ikalugin
-
Posts
773 -
Joined
-
Last visited
-
Days Won
2
Posts posted by ikalugin
-
-
You are welcome, but actual Vostok-2018 final exercise would start later this month
It appears that there are also a number of other exercises and events going on, such as:
- large exercise in Med from combined forces from Northern, Baltic, Black, Caspian, Red seas, 26 ships and vessels would participate, including 2 submarines, as well as 34 aircraft. Flagship would be Marshal Ustinov cruiser. The force would be supported by Naval Aviation MPA (Tu-142 and IL-38 series) and fighter aircraft (Su-33 and Su30SM), as well by Long Range Aviation's Tu160 bombers.
- RVSN exercise, with mobile TELs being dispersed onto their patrol routes.
- Peace Mission joint exercise of the SOC countries held in southern Urals region (so in the Vostok-2018 area but separate from it), video related: -
Quote
Все соединения и части Воздушно-десантных войск получили боевую экипировку «Ратник», сообщил 25 августа в ходе форума «Армия-2018» командующий ВДВ генерал-полковник Андрей Сердюков. «В 2018 году завершено оснащение всех подразделений ВДВ средствами защиты «Ратник», — сказал он в эфире телеканала «Звезда». В настоящее время в боевом составе ВДВ имеется четыре дивизии и пять бригад.
it appears that all of VDV (as well as Naval Infantry) uses Ratnik now.
-
"Maskirovka" is a bad term in my opinion, as it adds mystique to otherwise mundane military concepts.
About terminology, A2AD and some other concepts used in the paper are no longer as popular, I wonder why.
I wish I could find (again) Kofman's review of this paper to link it here.
-
There are many factual mistakes (not to mention questionable narratives like the whole "Gerasimov doctrine") in the document and, to me, it appears poorly writen when compared to some other works on the topic, for example this book, also from 2016:
https://ru.scribd.com/document/361002279/The-Russian-Way-of-War-Grau
If you want I could list other factual mistakes that betray it's quality, other than say the above example (misidentifying S300V series as SA10 series) or listing BTR-90 in the Russian service (instead of say BTR-80 series) or other low hanging fruit.
-
10 hours ago, akd said:
It didn’t show up until after the game was long-finished. The version in the game is still the dominant version in service. I think maybe the obr. 2016 version has been seen with one unit on parade, and only just this year. The version with CITV (“B3M”) still hasn’t made an appearance in service, only in tank biathlon.
Both are still more common than Oplots or T90Ms.
-
Not to nitpick but quick look shows obvious mistakes, such as:
SA-10 Grumble (S-300VM)
(page 10)
which make one wonder about the quality of the overall work. I would read it (today b/c local time is 0020) soon, to make a proper personal value judgement.Did you read the books by Grau? You may find them of interest.
-
Still, more of them (working Armatas) than Oplot series in Ukrainian service.
-
Won’t that be the job for 40 odd existing Armatas?
-
Yes, it is that time of the year and the big annual exercises begin.
I would try to cover them, as it seems to me that they are not covered otherwise here and that they may be of interest to the public here.While they may not be as exciting as Zapad-2017 or Kavkaz-2016 to certain observers in Europe (as we can remember said observers claimed that those exercises are a cover up for an attack on Baltic and Ukraine) they do seem to be the biggest exercises since Zapad-1981 with 3 MDs (East, Central, North) and various centrally commanded assets (VDV and others) participating. Overall it appears that the overall event can be split into 3 main parts:
- surprise alert drills
- logisics/rear area exercises
- actual final exercises
Between the three above it appears that around 1/4 (some 262k servicemen) participated (and/or will participate, as final exercises would be in September) in the event,
The scenario appears to be combating a mass attack by a peer adversary, with a lot of emphasis placed on:
- mobilisation
- rear services such as repairs and logistics
- inter theatre and local relocation of forces (especially aircraft), dispersal (ie to back up airfields or road strips)
- counter sabboteur exercises (by some VDV air assault units and by Navy)
- cruise missile strikes (by Tu95MSs, Iskander-Ms, Bastions)
Overall it is unclear who is the adversary, as large scale invasion, which would warrant the scale of the exercise, by Western Forces seems implausible in the East and China is participating with some 3200 troops as an ally rather than as an enemy.Some footage by Zvezda:
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808210347-s1gh.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808220534-z7b1.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808211749-lo17.htm/player/
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201808230431-koxp.htm/player/ -
A bit late (but then I don't really post here much anymore):
https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160906/1476182016.htmlA new contract for 132 Armata based vehicles has been sighned, so it seems that Armata is moving towards LRIP and brigade sized IOC.
Full scale rearmament, however, indeed has been pushed beyound 2020 with all the delays, which creates a need for the T90A->T90M upgrades, as the Ground Forces need more tanks than the 1000+ run of T72B3s can provide.
-
Because this appears to be the current VSU thread:
http://ic.pics.livejournal.com/redplowman/77578032/4645/4645_900.jpg
In here you can see the changes in the apparent inventory.
-
4 hours ago, JonS said:
Lol, wat? Is this the modern version of the Wehrmacht-apologist's "Oh, they never lost a tank you know. They just sportingly abandoned them for no good reason"?
The detailed story has already been posted here above.
From the original data you can see that the fire is external.
-
2 hours ago, Haiduk said:
No. This is just a consequences of chose strategy. We can't now to offense with large forces, because there is a risk of large-scale Russian response like in 2014.
