FlemFire
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Posts
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Posts posted by FlemFire
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
Ok now you have my full attention. So to answer your first question - no, it was a terrible idea but here we are. We did not “push” Russia into anything - unless you subscribe to the John Kettler school of international policy. They did fall into it.
I think what I find most offensive about your position now that is becoming clear is that somehow this entire war is Ukraines fault because they pissed off Russia. So small powers should basically all fall in line to neighbouring greater powers and the freedoms and will of their peoples do not count? This is where oversimplification get us.
We stationed western troops, including Canadians in the Baltics. But we should back off because we wouldn’t want to make Russia angry. Beyond your definitive tone you also appear to get pretty high on your own opinion. Chinas status as a superpower is debatable:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/02/china-superpower-us-new-cold-war-rivalry-geopolitics/
https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-emergence-superpower
https://thehill.com/opinion/international/3936751-china-a-great-power-but-not-a-superpower/
So glad another expert could come and tell us how it really is.
You misunderstand a lot of things here. We didn't push Russia into it -- we pushed Ukraine. That's the whole point. Russia is acting in its own interests and their response could be -- and was -- predicted. Wars do not fall out of the bloody sky. Many things have to happen for them to occur, and childish kool-aid drinking nonsense that pits this as some sort of Good vs. Evil crap might be suitable for the superhero Marvel fanboys, but it isn't suitable for analyzing international relations. Just a second ago someone tried to seriously inquire when and where the West should step in for human rights and decency, while the West's boy toy Israel is massacring civilians on the daily. Yes, I'm sure the United States and Friends mean well. That's why the U.S. lied to its own people to start a re-construction of the Middle-East, right? They're totally the good guys right?
And yes, I will tell you how it is. Who has actually been correct? You or me? Last time I was in this thread I asked how is it even remotely feasible that Ukraine militarily wins this war. The response I got was, "Ukraine already is." Sure are taking their sweet time, yeah? Thousands dead and now outcome-independent people cheer on thousands more for, frankly, some bizarre bloodlust to avoid reality. How is it possible that a forum of grognards cannot see the war for what it is? The Ukrainian counter-offensive evaporated. They didn't take a solitary inch of anything worth a damn, but they criminally massacred their own people in modern day Pickett's Charge reenactments. The sanctions? Didn't work. Not only did not work, but clearly more and more countries are circumventing them. Political isolation? Failed. Moral isolation? Failed. Prestige hit? Yeah, probably a little. Is Russia being in China's corner a good thing? Oh China isn't a superpower so this question is not worth pondering. Of course it isn't worth pondering, right? You think a country conscripting grey beards to go stand in trenches before a 20:1 artillery disadvantage is a winning move. Half the people in here still think more American monopoly money is an actual difference maker. Questions of international tension concerning a very large and very nationalistic nation might as well be a conversation happening on Mars compared to that.
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7 minutes ago, dan/california said:
Funny you should mention that....
HELSINKI, Dec 14 (Reuters) - Finland will on Monday Dec. 18 sign a defence cooperation agreement with the United States, the Finnish government said on Thursday, to grant the U.S. military broad access across the Nordic country to the vicinity of its long border with Russia.
Russia's Nordic neighbour Finland became the NATO military alliance's newest member earlier this year in response to Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
"The fact that there will be no need to agree on everything separately, makes organising peace time operations easier, but above all it can be vital in a crisis," Finland's Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen told reporters.
Not nukes, yet, but certainly a very sharp stick in the general direction of Putin's eye.
Wake me up when something provocative happens. After all, what did happen the last time some provocative occurred? The U.S. dogwalked Ukraine into a shredder. Twice. I'll ask again, are you willing to be incinerated over Finland? Lot of talk in this topic, not a lot of backing it up, though.
BTW, not sure if you know this, but a form of this sort of 'relationship' already exists in a couple nations around U.S.'s enemies. For Russia, the most obvious is Armenia. Unless you have some other good reason for U.S.'s second largest "embassy" being in that little country, or why this diplomatic structure looks exactly like a gigantic listening post.
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7 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Wow that went on a journey. My main point is I instantly push back when anyone says "simple math" when discussion global power dynamics. There was nothing simple about how WW1 happened. There was nothing simple about how Afghanistan got pulled into various empire games. There is definitely nothing simple about the rise and fall of the Mongols. Vietnam is about the least simple nation in that region.
And then we moved onto China...again not simple. In fact what constitutes a "superpower" is also not simple as we have watched many empires with feet of clay rise and fall.
But for just simple counter example - The Baltics and now Finland. Free to piss off Russia with abandon because they entered into a collective defence organization. There are a myriad of strategies and ways a small nation can manage a relationship with a great power - "don't piss them off" is reductionist and narrow. There is no "easy math out there".
China is a superpower. Any discussion otherwise is fruitless with you. I asked you a 'simple' question and skirting it in this manner is unproductive. There shouldn't be discomfort in answering.
Would you be willing to put your argument to the test and station nuclear missiles in Finland and the Baltics? Are you ready for you and your family to be incinerated over Riga and some Finnish swamplands? I doubt it. Nominal attachments aren't worth the paper they're written on. Russia cares about Ukraine because they believe its position, people, and geography of considerable importance to the health of their state. These other nations mean nothing until they act in a manner that changes that dynamic. Almost like, again, it's simple math. You put anti-Russian threats in your "free to piss off Russia" nations and we all pay the piper.
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17 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Bosnia-Serbia 1914
Vietnam-US, Vietnam-China
Afghanistan- Anyone
Mongols - Everyone
I would argue that the math is never simple.
WWI, a completely pointless war dragged out on emotions and unnecessary allegiances. The math was so simple on this one that even today people can't even understand how millions ended up dying over nothing. Afghanistan's existence was secondary, it was more an empty field in which global powers played to control a borderland. If anything, this demonstrates that all great powers will gladly bat smaller nations around like tennis balls. And the Mongols? Were the Mongols not explicitly clear in their intentions? Pray tell, if Mongol ambassadors stride into your little kingdom demanding submission, what was the smart move? Do you still clap for the bravery of those who resisted them? Or do you think wow, that was very, very stupid and got very many people killed? Not to be too apropos, but there were leaders who flaunted their power at the Mongols, and then when reality came to the fore they fled out and left their citizens to be butchered. Be careful of hitching your horse to an outcome-independent party, yeah?
