pintere

Unconfirmed, but it seems like Surovikin may have been arrested. https://www.kyivpost.com/post/18817 "A Report has appeared on the “Ukraine” Telegram channel, quoting the Russian rosZMI media channel that Surovikin was arrested on the evening of June 27 and is detained in the Lefortovo pre-trial detention center along with his deputy, Colonel-General Andriy Yudin. Kyiv Post was unable to verify this at this time and is investigating."

I wonder, where are all those tanks/artillery gonna come from? They’re already struggling to supply enough to the army in Ukraine, and even all the ones Wagner had won’t be nearly enough. On the other hand, this does increase the probability we‘ll finally see a T-34 operational once again

Going back to the war in Ukraine for a moment, we do have a piece of good news. https://insightnews.media/germany-to-transfer-45-more-gepard-anti-aircraft-systems-to-ukraine-in-2023/ According to the newspaper, Germany has already handed over 34 Gepard systems to Ukraine, and another 15 will be delivered in the coming weeks. “In addition, we want to deliver up to 30 more Gepard systems by the end of the year in cooperation with the United States,” Freuding said.

There’s a million other ways he could’ve done that which wouldn’t make the world hold their breath for another revolution in Russia.

What I wonder about is what Prig‘s endgame was this whole time. I can’t imagine he could’ve negotiated for any sort of concessions as soon as he began taking over sovereign Russian territory with his troops. Say he bottled up in Rostov. What then? He might be a thorn in Russia‘s side for a while, but if no one came to his aid then he’d just be waiting to get bombed out ala Grozny style. I’m pretty sure he and his co-conspirators were all in, but not enough important people defected to him for the plan to work, and so he chose the off ramp. Could he have taken Moscow if he chose to reject Luka‘s offer? Maybe, but without defections from other local forces I wouldn’t be so sure. The force sent to Moscow apparently had ~5000 men, and though there wasn’t exactly a lot in the way aside from special forces, Rosgvardia and police, I doubt that even the skilled Wagner detachment could’ve captured the city in the face of substantial resistance. If Kyiv 2022 taught us anything it’s that even a somewhat ragtag defense can prevail if it’s defending a major urban centre and if all it needs to do is delay for a crucial period of hours.

My best bet is that Prig concluded that either: 1) He wouldn’t be able to take control of Moscow with the limited forces he had. 2) Even if he DID, he wouldn’t last long without other Russian players taking his side. We have to keep in mind what each party had in mind for an endgame. Prig was probably planning to overthrow the current military (if not political) leadership, and had been planning this for some time. He knew full well that his plans would go nowhere unless others joined him in his rebellion, but that support never materialized for whatever miscalculation. Now he’s in a bind, and even if he consolidates in Rostov his days are numbered. Meanwhile Putin and Russia want to stop Prig, and Luka basically offers Prig an off ramp that Prig at least gives him a plausible chance of surviving this ordeal with his power somewhat intact. So he decides to stand down.

Best theory of what happened that I’ve heard (though I disagree about the Chechens): "Verdict from some official news sources as to the about-face is apparently that Prigozhin had been counting on public and some high-level support for his coup, but not enough materialised even with the defections, while a force capable of dislodging him in Rostov in the form of the Chechens was appearing to his south. Perhaps Prigozhin realised he might not take Moscow even if he got there, and even if he took Moscow he can't hope to hold it. So when Lukashenko called to cut a deal where he and his forces could get out alive without charges, he took it. The coup was well-planned, but circumstances beyond his control prevent him from succeeding."

That’s the only way this whole thing would make sense then. Somehow, Prig came to the conclusion that his grip on Wagner was slipping and he himself was in danger. So, in order to prevent the MOD from achieving their plans, he decided to make his move like this. But, either before or during the process of his thunder run to Moscow, he decided that he had no realistic chance to topple Putin and so forced what he thought were good concessions when he had Moscow by the throat. Maybe he’s just trying to buy time while maintaining a decent contingent of troops he can rely on. What his (and Putin‘s) long game is remains to be seen.

