Zeleban

I think that the number of Russian Su-34s has not decreased, given the new aircraft that Russia has produced over these 2 years. Russia does not experience any particular difficulties with spare parts for the Su-34. This allows not only to repair old aircraft of this type, but also to produce new ones

It looks like a battery of Patriots has arrived from Germany. Three Su-34s shot down today in the Kherson region

Looks like Trump's opponents aren't giving up, and that's good news.

It is not true. For employees of defense enterprises in Russia (as well as in Ukraine), the so-called “reservation” applies. They are completely exempt from mobilization. Putin has Western money received from the sale of minerals, so he can easily attract the necessary specialists to the defense industry, both from China and from any other country (yes, the USA and Germany are no exceptions).

"border security" is just a hoax to the public. The real reasons for blocking aid to Ukraine is the decline in the popularity of Biden and the Democrats. Democrats know full well that even after they agree to Republican demands for border security, Republicans will still block aid to Ukraine for new flimsy reasons. For example, Ukraine does not have a plan for victory, show us the plan. That's why Democrats are in no hurry to agree to demands for border security.

The absence of foreign brands in Russia is precisely aimed at putting pressure on residents of large Russian cities. Residents of the rest of Russia, even before the start of the war, were not interested in popular Western brands. Rich residents of large cities should have felt that Russia was being punished for its aggressive behavior and put pressure on. Instead, Moscow residents do not consider themselves European outcasts at all; just like in the good old days, they buy expensive Western goods in boutiques in the center of Moscow.

Pekka Kallioniemi is one of the most ardent supporters of Ukraine, why would he spread false information? Western firms are gradually returning to Russia. Without even waiting for the end of the war. Many on this forum argued that Western businesses would never return to Russia due to reputational risks, as well as fear of their business being confiscated by the Russian government. However, we see today that many companies have returned to the Russian market in one way or another. If a Western firm trades with Russia, it loses nothing, and vice versa, if a Western firm refuses to do business in Russia, it loses millions.

This is true. Residents of the rest of Russia hate residents of large Russian cities (especially residents of Moscow). Since they sell resources from all over Russia to the west, but the lion's share of the proceeds remains in Moscow. In turn, Muscovites despise the inhabitants of the rest of Russia, considering them stupid losers Contradictions and mutual hostility between Moscow and other major cities of Russia on the one hand and the rest of Russia can become one of the “levers” for destabilizing and subsequent dismantling of the Russian Federation. Of course, if the world community finally decides that the last empire of our time has no place in the future.

In the event of a confrontation with a country like Russia, the more people the better. I would be glad if my old friends were drafted into the armed forces. This would mean that the leadership of my country perceives the threat adequately

no, I am not ready to provide a link to a document that indicates the direct number of Ukrainian military personnel who are currently performing their duties in the war. I can only say, referring to recent speeches by the President and the Minister of Defense, that the total number of Ukrainian military personnel is more than 1,100,000 people. While the number of people directly performing their military duty on the front line is about 450,000 people. For example, the TOTAL composition of the French armed forces as of 2022 is 203,250

I'm not sure that you fully understand my posts. Perhaps these are just Google Translate errors. But there may be something deeper preventing you from understanding my posts.

I have a faint hope that Ukraine can still survive this winter (I don’t know what exactly influenced my opinion, objective reasons, or another bottle of Madeira I bought this evening). The key events, in my opinion, will unfold not on the front line, but in the rear. It all depends on whether our president will be able to change public opinion, destroy the influence of the Russian information machine on the consciousness of our citizens, and also restore the faith of our citizens in the armed forces of Ukraine. Zaluzhny previously expressed the opinion that Ukraine needs to return to last year’s level of citizen mobilization. However, Zelensky said at a press conference that another 500,000 mobilized Ukrainians are needed. This means that Ukraine's armed forces must increase by another third of their original strength. This clearly contradicts Zaluzhny’s assertion that everything is normal and no special mobilization measures are needed. Be that as it may, I can be guided by the mobilization of my youth acquaintances from Krivoy Rog. They have significant abilities to corrupt any government bodies. Even if these guys were drafted into the army, then everything is very, very bad. So far, fortunately, none of my friends have been drafted into the army

