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Eddy

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Everything posted by Eddy

  1. We don't have any actual data on Russian missile stocks. But we can attempt to deduce from how often or not missiles are being used. So far this winter, including last night, the numbers are way down on last year. Therefore it could be they have less. It also could be they are stockpiling them for a future campaign. Or it could be last night was the start of a missile campaign. If there are no further missile attacks for 2 months does that mean their stocks are low. Not definitely but it would reinforce the impression. (Impression is the wrong word but I can't think of a better one)
  2. I read somewhere else recently that these issues were to do with problems with payments. Russia wants to be paid in roubles, India wants to pay in rupees. Lately the oil has been paid for with rupees which Russia can't convert into roubles because of sanctions and it needs that money in roubles. Or it could be that Indian refineries are full and the ships are being used as floating storage until capacity becomes free. This happened last year from memory. That said, I hope the businessinsider article is correct. About time we started clamping down on these sanction busters.
  3. Not so sure about this tbh. Russia has not been deterred up to now and even today the Guardian is reporting that 70% of Kherson is without electricity due to shelling. And Shaheed attacks on civilian areas are still ongoing nightly, which also doesn't look like Russian being deterred. I wonder whether if we don't see a cruise/hyper-sonic/ballistic missile campaign like last winter it's because the Russian no longer have the capability, not by choice. The only production numbers we have seen come from Ukraine, which is understandably incentivised to err on the side of caution. Maybe the Russian's just can't produce that many anymore and the estimates from Ukraine are wrong.
  4. If there even is a winter missile campaign card. We are deep into winter and there has been nothing like last years onslaught. Maybe they are waiting for the weather to turn really cold or something, but it's not like so far we've seen any evidence of Russia waiting patiently, building up its capability until everything is in place. I wonder whether they've got the ability left for another winter missile campaign. At least on the same scale as last winter. If they haven't that will be very instructive. Of course it goes without saying that the people on the receiving end couldn't give a stuff if it's a single Shaheed or full blown winter campaign. I wouldn't want to appear to be belittling the suffering going on.
  5. I've been thinking about the Storm Shadow/SCALP attack on the ship in Feodosia. That is right on the edge of Storm Shadow/SCALP's range which means that the SU24 either went over the Black Sea or very near to Russian controlled air space in order to deliver those weapons. Either way, normally that would put them at risk of Russian fighters and the Ukrainians don't have enough SU24s to take many risks. And they need those SU24s. However, with the downing of 5 Russian jets (from whatever source), the Russian have to pull back before they work out what the hell happened, thus creating gaps. So, for me, this a planned operation. First shoot down the Russian fighters and then exploit those gaps created with a Storm Shadow/SCALP attack as part of the same operation. I can't see it being an opportunistic attack. The timescales are too tight. Secondly, it creates a dilemma for the VVS. Do they go back to employing their fighters the same way prior to the shooting down and risk further losses. Or do they protect the fighters but leave themselves open to further Strom Shadow/SCALP attacks?
  6. Not a dumb question, Dan. Both Reporting from Ukraine and Anders Puck Nielsen YT channels have asked the same question. There's no evidence either way except that 5 Su34s/Su30s were shot down by something in the last few days. As Nielsen states, if the F16s were quietly introduced this is probably what it would look like. The trouble is if they were shot down by Patriots (or whatnot) this is also what it would look like. I've been going through the old Warzone articles on the the timelines for training UKR pilots on the F16 and they basically put forward the opinion that it will takes many, many months. But I wonder whether that's for full training across all missions, like ground attack, SEAD/DEAD etc. I wonder how quickly experienced pilots could be trained to do just AA missile interception and then train them later on the other stuff. That said, Carolus is correct. Without AMRAAMS/Meteor the F16 would not be capable. (I don't even know if F16 are integrated with Meteor - the only thing I could find on it is that Greece has Meteor missiles and also F16s. Doesn't mean they're integrated. Greece also has Rafales which are integrated).
  7. Apologies if this has already been linked but if your life is not complete without a report from RUSI on UGS's, then it is now Uncrewed Ground Systems: Organisational and Tactical Realities for Integration | Royal United Services Institute (rusi.org) and the pdf is here: Uncrewed Ground Systems: Organisational and Tactical Realities for Integration (rusi.org) Chapters: What are UGS? What are the purported benefits of UGS? What are the potential uses of UGS? Considerations for UGS support to light manoeuvre forces How do UGS get to, and stay in, the fight? How to make sure soldiers use them I know this OT but we have occasionally touched on UGS on this thread so just thought I'd link it.
