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Hapless

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Posts posted by Hapless

  1. Haven't seen one of these for a while. What I'm finding more interesting is the way the Ukrainians are hounding it (assuming that it's the same vehicle being hit, then recovered).

    This really speaks to FPV drones as munitions, a 'permissive drone environment' (ie. no obvious countermeasures) and an ISR capability that allows tracking of individual vehicles. I'd love to know the strike mechanics: is there a taxi-rank of FPV drones assigned to an ISR drone waiting for targets or do they launch them individually? Does a single team operate both, or are there separate hunter and killer teams that need to co-locate?

  2. For a different perspective:

    If the USA invaded Mexcio to enact regime change and instead suffered a string of embarrassing defeats, lost an aircraft carrier, was forced to rely heavily on Blackwater only for them to attempt a coup and had lost it's military reputation along with international influence, narrative control and huge numbers of men and military hardware...

    I don't think anyone would think the US was winning because they were squatting in the northern half of Chihuahua. They've still lost, incurring significant all-spectrum damage in the process.

    Of course, Mexico might be unable to regain it's international borders and a frozen conflict might develop... but that isn't going to make the US less crippled and Mexico less undefeated.

  3. As a guess: the 88 spotted and engaged the Sherman in the second pic but missed it and the round went through the building and hit the Sherman you lost.

    An 88mm AP shell shouldn't have too many problems going through a building (range dependent, obviously) and it's not going to damage the building that much- it's only going to leave an 88mm sized hole after all.

    But hard to tell without the save file.

  4. 1 hour ago, Carolus said:

    I would love to know how it would change Ukrainian abilities

    It would make defence more complex for the Russians- for example:

    ATACMs flies on a ballistic trajectory while Storm Shadow is a cruise missile, so one of each fired at the same target presents two different air defence problems at the same time (fast but telegraphed ATACMs vs slower but stealthier Storm Shadow). Mix in decoys, Storm Shadows changing direction etc and things can get real confusing real fast.

    This might prompt the Russians to concentrate more air defence on more important targets, leaving other (still important) targets less well defended.

    There's also the EW game- the Russians are inevitably going to get their hands on some kind of salvageable internals from whatever weapons are used, at which point they can dig into the systems and figure out how they can jam or spoof them. They've already apparently gotten hold of a Storm Shadow, so from here on out there's a possibility that Storm Shadow strikes can be degraded by EW effects.

    Having more different types of weapons in the mix keeps things fresh (as it were), so there's always something up Ukraine's sleeve that the Russians haven't developed a counter to yet. At the same time, depending on the specifics, even if the Russians have worked out how to jam ATACMs and Storm Shadow, they might not be able to jam both at the same time because EW cna be finicky, or if they can, they might need more rare, expensive EW assets concentrated to do so.

    Stuff like that.

  5. 2 hours ago, Centurian52 said:

    Not sure why they think they need volley fire by squad on the books now that they have bolt action magazine rifles though.

    At this point, it's usually a worry that trigger happy soldiers will splurge all their ammunition if left unsupervised. Aside from the fire control element, some military rifles around the turn of the century had magazine cut-off devices, which mechanically prevented the use of the magazine and forced soldiers to load and fire one round at a time. The concept was that the cutoff could be disengaged on order when rapid fire was necessary.

    I can't find a link to the Brit's "Infantry Training, 1914" but a couple of interesting snippets about the attack (original bold):

    Quote

    "5. The main essential to success in battle is to close with the enemy, cost what it may... The object of infantry in the attack is therefore to get to close quarters as quickly as possible..."

    Immediately followed by (more original bold):

    Quote

    "6. The object of fire in the attack... is to bring such a superiority of fire to bear on the enemy as to make the advance to close quarters possible."

    Leading to the, surprisingly modern (my bold this time):

    Quote

    "7. The action of infantry in the attack must therefore be considered as a constant pressing forward to close with the enemy. Owing to the effect of the enemy's fire, however, this onward movement can rarely be continuous, and when effective ranges are reached there must usually be a fire-fight... in order to beat down the fire of the defenders. During this fire-fight the leading lines will be reinforced; and as the enemy's fire is gradually subdued, further progress will be made by bounds from place to place, the movement gathering renewed force at each pause until the enemy can be assaulted with the bayonet."


    A quick, generalised guide to infantry attacks in this period is that they consist of waves:
    1. The first wave advances and- at some point- is forced to stop by enemy fire. They go to ground, form a firing line and return fire.
    2. Following waves reinforce the firing line, increasing the number of rifles and thus weight of fire until the attack gains fire superiority.
    3. At this point, the line resumes the advance, this time by short rushes with supporting fire, until they reach the enemy position and can get stuck in with the bayonet.

