billbindc

This. Pre-war, the assumption was always that the Russians were master strategists and everything was done with purpose, acuity and effectiveness. Post-blundering-invasion, the assumption now has become that they are all crude banditti operating within a B movie version of the Godfather. Both versions of the myth badly miss. The best way to look at it is as you've done above.

Exactly. Before you articulate some badass US or NATO flex you should be sure that Ukraine isn't going to take it on the chin if it gets out of hand. And yes, there are far worse things than a ground out Ukrainian victory.

Diplomatic rotation at the Russian Embassy in DC. It happens fairly routinely.

It let's guys like Cohen...who can posture without fear or real world repercussion....look like tough guys. That's all it is.

Prigozhin’s pitch clearly stated that Ukraine didn’t provoke the war, that the reasons the Russian people were given for starting it were bogus and that the premises Russia went in believing were totally wrong. He also was clear that Russia was overmatched. There are no sure things in any of this but it looked an awful lot like he was setting the groundwork to call a ceasefire and end the war if that’s what he wanted. It’s certainly what a lot of Russian elites want.

Neither, I think. We've already seen Shoigu and there's no word yet on Gerasimov other than rumors that he got dead drunk when this went down.

I feel soiled.

My methodology is also to be suspicious of attempts at complexity. Instead and as above, it's better to see what players are actually saying, what we can see of what they are doing and then make a mosaic of that information that fits all the pieces. It also helps greatly to see what they are *not* doing. The combination in this particular instance seems quite clear. Regime stalwarts are being guarded or completely silent. The guy who launched the coup is not just not dead, he's exuberantly putting out videos that continue to make the coup's case. No waves of arrests yet. Utkin (who led the charge on Moscow) hasn't been arrested as far as we know. Etc. The situation that fits what we can confirm is that Putin doesn't have the power to reassert his unchallenged power. Prigozhen does have the power to continue the propaganda that got him into position to challenge Putin. Regime players are keeping their powder dry or laying very low (Gerasimov). As I joked elsewhere, the coup runneth over.

If Putin had clearly won this round, there are things you would be seeing and things you wouldn't: 1. You would be seeing a lot more regime PR folks cheering on the boss and baying for blood. Simonyan, Solovyev, Peskov etc. Instead, most of them are being careful to throw a scrap to Putin but not much more. We would also be seeing folks like Patruschev and other major players being out front with statements, taking steps, making arrests. 2. The faces at Putin's round table wouldn't have been downcast, exhausted and monosyllabic. The whole point of that exercise was to project strength and they did the opposite. Those are men who still don't know when the music stops. 3. Putin would not have given multiple speeches and they wouldn't have been in response to Prigozhin's or indicated as the day went on more concessions. 4. Prigozhin would very definitely not have been giving jaunty speeches about the efforts of Wagner for the Motherland and asking that very loaded question "What is to be done?" (See Lenin and Chernyshevky on that one). All of this screams continued instability and factional deal making with Putin in the center trying to come to grips with his straitened circumstances. If I had to guess from the looks at that table, Putin is trying to order a purge and finding out that he simply can't order it. His flunkies can agree but they don't think the ranks will follow through. And if that happens, a lot of elements will come off the sidelines.

Putin is attempting to renege on the deal. Wow.

Spot on. It's been amusing to watch some of the experts talking about the mismatch in forces between Prigozhin and the MoD in quantitative terms....which is exactly the mistake they made in regard to the invasion of Ukraine. The reality is that as long as nobody was willing to fight him, whatever forces Prigozhin had on hand were...at least at first...going to be enough. I am solidly in the camp that this was neither a coup or a mutiny. It was a forced rearrangement of the terms on which the state operated. It went farther than anyone expected (Utkin probably has some agency there) and turned into a potentially centrifugal disaster so the parties agreed to initial terms. Now...it looks like we are in the phase where we'll see if everyone abides by the terms.

Power in Russia right now is being negotiated which is really hasn't been since Putin was able to successfully force through the seizure of Crimea. You will know that things have reached some sort of temporary equilibrium when regime figures begin to start making public statements and appearances. That there have been virtually none since the visible end of the coup tells you that that temporary equilibrium remains elusive. Or...Putin is attempting to drag out the inevitable as is his won't and so isn't providing the deliverables (Shoigu out, Dyumin in at MoD, etc) he promised. Just waiting it out at this point.

