undead reindeer cavalry
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Posts posted by undead reindeer cavalry
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bingo.
just to throw one example, real mines or fortifications would be meaningless to simulate in CMSF setting. dynamic realtime simulation of vehicle suspension, on the other hand, is crucial to have in the game.
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i don't think it should matter wether the shot penetrates the armor or not -- the guy should be out of the battle anyway.
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If they added the M113, we would have the same discussion about another vehicle, say, a M60.</font>Originally posted by Thomm:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:
If your content pipeline is such that it will take several days to add such an featurewise simplistic and visually such an block of a vehicle like M113 then you are simply doing it wrong.
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fair enough
BTW selling CDs has its good sides: i have had to buy CMBB two times (and in between i bought CMAK only because local store didn't have CMBB) just because the CD had rendered itself unusable because of heavy usage. with a downloadable i'll just reload it
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still, even at BFC partner site gamersgate.com CMBB costs 25.00 euros while CMSF costs 19.99 euros. both are downloadables.
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well for example compare CMBB and CMSF prices in stores that are also selling thru Amazon.com:Originally posted by TheVulture:Odd - the first few sites I checked weren't selling any CMx1 products at all.
CMSF: $7.67, $9.97, $19.99, $6.99, $6.99, $8.12, $9.67, $10.00 -- average price $9.925
CMBB: $36.67, $36.68, $37.19, $37.75, $59.99, $28.91, $28.92, $29.55, $34.25 -- average price $36.65
by average CMBB costs more than three times as much as CMSF. at highest it costs 8 and half times as much.
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i am sure JasonC would buy CMBB v2 if you added a couple of fixes and gameplay improvements.Originally posted by Battlefront.com:Once again, proving my point that unlimited content gives a player too much incentive to not play anything else.
in CMx1 the models could have as well been totally untextured, had 50% less polygons, and the graphics would still have been groundbreaking. it's the game mechanics that made the game so good.
i'm going to be an arrogant clueless ass for a while now, once again
for gawd's sake, one in a hundred gives a flying f about the details you model and show in 3D. you do not need to show individual men correctly disembark from a APC. you do not need to simulate how and when the loader can use his MG. individual shells do not need to hit tree branches. if your content pipeline is such that it will take several days to add such an featurewise simplistic and visually such an block of a vehicle like M113 then you are simply doing it wrong.
stop ruining the game by focusing on meanigless overengineered crap. please focus on game mechanics and game play - that's what made CM so dear to our bleeding hearts.
Leave Britney Alone!
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isn't it odd how CMx1 is still being sold at a higher price than CMSF. and by higher i mean twice the price or more. retailers are rats, but lets delude ourselves for just a second in the fantasy that there's a difference in quality of the product at play in here.
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a cool idea! i will try this out.
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i might buy the module just in hopes to get a good play with BMP-3. hopefully you can use its indirect fire configuration and something has been done to AFV weapon selection.
BTW what comes to the price of CMSF, didn't it drop right after it came out, in something like a week or two?
i sure hope the stores will be selling the WW2 title for practically nothing as well...
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Yes you can. </font>Originally posted by Melnibone:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by undead reindeer cavalry:
huh, so you can't have modules with the Paradox version?
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EDIT: ok, so you can use modules with Paradox version
still a couple of questions:
is the indirect fire mode of BMP-3 modelled in the game?
how likely is it that the follow-up modules will ever include Shilka (ZSU-23-4)?
[ May 07, 2008, 07:56 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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google for OpenSource CMx1.Originally posted by Mord:What would that be?
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very entertaining AAR. great read
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i know that there's at least one open source project aiming to recreate CMx1. i haven't followed its status tho, so no idea how it's processing forward.
