hcrof
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Posts posted by hcrof
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ilochim - I considered what you suggested but I think in this case it would not change the outcome of this fight.
1) I have a huge advantage in intelligence. I know where Mike is but he doesn't know where I am. For this reason he doesn't fully know where an attack is coming anyway.
2) Because of this he has not allocated enough assets to defend the north hill. He is stretched quite thin.
3) I want to concentrate my forces as much as possible at the point of decision. Since Mike has a numbers advantage overall now I can't afford to waste a single tank
4) Even if I wanted to send a tank to the other side of the map it would be very difficult. Mike can watch my lateral routes from his position and would see me shift sideways.
My AT launchers have proved quite useless so far. With all the wind and relatively dense vegitation I have a very low chance of kills. My southern launchers have been taking pot shots all game and I am almost out of ammo. Result - 1 enemy tank destroyed, 4 Freindly BMPs dead. Not a good ratio!
We will see how this attack goes. If it fails you can say 'I told you so'
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The other spotters on the south hill couldn't see anything, they could just hear gunfire and a few grenades followed by silence. A few seconds pass and suddenly there is a huge explosion where the FO used to be. What happened!?
They crawled over to get a look at the other side of the ridge. If the enemy tried to move down the friendly side of the hill they would get a nasty surprise.
In the north orders had been given and the commander ran back to their vehicles. They avoided revving the engines and crept towards their lines of departure as the first spotting round landed in the trees...
My Radio operator in the south died but just as the enemy overran his position there was a large explosion. I don't know what caused it but his men are probably all dead or wounded by now!
The artillery is about to start and my guys are getting ready to go. Mike has sent me an email and I suspect he knows what will happen. It doesn't really matter now to be honest, nothing short of a full tank company will stop me now!
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Well the vehicles were hull down and pretty well conceiled, the tanks were moving towards them at a distance of 3km so I expected the the BRDMs to take a shot. I didn't test with laterally moving tanks though but unfortunately I now don't have the time.
Any word on vegitation or 73mm rounds? I just had 7.62 appear to be stopped by trees now. It is quite hard to tell whether it is just the tracer disappearing (and an explosion on the tree) but the bullet is still calculated as moving forward or whether the tree stops the rounds completely.
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(Being British
) I think the English attitude mentioned in this piece is the right one. Terroists are somewhere between Tiresome and a Bloody Nuisance depending on how big the attack is. Its all very newsworthy but the chance of getting killed by a terrorist is very, very low. I could live in london all my life and I would probably just get hit by a car.The American response to the latest 'underwear' bomber is very telling. The attack failed and yet you wouldn't have thought it from the media! Security is now so tight that terrorists have to resort to ridiculous and unreliable methods like using liquid detonators and explosive nappies and the US media is terrified!
Be like the brits when someone drove a flaming car filled with propane into a crowded airport lobby. Condemn the terrorists, congratulate the guys that overpowered them and forget about it in a week.
Funny article by the way
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Wow, its becoming a trend now. Someone asks just as I am beginning to write a post! I must be able to feel it or something
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The Major called his called his company and platoon commanders to his command post. He wanted to brief them personally. He began to lay out the best knowledge of enemy positions and exactly what every unit should do...
On the south hill, the FO radio operator spotted a man creeping through the trees and let off a burst. The man hit the deck.
A few minutes later, the man appeared again and he squeezed the trigger again, emptying the magazine at his target. The panicked fire went wide and enemy bullets began to snap overhead. As he franticly reloaded something hit him in his leg - a grenade! A desperate kick pushed it away and the huge bang shook him. Dizzy now he turned and began to crawl away but it was too late, an enemy soldier was only feet away!
In the north Mike has tweaked his defence. He has moved some carriers and infantry back, occupied HILLFARM and put some infantry on the edge of the woods. This doesn't change my plan one bit. I now have 2 minutes before the first arty rounds drop onto Mikes position. The heavy guns will hopefully destroy a vehicle or two as well as any exposed infantry but their main role will be to create confusion and force his defenders back from the treeline.
