Dandelion

Ah yes, the Panzer-Lehr, you're quite right, and it was not mentioned earilier. I stand corrected. Not an organic battalion, but she did have stray samples serving. An unusual practice, but then again the Panzer-Lehr was rather unusual. Regards Dandelion [ June 16, 2003, 07:17 PM: Message edited by: Dandelion ]

....errrright René, the Albanian machineguns of 1927, yes, lets see, this is when chieftain Zog of the Mati tribe has retaken power from bishop Norli right? ....one year before he declares himself King Zog I...and then hands Albania over to the fascists and runs off into the mountains with the state treasury...all three kopeks of it... Everyone owned a gun of course, but what kind of machineguns could they have used? Hrm...well, the tribes received military "aid" from six nations during WWI, were occupied by three of these - four if counting postwar years, and in addition both the Yugoslavs and Italians poured weapons over them between the wars. There must have been more machineguns than schoolbenches around, considering the 90% Albanian illiteracy figure of the time. They fought major battles between the tribes, and against the italians at Vlores. Does anyone know what type of machineguns they used? Now I'm really curious. Cheerio Dandelion

...And I agree with Hussar, AARs of all nations are to be regarded as how the action was experienced and perceived by the participants, not necessarily what actually happened. You need scientific historical research to conclude the actual events. For example, remaining in Rocherath, the Germans participating reported as far as I can see only Shermans opposing them - thus mistaking all TDs for Shermans. The divisional historians corrects these statements by adding "[oder Panzerjäger - der Verf]" to almost every qouoted sighting of a Sherman Cheerio Dandelion