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some disagree and believe that motorization, airforces and signalling technologies have fundamentally changed the nature of war. some just have different interpretation. some of it is just talk on different scale (e.g. "going around" and aiming at weakness on smaller scale to achieve enemy destruction on larger scale). much of it is just relatively meaningless mumbojumbo about terminology.Originally posted by Tux:As for the discussion re military strategy, excuse me for being slow but I'm encountering most of this for the very first time in this thread. Do 'modern manoeuvrists', as JasonC calls them, truly fundamentally disagree with the teaching of Clausewitz and Napoleon, or do they simply insist on a different interpretation?
none of it is a new phenomenon. it certainly predates WW2.
the discussion is a bit of a mess and must be very confusing to read. for example in the original thread there was much talk about attacks that are blind rushes and evils of maneuver theorists, while many of contemporary methods of maneuver theories were specifically created to avoid having attacks that are blind rushes.
anyway, JasonC is of course in general absolutely correct about the common cartoony version of German military tradition, though he himself is a bit quilty of making cartoony generalizations.
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JasonD,
are you aware of MDMP (Military Decision-Making Process) used by the Marines (and Army)?
it's divided into a number of field manuals covering key sub components like Intelligence Preparation, Targetting Process and Risk Management.
EDIT: googled some of the manuals.
FM 5-0 (PDF) - Army Planning and Orders Production
FM 34-130 (PDF) - Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
FM 6-20-10 (iPaper) - Tactics, Techniques and The Procedures for Targeting Process
FM 100-14 (PDF) - Risk Management
[ April 25, 2008, 07:49 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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it's simple as this: you are factually incorrect when you say that according to Clausewitz the enemy armies are always the center of gravity. you are simply wrong.Originally posted by JasonC:Tux - except, you are being spun with a modern maneuverist load of bull, that is a direct denial of the original meaning of center of gravity or center of mass, as meant by Clausewitz and before him by Napoleon.
exactly.The idea is about *decision*, and it is about attacking the enemy *strength*. It is not about finding critical weaknesses - that is an alien maneuverist idea. In fact, the whole point is to utterly ignore as unimportant side shows, anything of that kind.
heh, the evil maneuverists conspire.Maneuverists therefore hate it, and spin it away.
German plan was certainly sound considering the information available for them, but in hindsight it was an error as defined by the criteria set by the German planners themselves.In the case of Russia in WW II, there was nothing wrong with targeting the fielded forces of the enemy, the Germans were right to do so.
i am impressed by your pessimism. take a break some day and allow the world to vary from the script you have set up.This spun Clausewitz revisionism is entirely typical of the tendency I am talking about. No element of the German military tradition is allowed to vary from the script, because it is all about boosting a modern doctrine, not understanding the internal variety in actual German doctrine, over time. And one is especially forbidden to notice when the historical German doctrine is not only different from the modern spin, but superior to it.
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don't confuse enemy COG with your goals, territory or things like "psychological shock effect".Originally posted by Rankorian:Most simulations I see of Barbarossa require for a german victory the occupation of the Soviet territory to...usually something like the Urals. But, of course, that is a post-war, post-hoc, designation of convenience. I would imagine the german military would have hoped, prior to the invasion, that the COG was something less than that.
At this point, though we know that destruction of the initial Soviet armies were not the COG, we can't know what would have been--since the Soviets never collapsed. Perhaps taking Moscow in the initial lunge would have caused a....psychological, much like the Cold War, collapse. Maybe the early capture of Leningrad would have done it.
We will never know--but most simulations/games stack the deck to require the Germans to drive heedlessly east. (Something different, like: "Liberate" the Baltics and the Ukraine, then set up heavy defensive positions and negotiate for peace--not usually an option.)
taking Moscow won't make Soviet armies disappear. by aiming at Moscow you just may have better chances at destroying those armies, of achieving a decisive battle of annihilation.
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i'm not sure if JasonC is aware of CES procedures, because it seems a bit like that is what he is describing.
with CES procedures the commander in practice enters parameter values to predefined functions and receives a number of plans (or just a single plan) that are most likely the most effective tactic under the given conditions (as dictated by precalculated logical methodology). all commanders are trained in CES procedures.