HILLFARM will then be isolated and can be attacked by a scratch platoon of infantry and a platoon of tanks.
My other platoon and the rest of my tanks will then race to the treeline and dismount just as the arty stops and the smoke drops, preventing Mike from counterattacking. Finally, I will hammer and anvil the remnents of his force to destroy them!
Mike seems to be probing in the south, it would be unwise of him to attack though as it would stretch his forces, especially during my attack of the north hill. Just to be sure though I have prepared my defenders in a nasty reverse slope defence if he does. Hopefully I can hold off any tanks that come my way!
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Thanks jjhouston, an interesting piece of history. I can't seem to download all of it though.
John - I suppose it would be fair to say then that noone knows how effective an air campaign would be. Just that it would be very costly for both sides!
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Well after reading a couple of those links my conclusion is that the NVA had plenty of SA-2 (a pretty respectible high altitute SAM for the time, albeit with reliability problems in the climate), a few SA-7 (a pretty useless MANPAD) and lots of AAA, only some of which was radar guided. These were coupled with a small number of respectible MiGs with good pilots.
While dangerous, the system had weaknesses at medium altitude and advances in countermeasures and tactics allowed the Americans to exploit this weakness by the end of the war to great success.
Would that be a correct assumption? And if so, how does that compare to the massive and well layered AD systems found in Europe in the '80s
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John - A bit of a mix up of terminology there, as seems to be pretty common with this subject
By second echelon I was deliberatly being a bit vague but I ment the rest of the battalion or regiment.Thanks for the insight as to the air situation. I guess the whole thing would have been pretty messy! Could it ever get to a point where attrition means neither side has enough aircraft to achieve any major goal?
Grozny is a wierd one. The Russian army demonstrated everything bad that could go wrong with the system but to be fair, it was in desperate shape and all of the well trained troops from the soviet era had rotated out of the ranks. The Chechens however were all Soviet trained and demonstrated how the Soviets could be more resourceful and clever than the west had given them credit for!
Certainly if the poster that Vark quoted is correct, it would make a lot of sense
jjhouston - Thanks for the link, I have read the first few sections and it is fascinating stuff!
Vark - I would love to see what that guy wrote but I suppose we will have to wait untill he gets around to publishing it. Hopefully, demand from historians and wargamers will mean that valuble information wont be lost! I think the true story is that the Soviet army was very mixed. Some units were well trained and flexible while others failed to elevate past box ticking and textbook manouvre.
What do you mean by 'Real world examples of the efficacy of Western airpower v's Warpac equipment and docrine. Take any factors, and multiply by a factor of ten'? Western planes have never attacked a modern, integrated air defense system. The most dangerous thing they have fought is one or two SA-2 systems as far as I know. (Which isnt that much TBH).
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Well I certainly like the way that the game has got to the point where we don't get many of these threads these days but I have a number of minor issues that could be looked at. None of these warrent a thread of their own but now that I have 4 of them I thought I might as well raise the issues!
- 73mm HE fired by BMP-1s has very strange behaviour. It is devistating against troops in buildings but not at all lethal against troops in the open. In one case it took 5 rounds at point blank range to take out 1 guy!
In comparison, the 51mm mortar fires a smaller round that is much more lethal. I am beginning to think that the game thinks that the 73mm HE round is HEAT and the explosive power is reduced accordingly.
- HE fired from tanks explodes when hitting trees. Every time. It seems that even the smallest shrub can cause premature detonation of the round. These rounds don't explode in the violent conditions inside the gun barrel yet a leaf manages to trigger detonation! Savegame available (v1.20 I'm afraid)
- Simerlarly and in the same savegame I have a Stryker firing .50cal though a tree. Or rather it would be had the rounds not began to explode on the tree. The target was destroyed eventually but far too many rounds were stopped by the foliage.
- This one never got followed up. I should have bumped it a long time ago
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One question I have to ask is about the effect of western air power on Warpac forces in our hypothetical mid 80's war. It was the one area in which the west had an advantage but how vital would it be?