And as you clearly understand, this rule of reality applies between superpowers just as well: there's a reason why the U.S. fought an entire, massive war in Vietnam yet did not step foot in North Vietnam. And did China's invasion of Vietnam fall out of the sky, or did it have to do with Vietnam involving itself in the domain of a Chinese ally? If you find yourself bordering a very powerful nation, then every foreign policy measure taken is going to have extra costs attached, tangible or otherwise. If the Chinese offer Mexico a trillion dollars to base fast strike capability in Juarez, do you think Mexico goes "Wow that's a great deal!" Or is there one big giant elephant sitting in the middle of the equation?
Speaking of the Chinese, they currently do not have to concern themselves with Russia. This is a nation explicitly building for war who has two key deficiencies: consistent food supply and a base of energy (oil) to use. Russia can provide both. Do you think putting Russia into China's sphere made this world safer?
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1 hour ago, The_Capt said:
So “war in a box” (copyright) is where we are at. Unfortunately, all of Ukraine is inside that box. The big and highly cynical lesson for a lot of smaller nations after this war is “don’t be Ukraine”. How they go about doing that will vary.
There is no need to wait for "After this war". Smaller nations do this every day and have done it every day for hundreds if not thousands of years. If you're in the sphere of influence of a major power, don't do things that piss off that power. Very simple math. -
18 minutes ago, riptides said:
The bottom line.
How far do you (the west) support the rights of the individual and the rights to self-determination?
The same West that is cheerleading Israel carpet bombing civilians?
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56 minutes ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:
I would not dispute that, but that is beside the original point. The original point was whether Ukraine deserves support solely because 1) the attack on it is a Russian land grab in Europe and that kind of political move should be resisted in principle; and 2) the attack on it is indirectly aimed at and would have the effect of undermining NATO, and NATO should indirectly defend against it; or , as a conditio sine qua non, in addition to the preceding points 3) Ukraine also has to display moral superiority over Russia in some ways (democracy, human rights, corruption, adherence to LOAC, whatever else).
In my view 1) and 2) are entirely sufficient reasons.
Deserving support and thinking out the consequences of that support are two very different things. Unfortunately, all forms of public policy are captured by the needs to propagandistically capture the emotions of the citizenry who don't know any better. The Ukrainians had a Georgia-esque deal on the table in Ankara. They went with the West instead. Now this talk of Taiwan and China? Absolutely daft. No perspective at all on the bigger picture. -
10 hours ago, Maciej Zwolinski said:
Very apropos our topic du jour.
So the Russians got a massive drone advantage paired with a massive artillery advantage in a largely unmoving, anti-maneuver war.
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20 minutes ago, Carolus said:
I wondered last year if there was more to what we see in a positive sense. Sure, politicians are talking nonsense in public about Ukraine, but behind the curtains, the US is taking the lead, formulating a secret plan with Ukraine and tells militarily unexperienced Europeans to follow their lead. This completely embarrassing floundering of the Western countries in the face of this serious catastrophe - for Ukraine and the global order - must be performance. Must be a ruse. They cannot possibly be this dumb and corrupt.
Now, more than one year later, I wonder if it isn't going in the other direction. There is more going on than we see, but in the negative direction. The embarrassing floundering is actually the best "show of united strength" we can manage and behind closed doors, things are way worse.
Maybe when these leaders go on T.V. and speak they're in actuality lying. Just a guess.
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It's criminal negligence to be in a military uniform commanding the lives of 1,000s of men and not input "thick minefields" into your "what do Russians do on defense?" calculus. To be frank, any discussion of that offensive as being worthy is akin to people who think Pickett's charge was the right idea, just poorly executed. I'll just never understand it.
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6 hours ago, LongLeftFlank said:
Well over 2000 pages ago, around the time of the battles for Sieverdonetsk/ Lysichansk, somebody (Steve @Battlefront.com ?) observed that the Ukrainian command is quite adept at setting up the Russians to make costly mistakes and then forcing them to make them, even when their own commanders know full well what the trap is. Pure Sun Tzu.
This latest reversion to VDV kampfgruppen attacks (BTGs, but lower tech and more infantry) seems to call for UA to revert to the Jaeger tactics that worked well for them during the 'war of movement' in the north in 2022. Infiltrate and envelop the roadbound elements using small killer teams, not allowing them to form up for any coherent attack so they go off piecemeal, flail and fizzle. I doubt Russian drone warfare is yet at a state where it can find and destroy these teams, and 2023 mobiks still seem to be pants and flank security and active patrolling, even if they wear VDV sailor shirts.
A mistake IMHO would be a 'NATO solution', i.e. trying to bomb these forces to smithereens using UA's very finite stocks of ranged PGMs as ersatz airpower. Depleting these stocks may be part of Teplinski's own plan, given that these actions seem to fall near the limit of UA conventional artillery sited on the north bank of the river.
I imagine most people who haven't let emotions melt their brains have made this observation. The required effort here hinges largely on putting the ball in the Russians' court and letting the weaknesses of their military doctrines do the rest.
QuoteRussia can hang themselves in maneuver warfare. They can't hang themselves sitting in trenches bombing the hell out of you. If you roll the clocks back a bit and actually look at NATO's military doctrine, and more importantly the USA's back when Russia was their focus, there's a pretty vested interest in meeting the Soviets in open plains. There is not much interest in getting into artillery slugging matches with them. If you flip through old Cold War analyses, Russia's artillery stock comes up repeatedly. Now look at the equipment given to the Ukraine. All these items gain tactical advantages when used in open plains. I just saw a clip recently where a number of Russian tanks bumbled into a minefield. They just had a loss of what looked like two or three tanks. To mines. What do you think that looks like if Ukraine invites Russia into that sort of war?