Harry Yes you're quite right again, the term assault gun simply meant assault gun, by design or use. Still, I persist in the 560 not being present at Rocherath or Krinkelt, but engaged at Bütgenbach instead, where probably about 6 or so Jagdpanthers were lost to the Americans. The statement of them losing Jagdpanthers at Rocherath does not compute with their orders, nor reported locations at 16-19 December. Nor does it compute with their personnel records (RS 3-12/35 BA, MA), as the first reported casualties (personnel) in December, 2 dead and 8 wounded, are from December 22. That's at the end of their action at Bürtgenbach. Among the dead were hauptmann Wewers, who reported his advancing into Domäne Bütgenbach 19/20 December, according to the radio log of 12.SS-Panzer, thus could not have simultaneously been at Rocherath. The 12.SS-Panzerjäger Abetilung itself contained no Jagdpanthers. Theirs would be the only destroyed sturmgeschütze-ish vehicles available for confirmation at Rocherath. They used Jgpz IV. There is a fairly decent account on their particular action in "Schwungvoller Angriff bleibt stecken, Die Panzerjäger 12 bei der Ardenneroffensive". Its in the "Alte Kameraden" magazine, December 1982. Its written by Major Holtz. Its not literature, nor scientifically speaking historical, but it gives a good idea. I can thus not conclude otherwise from the information at hand than that the 560 formed part of the southern Kampfgruppe of the 12.SS as she was ordered, and fought south of Rocherath as she reported. Where other Americans stopped them dead instead. Speaking of which, what American unit fought at Bütgenbach, December 19-22? Generally on organisation: There was no difference between ID and GD. Grenadier, when used within the branch of service of Infantry, is merely a name with no organisational meaning in itself. As you write, there were only two (well, three counting the 45 tables, but I won't) official tables of organisation for the German infantry (again - the branch of service Infantry). Issued in 1939 (1939/40) and 1944, with the plethora of variations they contain, mainly Welle such. These tables were modified, both formally and in practice (the 44 tables were mere formal codifications of what had been standard practice for over a year by then). But the 1939 table was pretty much unchanged until mid 43. I must write again - this concerning the branch of service Infantry. The reason I keep repeating that is the fact that infantry in the meaning of foot soldiers served in many other branches of service, using other tables of organisations and indeed used the term 'Grenadier' in other meanings, even denoting their own branch, as in Panzergrenadier. Even the Navy had Grenadiers with a separate sheet of organisation, though using the VGD as model apparently. This all gets confusing even for the contemporary Germans themselves, so we are excused if scratching our late arriving heads in wonder. To add confusion, Himmler created the VGD tables for the Reserve Army, overriding the OKH, and thus a separate parallel set of tables came in use. Here the term Volksgrenadier does carry organisational meaning, when applied on the infantry divisions that served in the Reserve Army or were otherwise specifically ordered to change into that organisation. Of course, there were numerous exceptions to the above. There always are. Looking at the 12th specifically, I can certainly appreciate your confusion here. Now, I am also confused. The logs: Mid July, Wehkreis II is ordered to "reconstruct" one of her divisions, namely ID12, to be named GD12. "Reconstruct" is used when divisions are destroyed and have to be rebuilt practically from scratch. Organisation to be used is actually 1939. The 44 establishment had not been issued yet. But in the list of units rebuilt, it looks like an ordinary 1944 division, and that's logical considering that the 44 was in practical use long before it was issued. The surplus of men that you mention will have been included in the ordinary line units then? Late July, order is cancelled by new order, now instead order is to "rebuild" the ID12. "Rebuild" is used when divisions have been decimated at the front and need a boost of replacement, the basic structure however being still intact. Its quite apparent, that between the issuing of these orders, they must either have found a surprising amount of survivors from ID12, or taken such from one of her sister units (Divisions 2, 32, 60, 75 etc). I cannot see any other explanation. Perhaps this can explain the surplus of men in the division? As a wild guess, perhaps they eventually gathered about 2500 survivors, when they had already ordered the detailing of 2500 recruits/reserves/replacements to the division? Of course, I am merely guessing now. The detailing of troops were not pinpoint accurate, and many divisions received too many or too few, but the scale of 2500 I think must be due to other things than natural inaccuracy of the system. August 44, the division reappears as active responsibility (meaning it is operating in the field army and needs a chain of replacement personnel etc from Wehrkreis II). Its formal name is still ID12. Thus it was never actually "GD12" to formal military CoC, in the sense that it ought not to have been possible to, say, order supplies to any GD12. But God knows which name they used themselves, formally or informally, or which name others used. Knowing the Germans, I imagine they used both, alternating in the most confused and confusing possible of ways. In 9.10.1944, the Wehrkreis receives orders to reorganise the division into VGD12. The sole effect at this point was apparently that the Wehkreis had to raise a Panzerjäger Abteilung and send it off to the 12th, hereafter called VGD 12. Also a platoon for the Feld-Ersatz battalion, catering the needs of this new unit. There is no date on the platoon, so maybe it was never created. Unfortunately these logs say nothing of type and amount of vehicles. I have no idea if these were new vehicles or in-theatre transfers either. Fortunately, the Kriegstagebuch Ob West give some input, Anlagen und Meldungen vom 11.12.-20.1944 (Bundesarchiv, Militärarchiv, RH19 IV/84 D, Ia Nr 10697/44 Geheim). Apparently they were StuGs, and six were operational at the start of the Ardennes offensive (no idea of how many were non-operational, i.e. total strength, I'm afraid). There is apparently also a study made by aforementioned SS-Staf Rudolf Lehmann in December 44, obviously mentioning the VGD12 in some detail, as there are frequent references to it. But I've never found the report (not from lack of trying), and am not sure where to look next. "Studie" means its a military publication, such as the one by Engel himself by the way ("Die Ardenneroffensive in der Zeit vom 16. bis 29. Dezember, 1944", which I also do not have, but am a little familiar with. These Studien are usually published in the late 40's or early 50's. And easily found (but not easily obtainable). Quality (as in historical usability) very varying, but always interesting. But this Lehman report that keeps MIAing in my searches. You wouldn't by any chance have a conquered sample in the USNA would you? By the way, these guys were from in or around Schwerin. The guys in the 12th I mean. You can get an idea of their...well get to know them a little by having a beep at "modern" Schwerin here if you like. Its a really nice place actually, I think. Phew, takes me half a day to write these posts, mainly from just rummaging my impossible mess of papers just to get my references to sources correct. I have a German sense of order, so everything here is a completely impenetrable pile of unsorted files and books Cheerio Dandelion

