Wartgamer

2nd Looey=ButterBar

2nd Looey=ButterBar

Ammunition, particularly artillery ammunition, tended to be a much more pernicious problem. In the early stages of the Army's expansion there were plans calling for a high priority in the production of 105mm shells of all types, inasmuch as these were the standard, general-support divisional field piece. Ammunition for heavier guns was accorded a lower priority, under the assumption that mobile warfare would reduce the utility of large, unwieldy and relatively immobile large artillery pieces. Unfortunately, a number of factors then intervened. First, congressional criticism was raised over large over stocks of all types of artillery ammunition that had accumulated in Tunisia in 1943. The Army was pressured to scale back production, particularly of 105mm ammunition. Secondly, the perceived need for an expansion of the heavy and medium artillery was mirrored by an expansion of the production facilities for the heavier types of shells. The expansion in heavy shell production was facilitated by converting light ammunition production to heavy. Thus, by late 1943 priorities had shifted radically. Many plants were retooling for other production, while some 105mm plants were closed completely. Events in France and Italy in mid 1944 then changed all the assumptions again. The fierce German resistance in the bocage of Normandy and in the Appenine Mountains of Italy placed a premium on all types of ammunition - just as stocks of 105mm ammunition began to shrink. Rationing was instituted (and extended to most other types of mortar and artillery ammunition), and captured German weapons and ammunition were utilized against their former owners. By 1 January 1945 the entire ETO stock of 105mm ammunition was reduced to 2,524,000 rounds, a twenty-one-day supply according to War Department planning factors, which were widely acknowledged to be too optimistic. The poor flying weather encountered in Europe in the fall and winter exacerbated this near-disastrous situation: Allied airpower was not always available to take up the slack. Although emergency measures in theater and in the U.S. improved matters, artillery ammunition shortages were to remain a chronic problem until the end of the war in Europe.

My thought is that cm is really a company command level game. I say that because the 'yes, sir' end of the stick described above ends at the company level. Higher ups do not talk to platoons generally. As far as the sub-company communications, procedures, that would be of great cmx2 interest.

All good stuff, but ... relevance to CM? </font>

On the left contact was maintained with the 422d Infantry by patrols and on the right with the 106th Reconnaissance Troop, attached to the 424th Infantry, and occupying GROSSLANGENFELD, by patrols. Wire lines existed to all units down to companies and lateral lines had been laid between regiments. While two channels existed between the division and regimental command posts, both were single cable; nor were alternate wire lines laid between other units. Teletypewriter communication was likewise available to the division. Radio silence was maintained among all units. Radios had been issued to all units in England, but since radio silence had been imposed continuously no opportunity for proper calibration or testing had been available except such as could be done without actual radio operation (Personal Knowledge). This is just before Bulge Battle.

So the French just had no counter battery? If you allow an enemy to just take shots at you, I suppose you will eventually just get attrited. A simple answer is to just not be under enemy observation. Reverse slopes work nicely to negate artillery. So does area. Length times width. Keeping your true front lines MLR beyond enemy observation helps. Defense in depth also. At the time that the French decided to be lucrative targets, did counter battery radar exist yet? Arty as a shovel is fascinating. The US Army certainly had German soldiers to shoot at with 105mm and no 105mm ammo 'lump' at the later stages of the ETO. They rationed these supplies till the end of the war. Another factor was tubes. The 105mm was often 'gang-fired' by lining up guys with ammo and wearing out the tube. If you expect any weapon system to work as a math formula then it will wear out according to a formula. I wonder what the ratio of arty ammo needed to attack and defend is? 10:1? The US certainly outshot the Germans after D Day and probably didnt budget the usage as they should have. So there is a limit to shooting the load. Even to a nation like the US with its industrial might. [ March 08, 2005, 09:11 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Many ETO US vets mention the FOs in the light aircraft in glowing terms. They were not only eyes but teeth. They could help any ground commander by throwing rounds into known enemy forming up points, positions, etc. This 'pointing' could help any commander savvy enough to use the intel.

I suppose having air supremeacy and good weather could help. The air force acting as a top down viewpoint to relay info.

And the vehicles of the last twenty years are so advanced in so many aspects that your opinion may be skewed. And you are entitled to that opinion also I might add.

And the vehicles of the last twenty years are so advanced in so many aspects that your opinion may be skewed. And you are entitled to that opinion also I might add.

And the vehicles of the last twenty years are so advanced in so many aspects that your opinion may be skewed. And you are entitled to that opinion also I might add.

Combat Casualties A total of 194 Purple Hearts were awarded to the men of the 752nd Tank Battalion during the 341-day combat period between 27 May 1944 and 2 May 1945. These awards were given to 178 men, of whom 16 received an Oak Leaf Cluster for their second award. Thirty-one Purple Hearts were awarded posthumously to those who were killed in combat. This analysis does not include those who were injured or killed in non-combat related incidents, as the Purple Heart is not awarded under those circumstances. So 31 KIA and 194 WIA in 341 days. The British analysis only concerned itself with tanks that were knocked out. And knocked out by specific causes. My thought is that many tank commanders and other crewmen could be injured while unbuttoned, outside the vehicle. Since this is for the whole tank battalion, it might include non-tanker personnel.