Yes, you have to give up terrain to do this. As mentioned before, when you draw out Russia's advances they risk cohesion loss. I saw this myself in Georgia in 2008. Russians bumbling about everywhere against an almost nonexistent enemy. They just don't have the discipline and command of Western armies. But you don't need either of those things to put, as some people say, 40-year old artillery shells into a cannon. And, still granting this notion, I think even 40-year old shells exploding still do more or less the same thing to human bodies.
Engaging in offenses into the teeth of Russian defenses, or engaging them in attritional warfare are losing efforts. Maybe you'll lengthen the war, but you're going to lose in the end. Per a previous post, 90% of the casualties are committed by artillery. In another previous post, an analyst believes Russia is dumping 275+ artillery pieces onto the front every single month, compared to Ukraine's 20+. Let's throw in the 120+ monthly Russian T-55's/T-62's which are being used in support artillery roles. That's potentially up to a 20:1 firepower deficit, not including the massive firepower found in the form of missiles and drones which also tilts heavily in Russia's favor.
Ukraine should have given up territory to invite Russian advances and pounced on them in turn. The offensive Ukraine launched, though, ultimately does not surprise me. Attacking across open ground with zero air supremacy in this day and age? Just a little bit of criminal negligence, that's all. You have to understand, though, that in the West its military thinking hasn't been tied to winning wars for about 60+ years now. It's more focused on fighting them, which is a key difference, one heavily attached to the massive amounts of $$$ corrupting the armed forces. It says a lot that the Ukrainian armed forces would've done infinitely better under the thinking of some hardnosed Afghans than these corrupt generals who always have one foot in the door of the nearest Lockheed, GD, Boeing, etc., and who dedicate more resources to emotional propaganda than to tailoring their fighting forces to the realities arrayed before them.
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7 hours ago, Letter from Prague said:
Of course!
That is why we can't give Ukraine Javelins, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
Oh but that is why we can't give Ukraine HIMARS, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
Anyway, this is definitely why we can't give Ukraine tanks and IFVs, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do. But wait, they didn't.
But it definitely is why we can't give Ukraine proper air defense systems, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
This time though, this is why we can't give Ukraine Western tanks and IFVs, because Russia said it will nuke us. But wait, they didn't.
It is however most definitely why we can't give Ukraine long range missiles, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do. But wait, they didn't.
And of course we can't give Ukraine the cluster ammo, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do. But wait, they didn't.
But this time. This time for sure! This time we can't help in any other way, whether it's the grain deal (also known as "Russia manufacturing famine in the third world", something Russia does for fun every once in a while) of jet fighters or more missiles, because Russia said it will nuke us if we do!
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I took a tram in the city the other day, and saw a teenage girl with Ukraine pin on her backpack. She was wearing a glove over the stump where her right hand should be, and had some black cloth covering part of her thigh where something took out bunch of flesh. World doesn't need more of these.
But keep coming up with reasons why Russians should be left alone murdering and crippling more and more Ukrainians. Keep calling looking for solutions "bloodlust". I'm sure it's easy and fun thing to do. I wouldn't be able to look myself in the eyes, if I did, but you do you.
Not sure what you're faffing on about here. Not a single thing you said has to do with first-strike capable assets being operated by Western forces over Russian territories. Note, this war started because they didn't want those things in a bordering country, but suddenly they're going to be chill with it, for real, as it flies over Russia?
9 hours ago, kevinkin said:I suppose that might be true for those handicapped with just 2 brain cells. Life must be scary especially when they run out of meds. This line of discussion boils down to trying to understand where Russia's red-line exists. It's impossible to know. I assure you, many in government are up late tonight trying to figure that out giving their third cell a whole lot to think about. But I don't think they are insulting each other based on differing opinions of where the red-line stands. They have a list of items donated to Ukraine that have not crossed the red-line. (HIMARS, AFVs, 155 mm shells, bullets, boats, etc,) And as they close up shop for the weekend the question becomes: "ya know maybe we are over thinking this, let's get a beer."
We're literally looking at the result of a redline being crossed: they invaded Ukraine at enormous cost to themselves. Now, why did they do that? Because they don't want an anti-Russia alliance right next door that is, in effect, bulging right into their main territories. The fact I have to explain this being the ultimate redline when this entire conflict exists because of the threat of it is bananas. Is anyone paying attention in this thread? What are you even talking about people staying up thinking about this. You put NATO forces in the field and this whole thing is over. Things will rapidly escalate and the nukes will fly and we'll all be dead. The ghouls who framed this conflict will mostly be fine, hiding in bunkers and what not, but us normies will be ash or killing one another in the ruins.
This is simply not an appropriate resolution to the uncomfortable fact that, all of a sudden, military thinkers have thrown all common sense out the window as they wish under-trained conscripts to instantly develop military doctrines and blow out entrenched Russians despite being outgunned, outmanned, and having zero air support. All I see reading this crap is Robert E. Lee and George Pickett had the right idea, they just didn't probe enough, or they just didn't have fight hard enough, etc. How about no. How about attacking into the teeth of static defensive positions with zero air support has been a bananas idea for 100+ years now and not all the propaganda in the world is going to magically change it. And now I gotta read Aztecan death fantasies over ending the world because people can't bring themselves back to reality.
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15 minutes ago, kimbosbread said:
I would. I'm less worried about Eastern Ukraine and more the South China Sea. That's why Ukraine is important.
Newsflash: if there's a nuclear exchange nothing matters.
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3 hours ago, kevinkin said:
No, it's far more important and therefore worth the added risk.
All that can be managed. That's why we spent so much money on the technology and training to enforce a no-fly zone. If Russia lights up an allied a/c they would be toast. Yes, there is risk. But I think it's worth it to save Ukraine. I do respect your thoughts on this. Tough call.
I would never risk myself or family getting incinerated on behalf of eastern Ukraine and every single person who has two brain cells to rub together thinks the same. Your bloodlust and suicidal tendencies exist only on paper.