Harry, Its no problem at all, and I'm not trying to pick on you either, we're investigating history here And we're starting to get actual events very much within reach. Thanks for the input on the US. The 12th SS didn't have any StuGs But the 12.V.G.D. did (a mixed battalion of Panzerjäger and StuG, the usualy authorised such for a V.G.D.). The 12.V.G.D. operated on the left (south) flank of the HJ and fought at Hünningen and Mürringen, a mere 2 kilometers to the South of Krinkelt, where they lost StuGs, December 17 and 18. Yes you're right, the 560 served alongside the 12th in december. I believe I mention this above. The unit did however not take part in the Rocherath-Krinkelt debacle. On the composition of the Panzer battalion, and on the service of 560, I've selected some paragraphs from the divisional history (amateur translation, as always): "By October 14 the Führungshauptamt made known further details. As of Führerbefehl the division HJ was to reconstruct during October, to be completed by October 31. All personnel vacancies in the division were to be filled. The Panzerregiment however, was to (apart from the Regimentsstab) consist of only one mixed battalion, with two companies of each 12 Panzer IV and two companies of each 14 Panzer V. For Regiments- and Abteilungsstab only 2 Befehlspanther were made available. The regiment received only a mixed Panzer-Flak-Zug with 4 Flakpanzer IV (2cm Vierling) and 4 Flakpanzer IV (3,7cm). For the time being, the two battalions remained Panzer IV and Panther abteilungen." "As the division reached quarters [in Brauweiler at this point] it was reorganised. As it had not been possible to organise two complete Panzerabteilungen, a mixed Combat and a mixed Training unit was formed. The I.Abteilung [Combat] under SS-Stuba. Jürgensen with 17 Panzern per company, was deployed with the division Raum west of Köln. II.Abteilung [Training] under SS-Hstuf Siegler was deployed to Truppenübungsplatz Fallingbostel with a couple of old training tanks. Here it was to reconstruct. As a second Combat [Einsatz] Abetilung, the Schweree Panzerjägerabteilung 559 was temporarily subordinated the division by order of OKW 17.11.1944. (lt.Kartei, OKW I/20632 g.K. v.17.11.1944). They arrived at division by the end of November/beginning December, but were immediately diverted to the Saar front. The personnel of this unit considered themselves still part of the division apparently, as soon afterwards an American propaganda leaflet was sent to divisional staff, which stated among other things that the force of the American offensive had already forced Hitler to throw his last assets into battle. A theory supported by the fact that the 12.SS-Panzerdivision was fighting on the Saar front. This was an unexpected help in the camouflage [of the Ardennes offensive buildup]. Replacing the 559 was, by order of OKW 5.12.1944, the Schwere Panzerjägerabteilung 560, which was equipped with Jagdpanther. It was led by Major Träger and arrived a few days before the offensive started." "On December 8, a summary of divisional strength was made. [here follows numbers and tables] 3. Panzer und gepanzerte kraftfahrzeuge Panzer IV soll 103, ist 37 Panzer V, soll 81, ist 41 Pnzerjäger IV soll 31, ist 22 [etc] The count of Jagdpanthers of s.Pj.Jg.Abt.560 is not given, apparently as it had not yet arrived by December 8."[and in the Instande counts, we see only one figure for all Panzerjäger, them not separated by type, as I show in earlier post] "The I.SS-Panzerkops ordered continued attacks on Rocherath-Krinkelt by the division, committing the I.Panzerabteilung. [---]. During the night [between december 17 and 18] the I.Panzerabteilung, consisting of 1. and 3. Pantherkompanien and 5. and 6. Panzer IV kompanien, advanced on the Reichsstrasse from Raum Blumenthal (2 km NW Hellenthal) via Hellenthal, Hollerath, Miescheider Heide until the crossroads west of Udenbrethand then on to the forest road northwest to the Bereitstellungsraum in Foret du Communale de Rocherath. The Abteilung had the mission to attack and destroy the enemy at Rocherath-Krinkelt, supported by 25.SS-Panzergrenadier regiment as well as the parts of 12.SS-Panzerjäger Abteilung that were already on site [these were JgdPz IV).[---]" "The Schwere Panzerjägerabteilung 560, the SPW battalion III./26 and the majority of the [26.SS-Panzergrenadier] regiment stood by, awaiting the removal of the enemy from Hünningen and Mürringen, enabling them to continue advancing along road C."[the clearing of these towns was the task of 12.V.G.D] [The divisional recon battalion also stood by awaiting the clearing of the towns, with orders to support the attack on Krinkelt from the south as soon as they had] The Kampfgruppe formed around 26th regiment and the Jagdpanthers eventually did see action, in the attacks on Domäne Bütgenbach and Bütgenbach itself, December 19 to 22. I can see in my older post above that I write plainly that the 12th SS had no Jagdpanthers, period. My mind was at the Rocherath-Krinkelt battle as I wrote that. It is not a truthful statement in the sense that the HJ never operated alongside Jagdpanthers. Sidenotes: - The battalion to reinforce the Panzerregiment of the LAH was Schwere SS-Panzerabteilung 501, equipped with Tiger II by this time. This was the korps heavy battalion. - The Kraas notes on 560 compute with those made in the divisional history. The reasons they did not brigade them to one unit (as intended by higher command) was partly because they did not believe in using TDs as tanks, but mostly because the crews of 560 had no training whatsoever for conducting attacks in cooperation with infantry or even other tanks. Regards Dandelion

