undead reindeer cavalry
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Posts posted by undead reindeer cavalry
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I'm not sure why the recon forces are meant to engage in combat, my understanding being that recon patrols generally find the enemy by observation and "bumps" and the rest of the recon detachment as a whole tries to avoid what the CRP's find, with the overall mission of infiltration for information.
yeah, modern Soviet recon tactics are based a lot more in infiltration. the WW2 era tactics i was talking about were much more aggressive with raids and such. the reason why recon forces were meant to engage in combat is that it's the only way the enemy can be forced to show his force. of course observation was important as well, but it could provide only limited information.
The other quibble is about the advanced guard being very aggressive, I'm not sure that is necessary, but this depends on context. Feel free to share your thoughts on this.
the missions of advance guards are such that it is forced it to be aggressive. they are not a recon force. AG is what destroys those enemy forces the recon & FD forces bypassed. it destroys the outposts and clears obstacles. it's what enables the main body to deploy for the attack, and it does it by combat and it does it as quickly as possible. its actions are fast, bold and resolute. the only time it goes temporarily to defence is when it faces an enemy it fails to destroy, and even then it doesn't brake contact with the enemy. it is very different from a forward detachment or a recon force.
why not do away with the forward detachment? There are obvious advantages you get by detaching a part of your force, in this case roughly a tank battalion reinforced with an infantry company. You define those pretty well. So why do I ask? I want to know if this detachment is seen as a *sacrifice* of absolute combat power for the unit. What that means, is that if you take the same units in the forward detachment and stuff them into the first echelon of the regimental defense, entrenched and integrated with those co-units, they will be more powerful in raw combat power and survivability than if they were being used as a mobile detachment.
units fighting in the security zone of a motorized rifle division could be up to a regiment in size.
the individual strongpoints of a FD are build around a motorized rifle company, reinforced with assets like a tank platoon, engineers, ATGM and AA assets and some arty. these strongpoints can fight alone and surrounded. they are fortified and have multiple alternate positions (both as alternate strongpoints and as alternate positions within any given strongpoint). between strongpoints there are mines and such.
the FD does not fight the delaying battle only with its own assets, it also functions as the eyes of the weaponry behind it (up to front level). the strongpoints are located so that enemy is channeled into predefined kill sacks for these higher level assets (and of course to FD assets as well, e.g. AT kill sacks). also, the FD is not alone in the security zone -- there are stuff like Reconnaissance Fire Complexes, possible supporting elements of the main body and so forth.
besides the covered stuff, the FD has two additional roles which may now have come entirely clear.
a) it deceives the enemy about the actual location of the main defensive line. besides denying recon etc, the last defensive position of the FD imitates the main defensive line.
it gives time for the main body to react to the enemy advance. this is important in the Soviet doctrine, because, for example, the Soviets try to use mines in reaction to the actual route the enemy is taking at the very moment (they are laying and firing mines still just minutes before the enemy arrives).so no, i do not agree that FD is a sacrifice of combat power. the way it fights is a valid tactic out of its own (as much as the defender has enough space). but besides that, it maximizes the combat power of the main body (utilization of indirect assets, engineering works, locations & preparedness of AT zones, reserves etc) and the utilization of higher level assets (arty, aviation etc).
If it is accepted that the idea is to sacrifice some absolute combat power (entrenched, defending, integrated vs. mobile, attacking, independent) then the next questions is: *Why* are the Soviets talking about making *every* combat formation into a "forward detachment-style" unit in their late doctrinal debates? The general answer is, "Nuclear weapons and precision weapons mean we have to spread out and stay mobile to survive..." But, specifically, is that accurate, and if so what specifically does the forward detachment have going for it that makes it *more* difficult to persecute by precision air and/or nuclear fire?it being more scattered and mobile?
just compare FD to the main defences of a motorized rifle division.why would anyone want to make units FD style? because they can.
what's not to like in calling down front level fires 25 km in front of your first regimental defense line? having tiny company sized units work in cooperation (fancy comms) and ambush valuable divisional assets of the enemy, while still not offering the enemy any good targets to shoot at and making them run into further ambushes in mined kill sacks?
