michael kenny

I give the figures for June to January dummy. I gave complete information on the total number of Tanks/panzers/AFV's (that better?)for the 7 months for which we have good data. Obviously you are confused by the use of sources because you never seem to have any contact with them yourself Is this the same 3rd Army that destroyed 90% of the German Army in the West? The same 3rd Army that ko'd more tanks than the Germans actualy fielded against them? One wonders why anyone else bothered turning up because the claims they made account for nearly everything. They must have had really good statisticians working for them. Now't to do with me Jason lad. I never mentioned it and it was not raised to try and claim anthing of the above. Read more carefully before you spout off By now you must realise I won't rise to your baiting. Is this because I spurned your advances in the last email?

The mistake that causes most confusion in this area is the attempt to treat claims as if they are kills. The two rarely inhabit the same planet.

Do not worry. I am well aquainted with every type of german AFV. When I use panzer I mean a turreted tank. When I say Stug. or Stug/SP I also will include Stugs and Jagd.Pz's in the totals. Not strictly accurate but it will do for the type of loss figures I am using. I do not include any losses for 'true' German SP's such as the 105/150mm artillery guns but then neither do I include Allied SP's in Allied loss figures. I do not list Armoured cars or half tracks for any nation. I hope this heped clear up any ambiguity.

I reply: he says no such thing. He shows how the initial doctrine was altered over the course of the war so that in the end they performed far more as Infantry fire support(85% of ammo used in Normandy was HE) and never as swarming flocks of tank killers. Isolated examples where they did blunt Panzer attacks does not alter this reality. Again this turns on a fine point that may seem (and probably is) pointless Then: You assume from this that Gabel means failure but you can't find the actual word. Remember that you also said in the same post You went over the top with your language. Now in an attempt to get back on firm ground you ignore the 'useless' claim and try to find foundation for the 'failure' claim. Quote from the paper: The historical evidence does not show that the tank destroyers tried to implement their doctrine but failed for the lack of proper equipment. Rather, it is clear that tank destroyer doctrine was never really executed because it rested on false premises and thus had little application on the battlefield. To say this with authority you would have to know the number of Panzers destroyed by the TD's. I have never come across such information. Where can I find these figures? [ January 01, 2007, 09:55 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

No German tanks? On 1/6/44 there were 1928 German tanks in The West. That is 15 more than on the entire Russian Front. 1000 were in action by the end of June. 1000 more by the end of July. monthly total German tanks Sept = 540 Oct = 1026 Nov. = 1413 Dec = 1632 Jan = 1504 Try the date of entry into theatre for the TD Units. 13(x 36 = 468 TD's) were in place by the Cobra breakout

Gross distortion. He says no such thing. Exactly which page does he write about them being useless? I can't seem to find it. I thought his conclusion was they performed a number of tasks but not the one they were created for. A narrow point that seems to confuse some here. Again he says no such thing. He shows how the initial doctrine was altered over the course of the war so that in the end they performed far more as Infantry fire support(85% of ammo used in Normandy was HE) and never as swarming flocks of tank killers. Isolated examples where they did blunt Panzer attacks does not alter this reality. Again this turns on a fine point that may seem (and probably is) pointless.