We may soon see Chally 2s joining the fight

Good. Let all those damned Ka-52s fall out of the sky, it’ll make the work for the UAF way easier. Speaking of which… https://t.me/pilotblog/4984 The Armed Forces of Ukraine successfully crossed the Dnieper in the area of the Antonovsky Bridge, there is a battle going on, - Z-channels.

ok ok so here we have it, a military coup against Moscow, and Putin plans to put it down with Chechens? Assuming they don’t just defect, if it came to a showdown between Wagner and Kadyrov‘s TikTok warriors I know who I’m putting my money on.

And who will Putin be using to oust Wagner from Rostov? As soon as fighting starts to go down there Wagner will take a stand against any unpatriotic Russians, war in Ukraine be damned

If the rumours about Wagner approaching Krasnodar are true, then soon Russia will only have one railway line to supply all their forces in Ukraine… I’d say it’s time for the AFU to start HIMARSing the s*** out of Starobilsk. Then the whole Russian frontline in the south will be cut off.

I think that ties into one of the assumptions by the authors. Ukraine doesn’t have the manpower or material superiority to push the Russians back on a broad front. Therefore they’ll need to pick a spot they’re confident they can breach, smash the lines there and surge towards the south. But from the time they create a salient until the actual breakthrough, they will be more vulnerable.

Surely no sane person would give away the exact percentage of ammunition lost…

From RUSI, by the same guy who wrote the recent report about Russian tactics: "Ukrainian forces are making gains, but the offensive is some way from its decisive phase; we must refrain from premature pronouncements of success or failure. Ukrainian forces have launched their long-anticipated offensive in an attempt to break through Russian defence lines to liberate the occupied territories. Ukrainian troops have broken through initial fighting positions along a broad part of the front, but remain some distance from Russia’s main defence line. Kyiv has yet to commit the bulk of its forces as its lead elements try to set the conditions for a breakthrough. The fighting so far has been tough. Russia’s initial fighting positions constituted fox holes and hand-dug trenches, but behind these were complex minefields of anti-tank and antipersonnel mines, covered by Russian UAVs and artillery. The main defence line, still 15–20 km from Ukrainian positions, has properly dug trenches and concrete-reinforced firing posts, tank obstacles, ground-laid cable to coordinate artillery strikes, and even more mines. Behind that are the reserve fighting positions of the third defence line. The fighting will likely get tougher. As Ukrainian forces penetrate deeper into the defences, they will come into range of more Russian artillery firing posts. Moreover, their own artillery will be able to deliver fewer counterbattery missions, and the Ukrainian lines of advance will become more predictable, as they must follow the breaches identified in the minefields. As Ukrainian troops push forwards, they will also be covered by fewer air defences, and will likely come under greater attack by the Russian Aerospace Forces and aviation. Given these threats, the Ukrainian military is currently trying to achieve three things. Firstly, there is an intense counterbattery duel being fought, with both sides trying to strike each other’s logistics, command and control, reconnaissance, and artillery systems. The Russians are hunting for Ukraine’s artillery with Lancet UAVs. The Ukrainians are utilising Storm Shadow and GMLRS to try to destroy Russian command and control and munitions stockpiles. Secondly, the Ukrainians are trying to get the Russians to commit their reserves, moving troops from the third defence line to bolster sectors under pressure. Once these troops are pulled forwards, it will become easier to identify the weak points in the Russian lines, where a breakthrough will not be met by a new screen of repositioned forces. Thirdly, the Ukrainian military is trying to put pressure across the front to advance through the first line of defences in as much breadth as possible. The reason for this is to increase the options for attacking the main defence line and to keep Russian forces uncertain as to where the main effort will be launched. Furthermore, with such a long front, stretching out Russian troops limits their ability to stack units in depth, pulling more forward. At some point, the Ukrainians will have to decide where to commit their main assault units, and the offensive will enter its decisive phase. This decision must be conditions-based. It isn’t about adhering to some fixed timeline. When these units are committed, the offensive will either achieve a breakthrough or fail. Success is binary, not linear. The line is either broken or it is not, and Kyiv must shape the battlefield to maximise the probability of a breach. The extent of a success will be determined by how much progress is made on the other side of the breach. If a breach can be achieved, then the critical question will be how many units Ukraine has in reserve to surge forward and exploit the success. If operations are currently methodical, once a breach in the line occurs, speed will be of the essence. The uncertain variable in the current offensive is Russian morale. Russian units are currently fighting from prepared positions and their command-and-control infrastructure is mostly intact, though some key command posts have been struck. If Russian units can be forced to reposition, however, the poor training and discipline of Moscow’s forces could see the defence become uncoordinated and susceptible to collapse. Bringing about such conditions would require some significant actions by the Ukrainians to get the Russians moving, but it is possible under such conditions for the strength of the defence to crumble rapidly. Ukraine can endeavour to bring such a situation about, but it cannot be counted on. For Ukraine’s international partners, the summer is likely to be deeply uncomfortable. Losses will mount and success will take time. It is vital, however, that there is no diminution in the strengthening of the training programmes allowing Ukraine to continue to generate combat units, or the mobilisation of defence industry to put supply to the Ukrainian military on a sustainable basis. However much territory is liberated in this offensive, the critical variable is convincing the Kremlin that even if its defeat comes in stages, it is coming." https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/ukraines-counteroffensive-begins-shall-leopards-break-free

