TheVulture

Eyeballing various landmarks and street lights that line up to triangulate a position (isn't google maps satellite view useful sometimes), my first wild-*** estimate is that the camera is located somewhere around the hotel Baltschug, just visible in the bottom right of NamEndedAllen's map. The steadiness obviously suggests it isn't a hand-held camera. It's not entirely unbelievable that a hotel right next to central moscow might have a camera recording the view over red square (or one of the guests happened to), especially with the victory day parade on the horizon - might even be a film crew that booked some hotel rooms and had their cameras set up in advance (although a week in advance seems unnecessary). But it is possible to dream up plausible reasons why someone in the hotel might have been filming in the red-square direction at the right time by chance.

There are other possibilities than a) false flag or b) drone flown from Ukraine. Such as pro-Ukrainian Russians in Moscow, or simply anti-Putin ones.

I can see why the A-10 is great in situations like afghanistan, where air supremacy is assured, there is virtually no meaningful anti-air threat, and the targets are mostly infantry and unarmoured (essentially civilian) vehicles - an A-10 can wreck any target it can see, with enough ammo load to provide support for an extended period, and do so pretty cheaply. An F-16 lobbing JDAMs against a pickup carrying 4 insurgents is a very expensive way of achieving the same effect. In Ukraine, where anti-air is dominant, Ukraine is certainly behind Russia in air force anyway, and there are a lot more hardened targets and infrastructure targets - yeah, an A-10 is toast before it gets close to a target, while e.g. an F-16 can succesfully hit an armoured vehicle or a command center and live to tell the tale.

With Australia's reputation I'd call that a win. If I randomly dug a hole in the ground in Australia, I'd expect to unearth some kind of invertebrate venomous enough to kill a small elephant by looking at it.

Sweden is a bit more tricky though because they've managed to piss off Turkey (criticism of Erdogan's human rights record and support for Kurds) and Hungary (criticism of Orban). Nothing that other NATO countries haven't also said, but here they are in a position to demand concessions in exchange for not vetoing Sweden. Sweden and Turkey had an agreement on what Sweden needed to do before Turkey would allow it in, but Turkey is saying that Sweden hasn't fulfilled its obligations yet (notably extradition of some Kurdish organizers from Sweden, which were blocked by Swedish courts). The Turkish parliament has approved Swedish entry to NATO, but I gather it's not up to them, but to the Erdogan administration. So Sweden is unlikely to get approval from Turkey before the Turkish elections in May. Hungary is expected to give in if/when Turkey does, but that's not certain either.

This I can definitely agree with. Just because Russian troll farms try and push certain talking points, or try to stir up and magnify disagreements in general, it doesn't automatically follow that they are creating problems that didn't exist before. Or even that they have much effect at all. Britain joining the EU created (economic) winners and losers, and leaving the EU also creates winners and losers. Telling people who are genuinely better of personally for leaving the EU that they only think that because they've been fooled by Russian trolls is...odd. And for some people, the sovereignty issue *is* important and would still be a decisive factor even if they thought the country as a whole would be worse off. There have always been people who thought that, before the UK joined the EU, the whole time we were in, and during Brexit. I don't agree with them in the slightest: I'm very pro UK being in the EU, and don't give a fig about nationalism and sovereignty vs the EU. But I can accept that others genuinely have different opinions for valid reasons that I just don't happen to share. To dismiss the whole of Brexit as a result of Russian interference is to ignore that Britain really is very divided in attitudes to Europe and the EU in particular.

BBC report of interview Zelensky has given to a Japanese newspaper: No Ukraine offensive without more weapons – Zelensky. As always, it's open season on guessing how much of this is true, how much deliberate misinformation, and who it is aimed at.

Zelensky knows how to do PR. Putin goes to Mariupol, a place that Russia spent months trying to fully capture, now a safe distance behind the front lines. So a few days later Zelensky goes to Bakhmut, which Russia keeps insisting it is about to capture that Ukrainian troops are on the verge of being cut off. He combines mocking Putin's "bravery" by doing something considerably more dangerous, with demonstrating to everyone that Bakhmut is still securely enough under Ukrainian control that the president can drop in for a visit.

I'm more in inclined to think that it was a combination of realpolitik appeasement of Russia and not wanting to get involved if Russia did attack Ukraine (again that is, since we all know about 2014). Russia's problem isn't Ukraine in NATO. It is a Ukraine that isn't subservient to Russia whilst being better socially and economically. It is EU trading ties with Ukraine, not NATO membership, that is the problem (or one of the main ones anyway). But I bet you're not going to find many western politicians saying that we should avoid trading with Ukraine, and should avoid helping out to reduce corruption and improve living standards, for fear of provoking Russia.