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i fell for it. read the ToW 2 screenshot announcement and went to look at the screenshots. those fuel bombs were worth every penny
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does the "views" field show what you'd think it shows?
Marine video update: 27
this thread: 312
End of the world: 2000+
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after rereading some of the thread, i think Adam's questions still aren't answered. i'll speak of post WW2 Soviet doctrine, as this is what Adam is asking about.
in offense forward detachment (FD) secures key terrain locations revelant for movement of the main force. moving as fast as possible the FD avoids battle with the enemy security forces (and brakes contact with them) unless they are weak enough to be destroyed with ease. the FD acts independtly from the main body in the sense that it does not provide it any march security, doesn't have to move the route the main body will etc, but it does have specific given objectives. i guess all this is clear.
in contrast to the FD the advance guard (AG) moves the very same route the main body does and aims to destroy any enemy force / obstacle it encounters even if it is superior to itself. if it fails in destroying the enemy force it waits for reinforcements but keeps contact with the enemy and then attacks again. the difference between an AG and a FD is quite considerable.
in defence the FD acts as the outmost layer in the security zone with the mission of delaying the enemy force by destroying its recon & security elements in a fighting withdrawal. its delaying tactics are based around picking fights at alternate strongpoints consisting of reinforced motorized rifle companies located around the security zone, fighting a three phase battle consisting of indirect fires, ambushes, counterattacks and changes of positions utilizing the large space it has been given.
at first FD is located at the most likely enemy routes of advance, as strongpoints in scattered line formation. when the FD detects enemy forces it engages them at maximum range from the outer edges of the security zone both by indirect (arty in the security zone, CAS, fancy army level assets) and direct fires (ambush style). this in order to just cause attrition and delay.
next, elements of the FD move out to alternate positions to destroy advancing recon and security forces of the enemy. once those have been forced back the used elements of the FD return to their strongpoints.
next the enemy advance guard attacks the FD's positions. the FD repulses the attack but with considerable losses. the FD moves compromised units to secondary positions.
possibly bypassed units are still calling indirect fires at the enemy as he launches the main body against the FD. the FD fights back as much as it can (not much) while it withdraws and moves to cover secondary routes at the flanks, leaving the defence against the enemy main advance to the forward elements of the friendly main body.
so to answer the specific questions:
- the tactics used by the companies of FD are different from the ones used by the companies of the main body, as you probably can read from the above general description. e.g. when in offense the FD avoids contact with the enemy while the AG seeks contact with the enemy. e.g. in defence the companies of the FD are scattered in strongpoints that most likely are not mutually supporting and which are not even planned to "hold the line", while the companies of the main body are in positions that are mutually supporting and which are planned to stop the enemy. etc.
- the reason why FD exists in the portions it does is based entirely on the estimated strength of the various elements of the enemy. e.g. in defence the mission of the FD is to destroy enemy recon elements and halt enemy advance guard -- thus it requires forces that are capable of accomplishing that mission.
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what a confusing thread. some late war Soviet terminology:
ground reconnaissance
- penetrates enemy reconnaissance and security forces and seeks to find out the location & strength of the enemy, where the flanks are and so forth
- besides utilizing observation, forces enemy to display his strength by combat action
- conducted at various levels, e.g. as detachments (combined arms battalions), separate groups (a company of tanks + some infantry), patrols (squad to platoon)
security
- aims to prevent an enemy surprise attack, enemy reconnaissance of the friendly forces and give the friendly forces time to react to the enemy
- does it simply by warning of the incoming enemy
- conducted as march security, halt security and battle outposts
screening forces
- used as a temporary buffer between the enemy and the friendly forces concentrating or employing for an attack
advance guard
- used when friendly and enemy main body are separated by a long distance or a series of obstacles
- defeats outposts and obstacles (enemy recon and security forces), and establishes contact with enemy main defensive line ahead of the friendly main body, with the aim of providing the friendly main body good positions for the actual attack
- very aggressive
- consists of breaching teams, lots of arty, tanks, combat engineers, CAS
first echelon of the main body
- in the context of advance guard, first echelon follows the advance guard, clearing and organizing passages for the main body
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Well, this is just directly incompatible. You can't ask a vendor of anything to just give you more for less money. Well, you can ask but if the vendor is on a small margin anyway it's not going to do any good.
did you check the blog? the guy is a game developer who is taking the listed measures to make more money.
