Wartgamer

Yes but the Command Post is not a new term. And back when communications, digital maps, etc were not as good as now, it was even more important. So Command Posts are still important. Did I miss something? Its obviously a newer document. I have already supplied one quote from a WWII vet officer about Company Command posts. Does anyone really think they are not part of running a company?

From what I have read, the Germans actually captured some capabilty to manufacture these 'Soviet' rounds. In other words, they over ran the factories that made ammunition. That is what I believe this picture shows. It may be possible that the mortars, when being used as a battalion weapon, would fire a smaller payload round. But they developed thier own HE round(s) also. One of them is the round at the right in the previous picture. It was a smaller round, possibly with better range, and the Blast value in CM reflects this also. In Korea, the communists had a few 120mm rounds themselves, including a 46 pounder. [ March 17, 2005, 12:33 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

http://www.34infdiv.org/history/133inf/4503.txt This interesting history shows that AT companys in an infantry unit manned 50 cals in a platoon. They also used 4.5 in rockets, some with VT fuses. Strength report.. On 1 March the Regiment had an effective strength of 161 officers, three warrant officers and 3,080 enlisted men. On 31 March our effective strength was 167 officers, three warrant officers, and 3,145 enlisted men. During the month we received 62 replacements. Thus, our effective strength experienced an increase of 71 members. [ March 17, 2005, 09:15 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Getting back to the main thought of the thread... Are Heavy Weapon Company commanders the main personalities in the attack scheme? Do they develop the 'attack plan' around which a Battalion manuvers to get to its objectives? In the US infantry company, the Heavy weapon platoon is led by a officer equal in rank to the Company XO. He probably functions much like a Heavy Weapon Company commander does but in miniature.

Both weapons could fire each others ammunition but they were not the same. The game even reflects this with the soviet weapon having a higher blast value. Barrel life on these weapons may have been fairly low. I read one site claiming only 3000 rounds! It would also depend on what charge the weapon is fired at.

In certain units, like a US Armored Infantry Company, there would be no CP unless the unit was dug in and in a defensive posture. These units relied almost entirely on radio communications and in the attack, the Command Vehicle is the CP. These units are also a good example of TO&E not fitting the realities of war. Companies had 57mm and these were often viewed as a pain under most circumstances. The gunners were needed to make up losses in troops and drivers/mechanics. In most situations, Combined arms use of Tanks and TDs made the 57mm weapon just more traffic. The arm inf also had a different structure for its company heav y weapons. Each platoon had a 60mm and a MG section. In a defensive situation, I wonder if this did not revert to a more 'leg' unit grouping of the 60mm. [ March 17, 2005, 07:42 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