Harry, Sorry for not mentioning sources, its a bad habit. I was thinking primarily of the divisional history (Kriegsgeschichte der 12.SS-Panzerdivision 'Hitlerjugend'). Pages 414 to 436 mainly (concerning the Rocherath-Krinkelt battles as such, with further input on divisional build-up and strength pages 389 to 414). You don't have to read captured materials, this book is available in English And includes all known documents from the German side. Those documents are retrievable themselves also, but here we get the language barrier. The war diaries of several US infantry units are included for comparison. Among others the well known "1630 Tiger tanks are coming out of the woods" log of 38th Infantry regiment. Comparing the German logged orders, units and movements, at this exact time (1630 17.12.1944) the 38th was observing the TDs of the divisional TD battalion (December 17) advancing on Krinkelt, i.e. JgdPz IV vehicles, perhaps not the vehicle most commonly mistaken for Tigers. Casualty rates are quite telling. Cole writes (using US AARs) that the 741st reported loss of 11 Shermans while destroying 27 German tanks, of which 5 "Tigers". 644th lost 2 TDs while destroying 17 German tanks and 2 StuGs or TDs. 801 suffered 16 TDs and 17 ATG losses with no reported kills. Leaving the US casualties for US historians to investigate, lets look at the German. The stated total German loss here is 44 tanks and 2 TDs, based on AARs. The Germans have no battle-specific count from Rocherath-Krinkelt. They instead use the daily "instande" counts (the "tanks operational" counts - here OKW Lagekarte Frankreich, Lage 3). On December 16 (as visible in the 17.12.1944 reports due to report delay) The Germans in Lage 3 (12th SS, 277 VGD and s.Pz.Jg.Abt.560) had 39 PzKpfw IV, 38 PzKpfw V and 53 JgdPz all kinds (all tanks and 22 of the Panzerjäger belonged to 12.SS). December 20, the numbers were 26 PzKpfw IV, 21 PzKpfw V and 33 JgdPz all kinds. Thus a loss of 13 PzKpfw IV, 17 PzKpfw V and 20 JgdPz all kinds was suffered during 17-19 December. Causes unspecified, but lets assume they were lost in battle to US ground troops. Of these losses, 9 PzKpfw IV, 4 PzKpfw V and 4 Panzerjäger were reported in short term repair. Thus cannot have been left on the field of battle (as the field was in the hands of the enemy). These losses also included those suffered at Bütgenbach (TD losses of unknown count, suffered by s.Pz-Jg.Abt.560). This all leaves us with a definite loss of 4 PzKpfw IV and another 9 badly damaged, 14 Panther and another 4 badly damaged and 16 Panzerjäger with another 4 badly damaged. All in all some 18 German tanks and 16 German TDs were apparently left on the field, in Rocherath Krinkelt and at Bürtgenbach, while a further 17 vehicles were able to limp or tow back to friendly lines. Studying the actual presence of units, the Germans can really only have lost any tanks on December 18, as the Panzer battaillon was not in action until then. The TDs were then lost primarily on December 17, when their battallion was committed, but there were TDs around December 18 also. Coles write that 27 German AFVs destroyed were actually verified on the fields at Rocherath and Krinkelt, and this could well be the correct total count, leaving the Bürtgenbach fighting with 6 German TDs left to the enemy. Comparing losses, assuming the US stated casualty rates for their own units are correct, the Germans (at Rocherath-Krinkelt) then lost 18 total write off tanks to the American 11, and 10 TDs to the American 18. In all 28 German AFV to 29 American, though one must recall the additional 18 Germans forced off the field. What I do not have access to is how many the Americans were to begin with, which would be interesting of course. US sources indicate a fairly even share of kills between Sherman and TDs (about 60-40). Its interesting to note however that the US sources state their 57mm, another part of the warpackage, to be completely useless at Rocherrath. The casualty rates given 801 indicate, I think, that something was wrong. On the Cole "Tiger" count, its simply incorrect. The only Tigers in the general area served in the I.SS-Panzerkorps Schwere Panzerabteilung, which belonged to Kampfgruppe Peiper and was in action Raum Southwest Malmedy. This was the battalion of Wittman fame. One can pretty easily access equipment input on Germans. The complete actual equipment lists for 12.SS-Panzerdivision, e.g., can be had (also at low cost ) from the Bundesarchiv (K.St.N der Waffen SS ref RH10 and 11). It confirms that the 12th never had any Tigers. You can also easily trace which units that did have Tigers, any model, as they weren't very many, and then (hrm, well, at least if you can read German ) study the whereabouts of these unit at any point in time. Again, what comes up as the closest Tiger equipped unit to Rocherath-Krinkelt December 17-19 is the corps heavy tank, the Wittman gang SW Malmedy (sans Wittman by then of course). As a sidenote, the only SS-Panzerdivisions to have organic Tiger battalions of their own were the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. Grossduetschland also had one. All the other Tigers served in a handful of Army (in the SS it was corps instead) heavy tank battalions. Reports on battalions of Tiger and Panther must concern the attack of December 18. The IV and V were pretty evenly divided in numbers, though not even half-battalion strength either model (battalion strength was the vicinity of 100 panzers each - they were at Rocherath about 35-40 each). The PzKpfw IV was mistaken for Tigers on quite a few occasions. They do look quite alike on a distance. All this said, I do not contest the fact that the Americans were on the winning side of the war Cheerio Dabdelion