Given that the soviets had a huge and sophisticated air defence network ready to protect its troops as well as thousends of planes ready to intercept western attackers, would the west be able to inflict significant damage on the ground forces? Even if they could, would massive attrition render air power irrelevent within a few weeks?
On the other hand, recent wars have shown that air power has a tremendous effect on the troops on the ground. Even if there is no significant material damage, the morale effects are huge and the confusion that results from a successful attack multiplies its effects many times.
So, would western air power significantly hamper progress in any campaign in europe or had the Soviets managed to nullify its effects?
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I think many of these details can be gotten right only in 3d mode. If editing the map (tiles and elevation) in 3d mode is a huge task, do you think it would be possible to make a small change to Editor that would make it easier to change the map in 2d mode?
my idea would be to have a "cursor" the size of one map tile. You could move it in 3d Preview mode (like actions spots are shown when placing a waypoint when you play the game) and when exiting back to 2d mode, this cursor would be visible in 2d map also.
So it would be possible to find just the right places on the map that you want to change in 3d Preview, move cursor to that place and then make the changes in 2d mode. I think this would be a very useful feature for very many map making tasks: placing buildings, deciding where a road should make a turn, how big some field should be etc. It's very time consuming to get these right in current 2d mode.
I like this idea, the battlefield makes a lot more sense in 3D mode but can only be edited in 2D. Some way to pass information the other direction would be very helpful when putting in micro terrain features and ironing out kinks like cliffs appearing where you don't want them.
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Vark,
I think whoever wrote that article didn't realize a) how important fast decision making is in battle,
how few decision makers the Red Army has, and c) the vital facts that only officers have maps and that the staff is minuscule. When the M1 Abrams first arrived in Europe, we soon began receiving reports of the havoc it was causing because the type was so unprecedentedly fast and quiet, resulting in overrunning the encampments of a sleeping foe in combat exercises. What was happening is that the M1 was rewriting the book on armored warfare because it could operate inside the foe's OODA (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act) loop. Now, imagine trying to deal with a force trained to operate on such principles which is systematically killing scarce leaders whenever and wherever found.
The Red Army's battle drills and prebattle terrain orientation are helpful, but only up to a point, in dealing with "Kill the command vehicle!" attacks. That point is when the attacking force first leaves what it was directly shown and/or the enemy does something unexpected, causing the smooth mechanism of the assault to jam, kink and tear. A good time for NATO to COMJAM, I might add! At the company level, if Tank, there is no XO. If Motor Rifle and he survives the same blow that kills his CO (in same BMP or BTR!) I think the zampolit might be able to step in, and he may or may not be any good. If not, a surviving platoon leader (and PLs would be Priority 2 targets in either type of company) just inherited the company and now has to assume command while his formation is being cut to pieces. He has no maps, for those died with his company commander. Now what?
Here's what! If it happened in the Cold War, with nothing exploding and no projectiles rending the air, units are going to start to get lost! Plenty of accounts exist of Western military observers and such helping lost Red Army formations find their way even in East Germany. Care to bet the signage will be right? They won't dare retreat (KGB and political reliability stool pigeons in their own unit will shoot them), but they may very well simply stop. Exercising initiative to reconnect will be alien to these "battlefield promotees," and there will likely be bedlam in and between the tanks. In this situation, the leanness of the Red Army works against it, acculturation works against it, military tradition works against it, as do human nature and conflicting political power centers. Multiply this across an entire zone of contact, and the sharp spearhead gets blunt in a hurry. Throw in unending pressure from behind, and it starts to create a "trying to push a wet noodle" effect, in turn creating a succession of juicy interdiction targets at all levels. If things start to slow down the advance, the Red army's attack begins to fall apart. This is precisely why things like FASCAM and GATOR, not to mention EXJAM (Expendable Jammers) caused so much consternation when identified, especially when applied to the deep exploitation OMGs, for they threatened to negate the entire approach and could simply be injected into the formation proper, rather than merely wreaking havoc on the point elements as would be the case for a normal minefield or roadblock. How do you clear a route when anything that moves is likely to set off another mine, further screwing up the route? When the radio is a sea of earsplitting screeching? Even worse after MLRS, SADARM and the Air Force's SFW arrived!