  8. It's not published by RUSI. It's published by Bloomsbury if you don't want to pay Mr Bezos The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century: New Perspectives on Defence and Security Jack Watling Bloomsbury Academic
  9. 2 chapters in - all killer and no filler (for those of us of a certain age ). It's excellent so far.
  10. Not sure if this will be relevant to what you've been tasked with but Jack Watling from RUSI has a new book out - 'The Arms of the Future': The Arms of the Future: Technology and Close Combat in the 21st Century: Technology and Close Combat in the Twenty-First Century (New Perspectives on Defence and Security): Amazon.co.uk: Jack Watling: 9781350352957: Books I've just got it on kindle and only read the intro so far, but it looks promising. Judging by his RUSI articles it hopefully may be of some use.
  11. Maybe a bit off topic this but why have 2 top Polish generals resigned? Poland’s top commanders resign days before election | Financial Times (ft.com) (paywalled) Is this just internal politics or is it important wrt support to Ukraine?
  12. Now this is a good read => Biting Off What It Can Chew: Ukraine Understands Its Attritional Context - War on the Rocks Here's the Bing Chat summary: but I think it's well worth a read.
  13. More donations announced from Germany. M26 (AT2) are not the cluster munition variant but variant carrying anti-tank mines. 'Different versions' for 120mm means normal, smoke, illumination apparently. I wonder what the 50 unmanned surface vessels are.
  14. Professor Michael Clark was just on Sky News talking about this incident. His opinion is that the missile (the first one that is) was probably jammed by "something", although he does clearly state he has no evidence to back that up. The second he reckons probably failed
  15. I heard somewhere recently that the US DOD had signed contracts with Starlink some time this year for them to provide this service to Ukraine. I can't remember where (so can't provide a link) but it was definitely since the excerpt from the book was published. Is that not true, does anyone know? Or did I misunderstand what the contracts were for?
  16. I could hide behind that I used the words 'perhaps' but in all honesty I did not know any of that, so thanks for replying. Explains one of the reasons why Chally 3 will be smooth bore I suppose
  17. Don't want to derail the thread but not always apparently => Dutch disease - Wikipedia
  18. Challenger is rifled so perhaps that gives it better accuracy. Also uses DU rather than tungsten.
  19. A sober and realistic analysis of where the Ukrainian offensive is at the moment. Recommend giving it a watch even though it's over an hour long.
  20. Clever from the Ukrainian MOD Has a pop at the 'anonymous sources' talking crap Reminds everyone that these same sources were wrong in Feb 22 Emphasises that the Ukrainians know what they're doing Reiterates the point that for Ukrainians this is an existential war And for once the music's not crap Edit: Forgot they used London's Calling by The Clash recently
  21. Latest article from Kofman and Lee in War on the Rocks. Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s Counteroffensive Three months In - War on the Rocks Well worth the read, although it's long.
  22. Yes but that picture would appear to be not one of them Maybe it's just an illustration of one
  23. ISW not holding back. Full thread Apparently from this piece Let Ukraine Direct Its Own Counteroffensive - WSJ (I don't have a subscription)