Hi all, I thought the topic of AFV-interior realities (as brought up in the Firefly thread), so interesting it deserved a thread of its own. Notes that might perhaps be of some use for future design. I'll start off then, but my experience is limited so I'm relying on other people to pick up. Being used to modern NATO MCVs, and APCs, some points strike me as odd in CMBO: 1. The men in the back of a MCV have no possibility of following the progress of the vehicle. There would be no difference with open topped HTs, as the men wouldn't stick their heads up if they didn't know there were no hostiles within LOS. When they dismount in a combat situation, they have not the slightest idea what the terrain looks like. They could be jumping out into a swamp for al lthey know, and they don't know where nearest cover is. This is actually a highly desorienting factor, difficult for humans to handle. The men dismounting are in a state of confusion, including NCOs, even when acting as trained (fanning out). This seems not to be reflected in the game engine. Perhaps I'm just missing it. 2. Exiting times for a squad in a modern MCV, with hydralic or electric doors of generous size, would normally be around ten seconds minimum, counting to the last man having fannemd out into position and the door closed. WWII HTs did not have large doors, nor any mechanical aid, so exiting times will reasonably be significantly longer. Also, if exiting in any kind of slope, the doors will either be difficult to shut or open, affecting the exiting time (you can't just leave the doors open unless in very dire emergency, it exposes the buddies in the crew). The Germans (and probably others) had the habit of hurling themselves over the sides to speed up exit. Exit was no doubt speeded up, but at the price of landing from a jump of 175cm or so in full combat gear. 3. Both the men in the back and the crew becomes virtually beat-up riding in terrain. No European terrain is really 'flat' and even low speed will send people flying like pingpong balls. There are good reasons for peacetime restrictions on speed. Even with such, every so often your driver will miss, or be unable to avoid, a hidden bump or ditch, and the resulting impact will send the men flying with very painful result, injury not being uncommon. Its so bumpy you have to empty machineguns to not risk accidental discharge (at least with the G1-3 series and GPMG). Its not at all uncommon to be knocked around so fiercely that you become all dizzy and disoriented, even in the commander position (normally a comfortable seat in a modern MCV), especially if wearing old style steel helmet. And thats speaking modern suspension, not 1944 hard suspensions. Modern types of helmets reduce this problem dramatically, but not entirely. 4. Its impossible to fire a weapon and hit anything from a vehicle moving in terrain. Its simply so. You're standing on a surface which is moving, violently, in all 3D directions. Turns are violent with tracks. Aiming at something, you loose the possibility of predicting these bumps and turns. By flexing thigh muscles and avoid bodily contact with the vehicle other than soles, you can act your own suspension, but as you can't predict the bumps, its only to reduce effect, not prevent it. Even a slight bump will send you way off target and make you a liability for any nearby friendlies. Again, this is with modern soft suspension. If your weapon is fastened to the vehicle itself, you can forget about dodging vehicle bumps altogether, if its not a 1985 or more modern softmount. About the same goes if you can't avoid body contact with th vehicle, and have all bumps transported into your body. So all in all, any HT fire during movement is rather a hazard than an asset, and any hit achieved thus is really an anomaly with the game. A starkly reduced area fire ought to be the only thing possible fom any HT moving in terrain, with a risk of accidental fire in the wrong direction. 5. The men riding on tanks - again, the terrain bump factor seems missing. Even riding modern tanks (soft suspension, designated bars to hold on to) its a nervous ride. You are perpetually at a risk of falling off, and its no joke, especially when you're sitting on the forwardmost tank, or riding in low visibility (nighttime). All bumps are felt as keenly by the riders as the crew, and the riders sent flying simply falls off, sometimes spectacularly so. Thus, any tank riding in terrain with riders will either have serious restrictions on what ground to choose (as flat as possible), or serious limitations on speed, or have the riders spread out like a pearlnecklace on the ground behind it. With the Fast command, I find it very reasonable to have casualty probability, as if under fire. Well, that about sums it up. Any other experiences with HTs/APCs/MCVs that I'm missing in my list here? Whats the picture on tanks, as for interior realities? Regards Dandelion