Nor are higher HQs (regiment up) themselves immune from attack. And they're easier to find, less mobile and have substantial emission signatures. They are, in today's parlance, HVUs. In between, I'd be gunning for every ACRV ( http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/mt-lbu.htm), PRP-3 ( http://topgun.rin.ru/cgi-bin/units.pl?field=8&unit=2376&lng=eng ), SNAR-10 ( http://www.janes.com/articles/Janes-C4I-Systems/SNAR-10-battlefield-surveillance-radar-Big-Fred-Russia-and-the-CIS.html ) and anything with a "K" in its designator (T-64K, BMP-1K, etc) , since that letter denotes a command function and a 10-meter antenna on a static vehicle if it's actually exercising command. This would wreak havoc on seeing the battlefield, gutting fire support and actually being able to control now decapitated formations.
Naturally, there'd be other targets, but I provide this to show what can happen when command is systematically targeted, with "eyes" poked out, "ears" removed (SIGINT would be on high ground, at least initially, and intercept vans are soft targets), "fingers" lopped off or broken along the way, "fists" shattered before/during slicing off the various "heads," leaving the rest to be dealt with later.
Hackett, in both of his Third World War: August 1985 books, fully subscribed to the "Kill the commander!" model clear up to Front in his first book, and I don't recall Suvorov's presence in the second changed that. Indeed, this was one of the things that forced the hardliners to go nuclear, for their grand offensive had stalled, in significant part, precisely because of that core NATO practice. In reality, there'd be a judgment call made, assets permitting, on whether to jam or destroy a given command node, depending on how good and useful the intel "take" was from intercepts. In battle, lots of stuff goes out in clear or with minimal coding of key aspects, such as terrain references. This is because there's so much going on and there's no time. How much more would this be true were commanders and their radio/cipher guys blowing up left and right or being sniped by SBUs (Stay Behind Units)?
The author of that article would have to mount an incredibly compelling argument to offset what I've just described as likely.
As for Assault, I own the series, including the Suvorov module Reinforcements, but I haven't played it much (showed up after my gaming group both semi dissolved and had moved into things like Up Front). I do agree that the order system is pretty slick, since it rewards battle drills and punishes excursions therefrom, neatly reflecting how the Russians operate. If you want real initiative from the Russians, play Spetsnaz!
jjhouston,
I own several in that series and have read all but the last, which is wholly new to me.
hcrof,
Glad you enjoyed that, but you're definitely going to want to read the other two. The second's on supply and logistics, while the third has the nuts and bolts of who and what's in a given formation.
Regards,
John Kettler
Interesting post John, I spent so long researching Soviet practise I never got around to finding out what NATO planned to do to stop them at the tactical level. I asked a couple of old BAOR officers but they were not very helpfull (we'll just muddle through, we always do).
I think I agree with Vark though here. You kill the company commander but the platoon commanders have been briefed on what the immediate and subsequent objectives are so would just roll forward to take them. At the end of the day, even if just one platoon commander keeps going, all the others have to do is follow him! Because the company commanders have so little authority, their loss is not that important.
Even if they subsequently stop due to lack of comms (Quite likely IMO) they have done their job. The second echelon rolls on through to continue pressing the attack.
Result: Battalion becomes combat ineffective but it has torn a hole in the defences through which the rest of the regiment pours.
Now if you were able to take out the regimental commander you would cause some serious problems. In that case the attack would probably grind to a halt because the second echelon would never be committed.
Edit: Surely a better way to stall an attack would be small, local counterattacks to the flanks of the attacking force? This would cause a monumental amount of confusion amongst the junior commanders who wouldn't be able to deal with the change in circumstances.
About the MRL story. On paper at least, the political officer does not have authority over the commander he is attached to. I wonder where the difference is between paper and practise?
