LUCASWILLEN05

If they could just do something with AA in SF similar to BS hat would be great. The inability to shoot dwn aircraft is definately the weakest part of SF.

Agreed. I doubt any of the issues have been resolved. he Russian seperatists may very well take a bit motre territory if they can before the ceasefire and will use it as a lull to resupply and regroup. I suspect none of us will b surprised if the war is remewd in a few months in the spring after thhe rasutitsa season http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rasputitsa So most likely fighting will be renewed in April or May

Let's hope it sticks and does not turn out to be a "Yugoslav" ceasefire

If the AA defences have been sufficiently destryoyed thetactic can be workable. But for this o hppen you need a Combined Arms approach. The weakness of US air defences on the ground my well be a key US disadvantage for the Russians to exploit

Phillip The point is that the armed forces of a NATO country were attacked. It is highly unlikely that the US and other NATO forces would have entered Ukraine under the auspices of the NATO Council to give poltical, lefgal and military cover to the mission. And it is unlikely that the intent f the mission was to fight Russia. But something went badly wrong and, perjhps hrough a misunderstdig Russian Forces attacked the forces of a NATO State. That couuld well result in the invokking of Articles 4, 5 and 6 by the US whoose forces were probably involved. he USA woulld of course have to go back to the NATO Council and invoke Article 5. Historically this has oly happened once after the 9/11 terrorist ttack on he WTC. In our Ukraine case the situation may be less clear cut. But if the US was operating as part of a NATO force when the first atack took place and fighting is on going the North Atlantic Treaty is highly likely to apply. The Russians understan this and they understand, for the reasns outlined above that they don't have much timeto act being now art war with the US ad in every probabilty with NATO as wel. If they wait ad let NAO mobilise hey will meet the same fayte Saddam Hussein did during the First Gulf War (1990 - 1) To sand any chance of victory he Russians must act quickly and aggresvely. They must press the attack uin Ukraine, they must attack th Baltic States and they must undertake air and naval action in the North Atlantic and the Meditteranean Now you may regard that as Cld War thinking but you need to remember hat Russia's strategic problem in 2017 is exactly the same as it would have been during the 1980s and so is the problem fr the US. In both cases US reinfcements will have to deploy to Europe and Russia will have to delay them and attrite them while they are crossing the Atlantic. And Russia, as a continental (i.e. land) power must try to win the war quicckly before those fresh forces can be deployed. Effectively this is the race. And don't forget both the Russian and NATO leadership (political and military) will have had the formtive experiences of their careers during the 1980s, the final decade of the Cld War. Don't forget Putin is a former KGB officer. The senior Russian generals in 2017 will have been junir or middle ranking officeers during the 1980s. Much the same can be said for Western military and politicl leaders. Sure, there will be 21st Century features to the war such as cyberwar s Philllipp mentions. But that does not chage the fundamental strategic premises unde which the war will be fought. The geography is the same and it will affec war strtegy in exacly the same way as rthe Cold War. There will be new and untried weapons, technologies and tactics. As in 1914 and 1939 both sides will make many mistkes in the opening days. And, as in 1914 both sides will be pretty even at the start. Fighting will very likely be hard and bloody as portrayed in the game.It could very well become a vicious armoured slugfest. If you cannot understand this /I can only conclude that you do not understabnd the strateegic and logistical issues or the politcal issues

Here is a question about the scenario in June 2017. Once war breaks out between Russia and Ukraine 1 Why did the US and NATO send forces into Ukraine? In the first instance I very much doubt te intention was to fight a war with Russia? 2 More likely the terms of the NATO operation (most likely this would be carried out under NATO command and auspices) were to "daw line on the Dnieper" to halt the Russian advance under the principle of deterrance. This would be followed by a negtiated Russian withdrawl/ But something went wrong and fighting, perhaps initiated by the Russians either deliberately or more likely by mistake and the situation escalated out f control before anyone knew what was happening. The Russians may well have fired first but few believe them. In other words the war is a ghstly mistake. Would you agree these assumptions best fit the circumstances of the scenario? If you do then the North Atlantic Treaty very likely ca be invoked under Articles 4, 5 and 6. Even more likely if the original move into Ukraine was under NATO auspices and command - which would make a lo of sense gven the region and the circumstancesof the crisis.