CHAPTER 2 ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF THE COMPANY COMMAND POST In the previous chapter, we learned about the importance of a proficient Combat Operations Center (COC). For a Combat Operations Center to be effective, it must receive accurate information immediately from the companies assigned to the unit. The line companies (Alfa, Bravo, Charlie) man the defensive lines that are the battalion's portion of the defensive perimeter in the rear area or the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA); therefore, they are the "eyes and ears" of the COC. Company command posts are established to help the companies maintain command and control of their perspective companies. This chapter provides detailed information about the company command post and how the data it provides to the COC is vital to an effective command and control system. COMPANY COMMAND POST The company command post (CP) is the central point from which company operations are directed. The CP is established to provide the company commander centralized command and control facilities for the platoons assigned to the company. The platoon commanders report all activities to the company CP, regardless of their magnitudes, concerning their perspective platoons. The company CP reports to the COC all information concerning the company. The specific composition and functions of the company command post vary with the mission assigned to the company. The normal functions of the company CP are similar to the COC and include the following: 1. Receiving and recording operational reports from the COC. 2. Maintaining current maps and overlays of friendly and enemy situations within the company's area of responsibility. This information is displayed within the company command post. 3. Maintaining current maps and overlays of the company's patrol routes and other routes that may come in contact with the company's area of responsibility. 4. Preparing and submitting operational reports to the COC concering the company. 5. Providing dedicated communication channels for tactical and nontactical operations to the COC and to the platoon commanders. 6. Transmitting orders and tactical decisions of the battalion's COC to the platoons as required. 7. Monitoring the progress of the battalion's tactical operations and reporting immediately to the COC any significant event or incident concerning the company's area of responsibility. LOCATION The location considerations of the company CP are similar to the location considerations of the COC. The company CP must be hard to detect from enemy forces and must be easy to defend and easily accessible to battalion personnel. Other factors to consider am centralization, traffic, communications, and defense security. Centralization The company command post is located rear of the forward platoons manning the defensive perimeter or the FEBA and is centered among those platoons to enhance the execution of command and control operations. Traffic All of the traffic entering the company CP is by foot. Personnel approaching and returning to their fighting positions from the company CP should do so by alternate routes. When this rule is not followed, a beaten path leading to the company CP for the enemy to follow will result. Communication Communication is vital to the company CP for the effective exercise of command and control. The company CP must have constant communication with the platoon commanders, the listening posts (LP), and the observation posts (OP). The platoon commanders must have constant communication with the troops on the front lines. A break in communication can cause massive confusion and could result in heavy casualties and the loss of lives. Communications is covered in depth farther on in this chapter. Defense and Security Defensive and security measures for the company CP are similar to that of the COC. The major exception is that the company CP is not as fortified as the COC. For example, barbed and tactical wire entanglements are not used around the company CP because of the constant flow of traffic entering the CP. The company commander is concerned principally with the defense of the company's area of responsibility. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMPANY COMMAND POST The internal organization of the company CP varies with each company or contingency operation. Written Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) are established to avoid any confusion. Personnel duties, maps, and various boards are usually standard within any company CP. The company commander is responsible for coordinating, organizing, operating, and training watch standing personnel for the company CP. The number of personnel assigned to the watch stations, which are manned on a 24-hour basis, is normally maintained at the minimum needed to meet operational requirements. The watch personnel and their duties are as follows: Watch Chief 1. Before assuming watch, the watch chief should read the message board, be briefed on the current situation from the current watch chief, and then make liaison with the COC. 2. During watch, keep current on the tactical situation of the battalion, make routine decisions concerning the company, and notify the company commander of incidents of an unusual nature. 3. Read all incoming and outgoing messages. Take the appropriate action on messages received from the COC. Ensure the COC immediately receives accurate information pertaining to the company's area of responsibility. 4. Ensure incoming and outgoing messages follow established routing procedures. 5. Retain releasing authority on all outgoing messages. 6. Provide complete supervision of operations in the company CP. Watch Petty Officer 1. Handle and process information relating to intelligence. 2. Gather and distribute information gained from intelligence sources. 3. Maintain overlays of the enemy situation map pertaining to the company's area of responsibility. 4. Promptly inform the watch chief of significant or unusual incidents. 5. Maintain overlays of the company's patrols and convoys. 6. Supervise the action of the communication personnel. 7. Verify correct communication security measures are being used by all assigned communicators. Communicator 1. Monitor radio nets as assigned. 2. Use all necessary measures to minimize interception or jamming of transmission. Messengers/ Security 1. Perform all duties as assigned. 2. Ensure only authorized personnel enter the company CP.

The jeeps were actually part of the heavy weapons platoon and the drivers are listed under the TO&E for this platoon. The main function of the jeeps are supply for the weapons when fighting, and transport during moves. Even if they have 50 cals, they are not to be used as a weapon system. AA defense being its main 'shooting' role. Self defense being its actual shooting role typically. 'Basics' in the TO&E are more than likely troops getting some front line experience under one of the Company HQ's NCOs. IRL, many US companies got worn down and fresh meat was fed into the front line squads. This led to many new-guys getting killed as a matter of course. The loss of 200-300 troops a day was typical for many US Army divisions fighting in Normandy. These units may not get back to anything like the listed TO&E till they were pulled off the line and had a chance to develop a NCO/Officer structure and take on new non-coms.