I dowloaded it myself but would like interested parties to do some digging themselves. sample quotes: Page 42. "On 21 March 1943, Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ-General Eisen- hower’s theater headquarters for North Africa) issued a training memo that sought to tone down the aggressive orientation of tank destroyer doctrine: 'While it is true that tank destroyer battalions constitute a mobile reserve af antimechanized fire power with which to meet a hostile tank attack, numerous encounters have shown that their characteristics are such as to prohibit their use offensively, either to seek out the hostile tanks in advance of our lines or to meet and shoot it out with them in the open . . . .' The statement in FM PB--5 that they are designed for offensive action will not be construed to the contrary Major Allerton Cushman, an observer for AGF and the Tank Destroyer Center who witnessed the Tunisian operation firsthand from December 1942 to March 1943, filed a report bearing similar conclusions. He stated that the M-3 and M-10 tank destroyers can not be used offensively to seek out enemy tanks in advance of our lines or to engage in “shrgging” matches with them in the open. Any attempt to do so will subject them to destruction by the enemy’s AT guns, against which their flat trajebtory fire is ineffective.5a Troops in Africa have. found that the best way to meet a German tank attack is from concealed, dug-in positions with routes reconnoitered to alternate firing positions.51 Tank hunting, i.e., dismounted men going out after tanks with sticky gre- nades, Molotov cocktails, etc., ‘is fine in theory but is considered ridiculous by troops who are in actual war.52 page 46 "Bruce told the instructors of the Tank Destroyer School that “our tank destroyer mis- sion is to protect other troops from tank attacks . . . , “77 whereas FM 18-5 (1942) had stated unequivocably that the mission was the destruction of enemy tanks. Bruce used the same phrase in the cover letter to a Tank Destroyer Center training circular dated 15 May 1943 that was sent to all tank destroyer units for guidance until a revised FM 18-5 appeared. The circular employed the words “aggressive spirit,” rather than “offensive ae- tion,” to describe tank destroyer characteristics. It further stated that “stealth and deception” characterized tank destroyer tactics and warned that tank destroyers were “particularly vulnerable to antitank fire.“ page 49 "Whereas the 1942 manual had in- dicated that mobility, rather than heavy armor, would protect the tank de- stroyer from enemy fire, the 1944 edition stressed the use of cover and concealment ta compensate for the acknowledged “vulnerability of tank destroyers to hostile tank, antitank, and artillery fire.“ page 55 "Among the tank destroyer battalions assigned to First Army during the Normandy fighting, towed battalions on the average accounted for 5.8 enemy tanks and 4.0 pillboxes each, whereas the average self- propelled battalion in Normandy destroyed 22.5 panzers and 23.2 pillboxes." page 58 " Some infantry commanders preferred to use tanks rather than tank destroyers in the immediate front lines because snipers and hand grenades took a heavy toll2 among the crews of the open-topped tank destroyers.j” Unfortunately, other.. infantry officers were unaware of tank destroyer limitations and attempted, to’ employ tank destroyers exactly as they would use the better-armored. tanks.s4 Overall, tank destroyers “misused” in this manner suffered greater: losses and obtained less-impressive results than units in which the tank destroyer commanders were encouraged to exercise judgement and initiative" page 61 "The Americans actually stopped the German onslaught by denying transportation chokepoints to the enemy and sepa- rating the panzer spearheads from their follow-on elements, and not by ambushing the panzer spearheads themselves, as tank destroyer doctrine would suggest. By and large, the two dozen tank destroyer battalions that participated significantly in the Ardennes campaign fought in small units and in relatively static, defensive roles." page 64 "It must also be noted that of the self-propelled tank destroyers, only the M-36 had shown itself to be wholly satisfactory in terms of firepower, and even the M-36 suffered the disadvantages of thin armor and an open turret, a fault common to all self-propelled tank destroyers. After the Ar- dennes campaign, M-10 battalions began exchanging their weapons for the M-36.74 Ordnance developed overhead armor for tank destroyer turrets75 that, when taken together with the common practice of sandbagging tank destroyers to augment their armor, made the tank destroyer more like a tank than like the weapon initially envisaged by General Bruce. In the minds of higher commanders, tanks and tank destroyers became increas- ingly interchangeable as the European war drew to a close." page 64 "a Theater General Board composed of senior field artillery officers convened to evaluate the contri- butions of the tank destroyer to the war effort. They based their study in part upon the after-action reports of forty-nine tank destroyer battalions that had fought in Europe. In its report, the board noted that the tank destroyer was “a most versatile weapon on the battlefield” and admitted that there existed a need for self-propelled, high-velocity guns within the infantry division, a function that the tank destroyers had fullfilled admir- ably.80 The battalions sampled had destroyed, on the average, 34 German tanks and self-propelled guns, 17 artillery and antitank guns, and 16 pill- boxes apiece, with one battalion claiming 105 tanks destroyed.81 However, the board recognized the fact that tank destroyers had never validated the tank destroyer doctrine and, in fact, had not adhered to it on the battle- field." page 69 "Experience in battle quickly showed that tank destroyers were, in reality, highly dependent on other arms for support, and that “offensive action” for them was often sui- cidal. The Tank Destroyer Center learned of these battlefield findings through the reports of AGF observers3 and incorporated the lessons of com- bat in the 1944 edition of FM 18-Z This edition emphasized cooperation with other arms and made it clear that tank destroyer action was essen- tially defensive in nature.................................On the other hand, U.S. tanks were even less well armed than the tank destroyers, but because the armored establishment possessed a sound doctrine by 1944, armored formations suc- ceeded on the battlefield’in spite of their equipment. The historical evidence does not show that the tank destroyers tried to implement their doctrine but failed for the lack of proper equipment. Rather, it is clear that tank destroyer doctrine was never really executed because it rested on false premises and thus had little application on the battlefield."