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Just finished FM 100-2-1. (I have a hangover so wasn't going anywhere
) Its very good and while it does overlap with Isby's book it complements it very well by filling in a lot of gaps. In fact it pretty much answered all the questions I had after reading it! It really makes me want to go back to designing my RvR metacampaign (All that information makes it pretty easy to model a Soviet style force!) but unfortunately the game still can't handle it
When CMSF can handle 4x4km maps and includes red trucks ill start development again.
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Wow, thanks for the links guys. I look forward to reading through all this material!
I desperately want a cold war game from Battlefront, I tried WinSpMBT but I just couldnt fight my way through the user interface. I had no idea where all the hills where, the screen was too small and when controlling that many units you need to have a really streamlined interface!
BFC - Vark was right, look at the demographic! Your audience are all cold warriors itching for a chance to see 'what if'? The success of World in conflict shows there is an interest amongst younger players too and the battles would be even more balenced than WW2! Sounds like the perfect war game to me
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I get the feeling that your average BMP is stuffed to the gills with ammo and rockets of all sorts which the squad has managed scrounge. Even if it doesn't fit inside, there are many pictures of BMPs with boxes lashed to the outside of the vehicle.
While this may not be parade ground practise it seems very common in combat zones.
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well taccovert may be right. I don't generally try to destroy armour with artillery though because my opponent generally just moves the vehicles and they are safe. My thinking behind the armour mission is because that ellipse is where I want the rounds to go - I want the tighter grouping. The linear fire mission is general to spread the rounds out a bit off the line.
I don't think Mike will lose any vehicles with the barrage but the confusion it causes will prevent him from putting up effective resistace to my attack.
Right now we are just staring at each other, Mike is dropping airburst occasionally in front of me to discourage another infantry attack. Fat lot of good that will do him :cool:
A question. If I use all my mortar HE, can I still use the smoke rounds?
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John - I have fought a couple of battles using real world soviet doctrine and it works well. However, they were fought under the assumption that the higher ups had done their jobs right so I had a large overmatch in terms of forces (About 2-1). I suspect that against a human player with similar combat power they would not go so well!
The way I did it was by giving all my orders at the start of the battle and once I pressed play, I was only allowed to keep my vehicles in formation, issue targetting information and use artillery. No last minute changes in plans! Formations of course were key as the Soviets placed a lot of emphasis on them.
As an example, I attacked a dug in and reinforced infantry company (Regulars) with a Mech company supported by a tank platoon and howitzer battery. I took 1 vehicle loss and less than 10 casualties using the above restrictions. I didn't even have to dismount my infantry!
My only regret is that we can't use bigger maps and so do it properly. I want to give my orders to a few battalions and watch the sparks fly!
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MikeyD - I think you are right, there is little need to simulate MANPADs in the game as the threat can be introduced by the scenario designer. If they were to include SAM and AA HMGs I would be a happy man though!
John - we seem to be converging on a point here
I think we both agree on the effects of the stinger but we diverge on the extent of those effects. Unfortunately, I don't think that anything will ever prove it one way or the other!I actually have both 'The bear went over the mountain' as well as its companion book 'The other side of the mountain' (From the perspective of the Muj) as .pdf documents if you can bear to read them on a computer screen. PM me your email address if you want them.
More information can be found in this excellent MP.net thread, which is a general thread about the Soviets in Afghanistan but has lots of info about the effect of stingers and military operations conducted under the threat of them.
One of the posters, 16 OBr SpN was a member of a Spetznaz unit actually fighting in afghanistan and he provides some first hand commentary of the war. Take from it what you will, there is a certain pro Soviet slant to his posts
. It does provide an interesting counterpoint to the information found in the US DoD though.Edit: I found 'The bear went over the mountain' online, here it is:
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As the battalion commander watched the remnants of his force flee the hilltop he heard on the radio that the second BMP near BIGFARM had been lost. This battle had gone from bad to worse and thoughts of retreat flickered in his head.