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i have lost a number of games because of all sorts of DRM failures. i learned the lesson years ago:
1) buy the game
2) download the torrent
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an interesting blog entry: Talking to 'Pirates'
a game developer asked pirates to tell him why they pirate his games.
the survey led him to change some things, in order to make more money:
- No more DRM
- Better, longer demos
- Dropped the prices
- Improve the games, make them more polished
- No more DRM
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you could also try the original source from where RAS leeched the PDFs from. do a forum search for the link.
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where did you get that 38 came from Kolomna? I can't find anything about that.
figuring out Soviet factories is detective work.
same factories have different names, the names change, parts of the factories move around, get united, get split apart, get sent back, different sources use different transliterations for Russian names etc.you have already found some good basic sites. one other such basic site is wikipedia page about Soviet tank factories (gives an idea about the naming mess).
then there are a bit more academic pages. for example here (PDF) is a basic list of almost all Soviet factories. for example for that factory 38 at Kirov it nicely shows the history at Kolomna (38 at Kolomna: steam locomotives 1869-1956, tanks from mid-1930s; numbered from c. 1939; evacuated Kirov 1941. 38 at Kirov: evacuated from Kolomna; self-propelled artillery and light tanks).
then there are the sites of the factories themselves (most of them are operational still today), which typically contain some information about WW2 era. e.g. here's the one for the factory 38 at Kolomna (quote: As enemy troops approached Moscow major part of the plant was evacuated to Kirov where military machinery (tanks, mortars “Katyusha”, self-propelled plants) were launched during a short period of time.).
then there are sites about some specific vehicle/tank, which usually deal with production history. e.g. here about T-60, which states that initially production begun at Kolomna (and other four factories, but not the 38 in Kirov), then later also at 38 in Kirov.
all the information is doomed to be partly contradictory. you just have to try to figure out how things really went by combining different information from different sources. e.g. the T-60 site doesn't know about evacuation from Kolomna to Kirov.
so new TANK factories - ie factories that were now producing tanks that did not before.
yeah, in that sense, but conversion to tank production is a lot faster and easier than the building of a whole new factory. the formed can take just some weeks, the other years.
Thanks for the info about German tank production facilities - do you have an links to details?here's a good starting point. then google around when you know locations, company names and so forth. basicly it's the same detective work as with Soviets, with the difference that much of the stuff is in German.
if you are really interested in tank factories, there are academic papers about all kinds of stuff, but if you want online material you usually need an access to non-open e-libraries and journals. if you are a student, or work for companies that deal with this type of stuff, you might easily get access for free.
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The late war boost in numbers came from sheer volumes of labour poured into the industries for which the majority of production facilites already existed.
i did a quickish look for stats, but didn't find anything good enough. so here's a quick look on German tank production. i think it's good enough to make the point.
in 1933 there is no tank production in Germany. in 1934 two tank factories open PZ-I production. by 1939 there are six tank factories (plus two got in Czechoslovakia).
in 1940 and 1941 the six factories open new tank productions lines, and in 1941 two new factories are converted to tank production. during this period the plans are laid for future tank production boost.
in 1942 three new tank factories open production. the three new tank factories that open up in 1942 are to large part behind the boost in 1943 and 1944.
in 1943 component production becomes a bottleneck with the result that tank factories are not running at 100% efficiency. thus component production industry starts expanding. the new factories make 36.5% of all tanks already in 1943.
in 1944 three new German tank factories become operational (too late to make an effect) and two Czech factories are expanded. tank production is focused on maximizing production of a few specific vehicles. Allied bombing raids begin but with limited effect. component bottleneck has been reduced. note: tank production almost doubles from 1943 where as workforce allocation to tank production is basicly the same.
in 1945 it's game over.
