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warrenpeace

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Posts posted by warrenpeace

  1. 1) Follow command, (or a follow the road toggle attached to move commands).

    2) Improved editor AI scripting. Specifically the addition of additional triggers such as location triggers, and casualty level triggers (to keep AI from needlessly destroying itself). One could imagine being able to have an AI that tries plan 1, but if casualties get to a certain level could retreat and try plan 2.

  2. I think Hister is correct. In my half track gunnery range the gunners are lasting much longer especially at longer ranges. I set up a gunnery range where US half track with 50 cal machine gun is at one end and a MG42 team is at the other. I then hunt the half track and let them engage until either the gunner is killed or the team is wiped out. Pre-patch the half track would win very rarely (<10%). I just did a test post patch and the half track won 4/7 times. Gunners are definitely surviving longer

  3. Okay I tried to determine how complete the company was going into battle on the 11th. From June 6-July10 the company lost 127 soldiers (mostly through combat, but nine were transferred to other units). They received a total of 92 replacements during that time, so it seems they were down 35 men on July 11. Assuming that they were at full strength on D-day, that would mean that they had 158 men on duty (193-35). With 72 casualties the rate goes up to 46%.

    One other interesting thing I noticed while compiling these numbers. It is interesting how often a guy was promoted after he was hit. I must have seen at least a dozen instances of privates being promoted to pfcs just before they were dropped from the rolls. It would be interesting to see if this was standard practice across the division.

    With regards to CM, it seems that the real problem is that the ratio of KIA to WIA is not quite right. Also, the yellow guys (wounded but still in action in CM) seem more frequent than in the real data. During the period from June 6 to July 10, the unit had 27KIA, 30SWA, 48LWA, 6 LIA, 6 LD, and 6NBC. I only found 9 instances of soldiers that were wounded but stayed on duty. My gut feeling is that in a tough fight, the Americans will have lots of yellow guys at the end.

  4. Here is a link to a massive excel spreadsheet that has compiled the morning reports for the 29th ID over the course of the war. It really gives a flavor to the daily grind that was ww2.

    http://www.29idmorningrpt.com

    I have been playing with the data a bit. Some things that really pop out are how short an infantry man's time was with the division. In the first 78 people I analyzed from B co. 115 regiment (selected by ascending serial number, and only people who joined in 1944), the median time a person spent with the unit was only 25 days. If the person was present in June 1944 the median time was only 19 days.

    What happened to these people?

    9 KIA

    3 DOW (Died of wounds)

    17 seriously wounded in action

    26 lightly wounded in action (this means wound was not considered life threatening, but they were still sent to the hospital and for CM purposes would probably be nonfunctional).

    2 lightly injured in action (I think this means no bullet or shrapnel penetration.)

    3 MIA (at least one was a POW)

    10 non-battle casualties

    8 appeared to remain on duty until the end of the war (month joined: 1 June, 2 August, 1 September, 1 October, 1 November, and 2 December)

    Another analysis I did involved looking at the worst day to determine percentage of casualties and what the breakdown was. For this unit July 11 was a bad day. 11 KIA, 9 MIA, 22 SWA, 20 LWA. If we assume that the unit was near full-strength going into action, this would translate to about a 33% casualty rate.

  5. Steve:

    I guess I am a bit confused by your posts. Could you please clarify if you think there is a problem with the Tac AI and half-track machine gun usage? I think many of the posters think that the Tac AI is a bit slow to react to incoming fire, i.e. the gunner should duck sooner. Is this something that could/should be altered?

  6. The change with the rocket fired weapons and houses would seem to present some difficult decisions to the Tac AI. Do teams always fire when in buildings? Does the tac AI take into account how many other troops are around that might be suppressed or injured? Does it take into account hit and damage percentages in making the decision? Seems like a really challenging question with regards to the AI.

  7. After many tries finally figured out how to win this battle. A real problem for me was the AT mines. Marking AT mines does not help vehicles. They still hit them and get immobilized or abandoned. In my victorious game I used the largest Howitzer to target the mine field and that basically destroyed it and made it possible to get my tanks into the gorge. I also moved my TRPs to allow targeting of all of the objective zones. Then it was just a slugfest moving infantry into the gorge and slowly occupying two of the four objectives. I used all my artillery to drive the germans off the objectives. It was only a tactical victory, but at least I finally won. I had very few intact troops at the end.

  8. Sublime, you are right, higher caliber mortars and artillery are effective against buildings, I was only referring to 60 mM and smaller, which are not so great.

    Whenever I try and use my mortars in direct fire mode they tend to get shot up. They are slow to get the range and are very vulnerable to MG fire. However, I haven't thought about using them like you do, setting up after the enemy is suppressed and using them to finish off the suppressed guys. I'll give it a shot.

  9. Ithikial-as an economist you should definitely look at Dupuy's modeling. There is no 3 historian subjective part, that was a fallacy propagated by ASL squad leader. You should look at the link I posted and his book to see more precisely what he did. BTW, I've enjoyed watching your videos on utube.

    JonS-I kind of agree with you. When looking at the actual data points in Dupuys book, there clearly would be wide confidence intervals in his modeling. It would be interesting to have access to his data and use somewhat more sophisticated modeling techniques which include confidence bounds.

    JasonC-I agree that the Germans viewed campaigns in a short term time frame and did not plan for longer attritional warfare. It probably stemmed from their faith in blitzkrieg which worked pretty well in the 1939-1941 time frame. With regards to Barbarossa specifically, I wonder what the German estimate was about how long the campaign would actually last?

  10. JasonC-You did a nice job in summerizing Dupuy. I checked the book out of the library a while ago, so I don't remember exactly how he evaluated battle "success", so I will defer to you on that point.

    With regards to his methodology, what Dupuy is doing is basically what a lot of scientists and operational research guys do, create models based on empirical data and then test them. My lab is uses a similar modeling approach to develop a diagnostic test to identify people with kidney cancer. The problem with all models is one of "over fitting", where you assess the validity of the model only using the data you used to make it in the first place. The interesting thing about Dupuy's model is that the model has been tested on separate valadation data sets that were not used to make the model in the first place. It looks like the model is right about 80-85% of the time.

    Now if I put on my criticism hat, I will point out that if one flips a coin, one will guess the outcome of a binary event (like a battle) 50% of the time, so saying that a model is right 80% of the time is good, but not great.

    Micky D-I've got to read that book!

  11. Actually, I see where you are getting this and how you are deliberately misinterpreting it. This appears to come from a report the Dupuy did for the Army. Note, the historian part has absolutely nothing to do with the CEV modeling (This is why he says "As part of this same task, a review of the findings of HERO's Quantified Judgment Model (QJM) on the combat effectiveness of national forces was carried out." ) Here is a good post that describes the basics of QJM methodology and how it has been validated. If your going to criticize it, at least spend the time to understand it.

    http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-war&month=0602&week=d&msg=k4qdqzoz%2Bwegn5N/r8zL3g&user=&pw=

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