Found this BBC article: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-65012606 Relevant excerpt: China's President Xi Jinping says the killers of nine Chinese goldmine workers in the Central African Republic (CAR) must be "severely" punished. Two Chinese workers were also wounded when gunmen stormed a mining site near the central town of Bambari on Sunday. The local mayor blamed a rebel group for the killings. But the rebels said Russian mercenaries from the Wagner group were behind the attack. The Wagner group has not yet commented on the claim. Its fighters are widely reported to have been deployed to mineral-rich CAR to help government forces defeat the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC), an alliance of rebel groups. So looks like Wagner and CPC are on opposite sides, and both sides are trying to blame the other for the attack.

I think that's one of the reasons that Russia feels it needs to control Ukraine and Belarus. Strategic depth for a conventional defence. The West tends to disregard this since Russia has nuclear weapons. The west's logic is: Russia has nuclear weapons. Therefore it doesn't matter if hostile forces are based even in eastern Ukraine and Belarus, since any attack on Russia will get a nuclear response. Russia's logic is: if hostile forces (read NATO) are based on the border of Russia itself in eastern Ukraine and Belarus, then too much of the economic and industrial core of Russia is undefendable by conventional means, so they have no choice but to go nuclear, which then creates a likely WW3 scenario. Or they don't go nuclear, and get destroyed. Either way, if someone is crazy enough to start a war (and Russia has no control over whether a lunatic ends up with the power to start a war), then Russia is destroyed. Even more so if Finland and the Baltics are also on the NATO side. On the other hand, if Russia controls Belarus and Ukraine (at least up to the Dneipr), and Finland is neutral (assuming an all out attack from the Baltic States isn't plausible), then there is enough strategic depth to at least give them the possibility of a conventional defence - either successful defence that stops short of Russia's borders, or at least buys time for a solution to appear before Russia is destroyed. This gives them a course of action that isn't suicidal, unlike the previous scenario. Bear in mind the oft repeated point that Russia judges threats on capability, not intention. Intentions can change quite quickly. The fact that NATO isn't going to attack Russia is irrelevant. It has the capability to do so . Hope for the best, but plan for the worst - as a thought experiment, should a Stalin, Hitler, Genghis Khan type get decisive control over the west, Russia wants a plan where it can survive, and that plan is basically a conventional defence starting at the border of Poland, or as far west as possible. Without that depth, the Russian logic goes, any attack from the west leads to the destruction of Russia, with nothing they can do to prevent it.

Thinking in terms of a Ukrainian offensive in the south, how much is the rail line from Donbas to Crimea a meaningful factor these days? While a push to Melitopol looks like top of the wishlist, getting to Tokmak is half the distance, and would sever that rail connection. But I've no idea how much of a practical difference it would make to Russian logistics.

That's what I hope is going on: Ukraine saying that they're under pressure, under equipped and on the verge of withdrawing, to try and get the Russians to throw more resources away. Meanwhile we get regular reports of hundreds, or thousands, of Ukrainian infantry training in various European countries, people training on the Bradleys, Leos and Challengers. They are clearly assembling a trained mechanised force, and feel they have the manpower to spare for this longer term training rather than having to throw every available soldier in to try and stop the Russian advance. It might suck for the poor sods in Bakhmut (regardless of how accurate the stories are, the casualty rate is still high), but it's not like AFU are on the verge of a collapse, which is what some of the recent reporting seems to sound like. But as always we won't really know until months down the line, when we see who has made meaningful progress by the summer, not by next week.

I'm going to hazard a guess that there's at least one extremely nerdy game on the subject out there somewere. (quick search) Unfortunately the best I can find at short notice is https://www.cesim.com/simulations/cesim-connect-telecom-operator-simulation-game

Putin, on the other hand, world probably be quite pleased at the concept of Boris Johnson as NATO secretary general.

Cynically, I'd say they look straight from central casting rather than people who have been fighting a war for the last year.

In the 0-36 age range there is an excess of male over female in every age group, which I think is what Bulletpoint is referring to, not that there are more young people than older ones (which is obviously not the case). The common belief about a surplus of young men causing wars is about there being not enough women for all the men to have a partner, which supposedly causes social tension and is though to lead to more wars. It's certainly a commonly believed bit of folk wisdom, although I don't know if there is strong evidence behind it. It might be just one of those things that 'everyone knows' that turns out not to be true.