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Red Army considered Mannerheim line a real fortification line still in 1944, when it had already been destroyed by Red Army during earlier years. Finns didn't even consider it a defensive line. it didn't prevent Red Army commanders from calling the "destruction" of this non-existent line in 1944 a great accomplishment.
in general Red Army reporting standards are so low that i wouldn't trust any information based on them. the commanders are just trying to make themselves look good. destruction of imaginary enemy regiments, under reporting own losses and so forth. it makes planning at higher levels a stupendous task, because you draw wrong conclusions and end up giving impossible orders to units because of all the erroneus data.
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My point is that any increased investment in production facilities in 1942 had little to do with increased production from 1943 - I'm sure it helped, but the vast majority of the increase was due to improvements in use of facilities that had been there for a few years already.
yes, the most important factor in increased production was the relocation of labour and raw materials to the armaments sector. it's directly related to productivity (efficiency). economies of scale, retooling and such also play a role. with tank production, though, the investment in mass production factories did make a difference, not least because early production sufferent from wide scatter at various smaller workshops.
I'd be interested in any figures on how much extra capacity was actually generated in 1942.
i don't have any specific numbers to give, and i am not even sure the numbers exist. there's a hard to get paper by Knittel about panzer production, but i have been waiting for it to arrive for more than a year. there are some German papers online but so far i haven't found any good statistics.
there are some general armaments statistics with labour & raw material input, though. for example check out Tooze's excel sheet at his page.
I don't know about German tank factories, but Russia was still building tank factories in 1942 - Plant #40 at Mytishchi started production in 1943, plants 37 (Sverdlovsk) 38 (Kirov) Uralmashzavod (Sverdlovsk) 174 (Omsk) all started production in 1942 - betwen them these plants produced about 20% of the total Tank/SPG production after 1942 (RKKA site)
sorry but you should have looked a bit deeper into the subject. none of the factories you list are new factories.
number 37 - not a new factory, moved from Moscow
number 38 - not a new factory, originally in Kolomna
number 40 - not a new factory, just switched to tank production
number 174 - not a new factory, originally in Leningrad
Uralmashzavod - not a new factory, just switched to tank production
STZ itself only produced 3600 tanks before being over-run by the Axis in 1942.
3600 isn't a huge number if you compare it to the number of total Soviet production during the war, but during the period when many of key tank factories were being evacuated the role of STZ was significant.
It's not trying to say that the increase in production didn't happen - it's pointing out that the pre-conditions that allowed it to happen all come from before the war which is when the efficiencies came.
The late war boost in numbers came from sheer volumes of labour poured into the industries for which the majority of production facilites already existed.
that depends entirely on what type of production we are talking about. coal, steel, ammunition, aircraft, submarines, halftracks, Tigers...
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there's certainly truth in there both ways and not least because early deployment can take form at multiple levels. on tactical level one way to get the enemy to deploy early is to call those indirect fires at his leading elements.
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This article (pdf about 200kb) argues that the German production increase from 1943 was in fact due to investments made prior to 1939 coming to fruition' date= and better use of available manpower and facilities - ie nothing much at all to do with any investment 1941-42.
indeed, but that's aircraft production. Germans are still building some of their largest tank factories in 1942. these factories, together with stuff like "Adolf Hitler Panzer Programme" (shift of resources from other armaments sectors to tank production), are what causes the boost in German tank production in the following years.
the point is, in 1942 Germans are still building their capacity to build tanks, where as Soviets built their capacity years ago. Soviets made their production plans already in 1920ies. for example the famous STZ at Stalingrad opens production in 1930 -- Nazi Germany doesn't even exist yet.