Or he could see (unlike you) that this is getting nowhere. That is why I said the debate is over. I will not reply to the TD argument any more. Live with it. If you want an argument I suggest you look through one booklet I used to help form my opinion. You can still get it for yourself at http://www.merriam-press.com/mrl_000/mrl_0050/mrl_0013.htm Blurb: "On the battlefields of World War II, however, tank destroyers were unequal to the task of neutralizing German armor. Their aggressive doctrine played into the hands of the German panzer divisions, which employed highly integrated combined arms tactics. The tank destroyers were also outgunned by the heavy German tanks that appeared in the last three years of the war. Therefore, the original tank destroyer doctrine was largely abandoned n the field, where the tank destroyers continued to perform a variety of less ambitious missions. This work provides a case study in the formulation of doctrine, with emphasis being given to the conceptual flaws that marred the tank destroyer program and the corrective measures that were implemented in the field to alleviate these flaws." Could not have put it better myself. Now there you may have me! There, another excuse for silly name calling by the pack.

How did the Germans see the battles? Tanks/Stug in the West( i.e every front)total and (operational) 15/12/44.......................[] 30/12/44...[]..15/01/45 Stug = 598.......(410)......[]...676(335)..[]...716(340) PzIV = 503.......(391)......[]...550(345)..[]...594(330) Panth = 471.....(336)......[]...451(240)..[]...487(221) Tiger = 123......(70).......[]...116(58)....[]...110(64) Total = 1695.....(1216)...[]..1793(978)..[]...1907(955) Obviously the JgdPz. figures are not here and the full accounting has not been completed but you can see the trends. They are also at odds with the calculations done on December 31st but that is the problem we have with the original figures, they rarely are in a form that allows like for like comparison. 31/12/44 loss figures are in brackets after the net loss figures in the operational Panzers for 30/12/44 from the above tables: Stug = 75(102) PzIV = 46(77) Panth = 96(132) Tiger = 12(13) As 'tactical claims' seem to be given undue weight perhaps we should also factor in the German claims: 1700 tanks destroyed and 100 captured. The puzzle is that we know captured US tanks were used by the Germans-so when they were knocked out by the US are they to be included in the US or German totals! I think that is it for this topic as well. All the relevant figures are in and anyone can do the calculations to work out whatever they want. Bye bye..........

Post it then. Instead of giving us your precis give us your data and then we can examine it. I am not afraid of others using my figures so why are you scared of posting yours? You always shy away from giving us your raw data. Your opinions are interesting but without any detailed information are worthless to a serious researcher. Oh and just in case anyone missed it this is the confirmed US losses in the same period as the German estimated losses 20/12 to 20/01= 614 M4-208 Lt.-122TD Total 944 v 6-800 Worthless for compiling final figures. You say 1/4 because you use my reckoning of 20 TD Battalions but the flaw is I did not seperate out which Army they served in. So how do you know it was 25%? As you desperately want to confine the figures to 1st Army then you are asserting that ALL the TD battalions were in 1st Army? I again refer the gentleman to my previous reply about the TD debate. Obviously you! [ December 30, 2006, 10:53 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

All the figures I give have dates attached so I do not really understand what the confusion is. I don't think it is a 'crisis' either . But given the situation (77% half-way through)I think writing tanks off for minor mechanical failures would not be a common practice.