An overview of recent goings on in Moldova / Transnistria and how they affect the situation in Ukraine, from geopolotical futures: In Moldova, Ukraine Buys Time By Antonia Colibasanu -February 27, 2023 A war of words has troubled Moldova for more than two weeks. It started when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned of a Russian coup plot against Moldova on Feb. 10. Two days later, Moldovan President Maia Sandu said that Ukraine sent intelligence to her government, according to which the Russians had a plan to destabilize the country by organizing protests and by employing “violent actions.” It would have been the perfect cover for inciting a coup in a country that is prone to violent protest-induced governmental change. In fact, Moldova had been on high alert even before Zelenskyy’s warnings. Earlier this month, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov – in a not-so-veiled threat – accused the West of “having its sights” on Moldova as a country that might “follow Ukraine’s path.” Even before that, Sandu enraged Moscow in January by implying Moldova might consider joining NATO. Two influential Russian lawmakers responded by saying Moldovan membership in NATO could lead to the country’s destruction. Following the threat, Sandu requested that the parliament pass draft legislation to provide the Prosecutor's Office and the State Information System with tools to combat risks and threats to the country's security more effectively. News of the coup added to the already high anxiety in Moldova and triggered a change in government. Prime Minister Natalia Gavrilita resigned and was replaced by Sandu’s security adviser and National Security Council secretary – a signal that the government was prepared to operate from a mandate to protect Moldova from Russian threats. This is no small thing for a country usually committed to a policy of neutrality. Sandu and the new prime minister promptly issued statements on the shortcomings of neutrality and a potential constitutional change to join a “larger alliance” – that is, NATO. These kinds of statements, meanwhile, have stirred up domestic partisan activity. Pro-Russia factions are expected to object, while nationalist factions seek to double down on their own agenda, which includes petitions to the EU to add Moldovan oligarchs and other sympathetic politicians to sanctions lists. Moscow has responded to Moldova in kind. On Feb. 21, President Vladimir Putin canceled a 2012 foreign policy decree that committed Moscow to peacefully resolving the border crisis of Transnistria. The region is a narrow strip of land in eastern Moldova that has been controlled by a Russian-backed government since a war in 1992 fought between Transnistrian separatists and Moldova. And for 30 years, some 2,000 Russian soldiers have been stationed there. (The separatist region is said to host the largest weapons depot in Europe – about 20,000 tons of ammunition and military equipment, albeit likely from the Soviet era.) In 2012, Moscow agreed to help find a way to peacefully resolve the conflict, but that was at a time when Russia was seeking closer relations with the EU and the U.S. Clearly, that is no longer the case. In other words, Transnistria is a European region in which Russia has citizens to protect and military assets already in place to protect them. This is why fears are well-founded that Russia’s escalation in Ukraine could embroil Moldova. And it explains the most recent exchanges between Russia, Ukraine and Moldova. On Feb. 23, Russia’s Defense Ministry claimed that Ukraine was planning an operation to invade Transnistria. Moldovan media reported that the claim was merely Russian psyops. Still, Kyiv went out of its way to say it would act to help Moldova if Russia ever attacked. These statements paint a picture of escalation that Russia would benefit from. Moscow’s frontal attacks in Ukraine haven’t been especially successful, so logic dictates the execution of a flanking maneuver. Belarus – helmed by a staunchly pro-Russia government – and Moldova are the only places in which Russia could launch such a maneuver. The cancellation of the Moldova decree, then, is meant to force Moldova to accept Russian dominance and influence. It does not indicate an attack, but it does make it clear that one is a very real possibility. Imagine a scenario in which Moldova got militarily involved in the Ukraine war and opened a second front. Considering how quickly Kyiv responded to a potential Russian threat in Moldova, Ukraine could spare some soldiers along with weapons they received from the West to fight in Ukraine. This would allow Kyiv to ask for even more Western help. The U.S. and its allies may not want the conflict to escalate further – in fact, NATO has already urged Ukraine to use its arsenal for defensive operations, not for offensive ones – but if Moldova were attacked, and if Ukraine rushed to its aid, they would have little choice but to continue their support. For Russia, sustaining an offensive in both eastern Ukraine and southern Ukraine, where the country borders Transnistria, would be a logistical nightmare. Opening a new front might be worth the effort so long as it doesn’t spread itself too thin, doesn’t lose territory it has gained, and doesn’t upset the U.S. so much that it needs to intervene directly. Ideally, it would lead to negotiations. The fact that U.S. President Joe Biden mentioned Moldova in a recent speech in Warsaw shows that a new front is the last thing Washington wants. With that in mind, Russia may determine it is better served by opening a new front in Belarus rather than Moldova. If Russia dominates Moldova, it would imperil NATO’s southern reach, and would thus draw in the United States. Belarus would be easier to ignore. Meanwhile, the tension inside Moldova has benefited its pro-Europe governing party. The coup rumors helped Sandu and her party consolidate their position. Had it not been for the warning Ukraine delivered to Moldova, Sandu’s government would have likely fallen by the end of the month due to protests driven by general discontent with the country's poor economic performance. Installing a new government during what appears to be a security crisis has allowed Sandu to avoid further political instability. The mere prospect of a Russian threat against Moldova allowed the government to establish better relations with the West, giving Sandu direct access to Western leaders like Biden with whom she met during his visits to Munich and Warsaw. Engaging with the U.S. and EU leaders directly makes it more likely for Moldova to obtain security guarantees and funding to improve its economy. Moreover, Russia’s cancellation of the 2012 decree has freed Moldova up from the negotiation process Russia had forced it into. De facto, the negotiating format set forth by the decree was already doomed; Russia’s invasion of Ukraine essentially put an end to the “5+2” setup in which Moscow and Kyiv, in addition to the Organization for Security and Economic Cooperation in Europe, sat next to each other as “mediators” and “guarantors” vis-a-vis Chisinau and Tiraspol, with the United States and European Union reduced to “observers.” It could no longer function, and Moscow’s cancellation only confirmed as much. If anything, through this cancellation Russia acknowledged its weakened position. For Ukraine, the situation in Moldova buys much-needed time. It could help Kyiv negotiate more help from the West, and it could forestall another Russian offensive. It’s possible that none of this will come to pass, but the potential can’t be ruled out. For Russia, opening a new front, either in Belarus or Moldova, would give it a strategic advantage. If current anxieties lead to the destabilization of either country, Poland or Romania could be next.