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talking about warfare and Soviet doctrine as a Finn is a hard task when you are not talking to another Finn. there's a serious danger of talking past the other fellow because you can't expect him to know anything meaningful about Finno-Soviet wars, while Finno-Soviet wars had their specific twists.
fighting Finns was quite a nightmare for Red Army still in 1944. Soviets commented how Finns fight "the wrong way", against the book, totally unorthodox and in direct contradiction to rules of war. the non-Finn non-Russian doesn't know much anything about it, because Western writers don't know about it either (or worse still, like Glantz just repeat Stalinist propaganda without looking at what even front level commanders wrote about it back then).
there's a lot about force deployment in Finno-Soviet wars.
you have the classical tactical level Winter War "motti" battles, in which marching Soviet divisions are chopped apart before they ever manage to deploy their forces.
you have summer 1944 pursuit battles, in which, on one hand, Soviet strategic and operational level forces never really manage to have a clear battle with the defenders -- a strategic / operational unability to deploy the forces effectively (which pretty much lost them the campaign). this is achieved pretty much by what JasonC already described.
on the other hand, you have the summer 1944 battles in which the defender did choose to take a stand and the deploying Soviet forces are largerly neutralized by operational fires. this more what Tero is describing, i think.
then there is the Finnish tactical level "active defense" doctrine. counterattacks that are almost microscopic, seemingly uncoordinated & isolated, totally meaningless in force ratio calculations. e.g a single infantry battalion attacks a Soviet Guards Rifle Division head on. the superior Soviet force is confused by the blatant and laughable error of scale of the Finnish attack. the Soviet "winning by scale" doctrinal counter of massed fires is an ineffective response to such a small scale attack. the division is unable to deploy its forces effectively and is thrown back by the battalion.
the thing about deployment is that it requires a great deal of work. it's a huge hassle. on operational level the deployment of an army can take days. then, when that deployed army attacks a dummy target (e.g. the non-existant largely non-defended Mannerheim line in 1944), the operational loss in time and tempo is quite remarkable. the deployment will also generate friendly losses, no matter if the target is just a "dummy" or not, especially if the defender has well organized arty.
in CM you can deploy your forces as many times as you like (battle turn limit permitting). in real world (on higher level) you could deploy your force only a number of times, perhaps as few as 3-5 times, no matter how big (read: small and insignificant) each of the battles turn out to be. thus you don't want to waste a deployment in a marginal, non-decisive battle.
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"Total war" in the 30s did not include women in the workforce. There was still much civilian production during the early war years. Whereas Stalin had consequently shifted towards industrialization (accepting famine due to lack of farm workers) Hitler hadn't. He wasted several years. He built highways with manual labor (following the plans of his predecessors) instead of using that workforce to build factories - and then build the highways with tracked vehicles.
percentually there were more German females in the workforce already before the war than there ever was in UK during the whole war.
Germany had strong food rationing as there was a serious threat of famine.
there is no meaningful shift of workforce from civilian production to military production thru the war years. the shift takes place already during the 1930ies, when Germany mobilizes war economy. what comes to industrial production directly related to military production, Germany had a higher percentage than USSR (as much as it matters, since the difference between civilian and military production is purely artificial in war economy).
autobahns were just propaganda for the masses. the workforce working on autobahns was insignificant, and contrary to propaganda had little effect on unemployment since most of the work was done by slave labour. as already said, Germany considered total demotorization of the society (IIRC in 1940), meaning that all motor vehicles would be nationalized, but the plan was judged to be unpractical.
The number of Soviet tanks remains constant but the loss rates rise dramatically. From somewhere near zero in '35 to 10k+ in '41. So the production rises to make up for the losses.
In '41 most tanks were light - in late '42 the T34 is the dominant type. So additional industrial capacity in "tons of steel" is needed - and those factories aren't there in '40. Lend-lease factories built during the war make up for the factory losses in the conquered parts of the Soviet Union.
T-34 was built in factories that had made something else previously. eg. KhPz, which started the mass production of T-34 in 1940, had previously produced BT-series tanks. STZ, which started mass production in early 1941, had previously built half of all the tractors in USSR. KSF at Gorky locomotives etc.
factories producing T-34s that were threatened by Germans were relocated and combined at Urals.
Germans were still investing heavily in creating industrial capacity in 1942. Soviets had created the industrial capacity already a decade earlier.