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4 hours ago, kevinkin said:
I am not advocating nuclear war but advocating being more aggressive short of that. We will never know where the red line is unless we start inching toward it. For example, would a no-fly zone over Ukraine instigate a nuclear war? Don't think so. Would a two week air campaign against Russian positions in Ukraine be dangerous. Maybe, maybe not. How did we come to the conclusion the current level of assistance to Ukraine is safe against escalation? We only know because we are giving it. I think measures directed to remove Russia from Ukraine, while not threatening Russia's existence, will not escalate.
This isn't Syria. You won't have a no-fly zone. You'll have air-to-air combat between air forces, all within range of Russia's anti-air systems mind you, with fighters and bombers inevitably crossing borders and having their intentions misread, which will rapidly escalate into something worse. Russia isn't going to be very chill with Western aircraft zipping around their airspace and within minutes-distance of striking strategic assets. -
Yes. MOUT is amazing in SF2 and the primary draw of the game for me. It simulates the action well enough given the engine's limitations w/ urban elements.
I actually think getting good at SF2 will make you much, much better at the other games. It wasn't until I nailed down the MOUT-elements in Shock Force did I realize how lackadaisical my tactics were in the WWII ones.
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1 minute ago, Battlefront.com said:
Some people conclude that the US landed men on the moon, some people conclude it was faked. Two conclusions, one that stands up a bit better than the other.
Note that I did this hours after the invasion started and I nailed it. You can call it speculating, I can call it applied knowledge from decades of studying warfare and, in particular, the 2014/2015 conflict on a day by day basis.
Right, except that in this case they are that superficial.
This is flawed. Your premise is that just because something can't be known with 100% certainty than any crackpot theory is just as valid as any well thought out one. Sorry, that's just not the world we live in.
Steve
This is, btw, what I meant earlier by "absurd" responses.
You took what I said and immediately stretched it out to the most extreme BS possible, comparing it to moon landing conspiracy-thinking and eventually being more forward in calling it "crackpot." So, quite plainly, everybody who doesn't agree with you is a crackpot, right? They're all just a bunch of dummies, right? And then I sit here and have people coming out of the woodwork telling me I'm the one being snide...?
Do you have Russia's battleplans in your lap? Do you have a microphone into their war room? Did you wiretap their red telephones? Where do these certainties even come from? Think tanks? Two seconds ago you said you got into it with a Marine over WMDs in Iraq. Should I unfurl a giant scroll of think tanks who said there were totally WMDs in Iraq? Because I bet that Marine sure did. You argument boils down to you "know" what Putin is thinking, and what he's thinking is really stupid, therefore Putin is really stupid and Russia is totally borked. Man, I totally get that from an emotional standpoint. But from a logical one, nobody who "studies warfare" should ever say anything is a certainty when it comes to an outcome of an ongoing war.
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5 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
You came in swinging, which sets the tone for everything to follows. Then you make a declarative statement that is categorically at odds with reality and claim we need to agree with this unreality to understand your point of view.
This just indicates that your degree of "research" is superficial because it is you that haven't been paying attention, not us as you claimed.
You could go back and read the excellent discussions that were had here at the time the invasion started. In fact, I'll save you the trouble as I recently had a look back at that timeframe to refresh my memory as to how exactly right we've been about this war. I posted this on February 24... the first day of the war:
“As should be the case in a rapidly evolving war, it's a little difficult to make sense of what's going on. I'd like to take a stab at it.
Putin's obvious goal is to effectively control Ukraine. At least everything along the line Kiev to Crimea and everything east and along the Black Sea coast. This is logical as the area contains most of Ukraine's forces, its two largest cities, all access to water, and arguably enough territory to matter. The symbol of Kiev falling alone has significant propaganda value. It also gets Putin his land bridge to Crimea.
To do this the Russians launched five major pushes with apparently three goals. I'm going to name these so as to make it easier to reference. And yes these names might sound familiar file:////Users/Steve/Library/Group%20Containers/UBF8T346G9.Office/TemporaryItems/msohtmlclip/clip_image001.png
Group North consists of two forces; A and B. North A is coming down from Belarus through Chernobyl to encircle Kiev from the west and North B coming from Belarus and Russia to encircle from the east. Primary objective is to take out Kiev.
Group Center pushes straight westward through Sumy and Kharkiv. The immediate objective seems to be to separate Kiev from the forces deployed around the Donbas. It is responsible for securing the left flank of North B.
Group South came out of Crimea and appears to be splitting into two. South A is attempting to move westward down the coast to cut Ukraine off from Odessa and the Black Sea. South B is attempting to move eastward up the cost of Azov to take Mariupol. Both are the immediate objectives.
Group Donbas. We now know why very few forces appear to have moved into Donbas after Putin made his big to-do about supporting the call of DPR and LPR for aid. The traditional front is mostly there to hold Ukraine's ATO forces in place so that Group South B and Group Center can encircle and destroy it from all sides after they have completed their initial objectives.
Once this is all done I think Putin presumes that Ukraine will cease fighting in any sort of organized way. Therefore, I'm not sure he intends to do much more than what I just described. However, having all forces swing westward is an obvious thing to do if there's enough fores in reserve to hold down the captured territory.
We've talked about this ever since. The conclusion we came to (including the experts) is that Putin had a goal in mind and nobody told him it couldn't be done. Instead, they concocted something that theoretically could work if Ukraine rolled over and died. FSB and GRU provided the basis for presuming that is what would happen. And the disaster that happened from all of this is plain to see.
Here's one really great early summary of the war. Well researched and from one of the few think tanks that has been at the lead of helping us understand this war:
https://static.rusi.org/special-report-202204-operation-z-web.pdf
Steve
So it's a conclusion. Other people have other conclusions.
