panzersaurkrautwerfer

Oh lard jebus. Firstly just for the entire class, here's what a 140 mm round looks like next to lesser shells. This is clearly something that's frankly and obviously offers virutally no engineering challenges, so I have to imagine converting an Armata to fire something even bigger will be simply a matter of hours spent after work by loyal comrade engineers. Also interesting enough, so okay, 20 years ago the 152 MM was perfected and it's ready to go. However over the last twenty years we've reached the upper limits of what a 120 MM is capable even after upgrades. So riddle me this: How is a 20+ year old unproduced prototype not already obsolete in a 2016 world? It's not like the US went right back to the old 120 MM gun from the M103 for the M1 (despite having a 120 MM gun as one of the design goals. Also worth noting that it was only a pretty much 20 year old gun when the Abrams started to take shape). Speaking as someone who's pretty close to the western armor community: There's virtually no push for a 140 MM from reasonable sources. Here's how the old "Soviets have a new thing they're making!" dance goes: 1. Soviets reveal a thing. Claim it is impossible to destroy by HATO, will liberate French communists from bondage within 48 hour of HATO aggression via spetznaz troops against Soviet people. It is frankly invincible and oh wow the gun is 5 MM bigger than anything we have! 2. Defense contractors in the west start building plans for a HATO design that's got a gun that's 10 MM bigger. And it's sheathed in pure unobtantium. And it's personally piloted by a clone of Captain America, and maintained by a team of specially trained surgeons! WE HAVE TO BUY ALL OF THESE NOW 3. Simultaneous with 2, the one guy who believes whoever is change of the Soviet Union is the anti-christ emerges from his closet and starts screaming and throwing around products showing how doomed we are if there is allowed to be a tank gun gap, and it is only a matter of time before our freedom rests only on the efforts of our scrappy teenagers in the mountains of Colorado. 4. If the military actually wants the capability that is listed in 2, and likely has wanted it all along, then it starts parroting the "WE ARE DOOMED" line and pushes for whatever the new widget is, normally with the understanding that it's going to not actually have unobatnium (as that'll get cut by the first prototype) and the Captain America clones will be replaced by mere ninjas because the cloning process is another defense project no one wants. The end result is generally the same piece of hardware that the Army/Marines/Air Force wanted all along, independent of actual Soviet capabilities. If it's a capability/system the military does not care about, the scared guy is placed back in his closet, and more money gets shoveled into whatever military pet project is in the works. 5. Sometime later the Soviet piece of equipment is captured by the Israelis, BRIXMIS engages in sexual congress with it while the Soviets aren't looking, and it turns out it's pretty much the same piece of junk from 5 years ago with a funny hat. Right now we're at phase 2/3. Some folks are predicting the Armatageddon. Overwhelmingly the response from the folks I've encountered has been abject derision. I don't think anyone is planning to build something to counter the Armata simply because it's still well within the realm of unzipping by conventional systems, there's a lot on it that frankly doesn't seem to be well thought out, and it's being made by a country that has major financial problems. If this was 2009 or so and there was absolutely no perceived threat from the Russian military at all, that'd be one thing, but post Russian aggression against Eastern Europe, and continued saber rattling, there's been a serious amount of time and money spent into preparing for a Russian invasion (because let's be honest, that is the only way NATO goes to war with Russia, and it isn't like recent history makes that look unlikely!). Even the National Guard is getting in on it as part of a combined response plan. And I can tell you the Armata has exactly zero impact on the planning, risk assessments, military procurement, or inability of strategic planners to sleep at night. We're by far more worried about some sort of "polite men" BS, another astroturfed "rebellion" by imported Russian hooligans, or massing enough NATO folks to kill all those T-90As and T-72s that will inevitably be the primary tank of the Russians until likely well after I retire. The Armata is just another high profile Russian weapon that has yet to overcome the sort of friction that has killed every high profile Russian weapon that wasn't invented with the Russian flag had way more red. It may happen, but by god until the basic model is out and in service beyond whatever crappy knockoff of Top Gear you guys keep posting videos from, I'm not holding my breath on seeing a 152 FSV/heavy tank/magic school bus variant.