The Soviet bomb was bigger. That SP may be a 80mm. Sort of a substitute for a 251 haltrack mortar I suspect. And I agree that the 120mm makes sense as a regt weapon just due to its range (as I said before, range defines a weapon system). But as German Battalions were asked to cover more frontage, they may indeed have been issued these weapons. I am still not sure they weren't.

Trying to initiate a discussion about C&C. No one is trying to steal your boyfriend Dorosh.

A company will generally have 2 platoons forward, one platoon back (generally occupying a OP position), Heavy weapons platoon deployed as needed, and a Company CP. Platoons are certainly 1:1 represented. The company HQ unit is really 'based' at the CP most of the time. When the CO has left the CP, he usually does it in a 4 man group (or so). If he is just going back to Battalion HQ, he may just take 1-2 men with him. But the CP is manned 24 hours a day and it represents quite a few 1:1 soldiers that should be modeled. The other people like clerks, cooks, etc are typically further back and in some armies even back at Battalion (they only join the company when the company is detached). But in certain circumstances, they are certainly to be viewed as 'reserves' and if it comes to it, they will man a weapon. The Company Command Post is wired directly to the Battalion CP. Its where the intel/orders get exchanged. The wireless (SCR300 'backpack' and SCR536 'handietalkies') are additional communications. Platoon control and communication with other non-wired assets/commands are possible. [ March 16, 2005, 10:13 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

A good photo showing the size of the weapon A German SP mortar?

I figure that means communications equipment and messengers are modeled. But messengers are dependant on soldiers. But I think I get the point, and that is, you still ain't giving up bones on C&C yet.

I believe the jeep was 600 pounds capacity. The trailer is 500 pounds capacity. And the cube space on a jeep is quite small. [ March 16, 2005, 09:51 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

Page about Jeep trailers

How about a comment on the role/inclusion of OP and CP in a tactical wargame featuring companies and battalions? I suppose it really depends on the C&C abstraction that will be implemented.

Table of Organisation & Equipment Maschinengewehr-Kompanie, 1939 The fourth company in the infantry battalion was a support company, designated Maschinengewehr-Kompanie, with three heavy machine gun platoons and one heavy mortar platoon using 8 cm mortars. When the 12 cm mortar became available, the 8 cm mortar was officially redesignated a medium mortar (mGrW) and the fourth platoon of the MG-Kompanie was partially or fully re-equipped with the heavier 12 cm mortars. Maschinengewehr-Kompanie, 1939 Kompanieführer, company commander Kompanietrupp, company HQ section Kompanietruppführer, HQ section leader Beobachtungs-Unteroffizier, observer Richtkreis-Unteroffizier, range taker Richtkreis-Unteroffizier, range taker Melder, messenger Nachrichtenstaffel, communications section Fernsprechtrupp - wire communications group Funktrupp - radio communications group 1. schwerer Maschinengewehrzug, heavy machine gun platoon Zugführer, platoon commander 1. s.MG-Gruppe, HMG Section s.MG, heavy machine gun s.MG, heavy machine gun 2. s.MG-Gruppe, HMG Section s.MG, heavy machine gun s.MG, heavy machine gun 2. schwerer Maschinengewehrzug, as above 3. schwerer Maschinengewehrzug, as above 4. schwerer Granatwerferzug, mortar platoon Zugführer Zugtrupp, HQ Section 1. schwere Granatwerfergruppe s.GrW 8 cm, mortar s.GrW 8 cm, mortar 2. schwere Granatwerfergruppe, same as above 3. schwere Granatwerfergruppe, same as above Gefechtstross, field kitchen Kompaniefeldwebel (Spieß), Company Sergeant-Major Waffen- und Geräteunteroffizier, weapons and technical NCO Futtermeister, farrier Beschlagschmied, hoofer Feldküche, field kitchen Verpflegungstross, supply wagon Fourier-Unteroffizier Supply NCO Verpflegungstross I, supply wagon Verpflegungstross II, supply wagon Gepäcktross (mot.), baggage transport (motorized) Rechnungsführer, accountant Fahrer, driver Handwerker, craftsman Handwerker, craftsman Field kitchens were grouped at the battalion level, but detached companies took theirs with them. The Company Sergeant-Major normally remained with the field kitchens. Supply and baggage wagons were grouped at battalion, or the next level above it.