In your own words, you "took a stab" at it and you "think" Putin presumes xyz. This is called speculating. I don't see the controversy in saying we actually do not fully grasp Russia's internal thinking or that their army/intel ops are so superficial that grognards on the internet can plot it out by opening a newspaper or putting an ear to a think tank. I brought up George Kennan earlier. He was the preeminent source on all-things Russia for the Cold War, but even he himself ultimately concluded you can never really know a foreign nation's thinking or what they intend. There are entire schools of international relations quite literally built upon this unfortunate reality. Are we going to seriously imply the likes of Morgenthau, Waltz, Niebuhr, Thompson, Carr etc. were just wasting their time, and we can in fact just divine a country's intentions that easily and thus there is no need for all this gamesmanship? I mean, make your argument, fine. Maybe you're right. The point is "maybe," and I don't think I deserve chastisement cause you to talk as if you have spies in Putin's inner circle and listen in on what those goons are up to because I know for an actual fact you do not nor do any think tanks nor do any YouTube bloggers. BTW, this goes the same in the other direction. Someone brought up I think MacGregor who routinely makes claims with 100% certainty. It's all the same basic fact: none of us are in those rooms, whether it is with Zelensky, Putin, Biden, etc. This is all speculative and tearing me a new one for participating from a different angle is absolutely unfair.
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2 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Ok, last chance and then maybe we put it down? Maybe there is no fundamental common ground.
Let's talk about negotiation and positions thereof because before this war is over we may have to swallow some salt.
First off the Russians are clearly "occupying the territory that want" - the 900 casualties per day on attacks in Jan kinda suggest that they are not done yet. So Ukraine could sue for peace, I am sure Putin would be an a##hat and drag all sorts of concessions, like formal recognition of annexed territories and neutrality, so Russia could try again in 5 years.
The simplest answer is "why should Ukraine negotiate when it can still take back more of what it lost?" Here is where the disagreement lies. Many think this is impossible, clearly Ukraine and the western powers disagree. We are not going to sue for peace until we absolutely have to...and we are not there yet.
Awhile back I went on about measuring war by assessing the comparative options each side has in the conflict. I demonstrated how the Russian strategic options space has been compressing, quite dramatically from its start state on 24 Feb. So what has fundamentally changed? Russia has not expanded its options spaces at all - actually not true, it bought a bunch of Iranian drones and did a soft-mobilization, so there is that. Ukraine on the other hand is only going to negotiate when it is out of viable options. This is not a poker game, it is an existential war for this country. I argue pretty vehemently that Ukraine as of 6 Feb 23, is not out of options and all that western hardware says we don't think so either. So they are not going to negotiate, and neither are we because no one has to yet. This is not "bad statesmanship" it is good "warfare".
Now let's say Ukraine gets to the doorstep of the Crimea...I know, a really long shot based on your assessment. But if they do, the question will be asked..."is retaking the Crimea a viable 'good' option?" It is that 'good' that is going to stick. It is at those pre-2022 but post 2014 lines that options for Ukraine could take a hit. Ukraine has every right to retake those territories but should they...now? Very tough question, and we discussed it at length - lot of emotion in the question. Not going to open it up here, but as a hypothetical if Ukraine runs out of viable good options for offensive action due to political reasons within the post-2014 areas, well then negotiation will no doubt be discussed.
Personally I do not like it and would love to see Russia pushed back to her own borders but there are some pitfalls and serious traps in all this that I cannot un-see. Regardless, until Ukraine and the west are at that point, why would they vie for peace now? Because Russia is big and bad...I think they shot that bolt already. Because Russia may exhaust them...well maybe, maybe not. I come from the school of not tapping out when I think the other guy may win. I am not doing it until they win, and even then reserve the option for low-level insurgency and subversive warfare in the backfield...but that is just me.
So yes, we may have to sit down to a negotiation table before this is over. But we want it to be from a position of strength, and last Fall was not strong enough. And we obviously think we can make it stronger.
I am not in the diplomatic roundtables, but I mentioned earlier that I would be hardpressed to end this conflict with Ukraine still out of NATO. There are concessions to be made for this result, and that would be the eastern territories and maybe giving Russia back its frozen assets and whatever extra crap Putin can flaunt before his own people. Diplomacy means giving him his own 'win' to show off, that's kind of the crux of compromise anyway. If I'm Ukraine, I take that deal, personally, and not only take it but consider it in fact a win to go home to. Submitting the territories via negotiation and just assuming a cease-fire/peace is not really an option to me. Russia wants Ukraine defanged and hapless, and its pursuit of this goal leads to an almost tautological conclusion which is that Ukraine has to in fact have an army and a substantial one at that. I mean, this is the stupidity of the war, is it not?
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9 minutes ago, The_Capt said:
Ok, so this is pretty much the crux of your entire argument as far as I can tell? I mean if there is more please feel free to post it, again a few references or fact could be helpful. Like for instance how big is Russian military industrial capacity? How does that translate into military production? How does that stack up with Ukraine's? How does it stack up to western industrial production? What is happening to Russian industrial production? Hint, it does not look good:
Ok, back into my wheelhouse, the military situation.
"Victories of yore"...? we are talking last Nov. So in 3 months of what has really been leg dry humping in the Donbas, the entire UA war machine, one that was able to conduct two simultaneous operational offensives over 500 kms apart while being hit by Russian operational strikes...is on the verge of being wiped out. Or is in an untenable situation? The UA has lost the initiative and can never get it back?
So here is where I won't be snide or take personal shots. Instead I will say up front and simply: you have no idea what you are talking about. Now if you are really interested in exploring and widening you knowledge base, stick around by all means. If you here to promote unfounded points of view and insult everyone...well nature will take its course.
I am not sure who you have been reading or listening to but my best advice is to stop because they don't know what they are talking about either. Here is what Russia is not going to do because there is not pocket dimension that they can drive their military into and reform/rebuild it over 10 years - but only a few days in our time - and then drive it back out and actually change the course of this war:
- They are not going to solve for the C4ISR asymmetry, which is absolutely killing them (literally). In order to gain a level of parity they need to either expand the conflict dramatically and directly attack US ISR assets, or spend billions, compress time and space and invent a competitive ISR architecture in comparison to the US. That is a tall order China cannot meet but that is what Russia will need to do in this war to turn it around.
- They are not going to solve for air superiority. Closely linked to C4ISR, the inability for the Russian Air Force to get in this game and fight the war they need it to is nearly insurmountable. The air denial being exerted in this war is pretty definitive. Add to that the Russians never really had a CAS doctrine to speak of, so there is that.