Phillip "War is the extension of Politics by other means" (Clauswitz) Again you need to look at this from the RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE. You need to consider factors including 1 Russian History with particular reference to Operation Barbarossa. Note we are not talking about actual NATO intentions here. We are talking about Russian FEARS AND PARANOIA in regard to what those intentions are. 2 Russia's operational and strategic quandries. Steve and I both agree that Russia cannot win once NATO is fully mobilised and US reinforcements arrive in strength from theContinental United States. That is going to take several weeks in order to build up the force strength and logistics for a couner offensive. You seem to assume that Putin is going to be as stupid as Saddam Hussein was in August and September 1990. The Russian generals and indeed Putin (not to mention everybody else saw what happened. Putin and the Russian General Staff are no fools. They re not going to sit back and watch NATO and US forces mobilise and put the logistics in plaace becaudse they know they will get the "Mother of All Thrashings" if they wait and do nothing. Having begun the war they are going to learn the lessons of whhat happened to Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Milosovic's Serbia. They are going to have to press the offensive in order to hand the West a fait accomplli even if that actually means simply occupation of much of Ukraine and all or part of the Baltic States at the end of hostilities. At that point they can offer a ceasefire, perhaps accompanied by some nuclear blackmail (ie threats about using nukes. This, accompanied by hgh NATO casualties and battlefield defeats woul, the Russians would hope, be enough to bring NATO to the negotiatin table. Then the Russians extract evwery political concession they can get (eg Ukraine won;t join NATO, Kalingrad returned if lost, Russian speaking areas of Ukraine and Baltic States ceded to Russia. in excahange fo r which Western Ukraine stays independent with Russian troops withdrawing from terriories not ceded to Russia. A Russian victory in the 2017 would result in a political settlement looking something like that. Remember you need to consider this from the RUSSIAN point of view takng into account what they could reasonably achieve militarily and politically. How much of this can actuaklly be achieved depends n what hapens on the battlefield and, just as important, on wewhat happens POLITICALLY as a result of the fighting. I remind you again of Clauswitz' famous remark I qouted art the start of this post. Oh, and your assumption about Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty are ridiculous to say the least. I am bot sue you have eben read the relevant articles.Article 6 is also very relevant n tis instance, I specifically refer you to |Article 6:which specifically refer to an attack on the forces of NATO member tp be an attack on a NATO state Note such an attack is highlly likely to have occurred in our June 2017 scensrio Article 4 The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened. Article 5 The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security . Article 6 (1) For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack: on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France (2), on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer. And here is the link to the official NATO website directly to the link summarising the protocols odf the Noth Atlantixc Treaty. You should definately take the ime to read this! http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

Russia coud only effectively use air power and submarine attack on the North Atlantic convoys. Antisubmarine warfare is notoriously difficult because of the stealthy nature of this weapons system. in a 21st Century 3rd Battle of Atlantic the Russians would impose damage and delay on the reinforcement convoys. This is a battle the Russians would lose. But, if they can achieve their objectives on land defeat in the Third Battle of the Atlantic and in the Medditterranean would not matter greatly to them. And if Russia is going to have any chance of winning it must be a quick victory or it must be a stalemate resulting from heavy NATO losses and loss of will to continue the fighting. That means capturing territory, perhaps in the Baltic States as well as in Ukraine before NAO can mobilize and US Heavy reinforcements arrive to launch the cunter offensive. Aftwer that the very best the Russians can hope fr is a stalemate. NATO would need to attack Russian air bases within Russia itself and it would need to conduct air interdiction to restrict the flow of supplies and reinforcements to Ukraine and h Balic States assuming the Russians invaded them as already discussed. Other installations within Russia might also be attacked such as government/military buildings, media centres, power stations/electrical grid. Much as was dne durig he two Gulf Wars, the Kossovo Campign and the on-going bombing of Islamic State. General civillian tagets pobably would not be delibertely bombed althoug collatoral damage is likely unvoidanle, Regarding Russian ground forces. There may well be a situation late in the war where Russian ground forces have been defeated on the battlefield but they my be pulling back into Russia but may also still control parts of Ukraine or the Baltic States if the Russians have selected that varint. In this situation NATO ground forces may have a contincency for a limited ground operation into Russia either to sufficiently destroy the Russian military or to occupy territory that can be negotiated back in return for further political concessions and/or returmn of any territry still occupied by Russia when there is a ceasefire.