Perhaps some insight into those 'Basics' that are listed in TO&E... a. Replacement Procedure. Lieutenant Colonel HAROLD L. STIPP, Headquarters 34th Infantry Division. "Just prior to the start of the offensive to break out of the ANZIO Beachhead an overstrength of 150 officers and 750 enlisted men was assigned to the Division in anticipation of future losses. The purpose was to determine whether this would facilitate rapid replacement of battle losses and to determine whether such a method of replacement would be more effective rather than receipt of small shipments of green recruits, with the resulting immediate utilization in combat units. The 750 enlisted men were assigned equally to each infantry regiment with instructions that they be placed mainly in rifle companies to insure battle indoctrination during the defensive phase, and just prior to the opening of the offensive, instructions were issued to each regimental commander to form a replacement company. These replacement companies consisting of approximately 250 men were withdrawn to regiment rear echelons, to be held in readiness for immediate replacement of battle losses. When battle losses occurred, the regimental commander then drew upon his replacements, always maintaining the fighting strength of his regiment at or very near the authorized table of organization strength. The extra officers, consisting of about 40 per infantry regiment, were not a part of the replacement company but were assigned to companies and actually utilized with the companies in combat. Thirty additional officers, including 20 artillerymen, were assigned on the basis of 5 for a battalion, the other 10 being utilized in service elements of the Command where the need had become evident. The number of additional officers assigned to rifle companies should be 2 as a minimum with 3 preferred. This system of employing the individual in actual combat for a short period where the type of action permits and then with-drawing him to the regimental rear echelons for utilization as loss replacements, proved extremely satisfactory and seemed to be an important advance in replacement procedure. First, it is an invaluable aid in the training of replacements in that it provides training and conditioning in the presence of battle itself, common to the conditions in which they will fight. Secondly, it provides for small reserves to maintain combat strength and efficiency for several days after initiation of the attack, when it is most necessary to maintain drive and momentum. Throughout the ANZIO Beachhead break-through and continuation of the advance to PISA, additional replacements were obtained in groups of 150 to 200 and sub-allocated to regiments, maintaining in each an over-strength of 250. It is true that in an extremely rapid advance it is more difficult to maintain replacement companies as such and one or two minor break-downs occurred in the procedure. Through experience gained in fighting and the planning of operation of replacement companies, it is considered that a unit of a total strength of 750 enlisted men, infantry, attached to the Division, is the better plan for providing the necessary overhead personnel; administration and maintenance equipment can be made available to the Division Commander. Present T/E allowances do not permit the operation and maintenance of so large a group as a separate unit. Officer personnel for training administration can be obtained from surplus assigned officers, if the practice of a surplus is to be maintained. Within this attached unit there should be 3 replacement companies - one allocated to each regiment. This provides the regimental commander with an opportunity to rotate men in a state of near exhaustion, replacing them with fresh men with a minimum amount of administrative details. It provides an opportunity to train replacement groups in those subjects which are considered most necessary for the regiment at the time; however, the unit remaining under the Division Commander's control. It also provides an opportunity for the men to become acquainted with the regiment in which they will ultimately serve."