- They are not going to solve for operational pre-conditions. The Russian military has demonstrated again and again a failure to effectively dominate the: information/communications infrastructure of Ukraine (and now it is been hardened and integrated with the west), transportation infrastructure to effectively cut off western support and sustainment, and disrupt the linkages between military strategic and political decision making - i.e. shock. They also have not demonstrated an ability to establish effective levels of force protection - we see that nearly daily.
- They are not going to solve for logistics. This has been the major problem for the RA and the UA/Western actions have made it nothing but worse. At this point Russian logistics is functioning but has severely been eroded. They have had to disperse logistical nodes and their losses on logistical equipment is approaching horrendous. More facts: https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-documenting-equipment.html...and these are simply insane numbers btw.
This is the operational stuff and it does not even begin to address the effects of UA corrosive warfare and precision asymmetry at tactical levels.
At the strategic level, as we have gone on at length about, Russia has a lot of larger problems. Force Generation is likely the biggest one. Russia can produce all the hardware it can but it is useless unless they can turn it, and people into functioning fighting units and formations. We have seen indications that Russian FG is occurring, likely in better order than we had hoped, but it is no where near what the west is providing the UA with. We know the RA cannibalized its training schools last spring-summer, which can damage force generation for years. They have been able to turn out massed dismounted infantry but this is 2023, we have gone on at length at the challenges of training mechanized forces, let alone the number of specialist required to fix those four big operational points above. Force Generation-wise the RA will need to demonstrate that it can create divisions that are enabled comparative to the UA, and we have seen no evidence of this.
And then we get into the political level, and have gone on at length at Putin's constraints and restraints. I just posted an ISW analysis of his risk calculus which outlines some of this.
So against that you have..."well Russia is really big and bad". The first step to getting out of the Dunning-Kruger hole is to recognize that your are in it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dunning–Kruger_effect
Some of Russia's industries have virtually collapsed. If these industries were of military concern, we'd be in agreement. But they largely are not. Dunking on consumer goods is actually a good way to drum up discontent internally, but insofar as war effort is concerned the impact is minimal. It's not like, say, the loss of car production just vanishes into thin air. The slack is being pulled into war production. In democratic nations this might cause a stir, but unfortunately Putin rules Russia with an iron fist and people who complain suffer from bad cases of defenestration.
I mean, the rest... I'm not sure if I've made myself clear, but I can say it again: Russia is not a competent fighting force. The ugly flipside of this is you don't have to be a competent fighting force to win a war. An even harder pill to swallow is that fighting competently against an incompetent force doesn't even mean you'll win a war. Like, I'll totally grant everything you want there. You say Russia basically sucks at everything and they can't do anything right and they're running out of men, etc. Alright. I mean, if that is the case, then Ukraine shouldn't sue for peace. They should in fact keep grinding until Russia collapses internally. How's that for common ground?
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15 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Your position that this war did not start out as a "war of conquest" stands in solid contrast to all the facts we have in front of us, including well documented research into captured documents. For those of us truly paying attention to the details, we saw this ahead of the war and were only surprised that Putin was stupid enough to give it a go.
It doesn't do your position any favors to come into a mature discussion, declare everybody wrong, then not bother to support your position.
Steve
Why is it that when there is disagreement, it's just me "telling everybody they're wrong"? You characterize it like a disagreement is a one-way street. How is this fair at all, seriously? By definition, we're having a discussion. I don't mind but others treat it like I'm napalming villages here. Even crazier when these disagreements are not exactly that big to begin with.
I don't understand why you keep saying I don't support this position. My evidence is that Russia went after Ukraine with 40,000 men some of which carried parade equipment and riot gear. This tells me they expected Ukraine to rollover. 40,000 men does not strike me as a force capable of capturing Kiev in an actual fight anymore than the 200,000ish total invasion force seems even remotely sufficient to occupy Europe's largest country whose populace hates your guts. What I see is they wanted those eastern territories that they quickly annexed and are now occupying. I mean, either this or that, it's an act of aggression and an attack on a nation's sovereignty, which is basically the system we have all agreed to. I don't know if the extent of Russia's objective set is exactly all that important when the fundamental starting point is the same.
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1 minute ago, The_Capt said:
First off, I am not saying the 2014-16 Russian financial crisis was not a thing. However, if you actually read some of those links you would see that there was more to it than "western softball sanctions". The price of oil being a major one.
What I am saying is that we are only at the start of this thing and the Russian economy is looking like it has been hurt worse than it was by 2015. With all my "vomited graphs and charts" from economic sites, you still have not really answered that point. This is leading me to believe that you really do not want new information or data in creating a better knowledge framework, you instead appear to just want to see and hear what you already believe and then promote that.
Oh look another BBC article -
https://www.bbc.com/news/business-61061619
Sure we had an impact back in 2014 on an already vulnerable economy. And in 2022 we have had a similar impact - numbers show worse impact - on an economy that was much better shored up and prepared...while oil prices are in an entirely different context.
I am going to let your source "The Grid" slide: https://www.politico.com/news/2022/01/25/unusual-origins-news-site-00001776
But if we are going to play "my voodoo economic priests say this"
https://www.bofit.fi/en/monitoring/weekly/2023/vw202301_1/
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/putins-war-costs-changing-russias-economy
So here we are, you with some strong opinions, an IMF report that may be right or wrong and an old bbc story. It does not change the facts, something largely absent from your position.
Ah, ok I see it now. You "get it" and everyone else does not. Ukraine lost about 10% of it territory in 2014, the entire Crimea being the big one. In that intervening 8 years here are some more "vomited" inconvenient facts:
https://tradingeconomics.com/ukraine/gdp
That is the Ukrainian GDP after 2014. Here are the growth rates:
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=UA
All upward except for 2020 - you know the middle of that pandemic thing. So that is with 10% of "critical economic land in the Donbas) occupied.
Ukraine also reformed its military power to the point that is crushed the initial attempts at invasion occupation of a military force (and economic power) that should have crushed it.
So no, having an additional 7.5% of one country occupied, on top of the 10% they lost while the west was sleeping is not "taken lightly". However, it is not a sign of "unassailable doom" or that Ukraine is in the middle of crushing defeat.