Rexford, The continued miscalculations concerning munitions and effectiveness, was this due to any countersteps from the German side, or simply from lack of possibilities to research? Putting the question naïvely - why did the Americans not know beforehand, from testing, that neither APCBC nor HVAP would be entirely satisfactory? Regards Dandelion

Ravager, You're very much welcome, if I may make myself spokesman for the forum for a brief spell here. Very interesting input. I wanted to ask, is there any possibility for the crew of a M1A1 to predict the movements of the breachblock? So as to 'go with the blows' I mean. And also, when the guards are mounted, are injuries then made impossible? Or simply made less likely? I wonder if any such guards were improvised by crews in WWII. Seems intolerable to be a WWII loader and have a beachblock flying around in your face, on top of it when you're standing on a moving surface with no way of predicting its toss or turn. Ought to be enough just to have your head banging against the walls and roof. Loaders are not given enough credit, I suddenly realise. Regards Dandelion

Actually, the 12th SS never had any Tiger battalion. The persistent Rocherath-Tiger rumor stems from bogus US reports, primarily those of 38th Inf Rgt from December 17. Numerous other such rumors circulate, such as the 12th SS having Jagdpanthers (they did not) and more than 100 panzers (they had 79, plus 22 TDs, at the start of the offensive). The units actually deployed to Raum Rocherath-Krinkelt were the following (per date) December 16: Gren.Rgt. 989 (from VGD 277), reinforced by elements of I./25 SS PzGren. With G.R. 991 as reserve (not engaged, instead diverted South). December 17: I./25 and II./25 (both are SS PzGren bats) plus Pz.Jg.12 (a TD bat with 22 JgdPz IV) December 18: I./12SS Pz Bn (the brigaded remnants of the panzer regiment of the division, with 37 PzKpfw IV (coys 5. and 6.) and 41 PzKpfw V (staff, coys 1. and 3.), plus the entire 25 SS PzGren Rgt, plus elements of G.R.990. 741st were deployed to Rocherath December 18. I have no ID on the US armoured unit present on Decmber 17, it might have been 741 for all I know. Either way, they faced no Tigers on these dates in Rocherath. Regards Dandelion

This is all highly interesting. The Americans were then involontarily generalist, so to speak? About the Gyro-stab, a German report claims the same in september 1944. That (enemy) crews tend to disconnect it, apparently as it leads to injuries among the crewmembers. Not really sure what that means or how they were injured. Or if they simply said that in order to not have to learn new equipment? Regards Dandelion

Major, If Superman was offered a new set of tights made of Cryptonite, covered with thin cotton, would he wear them? I worked cleaning construction sites in the summers as a kid to earn some extra, and the union sent us to this lab to look at different asbestos types. Most modern (well, modern then) construction type asbestos are manageable and harmful only in higher concentration and prolonged exposure (breathing) - but several older types of asbestos fibres still around can simply enter you going right through your skin, as the fibres are so small and sharp. They'll enter the circulation, scar your vessels and pierce your cells, and its for life too, your antibodies can't mark them for destruction, which doesn't matter as your cells can't really destroy them anyway, so they'll be around forever. Did we become paranoid after that show? Yes, we did. Still am. :eek: You know its funny you brought it up as just the other day I was reading the BZ (before I see any jokes on that - I'm a FAZ man, a BZ was simply lying on the seat on the train and I was bored) and it said the navy has just completed sanitation of asbestos hazards aboard naval vessels. They are now about to do the same in the army. Hey! Thats great! Except I thought they had already done that decades ago... Come to think of it, haven't I been having all kinds of problems breathing since about ten years ago... *cough* *cough* :eek: As for the MGs, I never got the choice myself. I never saw any asbestos gloves, even for tankers, I think they've fallen out of use? Anyways, there's asbestos all over the place. In all armoured vehicles, in many structures and other equipment, somebody got rich supplying asbestos to the army. Hmmmm. Wasn't you was it Major? Cheerio Dandelion