Our famous Ukrainian sapper, who maintains a blog on YouTube dedicated to mines, claims that snow is a serious problem for the detonation of anti-personnel mines. Deep snow can also be a problem for the detonation of anti-tank mines, when a large amount of snow, when driven over by a wheel, is compacted around the fuse. Moreover, burying an anti-tank mine too deeply in ordinary soil, when the fuse does not protrude above the surface of the ground, can also cause the anti-tank mine to fail to fire when even a tank caterpillar hits it. He describes the Taliban tactics, when an anti-tank mine installed in this way exploded not under the wheel of the lead vehicle in the column, but under the wheel of the middle car, after the wheels of the cars in front gradually pushed through the edges of the hole in which the mine was installed. In this way, an ambush on the convoy was simulated (the convoy thought that it was a shot from an RPG and not a mine explosion, since the first vehicles in the convoy passed without being detonated). Thus, the movement of convoys was greatly slowed down and logistics were disrupted

This was common practice in the USSR. Here is a quote from Wikipedia: Since the 1960s, there were military departments at universities in 497 of the approximately 890 universities operating in the post-war USSR (at the very end of the 1980s, the number of military departments was reduced to 441)

Much worse. Many new Ukrainian officers are so-called "jackets" - this is the name regular Soviet officers gave to reserve officers - ordinary citizens who graduated from a civilian higher educational institution with a military department at that university. For example, at the law school where my friend studied there may be an artillery department that trained artillery platoon commanders. The preparation was very minimal (a friend told me that they had an 85 mm D-44 cannon as a training tool). Before the war, institutes with a military department were super popular, because they made it possible to avoid conscription. You calmly graduated from university, after which you automatically became a junior lieutenant in the reserves. Then no one thought that war would happen and that he would have to become a real officer. The disparaging nickname “jackets” was given to these people by real regular officers of the Soviet army. Because these so-called officers came to military training in civilian clothes. They didn't even have military uniforms. Due to their extremely poor training and virtual uselessness, the attitude towards such officers was very dismissive (we are not members of the same family). Today, such officers command platoons and even companies in the Ukrainian (and also in Russian) army. To be fair, I can say that not all “jackets” are bad officers. Just like not all regular officers are “good” officers. Everything depends heavily on a person’s motivation and desire for self-development.

One might think that this would have some significance for negotiations with Putin. In today's realities, it would be a real gift for Ukraine if Putin agreed to negotiate with Ukraine. This would give the state of Ukraine at least some illusion of being able to exist for another couple of years (which I highly doubt). But being a pragmatic politician, Putin will not enter into any negotiations with Ukraine. - the flow of weapons parts has intensified. - the Russians have built an entire plant for the production of FPV drones - repair and restoration plants for the restoration of equipment from storage bases are operating at full capacity. - There is not even a hint of problems with the entry of manpower into the army. Income from the sale of mineral resources allows you to recruit volunteers in any quantity, without the need for mobilization What can Ukraine do to counter this? - A severe decline in morality in the rear (now the first signs of a decline in morality are appearing at the front. The military themselves talk about this) - Lack of finance in Ukraine's dilapidated economy. - Lack of normal replacement of losses in equipment due to extremely limited supplies from the West - the continuing decline in the popularity of support for Ukraine in the West. (I’m sure Western leaders will soon begin to disown Ukraine as if it were suffering from the plague. American politicians are setting a good example for the rest of the world) What is the point for Putin to sit down at the negotiating table with Ukraine, if even an ordinary resident of Russia understands that Ukraine is going down? What can he say to the Russian’s question: “Why the hell did we endure all this for 2 years to retreat now when our victory is obvious?” I am sure that Putin will not conduct any negotiations with Ukraine. Yes, for the West, he will pretend that he is ready for dialogue with Ukraine. However, these will be obviously impossible conditions = complete surrender (for example, the disbandment of the Ukrainian army or the complete disarmament of Ukraine). Why do the West believe that Putin is really waiting for Ukraine to sit down at the negotiating table with him? What do you think he should do with the hundreds of thousands of mobilized people embittered by the war? Return them to Russian cities so that they sharply worsen the crime situation inside Russia? Do you know how many illegal weapons and explosives are now in the hands of former criminal elements who are now in Ukraine? Russia today literally lives off the war, and if the “enemy” suddenly disappears, where should the rage and anger of all these people be directed? No, war is vital for Putin. No negotiations

It looks like hitting a tank with an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile.

