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kensal

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Posts posted by kensal

  1. I don't know if anyone else has picked up on this but I've seen it in a H2H game I'm playing of the Bloody Buron scenario. My oppo laid a number of trench positions in cornfields and they were visible by me as a terrain feature from the deployment phase and before I had spotted the areas, not as trenches, but as normal ground (i.e. grass green) outlines in the yellow corn.

    I didn't realise what I was looking at trenches when I made my dispositions and ordered my pre-planned artillery, so it didn't impact on this game but if saw the effect again, I would certainly appreciate that I was looking at a trench system.

    Is this intended?

  2. I don't think I have ever seen a rule for PBEM play that prohibits it. That's not to suggest that nobody plays with such a rule, but I am fairly sure they would be the exception. Those types of rules that I have seen in the past were mainly for play against the AI to increase the challenge. The closest thing to a H2H rule that I recall was against the infamous gamey jeep rush, although that was an extreme version of gamey scouting that used the scout as a suicide unit to reveal the location of AT guns.

    Nothing gamey about jeep or Bren carrier or ht recon: there are recorded instances of such units being ordered to recon enemy held areas to provoke fire and so reveal enemy locations.

  3. The irregularities appear linear. Were the hillsides terraced?

    Michael

    Indeed so, although it seems vegetation and cover was very limited:

    "The ridges in the hill triangle are extensively cultivated by use of terraces. At the time of the attack, vegetation was sparse and what there was stood less than ankle-high. Some of the hills, notably the forward slope of The Spur, are almost bare. Even where there are scattered trees, by 11 May most of them had been sheared off at half length by artillery fire. Sunken roads that are little more than farm trails wind their way across the ridges; the most important was the sunken road which branches off from the Santa Maria highway, then winds across the forward slope of The Spur and northeast to Pulcherini."

    From: http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/smallunit/smallunit-smi.htm

  4. I like Kensal's contribution because it is an actual AAR, and because it believeably shows a real use of both the vehicles being discussed, and their role in the combined arms mix. Beyond that I don't know that it says what he may be trying to imply it says, but to be charitable he was fairly careful about the conclusions to draw from it.

    I note the following points -

    (1) the description refers to at least 3 distinct passages of combat, an initial movement by the German force in daylight, later night fighting, and "mop up" results to American forces bypassed by the initial movement.

    (2) the discussion of SPWs is limited to the first of these, the movement forward to the crossroads

    (3) there is no description at all of defenders against that first movement. It is described as a penetration, which implies some defense somewhere, perhaps earlier than the described movement, perhaps during it, but there is no detail. There is in particular not one word about any actual fire directed at the German formation described, *during* the movement described, or anything about a two way firefight.

    (4) The dominant features of that movement are (1) narrow axis, (2) dismounts closely accompanying the vehicles, not a mounted movement (3) recon by fire, hosing everything, not waiting for spots, full tank leading that (4) there is MG fire described coming from the "trailing vehicles" as a supplement to the tank fire (5) whole group moves rapidly, infantry closely following the fire and moving by field "bounds".

    Notice, there isn't any description of the force being checked at any point in that movement. Of waiting to outshoot a defender force. Of whether the infantry rush or firepower gets anyone out of the way - beyond a possible implication of the infantry being "right behind" the MG hosing, as meaning "before anyone could recover".

    (5) the lack of mop up description suggests there are Americans bypassed by the movement - how many right along the road, not clear. Also the description focuses on the action along the road (presumably as what he could see), but the full attack may have involved a considerably wider front with infantry leading, across routes that vehicles could not negotiate. But even so, lack of mop up and low American side casualties among the bypassed do not suggest a wide sweep by a line, nor heavy defense along the road axis.

    (6) the description is clearly intended to be normative and laudatory, not just descriptive. The end achieved, however, is to push a force to an objective - a crossroads - and then defend there. It is not e.g. to destroy an enemy force, surround anything, etc. Get there, then hold, is the object. Clearly the Americans on either side of the penetration could just get back (go around, wait for dark perhaps - no mop up).

    (7) the night fighting stresses noise discipline, not fire support by light armor etc. It is frankly an afterthought about a secondary normative point (be quieter at night), not related to our subject.

    I think the above description partially fits the SPW use I described as coup de main descent. Only partially because they still fight the infantry dismounted, to give the armor "essence of infantry" at the point of attack (clearing the hedgerows, deterring zooks, etc), where a pure coup de main might remain mounted and rely on sheer speed and surprise on the same task.

    My problem with it as an example of use of SPWs as fire support in front line fighting is, where is the fighting? I see a description of outgoing recon by fire to support a rapid offensive movement. Perhaps the observer just could not see any defenders or their fire, but there were both, directly in the German's path and at the moments he is describing, not earlier - we don't know. At any rate there is no description of any fire directed back at the tanks, other vehicles, or accompanying infantry.

    Maybe that is because there were defenders there, but they were simply suppressed or intimidate by the recon by fire, and got out of the column's way. In that case it would be an example of a meaningful use of SPWs for a form of fire support in front line combat, just doing their job by scaring the enemy rather than hitting him - still counts. Possible, maybe even likely, but we don't know, because the defender description is just too thin to tell.

    FWIW...

    I don't disagree with your comments - the description of the defence is absent but the suggestion is that some sort of front was penetrated, and I think the point is that the attackers clearly were anticipating the possibility of defence and were using, probably, SPWs, amongst other vehicles, to suppress any response. If there was a defence in fact, or, had there been a defence, the SPWs would have been engaged, rather than tucked away in the rear.

  5. This reminds me of a guy I met 40-some-odd years ago. He played saxophone in a jazz combo that toured playing in nightclubs in various towns. He told me once that during the break, he'd pick out the homeliest girl in the place and go chat her up. He said that they would be so grateful for the attention that they do anything he asked them to.

    I don't know how much of that was embroidery, but he was a good looking guy and it's reasonable to suppose that his approach worked often enough. I tried it and it worked for me several times.

    Michael

    Great euphemism, 'homeliest' :)

  6. It's also hardly conclusive, since there were plenty of half track chassis that were not APCs, and the author only says "probably...personnel carriers".

    I am happy to go along with the author's perception that they were probably personnel carriers, given that he was apparently in the position of watching the attack but not actually being subjected to it. He was able to distinguish PCs from sp guns, which could also have been half tracks

  7. There are a number of fascinating things about this passage, apart from the eye witness account of half tracks in a fire support role. The most interesting I think is the impression that the Germans effected a penetration of the front line by an intimidatory display of firepower. The witness suggests that the situation was fluid so the strength of the US forces opposing this movement may have been limited initially. The description suggests that the Germans maintained a momentum by firing as they went, the infantry moving from field to field quite quickly. The purpose of the fire seems to have been to discourage opposition to the movement ie area fire in hedgerows. The US troops are described as having been overrun but not suffering significant casualties due to lack of mopping up following forces. All of this seems to suggest that a sizeable German force used a show of firepower to push on to their objective while the US forces in the area may have moved out of their way or lain doggo while the attack passed by, thereby avoiding a confrontation (which they may not have been strong enough to win initially). It only seems later, in the night, that US armour / motorised columns arrive, in response to the German advance.

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