That's true. Operational research Group studies showed that very few German tanks were destroyed by air efforts. Vast amounts of thinskinned vehicles were massacred by bombers, some by JaBo, but not very many MBTs. Most of the thinskinned destroyed were hit passing through towns subjected to bombing raids. Or bridges. the JaBos weren't able to disrupt train schedules either. The bombers did that, with destruction of bridges mostly. PzLehr, 21st Panzer and 12ths SS Panzer (the Pz divisions first arriving to Normandy) register not a single MBT casualty to air atatck beffore June 10th if I'm not mistaken, in spite of being victim of incessant air attack, JaBo and bomber, all daylight hours from June 5 and on. They did lose a lot of trucks though, and some SPA, both of which was very serious indeed. JaBos also raised morale of allied troops. They liked seeing them up there. Thats actually very important. Of course in the east, with crazed airmen flying ten meters above ground firing autocannons, things might have looked different. But true or not, it need not mean that the US did not count upon the allied air force to deal with masses of enemy armour, a reliance that might have dictated priorities. After all, in the desert the air force had been able to show other results than they did in Normandy. And the desert was the major experience to serve as basis for planning. Regards Dandelion

Yes Ales, thanks. I'm just so amazed I didn't already have this link. It will take me ages to test all these mods out Well a few of the variants I do recognise, they must have been up at some other site before. Fortunately, the wife is at a party tonight so I suddenly have some time to spare... Hrm. Hope she doesn't meet some guy who don't own CMBO. Well, if she does, I'll just send him a copy and that'll be the end of that Regards Dandelion

LOL! Hey Lee, I see you sneaking away there! You're not trying to slip away in one piece from this intensely obscure debate are you? We'll have a book written here on the finer alterations of Albanian machinegun models of 1927 before were done You gotta love this site. Grog paradise and they've let us all in. After all these years believeing I was all alone in the world with these interests and heaps of unusable knowledge. Returning in haste to the topic, I was not aware of that reputation of the M60, Reichmann. It had many design flaws? Was it unpopular with the men? Regards Dandelion

Ken, Majority appeal? What's that - a place near Majorca? Jokes aside, the debate on narrow or wide appeal is indeed a tricky one. For scenario designers and, I suppose, for the BTS/BFC too. Remaining at scenario designing, I myself have reformed from extreme youknowwhat-retentative to slightly playability oriented. Still I simply turn the game off when Kangaroo mounted infantry come storming ashore at Vaagsoy. Can't define the line, but I suppose my personal demand is effective illusion. What's the meaning of the idiomatic expression hiding ones own Easter Eggs? Simovitch - In my analysis, SL/ASL "classics" share a number of features. In size, composition and plot. As far as I can see, they can usually easily bee taken out of historical context and inserted into any number of others. The enjoyability and skilled design made them classics, rather than historical accuracy. So going for accuracy can really only be an obstacle to be conquered, rather than help or asset. I might be Pavlovs dog here, but I (nowadays) feel the SL/ASL way is the way to go about things. A good idea and design to start with, then find a historical context to insert it in. Under such conditions, it is extremely difficult to find situations where you can verify every man and tree involved. Abstractions sets in. But going the other way around is more than fairly difficult I find (for me at least), looking at a historical battle trying to find a good scenario design. Hey Lee - don't do that to me Scenario designing is a walk in the park, easier than...something really really easy. You know, like eating ice cream on a hot day in Texas. I don't mean it flows out in a sticky mess all over ones hands. I mean it just comes natural and its over before you know it. Cheerio Dandelion

This is a very interesting question. As I understand it, they Americans knew their own 90mm was quite a way away in time by closing in on D Day. So why turn down the 17pdr? Regards Dandelion