That too. It doesn't seem like it offers much more than just a normal every day MBT would be able to handle. If it offered better AT performance that's cool and all, but looking at a history of tank destroyers/heavy tanks, they went extinct for a variety of reasons, but one of the key ones I'd contend is their better performance in some missions (at a cost in other areas or just sheer expense) did not justify their existence in the face of having more MBTs. The 140 MM school of NATO tank designed died off for a reason. The 152 MM tank designs the Soviets dreamed up also faded away. There's not much that has changed in the last twenty years that has re-balanced the math on big tank guns.

And the 140 MM was mature enough to put onto trials vehicles too. I'd still be just as eyeroll if someone claimed that a M1A4 was around the corner with that gun, or if it was even a reasonable requirement. Doubly so if it was a vehicle that cannot do a lap around the block without a blue screen yet. Not to mention the gun itself is not the issue, nearly as much as the loading/ammunition end of it. And that was the messy end to both the 477 and the CATTB.

Self Propelled Soft Serve Vehicle. It ensures the polite men have much ice cream for novorussians and liberated comrades! Soviet, and Russian equipment is often announced to much fanfare, sabers are rattled, hopelessly optimistic claims are made. and then most of the time something down the road that's much more modest appears, if anything at all. Often new systems or capabilities are promised, and then forgotten in favor of the next way in which this system will change the face of war. And honestly there's the same crap from western contractors too, but there's a lot more external attention, and rarely is the weapons producer as in bed with the actual government who also owns all the various media outlets for one of those countries. It feels like the lack of reality checking often leads to never ending waves of Russian systems that are on the verge of taking over whole world, only to disappear into smoke and mirrors.

I heard all of those have been delayed in favor of the T-22 SPSSV.

1. The 140 MM push was largely because of a gross overestimation of what the Soviet armor arrays actually were, and an assumed logical conclusion that Soviet armor circa 1995 would be even thicker. As the case was, no armor outside of things like the late model Abrams/Challenger II and Leo 2A6+ approach the realm of needing such things, and even worse, the various 140 MM experiments frankly showed just how bad the idea was. It was too large, quite unmanageable, with a just a little into double digit ammo load. The trade offs did not justify the extra power, and it made for an unmanageable tank. A lot more progress was made in propellant, projectile and precision that allowed for smaller more manageable guns to remain the standard. Same deal with the T58, there's a host of reasons why it proved to be a poor idea, and frankly those ideas are still just as valid now as they were then. 2. The employment of TOWs is worth dissecting. It happened mostly because the Stryker MGS was not ready to be fielded, and the SBCT did not have significant direct fire weapons systems outside of the Stryker ATGM. This is a good argument for a FSV as it's a not-tank vehicle on a chassis common to a lighter organization that operates in tank-like direct fire roles. It's also why the various HE TOWs exist, it's for formations that lack tank like vehicles and need a tank's hitting power. If there's anything an armored formation does not lack, it is tank like vehicles. While there's something to be said for a larger direct fire weapon, historically specialist armored vehicles (US Tank Destroyers, Russian SU series SPGs etc) rarely find their way to the right place, and right time. The practical reality, and a big deal on why the MBT remains the armored combat vehicle vs light/medium/heavy tanks, tank destroyers, assault guns, tankettes whatever is that having an 80% right answer to the problem that's available in number is the right answer more than trying to find the right time and place for an assault gun, or a tankette, or a tank destroyer. / So if the problem requires a big, armored thing on tracks with a large direct fire weapons system, then the answer is going to pretty much be a tank. If you cannot have a tank, then something that's pretty much a tank with a bigger gun is not going to be the solution. It's certainly another reason to take what Russians say vs what they accomplish as totally different topics though. I have to wonder if this isn't a sort of cover for other Armata issues, like please, let's not talk about the MBT, let's look over here at this new thing! LOOK AT THE NEW THING IT IS MAJESTIC PLEASE DO NOT ASK WHERE T-14 IS RIGHT NOW LOOK AT THIS MODEL.