There is also a very strong tendency to say "it's just a mafia state and these guys are all goons flailing about anyway". That's often true. But it isn't always true and it limits their analytical understanding.

If it turns out to be a solid report then yes, somebody got what the really wanted out of Putin. Oh...and being a do or die loyalist in Putin's inner circle just lost its iron clad guarantees.

I am hearing that Shoigu is under detention and being "investigated for corruption" by the FSB. That alone is a highly charged situation given Putin's intense loyalty to his own loyalists. Dyumin is likely next Defense Minister and also...interestingly...is who arranged the kabuki with Lukashenko. Can't recommend the article below strongly enough. It gets at the wider game being played out right now. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/vladimir-putins-weakness-unmasked-yevgeny-prigozhins-rebellion

This is the obvious conclusion. Further, if Prigozhin is the undisciplined, irrational wild man...how did all of this stay secret, be resourced and work!

I think quite the opposite. Putin now has a Kerensky problem. The more he mobilizes the more he arms groups that have a known propensity to overthrow the government. As someone smart told me...he's in a very Russian pickle.

I've been trying to track down where Utkin ends up in all of this. If he ends up staying in Russia...that will say quite a bit about Putin's position.

It's very important to remember that Putin has gone from being a negotiated, finessed arbitrator to an increasingly out of touch and fiat style ruler. That transition, which the war accelerated, made attempting to negotiate with him for the various factions harder. And the costs of that war have created pressures on those factions, between sanctions and economic stresses, that they are looking to address. The intense scapegoating of the FSB and MoD was used by Putin to attempt to balance forces that might oppose him. Instead, it seems to have driven them together. Put all of that together and the inevitability of an attempt to redraw the rules become fairly obvious. And now it is clear that the rules can be rewritten.

That pretty much tracks with my take.

The Wagner who participated directly are going to Belarus per the agreement. The rest are supposed to either sign up for the MoD or retire. We'll see if that's what happens.

What we know is that whoever that faction is must include large and powerful sections of the FSB. Otherwise, how does this catch the Kremlin by surprise? Beyond that I don't know. If I were Putin, I'd be looking closely at whoever suggested Lukashenko as the interlocutor. Remember, Wagner is going to be a remnant in Belarus and won't any longer be tied into the Russian military logistical train. They will be Lukashenko's praetorians. Not a lot of glory but they won't be going up against the Ukrainian military any time soon either. And certainly, Moscow will be now guarded by some hoped to be reliable units currently being withdrawn from reserves in Ukraine. Shades of 1917? You don't say...

I'm not sure I buy that. The Chechens attacking Prigozhin and Wagner could have had quite intense ethnic and political consequences in Russia. It would immediately let Wagner claim to be defending the motherland against the hated Muslims and would sorely tempt the regular army to intervene to teach the TikTok warriors a lesson. Kadyrov has certainly given the Russian army cause to hate him. Of note, the Chechens also didn't seem to be all that ready to fight. There' is a school of thought that moving on Rostov was more about being positioned to go immediately back to Chechnya if things went sideways.

Prigozhin could really use 5000 hard *** Russian soldiers who have no local ties and no allegiance to Moscow when/if things get uglier in Belarus. They can't run Belarus on their own either. The old bastard is cannier than I expected.

I think it's obvious that Prigozhin represented a faction and that faction got what it wanted so they ended it. Some things to note: 1. They have to have been a very strong in the FSB and MoD. There's simply no other way this stays quiet through months of planning and 100's of participants. There's no other way so many elements simply stood aside. 2. While the war in Ukraine is still ongoing, taking Putin's place is a poisoned chalice. The hard right will punish anyone who ends it. So...you force Putin to the table, you make him give you large concessions in the background and you have a gun to his head since virtually any 10,000 troops can take him out with some luck and planning. But you keep him there to own the loss when it inevitably arrives. If you look at things that way, I think it makes quite a bit of sense.