Suddenly a new voice on the radio:
'This is 3 battery – we have set up and are cleared to fire'
Artillery support! Time to start again! And this time there will be no half hearted attacks. This time it will be all or nothing!
OK, artillery support has arrived, my guys are back in the carriers and I have calmed down somewhat. From now on the battle has changed. My new objectives are to throw Mike off the hill and use that as a platform to bombard his forces with HE causing me to win due to him taking more losses than me. To do this I will use very large amounts of artillery!
My fireplan, it will take about 14 minutes to arrive
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Well we might have to agree to disagree here. I agree that disuading an air attack represents a victory for the SAM operator and that the stinger reduced the effectiveness of Soviet air power from the end of 1986 until more or less the end of the war (although by 1989 it was basically back to normal). However, you talk like stinger provided an iron barrier covering the whole of afghnistan against which the soviets could do nothing!
The two things the Muj feared most: the Mi-24 HIND and the Su-25 FROGFOOT, were all but checkmated by the Stinger.HUMINT was able to locate many of the missiles so they could be avoided and new tactics (like creating large wolfpacks of a mix of MI-8s and MI-24s) and countermeasures (like flares and armour) ment that relatively few aircraft were destroyed by the stinger after the initial suprise. For example, even according to your own sources, after modification against stinger, not a single SU-25 was shot down! Because of this, the soviets were still able to use their aircraft throughout the war. For close support, artillery was often substituted for CAS in hot locations and even after the introduction of the stinger, there are still countless stories of VDV being inserted by helicopters as before. For example, on the 12th april 1987, 2 battalions of VDV were dropped in the 'Melava' region in Nangarhar province supported by CAS from both MI-8 and MI-24 helicopters. Fighting against an estimated 500 Mujahadin, no aircraft were lost and the ground troops took 2KIA/3WIA(Grau, L. The Bear Went Over The Mountain, Soviet combat tactics in Afghnistan)
Vietnam showed the americans how important helicopters are in a counterinsurgent campaign and the soviets learned this too (eventually!). They still used them extensively after the stinger was introduced so I would say that my understanding of the word 'problematic' is that the problem can be solved
I would argue that the reason the soviets lost the war was not because of any Wunderwaffe imported from the US but the complete inability of the Soviets to commit to the war (I imagine they were very reluctent to weaken their abilities to defend their western border). They didn't provide enough troops, were very reluctent to change Motorised troops to light infantry, didn't do enough to support the troops once they were there but most importantly, they failed to justify the war in the eyes of the conscript troops and therefore the population in general. Gorbachev had already ordered his generals to prepare for withdrawel by 1984 and the escalation in violence in 1984-86 was a last ditch effort to salvage the situation so the troops could leave (I suppose you could call it a a 'surge'
). Based on that, I would say the stinger did not win the war. -
I'm not even going to write up the next turn. I am just speechless with anger. I told my rogue BMPs to drive as fast as they could down to the river after their missile hits so they can get protection from the trees. They decide to reverse a bit in the other direction and stop in the middle of a field.
Meanwhile Mike sees the threat, moves his tank to safety and fires. I lose 1 rogue BMP and another one providing overwatch in a hull down location.
I shouldn't get emotional but seriously wtf!?
And where the hell is my arty!?
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Very interesting posts John. Firstly, the Stinger issue. I think that this article is an excellent overview of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and I learned a few things from it too. I didn't know that BMDs were too light to set off mines! However the part that you quoted doesn't change my opinion of the Stinger at all, the key word here is 'problematic'.