Combat Casualties A total of 194 Purple Hearts were awarded to the men of the 752nd Tank Battalion during the 341-day combat period between 27 May 1944 and 2 May 1945. These awards were given to 178 men, of whom 16 received an Oak Leaf Cluster for their second award. Thirty-one Purple Hearts were awarded posthumously to those who were killed in combat. This analysis does not include those who were injured or killed in non-combat related incidents, as the Purple Heart is not awarded under those circumstances. So 31 KIA and 194 WIA in 341 days. The British analysis only concerned itself with tanks that were knocked out. And knocked out by specific causes. My thought is that many tank commanders and other crewmen could be injured while unbuttoned, outside the vehicle. Since this is for the whole tank battalion, it might include non-tanker personnel.

Combat Casualties A total of 194 Purple Hearts were awarded to the men of the 752nd Tank Battalion during the 341-day combat period between 27 May 1944 and 2 May 1945. These awards were given to 178 men, of whom 16 received an Oak Leaf Cluster for their second award. Thirty-one Purple Hearts were awarded posthumously to those who were killed in combat. This analysis does not include those who were injured or killed in non-combat related incidents, as the Purple Heart is not awarded under those circumstances. So 31 KIA and 194 WIA in 341 days. The British analysis only concerned itself with tanks that were knocked out. And knocked out by specific causes. My thought is that many tank commanders and other crewmen could be injured while unbuttoned, outside the vehicle. Since this is for the whole tank battalion, it might include non-tanker personnel.

10m by 10m = 100m^2, oh forget it. No more Beer for you!

The actual 10 meter diameter crater is approx 78-79 m^2 so it would take that many 1 m^2 tiles to represent it. And what is 200 squares????? A 20m by 20m tiles is 400m^2???? Does any one care to know the volume of the crater? And the pixie thing is just fine the way it is.

Take the case of infantry in good deep foxholes being attacked by mortars. Everyone is head down. After the attack, you might find that of the casualties, 70% were deaths. Why? In most cases, the only casualties were from direct hits in foxholes. While the number of foxholes hit was very small, it was very deadly when it occured. But AT weapons are not imprecise. The tank is not being 'barraged' by 75mm high velocity shot. It is being targeted and in most cases, can't hide and its speed is not as great a defense under most circumstances. So when its 'foxhole' gets hit, there's hell to pay. Especially when its armor is overmatched like shermens were. Its foxhole is conspicuous, noisy, and a recognizable target. [ March 08, 2005, 07:00 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Take the case of infantry in good deep foxholes being attacked by mortars. Everyone is head down. After the attack, you might find that of the casualties, 70% were deaths. Why? In most cases, the only casualties were from direct hits in foxholes. While the number of foxholes hit was very small, it was very deadly when it occured. But AT weapons are not imprecise. The tank is not being 'barraged' by 75mm high velocity shot. It is being targeted and in most cases, can't hide and its speed is not as great a defense under most circumstances. So when its 'foxhole' gets hit, there's hell to pay. Especially when its armor is overmatched like shermens were. Its foxhole is conspicuous, noisy, and a recognizable target. [ March 08, 2005, 07:00 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Take the case of infantry in good deep foxholes being attacked by mortars. Everyone is head down. After the attack, you might find that of the casualties, 70% were deaths. Why? In most cases, the only casualties were from direct hits in foxholes. While the number of foxholes hit was very small, it was very deadly when it occured. But AT weapons are not imprecise. The tank is not being 'barraged' by 75mm high velocity shot. It is being targeted and in most cases, can't hide and its speed is not as great a defense under most circumstances. So when its 'foxhole' gets hit, there's hell to pay. Especially when its armor is overmatched like shermens were. Its foxhole is conspicuous, noisy, and a recognizable target. [ March 08, 2005, 07:00 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

One of the 'perks' to being a tanker was that your combat days in the line were not the same as an infantryman. Tanks need intensive maintenance, repair, etc. So while, it may be deadly to be in a Sherman tank, you arent thrown in the jackpot as much as infantry. Just moving back a thousand yards greatly decreases your exposure to most small arms and minimizes mortar fire. I believe in the ETO, infantry riflemen had about a 50-60 % chance of being wounded and a 15% chance of being killed if they did a full tour from D Day till the end of the war.

One of the 'perks' to being a tanker was that your combat days in the line were not the same as an infantryman. Tanks need intensive maintenance, repair, etc. So while, it may be deadly to be in a Sherman tank, you arent thrown in the jackpot as much as infantry. Just moving back a thousand yards greatly decreases your exposure to most small arms and minimizes mortar fire. I believe in the ETO, infantry riflemen had about a 50-60 % chance of being wounded and a 15% chance of being killed if they did a full tour from D Day till the end of the war.

One of the 'perks' to being a tanker was that your combat days in the line were not the same as an infantryman. Tanks need intensive maintenance, repair, etc. So while, it may be deadly to be in a Sherman tank, you arent thrown in the jackpot as much as infantry. Just moving back a thousand yards greatly decreases your exposure to most small arms and minimizes mortar fire. I believe in the ETO, infantry riflemen had about a 50-60 % chance of being wounded and a 15% chance of being killed if they did a full tour from D Day till the end of the war.

These stats seem to imply that officers, while hit only slightly more than most troops, die at a greatly incresed rate.

These stats seem to imply that officers, while hit only slightly more than most troops, die at a greatly incresed rate.