Simovitch I find the discussion on historical CMBO scenarios/operations very interesting and its good you brought it up. I have some thoughts myself on this subject, having tried to design quite a few, succeeding with nil. There's a conflict, that I encounter all the time. The issue of application of accuracy into the engine so that the engine reflects reality. It can and will, normally, but sometimes you need to manipulate things and use unhistorical settings to achieve historical effects. Such tricks can look a little strange at times. So strange it hardly looks historical One good example is the scenario Bretteville. I downloaded it with some curiosity, as I've been working on that same battle for years. I noted that the designer had had access to fairly accurate details of the units and accurate maps (though one with no height curves). Yet he puts a couple of Shermans in the OOB. I believe that with such relatively gigh degree of insight he knows there were no Shermans there. I guess he put them there as he found out the same thing I did - accurate OOB will make this battle barely winnable for the Canadians. Is this a good choice? Or should one drop it altogether as a non-enjoyable accurate battle? I think now of the PzKpfw IVE reaction. Also, accurate isn't always possible. I am thinking primarily about maps. Every now and then you find that although two villages are perfectly placed relative eachother, you can't draw that straight road between them that was there in reality. Question is - do you move the villages to get a straight road, or have a bent road? Locality or function as priority? This is also a feature of many historical scenarios, where the designer has obviously used an authentic map, and apparently made a priority of exact locations. I find myself often feeling inclined to making the other priority - that of function, practically regardless of how distorted the map becomes. What's your thoughts on that? Is this what you meant by abstracted maps? Of course these issues arise with units also, as there is a limited number of types after all to choose from. Myself I've never encountered the problem. But how to properly face it? Exclude, or use an unhistorical replacement instead? Light conditions is also a tricky part. Returning to Bretteville, the battle took place in pitch black darkness, but the town was lit up by fires and the outskirts by Canadian flares. German armour also silhouetted against burning buidlings in the distance. In this case, the historically accurate setting is of course night, but perhaps a foggy dusk is closer to realism? In spite of it probably appearing somewhat weird to the player who knows it was a night battle and that there was no fog? Finally, the issue of accuracy warranting the term historical. Lets use the ASL as example. Most often, the SL/ASL scenario will use a section of a battle, including the actually present force types in an interesting mix. Rarely depicting complete engagements (most SL/ASL scenarios concern regimental battles or larger, but few make it above reinforced company level in size). Often lacking detailed verification (the designer does not know which company attacked where, simply that the regiment contained companies that were reasonably part of the battle etc). Is this level of accuracy historical? Semi-historical? Or must one be able to verify the presence at a location and time of all units one includes, and in such case to what level of detail, do you think? Regards Dandelion

Ales, No, sounds unfamiliar, where do I find that one? Cheerio Dandelion

Well Martin old boy, I'm sorry but as much as I'd like to I am unable to comply. As you're the only one commenting on the new engine here as far as I can see, You'll have to can your own comments if you want any saved. I'll get back to you on that as soon as I have any of my own. Which will be about the same time I see the new engine I dare presume. Delivery time for comment is short though, I can safely promise they will arrive for saving ETA JIT with no VAT. Cheer up Dandelion

Looking at initial graphics, studies of localities must have been made in one way or the other. Some houses are typical Normandy architecture in appearance, if not shape. A problem here is that architecture from the whole stretch - Normandy to Hamburg - has been used. So it looks a little circusish to see them all on the same map. Shape of houses is a real problem. In terms of making things look real. A regional mod that I find very nice in fact is the "Ardennes" mod available. Studying it bit by bit I wasn't that enthusiastic, but now I find it does manage to create a very nice overall impression when applied as a whole. Made me start up some Ardennes scenarios just to watch Regards Dandelion

Tooz No modding needed. Yes, well actually they said that about CMBB too you know. Not in those words but in like. They have a fiercely proud attitude at BFC. Just read the CMBO manual. Its kind of cute-ish There was this rather well known incident when the game nowadays called "Battlefield Command" or something (then WWII RTS I think) released a preview mpeg of a Soviet gun firing, and the graphic was so stunning that you simply lost your breath and wanted to slowly expire, and at this point a BFC representative says "bah, that's nothing". They were at the time working with CMBB. That comment sort of raised hopes I must say If you want to know what level of (graphic) expectation I mean, you can have a looksee at the recent preview stream here. This all just a graphics galore. We're all into CM for the game engine anyway so it doesn't really matter. Even so, regardless of how stunning the CMAK becomes (screenshots sure look very much like CMBO tho), there will always be modding and modders. There simply is no way of making everything just the way every half-crazed grognard likes it. At least not as long as its fun to mod. And it is. And BFC is relying on the very same global community of half-crazed grogs as its core costumers, a community proudly including some of the even more obscure and secretive sub-sect of modelpainterfanatics. So there ya go I'm not worried about the future of modding. Cheerio Dandelion

So Andrew, tell me, don't you feel it very challenging, that nobody ever managed to make a Goumier yet..? Cheerio Dandelion

Oh no problem. I've collected hundreds of pics on Normandy for my own (failed) modding. Just let me know if you want any Cheerio Dandelion