  24. Good read. Thread also can be found here => Thread by @emilkastehelmi on Thread Reader App – Thread Reader App .
  25. Bloody hell! If you can, it's worth reading the whole thread as there is images embedded. Suffice it to say, the whole idea that the Ukrainians would succeed if only they did it the NATO way is questionable (i.e. bollocks). This would appear to be a tough nut to crack. "Translation: Much has been written about the battles in the South. I wouldn't say that this is the case where it's better to see once (or multiple times) than to hear/read about it many times. Especially through the eyes of the frontline units. A thread about battles from the perspective of aerial reconnaissance: Environment. Steppe. Fields, tree lines. Slight elevations and dips, villages, small rivers. Minefields. Whoever you may be, an armored assault group, evacuation team, aerial or infantry reconnaissance, your movement is visible from afar. The enemy has long been preparing. Equipment and personnel can be spotted from a distance and targeted. Both sides understand that there are limited places for positions and deployment. Most likely, there's something to shoot at in almost every tree line. Confirmation is needed, of course. Primarily, it's necessary to determine the priority of the target There's a limited number of access roads, logistical routes. Everything's been calibrated and fired upon repeatedly every day. You certainly can be spotted. Carrying out the mission while maintaining complete concealment from the enemy is mostly impossible There has been a great deal of talk about fortifications and minefields. Every tree line has been dug up. On one stretch of the Mariupol highway, anti-tank fortifications have been installed. We're not just talking about trenches. There's an entire system of trenches, dugouts, and even undeground tunnels in some places In each tree line, there's a network of trenches and firing positions for various weapons. AGS, DShK, ATGMs. Anti-tank ditches and mine obstacles stretch across the fields. From regular TM and POM mines to more "sophisticated" ones, all lying in wait for infantry. Once again, it's crucial to emphasize that we're specifically discussing a system of trenches, interconnected by passageways and pathways. These pathways facilitate the movement of personnel, weaponry, and ammunition. As for what remains unexcavated, it's mined. All of this must be navigated to make progress forward. For those who are "overly smart" and believe that the Ukrainian Armed Forces took an incredibly long time to drive the Russians out of the village of Robotyne, they must have missed the defense system that needed to be overcome in order to push the russians away from the Mariupol highway and gradually approach the village, encircle it, and finally seize control. Truly, a monumental task has been accomplished. The russians are establishing firing points (AGS, heavy machine guns), and they mine the routes to them. They themselves move along designated paths. Our positions in the liberated territory are surrounded by mines and tripwires. Paths are cleared for ingress, and sappers gradually clear the area. Frequently, the hidden "surprises" detonate during shelling, triggered by fires that start due to the shelling (weeds, shrubs, and trees catch fire, setting off tripwires). At times, we ourselves discover and call in sappers to clear specific areas. There's much talk about armored vehicle losses, but the issue of initial setbacks is overlooked. In the long run, it's impossible to entirely avoid armor losses, even due to the enemy's advantage in the air. However, armor serves a specific purpose that entails risks. There's much talk about armored vehicle losses, I'll skip the topic of initial setbacks. In the long run, it's impossible to entirely avoid armor losses, especially due to the enemy's advantage in the air. However, armor serves a specific purpose that entails risks. These actions are justified by the fact that they save lives. I spoke with a soldier who survived two direct hits on a Bradley during shelling. Even the most critically damaged equipment is recovered and taken for repairs. You can replace a piece of metal, even if it's expensive, but you can't repair a human life Enemy ATGM operators position cameras in advance of their positions. This way, they can spot targets (all types of vehicles) in advance and engage them effectively. If successful, artillery finishes off the targets. Alternatively, they might start with air force, followed by artillery. They hunt for evacuation teams – both vehicles and stations. Right under our noses, they hit an armored vehicle, and an evacuation vehicle arrived for the guys. They had to maneuver in a tight spot, moving very slowly on a narrow road, avoiding going off-road into a mined field. Taking risks as well. Fortunately, they managed to get them out. KAB's are one of the biggest fears. The russians use them extensively. I can't speak to their accuracy, but the weaponry is powerful. They attempt to target logistics and command centers, just as we do. They don't hesitate to simply fire on roads. Forward defenses in settlements are constantly under shelling. The aerial reconnaissance linked system Orlan-Zala-Supercam is effective and causing issues. They identify targets and launch Lances, releasing them in swarms along with KAB's. They attempt to break through and hunt down vehicles. The recaptured positions are even more calibrated. Bombs are not spared. No lack of mines either. The tree line where one of the crews was operating was simply leveled. Only a palisade remained, and a well-made trench ceased to be usable. The russians use a standard tactic for their armor. The route to the firing position is determined, usually in a way that keeps the vehicles under visual cover of the tree lines and eventually positions them in an open space for shooting. They quickly expend their ammunition and retreat Vehicle cannot be completely concealed. Dust clouds are visible during movement, and the vehicles can be seen shifting between tree lines, while drones provide visibility as well. The main task here is to execute the firing mission quickly enough to prevent artillery targeting or counterattacks using FPV or ATGMs. I understand why the russians are intensively butthurt due to the loss of the village with six streets. They put in significant effort to prevent the Ukrainian Armed Forces from advancing. Defending is easier according to all norms. On the other hand, we're putting in a tremendous effort to break through. And when we succeed, it shows that our efforts are paying off Thank you for your attention. I might continue sharing in the future."
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