You clearly misread me, as I have explicitely stated:
"inability and/or reluctance", which includes term "reluctance", you can see the translation here:
https://translate.google.ru/#en/ru/reluctance
10 hours ago, Battlefront.com said:Except that it is more difficult to control three battalions from three separate brigades/regiments than it is to control three battalions from the same brigade/regiment. Also, it is pretty clear this is for experience because Ukraine has been regularly rotating battalions into and out of the line for 2 years now. This is also a way of dealing with rebuilding units when conscripts are released, good public relations in the home district (if all soldiers are gone at one time there's more problems), and probably other reasons that I am not thinking about.
I'm pretty sure that at some point I read that it was official Ukrainian strategy to have 1-2 battalions in the line and 1-2 in training from the same parent unit. It's very standard practice for very good reasons. For example, the US has many pieces of Brigades in Afghanistan instead of a few whole Brigades. You can't argue that the US is doing that because they lack the ability to control larger forces
Except that they are forced to use battalions from different units. This is actually supported by the practice of battalion rotation (units being unable to muster a larger force for new operations due to the low unit level readiness and other considerations, such as the difficulty of moving a dispersed brigade from the combat area). Then in addition to the inability there is a factor of reluctance that Haiduk talked about above.
This practice (to train at the unit level and rotate subunits) is actually another of the reasons why Kiev Loyalists could not deploy BDE sized force and instead have to rely on the ad-hoc formations of subunits. Again, I would suggest that you would look into the Russian experience in both Chechen wars and it's criticism in regard to using parts of units/formations (battalions out of regiments, regiments out of divisions) with rotation of said parts instead of full units/formations and rotation of full units.
-
"The obvious purpose of this is to make sure the widest array of forces have experience with combat operations. In this case the 54th Mech Bgd, 18th Tank Bgd, and (I thinik) 24th Mech Infantry Bgd."
From my perspective the obvious reason for this is different - inability and/or reluctance to operate brigades or larger formations. Compare and contrast with the Chechen wars. -
http://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/588879d09a7947708950103d?from=newsfeed
http://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12109321@egNews
More divisions for the god of divisions!
-
If I may copy paste information kindly provided by BTR elsewhere:
"The source is a Republic Guard commander who server in #Khanaser front. This tank was hit back in Friday not yesterday as #ISIS said, it was operated by Al Fatemeyoon militia The tank got deeper into #ISIS territory with Shtora off expecting not to face anything but a 23MM gun the crew got surprised by an ATGM hit the upper turret section and knocked out many vision sights and the machine gun. and set it on fire, another ATGM was fired into the side of the tank and injured the driver. Then the commander and the gunner abandoned the tank without the diver. He was rescued after one hour. After several hours and due to the opened hatch the fire reached the ammo inside the tank and exploded. but the turret didn't went airborne. If the crew extinguished the fire up in the turret, the tank would've survived."
If this report is to be trusted, then the loss was completely avoidable if crew didnt screw up.
-
Did you see the bridging exercise by the railroad troops last summer?
-
Just like the ammo for the new 125mm gun it is in production and service. For the Svinets series you would need a modified autoloader, with T72B3s (and the upcomming T90Ms/T90AMs) modified for such ammo. T80BVs/T80Us can be modified for the longer ammo as well, in fact it is much easier to modify them and it could probably be done in units (T64s and T80s in general actually).
But it would take years to displace the ammo used in units in peacetime. Nor are we likely to see it elsewhere unless something changes drastically (massive third party intervention into one of the ongoing conflicts or something like Ukraine fielding Oplots in quantity), as the current likely opposition uses cold war vintage armour (legacy T64/72/80 mods) which can be penetrated by the cold war vintage ammo.
-
-
We are filling out the UAV recon subunits in various units, sure.
Shoigu visits the newly formed 150th MRD in Rostov region.
Ukrainian MoD already complains on their social media accounts.
-
With the growth of combat strength of the Ground Troops we need all the tanks we can get.
-
This is quite possible, after all the voice over quality of the reports is also poor.
-
In the first video I see 90th TD using 2 T72B types, as far as I am aware they are transitioning towards the B3 standard.
The 42nd MRD appears to use a mix of T80Us and T90As, in my opinion T80U usage is a stopgap solution for the time being.
But then you would probably be better off asking BTR.
-
Those new divisions appear to use a mix of tank types. Below you can see the new 90th Tank Division and the new 42nd Rotorised Rifle Division stuff.
(this is the 90th TD)
(this is the 42nd MRD)
As a recap, currently Russia has, in terms of divisions already formed or being formed, usable against Ukraine:
- 2nd MRD (reinforced to a 5 or 6 regimental structure)
- 3rd MRD (standard MRD)
- 4th MRD (reinforced to a 5 or 6 regimental structure)
- 10th TD (being formed, standard TD)
- 42nd MRD (standard MRD)
- 90th TD (standard TD)
- 144th MRD (standard MRD)
- 150th MRD (standard MRD)
About 1/2 of this force is forward deployed in the jump off positions on pre 2014 Ukrainian border, the rest is deployed in the 2nd operational echelon and is being regularly exercised in long (up to about ~5000km long) combined (road/railroad/airlift depending on specific unit and situation) marches during random, sudden readiness checks (during which they march those distances in days from being alerted).
Vostok-2018
in Combat Mission Black Sea
Posted
https://russianmilitaryanalysis.wordpress.com/2018/09/01/vostok-2018-pre-exercise-review-of-events/
Review by Kofman, a good read as always.