Unable to refute the totals you are reduced to trying to cause confusion over dates. Again I gave you the figures by month. Tanks/TD ETO 20/10 to 20/11= 268 M4--83 Lt.-62TD(413) 20/11 to 20/12= 523 M4-134 Lt.-127TD(784) 20/12 to 20/01= 614 M4-208 Lt.-122TD(944) ---------------------------------------------- 1st Army alone for 13/12/44 to 19/01/45. M4 = 432 M5/M24 = 116 TD = 90 (est.75% of montly total) Total = 638 ----------------------------------- 1st Army alone for 13/12/44 to 28/12/44 M4 = 301 M5/M24 = 74 TD = 60 (est,half months total) Total = 435 compare this directly with German losses for 16th - 31 December: Tanks = 222 SP's = 102 Total = 322 Now the dates do not exactly mesh but we get 322:435. Now I hear someone wishes to exclude the M5/M24's. Why I do not know because there is no dispute that they are actualy tanks but lets give it a go: 322:361 But remember to get down to this, the lowest possible exchange rate, we have to ignore the fact that we are comparing 1st Army losses alone against all German losses on the Western Front. We also ignore all losses in 3rd Army who were attacking the same Germans. Is there any dispute that 3rd Army were taking losses before December 31st? The total German loss figure you parrot(800) is the absolute maximum (it is more around 600-650)and is the total of all losses in the whole of The Western Front-yet here you quibble over including 3rd Army losses in the US total.! Yes I know absolutely nothing and am wrong on every point. My understanding in minimal and I am making everything up. I don't play simulations, read too many books and lack your superior research skills. Strange that I found the actual loss figures and you, who did not posses a single one before I put them up here, managed to work out loss ratios to 2 decimal places. Boy you sure are a genius! I refer the honourable gentleman to my earlier reply, quoted below in case he missed it. The TD 'debate' is over as far as I am concerned. "Right then, that is it. There is no need to keep repeating it. We disagree and it is pointless to keep posting 'Yes it is'/'no it isn't'. Angels on the head of a pin and all that,great fun if you are in the fight but boring when you are merely an observer" YAY. YRA [ December 30, 2006, 09:15 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

How do you know this? Where is it so I can 'grasp' it? So even though Units were only at some 86% of full strenght on 1/12/44 you say they simply abandoned perfectly good tanks? Shermans were in short supply throughout the campaign in the West. Monthly totals of actual Shermans to allotted in 12th AG: 1 September..2108/2204 = 95% 1 October....1710/1988 = 86% 1 November...360/2632 = 89% 1 December...2366/2768 = 86% 1 January....2476/3215 = 77% 1 Febuary....2845/3155 = 90% 5 March .....3455/3785 = 91% 5 April......3498/3785 = 92% 5 May........3455/3785 = 91% Things were so bad that 500 Shermans were returned to the US from British stocks. See my reply above. Yes the Germans were fanatical in their recovery practice. From page 105 of Pallud's Bulge book for ATB(sorry about the use of such a poor reference source as the printed word) we can read about Willi Fischer who went into Krinklet to recover his Panther which was disabled on Dec 19th. The tank was towed out and made it back to the repair shop. Heinze Linke had to go Dom Butgenbach for his Panther. He got it out and was being towed back on Dec 24th when artillery targetted him, hit his Panther and left it in flames. Now how many times was Linke's Panther claimed? As Fischer got his Panther back should it be 'subtracted' from the kill claims? Thats the problem with field claims and thats why they are of no use when trying to calculate actual losses. Claims about losses and ratios are being made that have not the slightest contact with reality. I happen to know the claims are wrong because I took the trouble to ask those with the actual figures to share them with me. I posted the figures. I would like to think I was helping others to make proper comparisons by using the real figures. It seems I was wrong. Nobody has challenged the figures. Look if you start dishing it out I am going to give you it back. If you want me to act like an adult then do the same yourself. [ December 30, 2006, 04:34 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

"TD's had a very specific role in mind. Operating ahead of the tanks. Hunting down enemy armour to open up the front and allow the tanks to penetrate the rear areas. Perhaps I should have been more precise in my wording. TD's were to deal with the Panzers. Rush to where they were. Swarm all over them like ants. Hit them from the rear and sides. Scoot fast to get away from the retaliation. The analogy used was : "Hit him (Joe Lewis)behind the ear with brass knuckles. Then get the hell out before all Harlem breaks loose" No slugging match because they had glass jaws. Tanks were to penetrate the front lines and deal with the soft targets after the Panzers had been destroyed by the TD's. Marginal? ..................M4..............M10...........M3A3(StuartV) HULL Front.......2.0.............1.5/2.0............1.0/1.75 Side.........1.5.............1.0/0.75..........1.0 Rear........1.5.............1.0/0.75...........1.0 Top..........0.75/0.5.....0.75/0.375.......0.5 Floor.......1.0/0.5........0.5..................0.5/0.375 TURRET Front......3.0.............2.25.................1.5 Side........2.0.............1.0..................1.25 Rear.......2.0.............1.0...................1.25 Top........1.0..............0.75(add-on)....0.5 The TD's were made with lighter armour because the were to be a LIGHT tank with a HEAVY tank gun. Right then, that is it. There is no need to keep repeating it. We disagree and it is pointless to keep posting 'Yes it is'/'no it isn't'. Angels on the head of a pin and all that,great fun if you are in the fight but boring when you are merely an observer. I have given you some data you can use to make your games a bit more realistic. I hope your aversion to the printed word will not preclude your using the figures to correct your misconceptions.