So here I will tell you what. Let's put the economic thing to the side. I will accept that maybe the Russian economy may be more resilient than we thought and can possibly keep its head above water longer than anyone has planned for. It is a possibility and let's not dismiss that. I would also offer that a recognition of the damage already done is worth considering as we continue to ramp up pressure and push-back. In short, as to the economic warfare being waged, the jury is still out.
Now as a "studier of warfare", answer my next post down the line. Provide some actual facts that demonstrate how the trajectory the RA is on is going to change. How the course of this war has gone in any direction but horrible for the RA. How the UA has, and has every sign of being able to continue to prosecute this war on the battlefield. And I mean real facts, not stuff you heard in a bar or on Reddit or YouTube. Analysis or assessment by people who know what they are talking about.
You came on this thread with a position. One that you clearly are not going to come off. You are essentially promoting "negotiate now" as the only reasonable choice, less Ukraine continue down its doomed path of defeat and drags the west with it. You have not provided one corroborating assessment/analysis nor even your own research - you have indeed mocked the presentation of facts that do not align with your view. I have posted a lengthy analysis and assessment of the war to date, with references and demonstrated that it has been on a trajectory for severe Russian defeat.
You disagree, now prove it. Walk us through your analysis framework and how the RA is going to turn this around so definitively that the Ukrainian and western political level needs to seriously rethink their calculus. Do you have a different assessment of the war to date? Let's hear it. Do you have a different assessment of RA capability, force employment and generation? Put it forward, with maybe a few "vomited references" to back it up.
I agree, forecasts in 2022 predicted Russia's economy to virtually flatline. I myself actually assumed it would and thought Russia was in absolute dire straits when they militarily screwed the pooch. If they were convulsing like they were in 2014, there's just no way they could have a timetable to adjust militarily in Ukraine. I mean, I think that's just a fact, albeit one in an alternate universe heh.
But their economy didn't buckle. Hence why forecasts change. I don't think the impact this time around has been worse when the forecasters peg Russia for greater growth than Europe in 2023. These are still forecasts, though, so who knows. Forecasts of 2022 were completely wrong. Forecasts of 2023 could also end up completely wrong. But I'm just saying what they say, which is that Russia is clearly not wilting like they should be. I actually don't know how much of an argument is to be had here beyond just -- gulp -- giving those dirty economists their due.
I'm not sure what economic discussion of the occupied territories are supposed to concern. I never disagreed that the status of these territories is currently poor. That only makes sense after they've been in conflict for years and have had outside subversion 24/7 from a now-invading neighbor. Lost territory is simply that, lost territory. It's just not good and I don't see just cause to argue otherwise. Providing they keep those territories, Russia will make use of them in their own way. Ukrainian territories being enveloped into Russia's general socioeconomic strata isn't exactly like oil falling into a bucket of water.
As for the conclusion or I guess my position, it's not negotiate "now." It's negotiate when you take the initiative. Two different things. Diplomacy and negotiation require compromise, and compromise is best had when you have bargaining chips. I said this a long time ago, or at least implied it, but today's statesmen leave a lot to be desired. When I see both sides making irreversible claims, it gives me a bit of WWIII-is-coming concerns. Both sides are failing to leave the door open to compromise and that genuinely scares me. Anyway, right now, Ukraine is not in as good of a position as it was in Fall 2022. Say Russia goes on some other major offensive and Ukraine eats their lunch a 2nd time? Negotiate. And in that case, very likely negotiate from a stronger position than Fall 2022, in which case the ongoing strategy would be a win. But I just don't think there's any fundamental common ground here when you use language like "how the RA is going to turn this around." The Russians are occupying territory they want. What is it they need to turn around, exactly? They seem very content. So I guess to answer your question, if I get into the Russians' head, I don't change much of anything. I let convicts exchange their lives for contacting Ukrainian positions and simply ramp artillery expenditure until the cows come home. If I'm operating from the assumption that Russia seeks conquest, then I declare war and roll in the rest of the army and see if NATO blinks while I prepare my nuclear bunker for a 20-year vacation.
The simplest point to defeating Russia is economic. I mean Russia collapses pretty much instantly if you target the economic throughputs it now goes through. The difficulty arises there because it would require the West to get ugly with the Asian markets and, to some degree, the rest of the planet in general. There are very powerful interests within those markets who would love to see the West self-immolate to battle Russia, btw. However, that is a much, much larger discussion and one I'm too tired to have now.
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3 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:
Wow. No, I don't have to accept that perspective because doing so would be in conflict with mountains of evidence and also not understanding what the war in 2014/2015 was all about. Or Russia's 20+ year history of relations with Ukraine.
This was a war of conquest from the outset. And yes, it was horribly planned and resourced, but Putin isn't the first dictator to screw up this big.
Steve
Nobody's forcing you to accept anything
FWIW, while I disagree with you here, I do think it could very well be the case of conquest now.
13 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:Well, then I suggest a bit of introspection in how you interact with others. This is your second major dust up with people here and IIRC the last one was similar to this one in that you don't seem very interested in debate, just hammering a point home without much evidence and expecting us to all succumb.
Your characterization of well thought out and explained responses as "absurd" clearly is a red flag.
Steve
Fair enough.
15 minutes ago, Twisk said:@Khalerick
- Where does Ukraine retreat to that it has better odds in the Bahjmut direction?
You say that they shouldn't be fighting there but where should they fight? The terrain is mostly the same for nearly 60-70kilometers in that direction.
- Why is this current moment different than Lyschansk, Sievierodonetsk /previous UAF setbacks last year?
I remember many talks last summer about the dire straights of the UAF as bad news came out of Lysychansk, bad videos, and bad news elsewhere on the front. What is unique about the current moment?
More philosophically I don't believe that Ukraine suing for peace being good for the nation-state at all. Lives would be saved if fighting were ended but if the war ends with the map like it exists now Ukraine won't ever recover. @LongLeftFlank described Ukraine as an "armed camp" many posts ago and I think your suggestion for suing for peace is achieving that future.
