. And yet, Putin's regime is still in that space. It is locked in a high intensity conflict with an ever more competent and technologically superior foe backed by potentially overwhelming allies and still....still...is trying to leverage a weaker hand. In other words, it's not procrastination. It's a mindset.

To your point, Putin already had Lesin working on taking control of Russian media as early as 2004. Where we are now didn't happen overnight but...Putin's methods then realistically took into account what was feasible and what was a stretch. He also wasn't notable for stunts with maps that made him look like an idiot. Also, Russia already tried the mad dog approach in this war. Mostly because of the sang froid of Biden, Poland, etc it didn't work. It is even less likely to work now.

I must admit, after 30 years in the business it was the first time I had to think about the practical problems of creating a firing position for a tank on level B2 of a garage.

I’m starting to wonder if that moment matters more than we realize yet. That’s beyond bad staff work and into the realm of “just give the old man something to make him happy”. And if you are one of those in the inner circle who wants to win the war you’d have to be thinking “wtf?” watching that charade.

Oh believe me...there's nothing like a urine soaked hydraulic shoebox in the summer. Urine, machinery heat and sunlight through tempered glass gives you the full sulfuric terrarium experience.

Caveat emptor: Sushko is a fabricator.

I’m a strong proponent of this view but at the same time it feels like there is some movement going on. Various people are saying things in Russian media that wouldn’t have flown a couple of months ago both defeatist and hysterical. Putin’s position is being questioned. That’s new. I still think the power structures remain mostly intact but I’d be less surprised by a change now.

And in true fashion for this forum I have to chime in…I own a parking company and I am a paid expert. That technology is essentially 120 year old hydraulics and not new at all.