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Yes of course that is true. But unmanned does not equal autonomous. And yes, of course autonomous weapons will offer huge advantages to those who employ them, but at what cost (see video I linked to above.)? Due to the cheapness and ease of manufacture of autonomous killer drones (once the tech has been developed), the implications of their use by bad actors are horrendous. 
The world did manage to get some level of control over nuclear proliferation (somewhat latterly and post-hoc) - should we not at aspire to learn the lessons from the successes and failures of nuclear non-proliferation and at least attempt to limit autonomous weapon development? 
If we don't then we are heading into an utterly terrifying world, and one most on here seem to have just shrugged and set off down the road towards at the first fork in the road. 
 

My point to you here is to throw in the bin all your examples of amphibious crossings from previous wars, because what the last two years have shown is that war has changed immensely (as you of all people know). You may as well dig out examples of fall of France and Barbarossa to try justifying an argument for massive armoured schwerpunkts as a viable strategy in the current environment
It's not called 'a fortress of opinion', it's called drawing conclusions from what we are seeing play out on the battlefield. You on the other hand are bringing obsolete examples as evidence to the table.
At risk of boring everyone else with constant back and fourth, I've got no doubt what light forces can achieve against an overextended poorly organised attacker (Kyiv) or a depleted, unprepared, unentrenched defender (Kharkiv). Again, I say these are poorly selected examples for the discussion at hand. 
Sorrywhatpardon?! I must be fantasising this discussion then! 
 
That is close to my position, yes. I do believe the time to close down hostilities has arrived. If anything I am concerned that Ukraine's position will only deteriorate from here (unless Western supply delivery ramps up massively, which doesn't seem likely currently). I think the West will continue to do enough to keep Ukraine in the war, but will not supply enough to kick the Russians out. 
But arriving at this position is the product of drawing conclusions from observing how this war is playing out, not the other way round. 
 
 
 
I've been an admirer of a great many of your posts as a long time lurker here, but you do have a propensity to go ad-hominem with people who don't agree with your opinions. But going below the belt in an argument is not a good look for your position. You seem to believe anyone who disagrees with you is either a f*cking idiot, or a Russian stooge. 
I reject both accusations - I am a very stable genius! 

Thanks for engaging with my post.
I have no privileged information about what's going on around Krynki and the Dniepr front (I get most my info from here and various of the better-known podcasts) but I question several of your assertions, such as the two points in bold above. "non-stop attacks" and "giving better than they get"? Maybe this is true, but I question the data on this, given the first-hand accounts we've seen from the battered UKR marines. 
 
 
I think the first point to make is that if the Dniepr marsh/delta/peninsula area is so disadvantageous to Russian operations, and advantageous to UKR operations as you say, why are we not already seeing the UKR exploit this? 
I think that's probably because having some of UKR's best SOFs wading around in the marsh with nothing to shoot while RUS sit in their fortifications the dry land the other side of it doesn't really achieve much. 
I may be ignorant, but looking at the map I don't see how aviation attacking lobbing glide bombs at this zone of the front is any more difficult than any other zone? And I don't see how the BSF being in port changes that equation either? RUS aircraft will be lobbing bombs from somewhere over Crimea, presumably? Also see reports elsewhere on this thread of the horrendous bombing the current bridgehead is experiencing. 
 
Given how vulnerable Sebastopol has proven to deep strike missiles/drones, I really don't see the RUS wanting to build any major naval facilities much closer to UKR as would just be a sitting duck, no? I would have thought the whole Kinburn spit/Marshland area is a strategic backwater. You can't build on marshland - you can hardly dig a trench or a dugout - you can't deploy armour there, and you can't (especially if you're UKR) supply it easily. If there's a ceasfire and further conflict in years to come, it will be naval drones (launched from anywhere on the Crimea) that the RUS will use to shut down UKR shipping out of Odessa.
Yes, I could see special forces wading around conducting nuisance strikes and skirmishing, but much more than that I fail to see a) how it could  be achieved, and b) what good it would achieve. 
Your position seems to be 1: The marshes west of Oleshky to the K spit are of the highest strategic value. 2 That the terrain favours the UKR over the RUS forces. 3 Therefore UKR should engage in large scale light INF operations in this area.
I disagree with all three points, but I guess the next 12 months or whatever will prove the point either way.