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Clausewitz used (translation issues ignored) those terms to describe specific ideas related to warfare. his "On War" is one of the most confusing books, and the concept of "center of gravity" is especially hard. his use of various terms is not entirely consistent, not least because Clausewitz died before he finished the book. fortunately we know what parts he considered more and what less finished.Originally posted by Tux:Just a minor point: The terms 'Centre of Mass' and 'Centre of Gravity' are effectively synonymous, with the 'Mass' variation being more accurate for the purpose for which most people use either term, since it is independent of possible variations in the gravitational field within an object.
his "center of gravity" is not just mass (e.g. enemy armies), it is also things like movement and interdependencies. to simpify a great deal, it is The Thing that makes it possible for the enemy to wage war. according to Clausewitz it can be things like public opinion, alliances or even a single charismatic leader.
for example some argue that the COG in Vietnam war for South Vietnam would have been the alliance with the US, while the COG for US was public opinion. the US would have wrongly miscalculated the enemy COG to be Viet Cong forces -- thus the enemy was not defeated by the destruction of Viet Cong.
note that none of the above means that you should "go around". on the contrary it means that you should aim directly at the center of gravity. the center of gravity just isn't necessarily JUST the field armies themselves. also, the COG can change.
for example one could argue that in Operation Barbarossa Germans misidentified the Soviet armies in Western Russia as the Soviet COG. misidentified, because obviously USSR wasn't defeated by destroying their armies in Western Russia -- Soviets used a three layered system in which the high command mobilizes new armies in rear while the armies in front are being destroyed (just as planned to delay the enemy). German planners actually discovered in their wargames that it wasn't "all that likely" that they could destroy Soviet armies in Western Russia. they defined a line after which, if enemy still fielded coherent forces, they should stop and redefine their strategy -- in terms of Clausewitz to either recognize the changed enemy COG or simply correctly redefine it.
contemporary research has develop logical methods for helping commanders define the COG. these methods have also been used to analyze historical scenarios, to find out what the COG for various sides most likely actually was, and it is relatively easy to do it yourself. so far all such papers i have read have concluded that the Kiev turn was a mistake.
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you speak of "mass" but later you speak of "gravity" (in context of soft targets like capitals) so i suppose you mean "gravity" above as well.Originally posted by JasonC:Clausewitz taught that the center of mass of the enemy is always his armed
forces in the field
Clausewitz did not teach that the center of gravity is always the armed forces of the enemy. he actually did list soft targets like capitals and leaders as possible center of gravity.
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tactics without actual content is hardly the problem. according to studies, the problem is that commanders tend to be rigid attritionists who tend to order frontal attacks based on the dated data of their CES. thus maneuverist theories like "recon-pull".Originally posted by JasonC:More, as an answer it is a dodge from the substance of my charge. Which is that there actually are better and worse responses to definite, common tactical problems, and the corps (and army) could easily determine them and teach them. Instead it covers the manual writer's backside with a load of guff about perfection being impossible due to uncertainty, the net result of which is that some inexperienced captain gets to wing it.
It isn't only unwillingness to make a decision under stress and uncertainty, that betrays a lack of moral character. Abdicating the responsibility to teach tactics with actual content, is at least as bad, with less of an excuse.
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pamak1970,
there are also RAND studies (based on NTC data) on tactical level that suggest that more aggressive tactics are more effective and cause less friendly casulties.
the above of course with trained commanders who supposedly know what they are doing. they probably wouldn't do the sort of stuff that was relatively common in WW2. e.g. attack just for the sake of being able to attack, send a panzer company to take a meaningless village and then lose it all to a AT ambush.
Small calibres still seem wonky
in Combat Mission Shock Force 1
Posted
of course every now and then you read a story where dude x supposedly just kept on going while taking hits, at the end of the mission having 10+ holes in hist vest, but it's far more common to read how dude x leaves the battle for 20+ minutes to take care of himself after taking a hit.