First Lieutenant HAROLD C. BISHOP, 168th Infantry. "Battalion and company CPs, in stable defensive positions, can and should be set up in businesslike style, even if they are underground. Adequate files should be set up for the abundance of intelligence and operational material, such as patrol reports, overlays of friendly and enemy dispositions, counterbattery and counterattack plans, etc. Filing systems must be set up immediately, or valuable material will be lost." i. CP-OP Operations. The CP is the center of all operations and the OP is a business establishment for the purpose of observing and destroying the enemy. Established observation posts should not be subjected to the carelessness of commanders and their staffs.

Driving a vehicle in reverse with a trailer is a pain. Its also a skill that many people, who have driven vehicles, lack and needs to be learned. Runners should not be dropped if the unit has other commo capability. In the US case, in a defense setting, the use of land line wire would be primary, followed by radio (if it was allowed), then a runner. Front line commanders would not send all runners at once. Once one comes back, with a reply, then another might be sent back. Keeping every swingin' d**k in the line helps. And TO&E, while many would argue are not 100% correct (and no one was arguing that they were), are a godd starting point for any game. Many units arrived in Normandy very close to the strength/org shown. It would adapt to battle and battle would adapt it (loses). Major weapons sytems numbers are certainly known and in many cases the number of troops strengths are also known. [ March 16, 2005, 03:45 PM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

More faulty conclusions on your part, I am guessing. So the weapons company had a .50 on their official TOE. Doesn't mean a) it was used it was used in a ground (ie non-AA) role c) it was even carried d) it wasn't deleted a month after the orders were published I would be more interested in reading good company/battalion accounts of what they actually did with the weapons they had as opposed to reading loading lists. And your comments about what an overwhelming load this represented for a jeep trailer once again point out that you don't have the ability to interpret what you are reading. **shrugs** I see Steve stopped responding to you pages ago, so keep blabbing, I guess. dalem - I got your setup this morning, will try and return it by Friday night. I am doing Army stuff Wed and Thu evening after work. Gotta pay them bills, don't you know. </font>

I think that anyone that has followed this thread knows that weapons company trailer/jeep info is useful (especially the 50 cal and bazooka). How constructive you need people to be is not my concern. Dorosh's need to try to show his 'military' background in any thread is funny. Its not about how big that stuff is how much it weighs. The guy is a riot. He mentioned the BREN gun tripod also. Hee. [ March 16, 2005, 11:20 AM: Message edited by: Wartgamer ]

And since Mr. Questions (actually many CW people seem to do that "Do you even know..?" stuff) needs a drawing for everything, I will explain the obvious about the wire. The Battalion commo wire is going to a Company command post, through it and keeping up with the forward most reserve platoon ahead.

Its about 50 cals Mr Questions. You are very inquisitive fellow Mr. Questions. A congenital condition I presume?

MOVEMENT OF CP COMMUNICATIONS IN AN ATTACK (Battalion US Army) Responsibility of Com O. Wire head runs thru Bn OP, continues thru general location of next CP and OP and keeps abreast of the support Plat of the attacking Co. Wire head party consists of 1 Sgt and 2 linemen. Test phone is clipped on. T-spliced wire to install communications in new CP. All these communications move by echelon to new CP. In a fast moving situation, only one phone and a repeating coil (for TS installation) may be used at the new CP and the switchboard "hop frogged” to the next CP location. COMMUMICATIONS The following Com facilities are available: Radio: i. SGR 284 by Rag to direct Bns ii. SCR 300 by Bns to direct Cos iii. SCR 536 by Cos to direct Plats Telegraph: T5-5A or B - Bn to Regt. Telephones: EE8A - 5 in Bn Cp -2 in Staff; 1 in. OP. , 1 Stf or test phone; 1-test. Switchboard BD-71; 6 deep switchboard simple xed for 2 tg installations Messengers –12 - 4 from Bn; 2 from each lettered. Co. Airplane. Radio visual (panels) drop and pick up map principally used from grand to air. Visual Signal - lamps, flags, pyrotechnics, panels by prearranged code.