A 152 MM MBT makes fairly little sense in the wider spectrum of things. There will need to be a complete ammunition family invented for it, a new autoloader, and it'll carry like 15-20 rounds tops. If you put in some sort of, like Tiger tank battalion in which it was only briefly committed as needed I guess that'd make marginally more sense, but I remain unconvinced the development side and production of same will balance out economically. Also just the sheer size of a 152 MM tank gun rather boggles the mind, the 140 MMs of the 80's and early 90's were pretty challenging to say the least, while the unmanned turret seems to offer some relief, it's still a lot of weight, space, and ammo. Virtually everyone else on the planet is looking to longer 120 MM, or more advanced rounds simply because the bigger gun option hits diminishing returns pretty quick. The T-14 is ambitious enough that it's got a lot of eyebrows raised in terms of practicality. A 152 MM armed model looks very much like the F-35 also announced to have a two seated dedicated space combat platform model in the works level of "lolwhut?" What a 152 FSV would offer to mechanized type formations is also open to debate. The smaller more common 120 MM already reliably chews up the sort of things dismounts need to worry about, while it doesn't appear to offer much in the realm of anti-armor. Either way this is yet another moment in which I have to wonder about the realism or practicality of Russian rearmament, and how much of it is purely for show. If the US military announced a similar scaled program and then kept inventing new variants, I'd be just as dubious of the capability to accomplish it, and that's with a lot more money and much fewer obstacles. This also rather quickly torpedoes the whole concept of the Armata being "cheaper" in regards to replacing a wide selection of specialist vehicles by replacing it with a newer, more expensive set of specialist vehicles. It's not april 1st but I do have to wonder if this isn't some kind of prank.

In terms of FSVs, they have utility in the following manners: 1. They're able to go where you cannot send a tank. So they're air transportable, able to operate on more limited infrastructure, or otherwise are part of a formation that could not use an MBT (see Strykers, BMDs etc) 2. The country in question does not have need for an MBT, or does not have the resources for an MBT and the FSV is the cheaper option (good examples would be countries that still include World War Two armor in their military forces, they need a machine gun proof cannon, not a full on tank, or the M113 FSVs in Vietnam, Australia wasn't going to buy more MBTs, but having a tank-like thing had local utility). A hybrid direct/indirect weapon is sort of cool...except for I'd pose some questions about ammunition transportation. Either you need a platform that's big enough to carry a good load of 152 MM shells (which likely comes at reduced armor and mobility like most SPGs), or you need something else to carry the ammo for you (which seems rather silly to have in something within direct fire range of the front). Having looked at BTR's response though, lawl. The dual purpose 120 mm breech loading mortars make sense in the wider context of something that's light enough for a good ammo load, and also can be mounted onto lighter platforms, becoming sort of a light tank-mortar carrier hybrid. As presented it's inventing a position that frankly is just...god like I have to wonder if I'm missing something because I don't think the Russians are that dense. In an airborne type formation you get utility from that dual hat system because it's only one vehicles you need, no need for a direct fire FSV and a mortar carrier, you've got a Nona or whatever. In a "heavy" formation you already have, and will need to have MBTs in number so there you go direct fire support. You already have SPGs doing the indirect aspect, although with the Russian coms systems maybe they just can't control that level of fire locally effectively, but then that opens wormcan on giving precision missions to an FSV. You have mechanized mortars and something like a baby 152 isn't going to fill that role effectively. I guess if you added in a "cannon company" sort of analog it makes some sense, but a country in terrible economic conditions, that has to replace a wide selection of armored vehicles for the Armata's economic argument to take off, it seems like misplaced effort.

Verily I hath bathed in His Holy Ether of the JP-8 and returned a new Man of Steel and Wrath. Preaching aside, I'm interested to see what this Armata FSV is supposed to be. If it's just artillery, well, still doubtful but at least it makes sense. If it's a direct fire FSV, whoa boy am I going to be deeply amused.