    This is not a million miles away from something like a current section attack (right down to fixing bayonets and fighting through). The tricky part is how you mass and control firepower when all you have is riflemen. The more riflemen you have in the firing line- ie. the denser the firing line is- the more, better controlled firepower you can put out and the better chance you have of achieving fire superiority.

    Right until you get shelled or you can't win fire superiority, or you can't spot/engage the enemy riflemen effectively, at which point things start to go all Spion Kop.

  6. Couldn't resist:

    Also, fascinating to see at least one voice on Twitter insist that the MoD will win because it has more soldiers, more tanks, more etc than Wagner. Seriously? Have people not been paying attention to the last year and a half?

    Also also, looks like Wagner is going on all in and upgrading from mutinty to coup:

     

  7. 2 minutes ago, danfrodo said:

    But what end game is there for Prig?

    Living a couple of days longer? Going down fighting? Hoping that Putin will see the truth those nasty MoD types have been hiding from him and then back him up? Who knows.

    He still seems to be posing as the loyal Boyar force to take things into his own hands by the disloyal lying other Boyars.

  8. 18 minutes ago, Battlefront.com said:

    a successful seizure of rail infrastructure in Rostov gives him a huge amount of power.  What he would do with that is anybody's guess

    Rename it Prigozhingrad, declare himself mini-Tsar and start charging the MoD to use the railways?

    Jokes aside, if what he wants is leverage to force the MoD to back off and get himself into a position of critical importance, he's going for the right place. The MoD have a choice between cutting a deal or trying to dig him out- or alternatively, Putin has a choice between cutting Shoigu and Gerasimov out or watching the war collapse.

  9. One problem to bear in mind looking up British doctrine/manuals etc from the time is that the British army was out doing Empire things most of the time. So the concept of peer-to-peer industrial scale war on the continent had to take a seat alongside colonial policing, punitive expeditions and general engagements against sub-peer opponents (comparisons to the recent emphasis on COIN anyone?). A year before running into magazine-rifle equipped Boers firing from trenches, the Brits were standing shoulder-to-shoulder repelling massed infantry charges at Omdurman, a year after they were sending raiding columns out into the mountains of the North-West Frontier.

    For the Germans though, Balck's Manual from 1911 is pretty comprehensive: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/64927/64927-h/64927-h.htm (the WW2 Balck's dad). I don't know whether it's in the original or this translation, but this version also includes notes on how other armies do things, which is very helpful.
    Include gems like this:

    Quote

    "Battalion drill is, however, necessary, since, as shown by the advance of the IInd Army on the morning of August 18th, 1870, simultaneous movements of large masses across country will be unavoidable in future wars on account of the great size of modern armies."

    And a good quick overview of the then open vs close order debate:

    Quote

     

    "In close order the men are placed so close together that they can be led by word of command and directly influenced by their officers. The position of the individual soldier is fixed; the men on either side of him interfere with his utilizing cover or his weapon. On terrain devoid of cover, close order formations present such large targets to infantry fire, that their employment, when exposed to the unsubdued fire of the enemy, is impossible and must lead to annihilation. Thus the hostile fire compels the most extended deployment..."
    "...In extended order the soldier’s position is not definitely fixed; he is not required to keep his body in a prescribed position, nor is he expected to handle his rifle by the numbers as in the manual. Instead, judgment, agility, courage, confidence in himself, skill in handling his weapon and in taking full advantage of the accidents of the ground, as well as unremitting attention to his leader, are demanded of the skirmisher.

    The difficulties of troop leading are, moreover, increased by the noise and other disorganizing influences of the fight, especially in broken or wooded country. Whether an organization is thoroughly trained and disciplined is best shown in extended order fighting, for, as the direct control of the leader on his command decreases, the demands made on the initiative of the individual soldier increase out of all proportion. It is at any rate more practical to develop this initiative than to try to prevent the disorganizing effect of combat by restricting the personal freedom of the individual soldier.

    In order to keep troops well in hand and to deploy them quickly in any direction, it is requisite that close order formations be retained as long as the terrain and the hostile fire permit. After an action, in order to make a renewed employment of the troops possible, they must be assembled[104] in close order without regard to the previously existing organization."