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/20thcentury/articles/sovietexperience.aspx(Fair Use)
"Surface to air missiles acquired by the Mujahideen from covert U.S. weapons programs proved problematic for Soviet aviation operations. The introduction of more effective surface to air missiles including the Stinger in 1986 significantly affected Soviet air operations in Afghanistan. The Stinger, a U.S. made man-portable system, weighs 34 pounds, is 5 feet long, and has a maximum range of 5,800 meters and maximum altitude of 3,500 meters. Their use forced the Soviets to greatly increase attack air speed and stop spending time over target. Fighters and bombers were forced to increase attack height from 2,000-4,000 feet to around 10,000 feet.[25] The Mujahideen, despite not having received a great deal of training on the missile, were able to hit Soviet aircraft out to a distance of 4,800 meters and up to 2,000 meters in elevation.[26] The greater altitudes forced upon Soviet close air support aircraft due to the effectiveness of the Stingers significantly reduced the accuracy of their bombing. The added danger of flying over target areas thought to have Stingers as part of their air defense arsenal increased the threat to Soviet pilots. As a result, "Soviet pilots proved far less willing to fly as many missions or as demanding high-risk sorties".[27] The sharp decrease in the ability of fixed-wing aircraft to find and kill targets allowed the Mujahideen to move through the country far more easily and restore their supply lines.
The main targets of the Mujahideen were Soviet helicopters, which also proved to be vulnerable to the Stingers. This meant according to author and historian Lester Grau, "The Soviet Command had to severely limit the employment of helicopters, especially during daylight".[28] The forced changes in Soviet aviation tactics had profound effects on the battlefield. Helicopters were less effective in providing direct fire support as pilots reduced the amount of time over targets thought to have Stingers.
More than just combat missions were affected. Casualty evacuation, once predominantly executed by helicopters, was significantly reduced. A Soviet combatant remembered, "Until 1987 all of our wounded were evacuated by helicopter to the hospital in Kabul. The arrival of Stinger missiles put an end to our massive use of choppers. We were forced to cram the injured into armored carriers-fifteen in each one-and send them down the local roads to Kabul."[29] Certainly, the fear of being wounded and not having adequate casualty evacuation capability had a negative effect on the soldiers fighting on the ground."
Without a doubt, the introduction of the stinger changed the nature of the war and increased the military burden that the Soviets had to bear during the conflict. The point I dispute is the simplistic assertation that 'The Stinger Won The War' that seems to have been thrown around so much that it is now just about the only thing people say about the period!
The key point that I am trying to make is that the Soviets learned to deal with the Stinger and although they where never as effective as before, they were still able to use helicopters and planes up untill the end of the war in more or less their initial roles.
Im afraid I am going to cherry pick the MP.net article ruthlessly
Without question, the Stinger had an immediate military impact. Although initial estimates may have been somewhat overblown—claiming the Stinger downed approximately one aircraft per day during the first three months of its deployment—the missile clearly represented an enormous qualitative improvement in the rebels’ air-defense capability.While the kill rate and number of targets destroyed are still disputed, the missile unquestionably shot down Soviet and especially Afghan aircraft at an unprecedented rate in its first few months of use.
Yousaf presents a detailed accounting of the Stinger’s first ten months in service until his departure from ISI in August 1987. During this time, he claims, 187 Stingers were fired, of which 75 percent hit their target, for a total of approximately 140 downed aircraft. Such detailed statistics must be based on Mujahedin self-reporting, the reliability of which is unknown. Nevertheless, these figures are more reliable than those in an oft-cited September 1987 U.S. analysis, which estimated “the destruction of about 270 aircraft per year.”
In response to the Stinger’s immediate success, the Red Army initially restricted its pilots to less dangerous missions, shunting the rest onto Afghan flyers. The Afghans, however, soon lost their nerve as well. According to Yousaf, they would pretend to go out on missions, fire off their ammunition, return to base, and falsely report success. A former Afghan pilot confirms that he and his fellow “pilots went on strike and refused to fly in areas where Stinger missiles were present.”
Fairly quickly, however, Soviet forces adopted a series of technical and tactical countermeasures that mitigated the impact of the Stinger. In the technical area, Soviet aircraft were retrofitted with improved flares, infrared beacons, and baffles on their exhausts to impede the Stingers’ ability to lock on target. Aircraft also were equipped with a missile radar warning system to notify pilots of the need for evasive action.