There are some very differing maps and reports on Bakhmut, which range from Russia continuing to gain ground (at high cost to themselves) to Ukraine having almost created a kessel of the Russians north of the town. Would it be fair to say at this point that the best versions are rather over-optimistic? We've seen that a few times before when Ukraine has some success, but some sources can be seen to have over-hyped and mis-represented it when more solid data is available a few days later?

It also matters, for some things, what the GDP per capita is. BRICS may have a total GDP on the same magnitude as the G7, but they also have something like 6 times the population - so the average wealth per person is considerably lower. For something comparisons, total GDP is a better measure, while for others GDP per person is more informative. Of course the reality is that trying to boil down the economic interactions and potential of the G7 and BRICS countries to a single number, or group of numbers, is always going to be a massive oversimplification. But it has its uses as a comparative starting point.

Without wanting to stray off topic in this thread, the US Department of Defence makes an annual report to Congress (publicly available) on Chinese military capabilites and intentions. The most recent one (September 2022) is currently available at https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23321290/2022-military-and-security-developments-involving-the-peoples-republic-of-china.pdf It weight in at just under 200 pages, so it's not short. This comes with the caveat that it obviously isn't going to include everything the US knows about Chinese military, since a lot of that information is going to be classified. And there are going to be limits to how accurate the underlying intelligence is (what's the Chinese for maskirovka?). And there may be deliberate biases if the DoD wants to influence Congress' policy and funding decisions in particular directions. But it's also about as good as you're going to get for a comprehensive open source review.

When you've got a steady, if small, stream of western politicians saying that we ought to stop supporting Ukraine (today's human nugget of choice: Ron DeSantis), it is important that they aren't the only voice being heard by the public, and that they aren't even close to getting equal exposure. So a bit of public theatre is needed to keep making it clear to everyone that political and public opinion is still massively in favour of supporting Ukraine militarily. It's not meant to be new. It's meant to continue to buoy up support and make it clear that any disagreement has a much smaller support base.

No, he's describing the Russian/Chinese leader mindset, not agreeing with it. Putin is probably genuinely worried about the threat of a NATO attack, just like in the cold war the USSR was worried about the danger of a NATO first strike, even thought everyone in NATO knew there was no way NATO would launch a first strike. Also, the Putin mindset is more worried about capabilities than intentions: Intentions can change much more quickly. So what the current leaders intend doesn't matter much. What counts is what they are capable of, and Russian actions are aimed at countering capabilities (on which they screwed up massively)

Reminds me of a comment I read earlier today (from a Canadian): "US military planning is based around the idea of having a strong enough set of capabilities to handle any eventuality. Canadian military planning is based around the idea of having a token capability for any eventuality". One thing the British military has done right (broadly speaking), I think, is understanding that in a major war it is fighting as part of NATO, and has focussed on providing a limited set of capabilities to augment NATO as a whole, rather than just trying to be a smaller scale copy of the US military, with less of everything.

About 6 months after the war ends they might feel okay about shell levels