Phillipp I speajk as a History and Politics Grad (majoring on the politics side in International politics) it is actually a full scale war. You need to look at this scenario from the RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE taking into account the perceptions and fears from their own history. Do you seriously think that the Russians are going to allow US reinforcements to simply sai accrioss the Atlantic from the United States without doing a thing to stop it.?Same goes for the US Marines tha we know go to Crimea.. Of course the Russians are going to do everything n their power to stop that. ~Because if they don;t in a month or two the US are going to reinforce Europe witha couple of corps, which, combined with a fully mobilised NATO are going to roll over the Russians. And logistically his would be very achieveable. Which brings us very neatly to the second point. What the Russians fear most of all is a Barbarossa Mark II. The US and NATO may have no intention of doing this but, considering their history (reference in particular WW2, WW1, Napoleon's invasion of 1812, the Swedish and Polish invasions of the 17th and 18th Centuries the Russians are (and will be) scared stiff of the US/NATO doing the same thing. From the RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE the only way they can preven this is for them to win the war fast once it starts. And that means rapid and decisive action to occupy the Baltic States to keep and maintain the initiative and to disrupt or prrevent the buildp of NATO forces in Ukraine. The Russians saw what the US did to Saddam Hussein's Iraq in 1991 and in 2003. They know that, if they let the US build up there is every chance that the same thing will hapen to them. And, as the Russians see it this could very well be Barbarossa II with the US ad NATO really marching on Moscow

My point is tht you can micromanage too much. I prefer to think in terms of operating my companies and platoons. On ccasion I pay attention to individual squads and more often with AFVs. Tiis is because I view my role as most often being a company, battlegroup/combat team commander. \That said thee are times when you want to concentrate on critical small unit actions at platoon level. The trouble of doing so constyntly is that you can lose track of the big picture of the overall battle at company/combat team level.

I see the Baltic Sates as being a part of the Ukraine theatre. As for Articles 4 and 5 Russia probably triggered that as soon as the first clash with NATO occurred in Ukraine. I have a feeling that NATO moved into Ukraine, not for the purpose of fighting a war with Russia, but to deter them, stop the Russian advance and then work out a political solution. But somthing went wrong// I call this the "Camlann Scenario" thinking of the way te ffinal battle of Arthurian legend started. It may well be that Ruussian forces, moving into a locality thinking they were opposed by Ukranian forces. Unkown to the tctical Russian commander US forces had also moved into the vicinty. Someone. probaby a Russian, misidentified US forces as Ukranian. possibly because Ukranian forces were being, or were about to be engaged by Russia. This quickly developed into a full scale battle. Before anybody in the senior chain of command could do abything Russiaand NATO forces were engaging all along the line. In short the outbreak of war between Russia and the USA was a horrible misake. But both sides accuse the other of "starting it" and both have "blood in their eyes" so it is too late to stop and get a ceasefire, prticularly with Washington and Moscow engaging in a mutual blame game. The US calls a meeting f the NATO Security Council a and invokes Articles 4 and 5 claiming, quite likely with justification, that their troops were attacked first. Hence it is too late for Russia to avoid triggering Articles 4 and 5 so they have to act under war plans for full scale war in Eastern Europe. Kind of like he August 1914 situation except compressed nto a few hours once U\S and Russian troops clash. In retrospect the US Presidennt probably ets pilloried in the press and may well facre impeachment proceedings (an impeachable offence is whatever Congress says i is) for taking a foolhardy political decision to oder US forces into Ukraine. NATO leaders who joined in at that pont are likely going to be in some serious post war political trouble afterwards given the unpopularity of the conflict and the casualties. Many people on the street might well be calling it WW3 because it involves two of the world#'s great powers. While most, if not all of the ground fighting will happen in Eastern Europe (a considerable amount of it but by no means all in Ukraine there ill certainly be air and naval combat elsewhere. A Third Battle of the Atlantic would be inevitable - the Russians are not going to let convoys of reinforcements from the US just sail over without a serious attempt at interdiction. A Russian attempt on Iceland might bee considered but s likely to be too difficult to implement so just air and naval interdiction. Long range Russian bombers would be hitting targets in Western Europe together with missile strikes. Possibly the Russians might even attempt to bomb the US in retaliation for NAO air and mmissile bombrdmet of Russia. Naval actions in the Medditerranean between NATO forces including 6th Fleet and Russia's Black Sea Fleet and Medditerranean Squadron are also probablr as US Marines will be using hat route for their amphibious landing in Crimea. Naval and air combat between US 7th Fleet and Russian forces would also be likely lthough engagement in the Far East would be limited, particularly if Japan declares neutrality. In the Far East North Korea may ty to take advantage of the European War although a full scale invasion of South Korea might not happen. On top of that operations against Islamic State are likely to be continuing in 2017 - I don't see that ending any time soon. All this would amount to World War proportions even if little or nothing happens in the Far East/. So yes, the 2017 War might well be termedWorld War 3 by historians as well as the media and the public.