Well that’s some top notch work!

These photos with the map and text boxes, where are they from?

"Ukraine will receive additional military assistance from Spain, including 20 armored personnel carriers and a field hospital, as well as four Leopard 2A4 tanks that were under repair." https://the-news.com.ua/en/single/ispaniia-peredast-ukrayini-20-btr-pol-ovii-gospital-i-4-vidremontovanikh "The German defense concern Rheinmetall won a contract for the supply of 14 Leopard 2 tanks to Ukraine. Sources of the Handelsblatt reported that Denmark and the Netherlands have already financed the purchase. Contracts for the new supply have already been signed, and the German government has been involved in the negotiations, as it must approve the export of military equipment. It is expected that the first tanks from this batch will be delivered to Ukraine in January 2024, and all other tanks will arrive during 2024." https://mil.in.ua/en/news/rheinmetall-receives-a-contract-for-leopard-2-for-ukraine/

Most recent update on the Velyka Novosilka front.

From the Kyiv Post. Apparently Urozhaine is captured. "1) The Gains Ukrainian forces on Tuesday captured the village of Urozhaine in the boundary area between the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk regions, which brings the total number of deoccupied villages during Ukraine’s summer offensive to eight."

Didn’t Ukraine get like 40 Wisent 1 mineclearing tanks from Germany? They may not be as capable as mineclearing Leos, but they should surely be up for the task in most situations.

That will be an interesting read. It would be pretty unimpressive if that’s true…

Oh for sure, but if I recall Russian doctrine correctly they would commit those reserves only when a frontline penetration has happened. Therefore Ukraine attacking around Tokmak won’t necessarily force the Russians to commit their reserves unless they’re actually able to achieve a penetration there, which they’ve so far been unable to do. The sector of front with just one defensive belt is 75 km wide. That’s plenty enough to launch attacks on multiple axes, and if anything the Russian reserves will be strained more if they have to deal with multiple penetrations of the only fortified line they have in the area. Of course, I’m sure the Ukrainian generals went through all these scenarios multiple times during the past half year. I trust that they’re pursuing the best course of action.

So from what we’ve seen so far, it looks like the focus of Ukrainian activity is just north of Tokmak and just south of Velyka Novosilka, respectively. We have video evidence of at least a few failed Ukrainian thrusts on the first axis, but several villages captured on the second. Given the state of Russian fortifications… … I’d always thought before the offensive began that Ukraine would be best placed to avoid the Tokmak area (as fortified as it is) and instead try to pierce the Russian defenses further east, with the goal to reach the sea around Berdyansk. It is a bit of a longer distance to get there, but in doing so Ukraine can avoid the much more extensive fortifications further west and also cut off a bigger chunk of Russian held territory. There‘s been talk of Ukraine pulling another surprise for the Russians either at Kherson or around Kupyansk. Assuming that Ukraine really is aiming to cut the land bridge this summer, I’d probably abandon offensive actions around Tokmak (or at least ones supported by valuable western equipment) and instead attack all across the frontline from Novozlatipol in the west (just north of Fedorivka) to Volodymyrivka in the east (just east of Vuhledar). It seems that the Russians only have one major defensive line in that entire sector, and the Ukrainians have almost reached it in one location. Bust through that line and then make for the sea between Berdyansk and Mariupol. Far better than trying to crack three successive fortified lines.