Tactically, the Soviets had numerous responses. Fixed-wing aircraft flew at higher altitudes outside the Stinger’s three-mile range, which averted the missile threat but reduced the pilots’ effectiveness, earning them the derisive sobriquet “cosmonauts” from Soviet ground troops. Helicopter pilots pursued the opposite strategy, adopting low-altitude, nap-of-the-earth techniques to hide from the Stingers, which function best when hot aircraft are silhouetted against a cool, blue sky. At the lower altitude, however, helicopters became more vulnerable to small-weapons fire. Interestingly, the same tactical countermeasures had been reported as early as the first year of the war and several times thereafter in response to earlier-model SAMs. However, the Stinger’s introduction apparently triggered a dramatic renewal and expansion of their use.
The Soviets also reportedly shifted many air operations to cover of darkness, as the rebels initially were not equipped with night-vision equipment. They increasingly relied on human intelligence to discover the location of Stingers, then either destroyed the missiles, purchased them, or avoided the locations entirely. Some daredevil Soviet pilots utilized a tactic that was a mirror-image of the rebels’ own: flying in tandem within the Stinger’s range but separated by a large distance, the first of two Soviet aircraft would make itself vulnerable in order to flush a Mujahedin Stinger team from its perch, after which the second aircraft would appear and fire on the exposed rebels. For important air support missions that could not be conducted safely in the presence of Stingers, such as facilitating insertion of special operations forces, the Soviets sometimes substituted long-range suppressive artillery fire, which was effective but required more ground forces and sacrificed the element of surprise.
Despite the army’s claim that the “Stinger was the war’s decisive weapon” —echoed by many others including 60 Minutes, which declared, “The Stinger is generally credited with having won the war for the Mujahedin” —the net effect of Soviet counter-measures eventually was to offset the Stinger. David Isby, an expert military analyst of the Afghan conflict, concluded in 1990 that, “although none of the Soviets’ countermeasures were totally successful, the Stinger... did not succeed in forcing Soviet helicopters out of the sky.” A leading French expert on Afghanistan, Olivier Roy, confirms from his experience among the rebels in late 1988 that, “by 1989, the Stinger could no longer be considered a decisive anti-aircraft weapon.”
As intersting as the videos are (and they really are!), anything that tries to pass an ATGM off as a MANPAD can't be considered authoritive so I won't respond to them. I think I have said enough anyway
As for Suverov, yes, he was right with respect to weapon systems (although he was a lone voice so I agree with the military specialists of the time when they didn't believe him. There was no proof! I am however too young to have been a Soviet hardware affectionado at the time however so I can't speak with any authority about that! The real bit of the book I disagree with is his description of the Nuclear forces and the politburo. He should have taken that out and published it seperately as 'wot I think - speculations of a junior Soviet army officer as to what goes on at the top of some of the most secret organisations in the world'. Very interesting to see his perspective but not in any way authoritative!
Now: Bioweapons
Again some very interesting articles, although I admit I am flagging by this point and have only skimmed them! Without a doubt the Soviet Union had developed a huge range of CW and BW agents for use in Europe or China in the event of a major war.
Although I did know that the Soviets used 'scorched earth' tactics in Afghanistan, I had not heard of allogations of the use of bioweapons. I thought you had meant Chemical weapons as depicted in the film 'The Beast', the use of which was always just rumour. Because of the fact that I know nothing about the subject I won't try to argue a point. I don't know if BW were used or not.
how few decision makers the Red Army has, and c) the vital facts that only officers have maps and that the staff is minuscule. 
). Based on that, I would say the stinger did not win the war.
During Action Report - hcrof vs Mike Churchmoor!
in Combat Mission Shock Force 1
Posted
The advantage of this avenue of attack is that I only have to worry about a relatively narrow area which has LOS on my vehicles. My tanks will advance with cover arcs basically because I cannot get flanked and I want to react faster to frontal attacks. As I get closer to the treeline I will take off the cover arcs as the angle of threat will get wider.
My BMPs following will be doing most of the shooting though. Everything without artillery falling on it will get shot up by their guns to keep the defenders heads down.