I suspect it pays to manouvre anyway. That is what I did in the Gauntlets Crossed svenrio with the reinforcing rifle platoon. Meanwhile the fist platon established a base of fire in the buildings opposite he apartment blocks. The manouverring rifle team moved down the right flank using the trees.Upon running into opposition at the housing estae he platoon employed Fire and Movement to occupy the area and subsequentl laid down an intensive cross fire in support of 1st platoon. When the engineers arrived a breach team from 1st platoon blasted through the high wall. The engineers and a squad of 1st platoon now stormed the first apartment building using close assault and demolition chargwes to "mousehole the walls. Having established a position on the top floor the remaining twov apartment blocks were cleared from the top down. The Russians attemted a final stand from a single sorey building but were rapidly overcome by intensive infantry fire power.. Most of my casualties were suffered by 2nd platoon during the fight for the housing estate where my tactics may have been slightly hasty and over agressive and it is my handling of that phase of the battle that I felt was badly flawed, dashing ouu along the streets befre adequately identifying Russian positions and suppressing them

Question is he extet of Putin's ambitions. Is he going to be satisfied with just Eastern Ukraine or do his intentions extend further to the rest of Ukraine, the Baltic States or beyond. Consider his Eurasian Union project. Is it a limited political and economic project? Or is he trying to rebuild the ld Tsarist Russian Empitre or the Soviet Union under a new brand?

I suspect we might have one or two. Sure, they would probably say that the game is not 100% realistic. But then it can't be. t best it would amount to a playable simulation of reality. But yes, it would be fascinating to watch an experienced soldier, particularly one with command experience at comny/combat team level play and talk us through what he is doing. We would all very likely learn a few things.

In my experence, sometimes it can be the other way around. I want to fire Javelins but the unit has other ideas. We have stepped ino the combat boots of a Combat Team or Task Force commander. Our job is to make tactical decisions regading how we fight the overall battle. We cannot be micromanaging every squad or vehicle all the time although we can make certain decisions. Uness we specify certain restrictions such as arcs of fire our subordinates, who (hopefully) know their jobs are quite capable of performing their tasks. Your squad commander percieves an armoured unit threatening his command and his perception is quite probably different from your perspectie at Combat Team Commander level. So my advce to you is don't try to micromanage everything. Concentrae on doing your job of managing your command and let yur subordiates do their jobs,

The wholle 2017 waris a speculative future history. abd it is a full scalle war between NATO and Russia. In fact a lot of people would probably be referring to the conflict as World War 3 even if most of the land fighting is restyricted to Eastern Europes Much like Hackett's Third World War scenario. It is true that Russia will be outnumbered once NATO have fully mobilized and NATO will have a technological edge. But NATO have to mobilise first which is why Russia will be trying to win a quick victory before that can happen. The Baltic Variant contributes significantly to that end. Please look at Google Earth and observe how a succesful Russia occupation of the Baltc States 1 Threatens to cut the supply routes to NATO forces fighting in Ukraine 2 Threatens Warsaw, the captal of Poland, an important NATO state in Eastern Europe Indeed such an offensive could even knock Poland out of the war which means NATO could only supply the forces fighting in Ukraine via Romania. Plenty of very good military and political reasons for the Russians to mount a Baltic States offensive in this scenario. An offensive which would not widen the war significantly since Articles 4 and 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty are almost certinly in effect anyway - remember Estonia, Latvia and Estonia are NATO members and therefore in a state of war with Russia under the terms of their treaty obligations. So Russia won't be attacking neutral states under international law. Russia has territorial claims on the Baltic States and this is the only time they are likely to be able to actually enforce those claims. If they don't do it in June 2017 they won't get another chance for decades, if ever. Examine this from the Russian perspective. There are excellent military and political reasons for Russi to conduct offensive operations into the Baltic States. That is even before we consider the risk, from the ussian perspective, of NATO conducting a military buildup there. NATO might have no intention of doing so but, considering this from the Russian view, specfically their historical fear of a Barbarossa II conducted by NATO. Smething Russian generals would realise very well would be mounted from the Baltic Staes. Russian generals are not likely to be fools. They would certainly be taking action to prevent such a nightmare (for them) by pre-empting the potential NATO move. We can only speculate in regard to how this war could be fought. There is a story about an argument between a US General and a senior academic arguing about how WW3 in the 1980s would actually be fought. After a lengthy debate the general, rather exasperated, says "We willjust have to fight the war and find out" The academic replies "We can't d that. It wouldn't be academically valid. We would only have one run of the experiment" Hopefully you see my point here