So, are we talking self propelled gun artillery piece, or direct fire support? The light doth not dwindle from Him, but from His coming. When the Tanking occurs all who that mocketh the Tank will be cast unto the eternal foot movement, their heretical way lit only by the burning hulks of T-72s.

No, that would be silly. They do exist as sacrifices to the tank god though so that he might be appeased to pour his majesty on more deserving platforms. TANKS FOR THE TANK GOD TURRETS FOR THE TURRET THRONE.

I think it usually goes *hand signal* -recipient is not paying attention- *frantic hand signal* -recipient has found a random thing to look at- *rock is thrown at recipient, angry gesture* -blank look- *VERY angry hand signal, followed by a knifehand* -blanker look- *hand signaler storms over to recipient, very unkind statements made, recipient wacked on helmet. More knifehand*

Pretty much this. A lot of unsexy boring things are what makes certain pieces of equipment "good" while others "bad." Which is why some paperpanzers annoy me because they've basically totally and utterly failed at the unsexy things that are pretty much mandatory for functional military hardware, but can handle being shot and shooting back okay so they become totally reasonable choices in-game. See, most of those (Pershings, Comets, Centurions, IS-3s specifically) I support rather heartily because they're real vehicles with known performance. The E series Panzers might as well be complete works of fiction, and the T-29/32s are cool, at least we have pretty solid numbers one what they could do, but it's not even like they were sort of on track to deploy to Europe. T28/T95 are different, but still pretty silly. I like some of the earlier war stuff too, for the variety especially...but every game I've seen that includes prototype sorts of vehicles always winds up being ABOUT the prototype vehicles instead of being a good representation of the historical conditions.

I remain impressed at the level of denial. Russian missile, from a Russian launcher in a Russian controlled part of the Ukraine, as verified from every source that isn't owned by the Russian government. Yep. Totally a Ukrainian stealth SU-25 false flag operation/mistaken missile launch/swamp gas.

Interesting where RT poaches footage from. Nice to see a T-72 working as intended however

Re: Dances with nationalists Pretty much. It gets boring quick. I like the duality though, Ukrainian forces are stupid dumby! But somehow they're still beating up Russian ubermen or whatever. Re: Paper Tigers There's a lot of question in regards to Russian forces in the following areas: a. Will Russian modernization be able to undo the 20 or so years of military neglect? The answer is mostly accepted as "no" but it's a question of where it might succeed and to what degree (Russian Naval ambitions, and much of the aviation might be out of reach...but a lot of the infantry stuff and some of the AFV measures might be within reason). b.Will the move to contact soldiers result in a higher basic quality soldier? The jury on this one is out, while there's been improvements in training quantity and quality, what outside observations have been made seem to indicate contract soldiers may be superior in the long run due to experience retained, but at the basic entry level there's no meaningful difference between them and conscripts. This might see more dividends later as contract soldiers turn into longer serving soldiers. c. Below Company level tactics in the Soviet-Russian model have always been fairly basic, often their independence and capabilities more closely mirror the next smallest western unit (or in so many words, a Russian Company has about the same level of support and mission independence as it relates to a battalion, as platoon relates to a company within the NATO realm). This is largely a reflection of taking a lower education base for a shorter window of training and indoctrination. The initial article seemed to indicate this is still the case, but other relevant information seems to indicate the infantry guys were not regular Russian military forces. With that said the trend of Russian small unit leadership does not appear to have changed terribly much, which puts random lost soldiers or a level of disorganization on the objective (and a certain degree of "what next" in the absence of a larger mission) not outside the realm of reason.

I think it's more critical that Russians are always wrong, so really there can never be rapprochement. Joking aside, it is frustrating. It's a bit like being unable to get partway through a dialectic. Thesis: Russian forces in the Ukraine might be not so good at small level tactics. Counter Thesis: There are no Russians in the Ukraine this is impossible. Thesis: Pretty much everyone knows there's Russians there man. Counter Thesis: No. It's impossible because here's some stuff from Russia Today and no other sources. If we were dealing with more of a halfway position, that given the unit in question it's highly doubtful the commentary from the original post applies to actual Russian forces, or there were more of a depth to the "no Russians" theory, it'd be interesting at least. Or at least I'd be less inclined to break out the Rick.