     

    11 hours ago, The_Capt said:

    The conversation has me wondering about the naval forces in the same era

    The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command by Andrew Gordon is a good deep look at Jutland and how the Royal Navy in the preceding 50-60 years, with a significant emphasis on signalling and how unwieldy it was having to rely on increasing combinations of signal flags. Hand-in-hand with that is the thread of naval command and control as some elements of the RN tried to adapt to either simplifying the signalling system or giving individual captains more freedom to act (including the tragi-farce of the HMS Victoria sinking- potentially an example of "Here's a stupid order, let's see if you're smart enough to not do it").

    In general though, there was probably more continuity in tactics at sea than on land. The ranges are greater, but there was no 'devolution' of command in the same way as there was in No Man's Land: where a platoon commander in WW1 goes from being an unthinking cog in a battalion-sized machine to being an independent actor, the captain of a ship at Jutland is still the captain of a ship the way he was at Trafalgar. Battles were still fought in lines of ships trying to destroy one another with fire, just at much greater range.

  10. Relevant (if blatant) self-promotion, but if anyone wants 4 hours of my take on where modern warfare came from: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLYvL90uFbwhO_2-ULfOsTR8EIz7VxbA27

    Obviously this is a big topic and there's a lot to unpick, but it's always worth bearing in mind that the militaries of the time were big chunky organisations with plenty of variation in thought. The Cult of the Offensive was absolutely not a myth... but that doesn't mean that there were no officers or factions in the mix pushing for armies to adapt to (supposed) lessons of the Boer War, Russo-Japanese War and Balkan Wars. 'Tactical fashion' ebbed and flowed over time, with attempts to adapt waxing in the aftermath of certain conflicts and waning as naturally conservative military establishments reasserted themselves. If WW1 had kicked off in 1917 and the lessons of the Balkan Wars had had more time to bed in, the opening phase could have been very different.

    It's also worth noting that the historical record is not exactly crystal clear: the British might have struggled at first in 1899, but once they deployed a more 'continental' level of force they crushed the Boers. Grant beat Lee because he was the first Union General to go up against him and just keep coming, no matter how many casualties he suffered from battle to battle. The French lost the Franco-Prussian War because the Prussians went faster and harder. And there are, of course, massive game changing technological developments in firepower over the same period that may- or may not- be changing the dynamics... but the victors in all those wars arguably won because they were able to sustain heavy losses.

    Not to mention the obvious fact that no-one ever won a war without attacking.

    RE: Close order massacres/ the offensive-defensive balance... Bussaco and Waterloo anyone? Column vs Line? If we really want to pull the thread we could maybe argue for Crecy and Agincourt, all the way back to the Thebans getting pelted with roof tiles in the streets of Plataea. I think the issue isn't simply one of firepower vs mass, but the ease with which one side can create the tactical conditions necessary for the other's failure.

    Wellington was famously a master of exploiting reverse slopes- using the terrain to mask his force, manoeuvre to block incoming French columns and then break them with the shock action of massed firepower at close range. Fast forward a century and while those factors are still important, all it takes is one machinegun team in the right place at the right time to achieve the same thing.

    Another century later and... we're looking at WW1 pumped up on steroids stood around wondering whether it's still relevant while a 100km deep, satellite, EW and drone enabled corrosive warfare campaign rages on overhead.

  11. We're in macro-masking/tactical deficit country again!

    Like in WW1, this war has revealed (or confirmed, or reiterated, take your pick) that the factors influencing success in base tactical interactions did not align with the pre-war expectations of the belligerents. So officers have been ordering units around with an inaccurate concept of what they're capable of achieving in the prevailing conditions.

    This happens all the time, the tricky part is figuring out what has changed and whether those changes are going to be important or applicable in the future... something people from a wide array of boxes typing in a wargame forum might be able to process better than a collection of people all sitting in the same military career box.

    Or we can at least be wrong in original and unexpected ways!

  12. 16 minutes ago, Bulletpoint said:

    I don't think this is genuine.

    It is a weird thing to capture on drone footage, unless the blocking detachment is using drones to find and follow friendly troops that run.

    Source provenance aside (looks like it's been taken down now, which is interesting in and of itself); the behaviour seems pretty coherent to me:

    The blockers might be screaming at them to stop all the time- that's not going to be clear without audio.
    The runners are... running, so they have to physically confront them.
    Then the blockers fire in the air.
    The two closest guys try to run, then the blockers shoot them.
    Not as clear if they start shooting everyone else, but it's on the cards.

    Worth noting that the two guys who get shot are themselves armed: that's a real danger for the blocking troops. Obviously they weren't taking any chances.

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