Of course, if I were to play against a real military professional I would in all probabiliy be soundly thrashed. Kind of like a decent chess club player going up against a Grand Master

Depends what the scenario desgner considered acceptable. While in the scenario I qouted the casualties I took were considered perfectly acceptable in terms of the mission I felt that some of them were unneccessary. My tactics were very aggressive which was good in that I won decisively but they might actually have been overly aggressive and maybe a little careless in that I got more people killed than maybe I needed to. I am probably being overly self critical here but self criticism can be a good way to learn from your mistakes.. On other occasions I have "won" a scenario by obtaining an enemy surrender but lost the game because I took to many casualties. I regard thhis as being a phyrric victory in real world terms.

Depends what you call a normal level of casualties. Some games you might do really well and suffer a handful of casualties. Or maybe even noneat all. Sometimes you may end up with a nasty slugfest and dozens of dead and wounded, In the Gauntlets Crossed scenario I gamed a couple of days ago I lost 10 dead and 15 wounded, winning a Total Victory. The Russian defence was almost wiped out having about 6 men left on their feet and able to fight - and a couple of them were cut off and likely would have surrendered shortly. While US casualties were within acceptable limits I felt I could have done better having lost men because of careless or overly aggressive tactics.

Morale is a funny old thing. As Womble says, if something bad happens (Unit B sees Unit A beig gunned down) or maybe even just pinned down that would be "somewhat worrying for Uit A. Much of course is going to depend on how well trained and motivated the units in question are. Green troops with poor morale should be likely to break or surrender far more quickly than highly motivated, well trained regulars. And of course combay weary veterans who havve just seen too much might well be more inclnred t go to ground. While not perfect the morale system seems to get it more or less right. That does ot mean it could do with a little fine tuning

Indeed it could. It would scare the hell out of the Poles who would feel ha they were directly threatened with a Russian invasion. And they could be right. An invasion from the Baltic States which had just, in this scenrio, beem brutally occupied by Russia would be a very real threat even if the Russians, like Saddam Hussein after his occupation of Kuwait in August 1990 had no intention of moving on into Saudi Arabia. The Russin army is far more competant than the Iraqis and logisically they are clearly far more capable. And, since such a move wold disrut NATP#s supply lies this woulsd be a threat that would have to be tken seriously, requiring the redeployment of forces hat might have bbeen sent to Ukraine to defend the Polish border instead. Militarily the Baltic Variant would be an efffective diversion on top of the other miliary and political effects. Hence it is certainly an option Russian military and political leaders would be likely to consider seriously. And when planning the invasion of Ukraiine it would have been planned as a contingency. Indeed Putin is reported to have made actual threats to invade the Baltic States and Poland http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/11106195/Putin-privately-threatened-to-invade-Poland-Romania-and-the-Baltic-states.html http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russias-growing-threat-after-ukraine-fears-grow-that-baltic-states-could-be-vladimir-putins-next-targets-10032378.html For this reason, in our 2017 scenario NATO can be expected to start reinforcing the Baltic States withi the first few days of the war. Which means that Russia will have to move fast in order fo an invasion of the Baltic States to succeed. With the current US forces TOEs we might see US Airborne/Light infantry types who are the most esilty and quickly deployed attemting to hold a position against heavy Russian Mechanized units. Later they will be reinforced with heavy forces. And with future BF expansions perhaps including Russian Airborne Units. Marines. maybe the Baltic Sates armies themselves and other NATO states the Baltic Variant can look even more interesting. Later on in the war NATO of course gets to launch a counter offensive in the Baltic States, perhaps after repelling a Russian attempt to invade Poland and certainly to liberate occupied NATO countries and to capture Kaliningrad. Anyway, all of this should generate some interesting scenario ideas. Perhaps units of 82nd Airborne or 101s Air Mobile (or perhaps 25th Light Infantry Division or 10th Mountain Division) might be tasked with the defence of Riga Airport or fighting delaying actions somewhere n Lithuania to gain time for NATO heavy armour to deploy..