You're missing the point. I posted the photo with fictional information on where it was destroyed, who it belonged to, and what happened to it. It was to show that your links are not for certain the truth because they too had photos and information. In most of the world it is a well known fact that Russian troops have participated in battle against Ukrainian forces. Putin as much as admitted illegally placing forces outside of what he was allowed to have inside of the Crimea prior to the fighting, and there have been well documented cases of Russian military regulars involved in the fighting in the eastern Ukraine. The use of Russian artillery, and air defense to support the various Russian militia groups in the Ukraine is frankly outside of Russia, accepted as entirely real, there's no dispute to it. The degree of regular Russian forces involved in the actual boots on the ground is less certain, but it is understood to have occurred. Certainly less than the Ukrainians have claimed, but many times more than the Russian claim of no Russian regular involvement. It is not helpful to dispute this simply because it is so outside of what is known as to argue the Soviet Union invaded Germany first in World War Two. In regards to the original post, it is worth discussing whether the troops seen were Russian regulars, Russian militias trained by the Russian military, some totally independent source or any of the previous two with Russian military support. It sounds like they were Russian trained, but not regular forces. It sounds like they're not terribly good at low level tactics. It stands as a question if this is the end result of being trained to the Russian "standard" and this in itself is unacceptable, or their performance was poor for other reasons. While off topic, this is an interesting look into the alternate reality Russian media seems to dwell in.

I think you're just angry at the total abject defeat of the 6th Tank Brigade in Iraq in 2003.

I will contend it's pretty hard to pick out Frank's AK vs the enemy's AKs in a firefight. Getting back to being grounded: 1. In terms of small arms, I don't think units in CMBS should come with captured weapons unless there's a really good reason. Even fairly cut off US forces seemed to cling to their M1s until the bitter end, Germans the same with their K98s. Occasional MP-40 using Americans or that one German who strapped a .50 cal to a Panther or whatever just don't really seem to fit programming in the odds for it occurring. 2. In terms of Panzerfausts, having them present in some supply caches seems about spot on. Some units certainly trained on them, and they were certainly available to Allied forces in not small numbers. Having a specific supply cache that contains them might be helpful though (or at "veteran" settings it assumes it's a unit that's been a scavenging). Perhaps the same could apply to some small arms (extra BARs, Carbines, Shotguns, an STG44 whatever). 3. In regards to vehicles, the following certainly showed up on the wrong side of the fence in a combatant role: M8 Greyhound M4 Sherman (both 75 and 76 MM) M20 M5A1 Jeeps Having these available with the proper german markings and adhoc crews as single vehicles would be authentic. Giving this as a straight forward option instead of trying to make players edit their way is the better choice.

I am going to make a turkey and bacon sandwich now using my george foreman. For reasons. I don't understand. Also seriously rickrolling in 2016 should be regarded in the same way as folks who hunt with blackpowder rifles or old school bows and arrows.

It did, but it's annoyingly un-useful to get bogged down debating "if" Russian troops operated in the Ukraine. There's some question to where they operated off and on, and occasional ambiguous encounters, but the "THERE ARE NO RUSSIANS IN THE UKRAINE EXCEPT PATRIOT DONBASSIANS" was a ship that sailed a long time ago, and it should be mocked accordingly.

You will know when you see it. You must obey. It will show you exactly how relevant I consider your links Also for reference: This is a tank of the 6th Tank Brigade from Russia Ground Forces destroyed in April 5th 2003 by America Stronk Panzertruppen in Iraq. The Crew 100% killed then rest of unit surrender. It is locate at 32.567973, 43.872561.

I could make the same list showing destroyed Russian armor in Iraq. Did you watch the video?

Did you even watch my link? I think you'll find it much more trustworthy than information randomly arrayed on an internet page.