And while Russia is not a democracy it has a psuedo middle class being the reseidents of core cities. Correct me if I am wrong here but none of the mobilizations have really bitten into those populations. Instead they focus on residents of the hinterland and prisoners, why is that?
Russia can hang themselves in maneuver warfare. They can't hang themselves sitting in trenches bombing the hell out of you. If you roll the clocks back a bit and actually look at NATO's military doctrine, and more importantly the USA's back when Russia was their focus, there's a pretty vested interest in meeting the Soviets in open plains. There is not much interest in getting into artillery slugging matches with them. If you flip through old Cold War analyses, Russia's artillery stock comes up repeatedly. Now look at the equipment given to the Ukraine. All these items gain tactical advantages when used in open plains. I just saw a clip recently where a number of Russian tanks bumbled into a minefield. They just had a loss of what looked like two or three tanks. To mines. What do you think that looks like if Ukraine invites Russia into that sort of war?
Yes, you have to give up terrain to do this. As mentioned before, when you draw out Russia's advances they risk cohesion loss. I saw this myself in Georgia in 2008. Russians bumbling about everywhere against an almost nonexistent enemy. They just don't have the discipline and command of Western armies. But you don't need either of those things to put, as some people say, 40-year old artillery shells into a cannon. And, still granting this notion, I think even 40-year old shells exploding still do more or less the same thing to human bodies.
Just now, BlackMoria said:Pray tell, explain it to me then. You said Russia went to a war footing. I am not seeing any impact, to date, on the battlefield. Just the same old russian tactic have trying to brute force their way through the Ukrainian defensive wall. Just how does all you say result in Russia coming out on top. Because I, and a whole lot of others on this forum, over the past 12 months, are seeing the same thing you must be seeing and yet, coming to a completely different conclusion of where this is headed.
Unending* brute force. It's not like we're going to see Russia dumping 1,000,000 soldiers into Ukraine. But they can dump material into the front pretty much forever. This is why I don't like the West's response of sending bits and pieces. Either help Ukraine win the war or don't. I don't like half-measures.
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5 minutes ago, danfrodo said:
TheCapt can be ..... direct. I've been on the other end of his directness once or twice. His worst and most despicable trait is his annoying and endlessly troublesome habit of being right, often, especially over longer time periods. It's awful
. But the dude really really knows his stuff and I've learned a ton from his posts.
If people just post random nonsense or be mean for the sake of it I just ignore it. He's been snide, but he has fronted an argument. If he didn't I wouldn't respond. I personally don't think many of my arguments are actually being discussed. You may have noticed, for example, that I didn't even bother with much of his post. There's nothing really to disagree with about the conduct of Russia's military in 2022. But I'm not talking about 2022. Not to pull a Godwin's Law, but I can strong, strong 1942 Mannerheim-Hitler vibes when I read some of these posts. Where people are just looking at Russia and laughing and not really paying attention to the details. Russia is on a war footing 1-year out and their goals have fundamentally changed. I'm quite spooked at what they have up their sleeve but everyone else seems to already be prepping the parade grounds in Crimea. I just don't get it
Just now, JonS said:True enough - at least for the West. And guess what: even with all our bickering and with one and a half arms tied behind our backs, it's still more than enough.
It's not. There's a reason why Zelensky is wanting more tanks and gear.
I mentioned this awhile ago, but the response of the West does not seem like arms expenditure made to win a war. It feels more like arms expenditure to flush stockpiles and start running capital through the war industry. Right now, the USA could dump hundreds if not 1,000+ Abrams into Ukraine. They could have done that months ago. But they're not, so I get this vague sense that the West is not so certain of itself as people here seem to be.
Just now, JonS said:Don't worry, I have to travel soon and then you guys can return to snorting Ukrainian glory stories straight off the T-72s
1 minute ago, BlackMoria said:You said "Russia simply has vastly more industrial capacity and manpower". It was true at the beginning of this fiasco. Fast forward nearly 12 months. Has that capacity resulted in victory for Russia yet? No. And Russia is worst off economically and has diminished industrial capacity due to sanctions than when this started. If a given industry can't get parts and technology due to sanctions and has a reduced workforce due to workers fleeing the country or being fed into the meatgrinder, just how do they intend to leverage that industrial capacity and manpower for victory. Maybe over time but the opinion of most on this forum is Russia doesn't have the time to make the sweeping changes in industry or the military industrial complex to ensure victory. Nor do they have the time to completely reform and restructure their armed forces. Russia military is dying ever so slowly the death of a thousand cuts and the industrial capacity and manpower isn't going to be a timely savior as the Ukraine wolves keep tearing small pieces of the Russian bear. Changes to salvage this situation for Russia requires changes and reforms that will take years to implement. Not in a few short months. Sure, Russia has shore up what it has but frankly, they seemed determine to banzai charge their way to victory, which is fundamentally a stupid way to try to achieve victory.
Having industrial capacity and manpower is not enough. It is how you leverage it and so far, 12 months in, Russia is very poor at using it to advantage. Hence, poorly trained, poorly armed, and poorly motivated conscripts and criminals are the thing right now; poor leadership and limited equipment are the norm. Just when is the industrial capacity and manpower going to kick in and win this for Russia. Maybe in some years from now but Russia doesn't have the time. For Ukraine, its NATO tanks today... it could be F16 / Tornadoes etc. next week.
Yes, if Russia is fighting the war you think they are fighting then the IC is not being used correctly and they are moving slowly. This is the convenience of arguing strawmen.
How Hot is Ukraine Gonna Get?
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
Yes it's alright. I already got an explanation from a resident grognard how assaults across open ground sans air supremacy or any air cover at all into the entrenched teeth of minefields and pre-sited artillery zones is not at all suicidal or even irresponsible. Another informed me that it was all a matter of probing and that they would soon probe their way to a weakspot. I took this as eschewing common sense. After all, probing by fire is a thing, but doing so via entire mechanized battalions is not a version of it I've seen before. While you are all educating me, please inform me how 40-year old Ukrainians being conscripted off the streets are going to win a war now. Can you name the last conflict won operating with this strategy? Just as a reference point.