The Second World War. 40-year-old Ukrainians conscripted from the streets captured Berlin in 1945

Now, as for the enemy’s strategic aspirations militarily. Or, better said, the main reason for the Russian military command to “rush to the offensive” right now, despite a real assessment of its own capabilities in this area. The enemy switched to active offensive actions in almost all operational directions. It most actively carries out attacking assault operations in the Bakhmut, Avdeevsky and Kupyansky directions. In certain areas and segments, he also attacks in the Orekhovsky, Novopavlovsky, Limansky and Dnieper directions. In fact, the Russian command, at the moment, believes that the conditions for regaining its strategic initiative have fully developed and the right moment has come to do this in practice. Therefore, as part of the implementation of this aspiration, he planned, organized and is currently “putting into practice” a complex of offensive counter-offensive actions of an operational-tactical scale in several operational directions at once. But, in my opinion, the further we go, the more debatable this opinion becomes.

In the Dnieper direction, apparently, the command of the enemy grouping of forces "Dnepr" is in a hurry with the issue of "liquidating the enemy's bridgehead." The transfer of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces to the Dnepr group of a fresh airborne assault division should, as far as I understand, speed up this process. But at the moment this has not happened. The “first attack of the East” by the 104th Airborne Division on the Ukrainian bridgehead did not end in anything significant. Its 5-day continuous attacks led only to significant losses in weapons and military equipment in the advanced units of the 328th and 337th air assault regiments. The forest to the south of Krynok became a real “curse” for Russian paratroopers, as before it was the same place for units of the 26th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division and the 810th Separate Marine Brigade. As for further prospects in the Dnieper direction. For those who forgot. The enemy reinforced its Dnepr group of troops operating in this direction with not only the fresh 104th Airborne Division, but also the 70th Motorized Rifle Division + at least one separate motorized rifle brigade from the 40th Army Corps - the 144th Motorized Rifle Brigade. This is in addition to the troops of the 49th CAA (205th MRBr), 18th CAA (22nd AK), formations of coastal forces "North" (61st Marine Brigade), previously part of the Dnepr group of forces ". Well, I don’t even mention the whole “scattering” of regiments and battalions of territorial troops that perform an important function as part of the Dnepr group - on a fairly wide front (I recently gave numerical indicators) covering the coastline of the Dnieper. Therefore, from a formal point of view, General Teplinsky has enough strength to not only liquidate Ukrainian bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper, but also to “fend off” such attempts (even larger ones) in other possible areas and directions. The question is different - to what extent are these forces and means REALLY capable of doing this, and does General Teplinsky believe that he really has “enough” of the currently concentrated troops (forces) as part of the Dnepr group to complete the task and is capable refuse to demand from the “superiors” even additional “forces and means”? As far as I understand, in any case, he is required to liquidate the Ukrainian bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnieper, under any circumstances and under any conditions. In this regard, one must understand that General Teplinsky has an “open loan” for the use of forces and means (that is, he will be given as much as he asks, of course, within the REAL capabilities of the Russian General Staff), without restrictions. In this, his position is quite similar to the situation in which the Russian command of the Main Guard "South" is now, which is "occupied with Avdeevka." Simply because the people need victories (the most “attainable”, in the Russian military command, Avdievka is considered the same), and, on the eve of the “electoral act,” there is no need for any “Ukrainian bridgeheads” on the left bank of the Dnieper. Therefore, obviously, persistent attempts to eliminate these bridgeheads on the part of General Teplinsky will continue. If necessary, they will fill up those Krynki (and any other bridgehead) with burnt iron and the bodies of their soldiers. the same as near Avdeevka. They will continue to pull troops into both places until two things happen: - either Putin will finally not be reappointed president, or for the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation this “act” will lose precisely its meaning, for some other reason; - or within the Russian military command, finally, there will be a certain “military chief” who will clearly and unambiguously formulate for the top political leadership of the Russian Federation the opinion that the very existence of this kind of “open loans” for personnel and weapons and military equipment (especially immediately several operational directions) quickly and effectively neutralizes the combat qualities of the Russian army than any active actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. At the moment, for the officially formulated (and actually in mind by the Kremlin regime) war goals, both directions (both Avdeevsky and Dnieper) are important.