There are reasons why there might be some limited oprerations outside Ukraine but inside Eastern Europe. A Russian invasion of he Baltic States threatens Poland ansd the routes needed to move NATO supplies and reinforcments. For the Russians it would secure their very imporant naval base in Kaliningrad. Later in the war NATO commanders might well consider a limited incusion into Russia to capture a city like Kursk that is close to the border. We are not alking about a Barbarossa II "March on Moscow" which, even if it does not result in nuclear war would require a long NAO occupation of Russia. Babarossa II would only be undertaken under extreme conditions such as a large scaleuse of chemical weapons with high civiliann casualties. NATO might also want to further destroy Russian forces so the Kremlin cannot do this again. And such a military operation has a political aim too. Captured Russian territory an be negotiaed back for Russian concessions (such as withdrawl from any Ukranian territory they stll hold or political concessions such as Russian recognition of Ukraine's right to join NATO or withdrawl of Russian support for the Russian seperatists. Remember, at the end of this war there are going to be negotiations. Each side is going to consider what it can use to extract political concessions

The Russians are not crazy. Russia escalating the war to other parts of Europe (eg air/missile atack. a military offensive to relieve Kaliningrad) is plausibe. Likewise limited NATO ground operations in russia to secure territorial negotiating chips or to destroy the Russian military are reasonable steps. The Russians are unlikely to go nuclear just because NATO conducts a limited ground invasion. Release of nuclear weaons by either side would result in a dangerous escalation to a nuclear exchange. Both sides are well aware of what his would mean. Further it is suposed to be very hard to get people to press the button in official wargames which suggests national political leaders are very unlikely to go nuclear unless the circumstances are extreme. I would not however rule out the possibility that nuclear weapons would never be used in a war of this nature. We have never had a war between two nuclear powers and so it is impossible to predict, with any certainty whether these weapons would be used and in what circumstances. If the war did go nuclear the most likely cause would be hum,an error or techncal malfunction of a warning system. Errors of that kind have been quite common and should somehing f that nature happen during a conventioal war decsion makers might not be so willing to pause and check as in peacetime.

Yes pease. It makes it much easier to know the correct flder to place the file in. K mistakes can be easily corrected but it takes a little time

In terms of how the US first comes into direct combat with Russia it could be like this. I call it the "Camlann Scenario" thinking of the tragic final battle in the Arthurian legend. Russia invades the Ukraine following the incident at the military base. After a few days consideration and consultations with NATO leaders the US President, with the support of NATO orders troops into the Ukraine with orders to halt the Russian invasion. In retrospect this turns out to be a tragic mistake. NATO umnits advance into Central Ukraine and moves into position where they are in a first contact siuation with Russian forces. The Russians know there are Ukranian units in the area but have not realised US forces have just moved into the vicinity as well. Nobody knows for sure what happened but the balance of probability is that the Russians misidentified US units as Ukranian and opened fire/ Within hours, before anyne can react to stop it events escalate out of control int a full scale battle right long the line. Consequently the US and Russia are engaged in a full scvale war niether of them anticipated. Moscow and Washington furiously blame each other. By this time it is too late to stop the conflict which escalates quickly and alarmingly ino a full scale European War. While the land ighting is mostly or entirely in Europe tere will be air and naval actions elsewhere outside the scope of the game. Many people will regard the conflict as World War 3 even though both sides will try to limit the fighting to Europe. I see naval actions in the Atlantic and the Baltic as a certaimnty. Very likely there will be naval and air combat in the Medditteranean and probably similar clashes in the North Pacific.