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a) Germany declared total war in '43 and the maximium in the war production is 1944 - with the allies at the doorsteps and massive air raids.
the declaration was done in the 1930ies before WW2 had even begun. the 1943 speech is just propaganda for the masses -- just like the "armaments miracle".
Instead of building factories (for war!) you build trenches. But you want to gear up towards full production. Spirng '41 there are 2 possibilities: Short-term or long-term investment.Soviets had already built their factories years ago. Red Army tank fleet is as large in 1935 as it is in 1945.
c) France built a superb defensive works. What happened to the Maginot line?that's more to the point.
Gambling that Hitler was building defensive lines or just fearing an attack - cause that guy did not invest as much in his military-industrial complex as Stalin did.actually Germans invested more in military-industrial complex than Soviets. Germans just had to build their mass production industry from zero, where as Soviets had already built their massive factories. German economy, like the whole society, was horribly outdated and they knew it. Germans admired Ford-type mass production lines but had nothing like it. they even considered total demotorization of the whole society. Germans are making huge investements in industrial capacity still in 1942 -- that's where the "armaments miracle" of 1944 comes from -- investments in creating industrial capacity in previous years.
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The German decision to attack when they did was not entirely irrational. Foolhardy, extremely ambitious and totally arrogant, yes.
it was not only not-entirely-irrational, it was rational and sound. it's pretty much the only real option for Germans.
it's considered extremely ambitious or totally arrogant only in hindsight. back then even US General Staff calculated that Germany would defeat USSR in 10 weeks.
Hitler must have realised any delay in his master plan would have meant the Red Army would have been reorganized and re-equipped if he turned East too late.Hitler's master plan was to fight naval and aerial war against the US. to do that he needed the resources located in USSR.
The apparent weaknesses of the Red Army had to be exploited before it could recover and learn from its mistakes.the temporary weakness of the Western Allies had to be exploited now, because calculations showed that US would take direct part in European operations in two years.
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one BG system i find interesting is the Tactical Combat Series. the difference to most other BGs is that you write down your plans before the game. it's a bit of a hack but creates some fun situations when plans no longer make sense but you still have to push on. the combat system itself is a bit too simplistic though. TCS is one of those things you either hate or love.
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i love it as well
it keeps surprising me again and again, not least because so much info is "hidden" in photo captions.
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According to Suvorov, tankodesantniki are from the penal battalions and expiate their guilt in blood.
on reason for the misunderstanding might be that some of them called themselves penal troops because of their ****ty tasks.
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historically the attritionist overwatch is 100 battalions of arty. first you create huge odds at the chosen attack sector (e.g. Soviet offensive against Finland in 1944, the odds at the breakthru sector were 18:1), then throw gigantic fires at defenders (this is the overwatch, in the case quoted above, it was 200 000 rounds of HE delivered in two hours against more or less a single regiment) and then attack, attack, attack. single attacking unit being typically a reinforced regiment, fighting as a part of a corps level (or larger) attack against a single defending regiment. when one corps is worn out, you throw in another one. you count to win by stressing the defender's lines enough to cause a breakthru. you have the odds and thus think you can take the attrition.Originally posted by Adam1:Attritionist attackers should therefore attack along routes where their overwatch works.
[ June 23, 2008, 01:06 AM: Message edited by: undead reindeer cavalry ]
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assault boats.Originally posted by Adam1:Are there any units you never buy?
it gives time for the main body to react to the enemy advance. this is important in the Soviet doctrine, because, for example, the Soviets try to use mines in reaction to the actual route the enemy is taking at the very moment (they are laying and firing mines still just minutes before the enemy arrives).
just compare FD to the main defences of a motorized rifle division.
Comparing echelons in the Red army
in Combat Mission: Barbarossa to Berlin
Posted
indeed.
by being harder to detect and harder to hit.
the use of nukes against potential company strongpoints is not realistic. if the doomsday has arrived there are far better targets.
which is why FD has additional AA assets.
BTW your take on air defense is quite "Western". what you see as a problem is what Soviets see as a solution.