Thats right. Only those people who play computer simulations have any real idea of warfare. I have no idea about anything because, sorry to admit this, I only know about the things I read. I was led astray by the printed word. Rather than accepting Jason's amazing discovery that US armour 'outscored' the Germans every time they met I continued to cling to the fiction of the real losses. I simply could not admit the medium I use is so useless. All the detailed records kept by the US Quartermasters where they listed the tanks the struck off are are no good. Jason is the only one who saw through their deception. Thus is dismissed the whole sum of human knowledge to date.............. Woe is me, undone by a geek with a keyboard!!!!! As a matter of interest Jason can you link me to somewhere where you post about the real thing instead of all the virtual stuff...........you do post in historical forums don't you?

Why so? There are lots of posts that have nothing to do with gaming, mine are not that exceptional. I 'trawl' a great number of forums in the hope I might learn something new. The data you have been looking for often turns up in the most unlikely places The battleships reference is, as you know, an attempt at humour. No you saw what you wanted to see rather than what I wrote. TD's had a very specific role in mind. Operating ahead of the tanks. Hunting down enemy armour to open up the front and allow the tanks to penetrate the rear areas. Now fortunately they never got to try this out. I think such lightly armoured vehicles rushing at the German front would quickly be despatched. End of story. The fact they found greater use as Infantry fire support and were able to destroy tanks when they met does not prove the were a success in their INTENDED role. Then we got a claim that US Armour 'outscored' The Germans in the Bulge fighting. The figures I had suggest the opposite. I put the figures up for anyone to pick over and correct. It is as simple as that. Do the calculations and work out the ratio's.

It may be to you but that does not mean it is. I really do not know what PBEM means. When you do not 'know' it is best to come right out and say it. Now I will use my deductive skills. I presume PBEM is something to do with a computer simulation game around which this site is built? I do not play it. I do not play any computer games. I am only interested in what actually happen in 1944/45. I am not interested in debates about 'what if' or complex re-runs of ww2 actions. Thus if, as I believe, a challenge has been issued then I am unable to take the field. I am sorry if this irritates you but that is the way it is. Wait.......hang on a bit. I believe the rules of chivalry allow your opponent to pick the weapons..... As I said earlier I am familiar with the game 'Battleships' and can oblige you there if that is a suitable arrangement. You may continue to address me with whatever epithet you like ,it reminds me of my childhood and the name calling we practised before maturity kicked in. I think this debate has long outlived its usefulness. Whilst we can argue about an opinion (was the TD a success in its designated role) we can't argue about facts. The numbers in the loss ratio spat are fixed. Total losses are known and thus OVERALL loss ratio's can be deduced. Ingrained belief can not overcome this awkward fact. I am suprised that anyone would construct a theory about exchange rates without apperently having access to any hard data on the actual losses themselves. Depending on claims culled from dated general overview books or unit histories is not productive and guaranteed to give an inflated total for German losses. If you try to use this flawed data then you are not going to be taken seriously. I have given the actual losses (insofar as they are known-nothing is completely recorded) Use them and work out the ratios for yourself. There is only one conclusion. They are more detailed than any previous attempt at the task and I again would like to thank Rich Anderson for compiling them and being generous enough to allow me to use them. I am suprised no one mentioned the flaws in the arguments. Using the figures to try and work out tank v tank loss rates is pointless. Much of the destruction was wrought by hand held Infantry weapons, A/T, mines.SP's and plain old mechanical failure. A large number (on both sides) were also abandoned intact. Tanks rarely met tanks in a vacuum and thus nothing about the effectiveness of such encounters can be extracted from the overall figures. All that can be said is US AFV losses greatly exceeded German losses. Now this could be for any number of reasons, probably because the US had more AFV's to lose than the Germans. Whatever the reason the fact is the German losses were smaller by a good margin. I take my share of blame for introducing some personal racour into the thread but I hope the posted data on US losses is useful. It is the best and most accurate available to date. Nothing else in print or on the web can approach it. Thanks again to Rich.

I would try the same thing if I was asserting a 1:1 loss rate and then was shown data that completely demolished my theory. I believe it is called the Ostrich defence. 3rd Army did not attack into the southern flank of the Bulge and 2nd and 7th AD just appeared out of nowhere to join 1st Army............ok ipse,ipse dixie,, I believe you. Even with this bogus hurdle that still means the losses were M4 = 614 TD = 122 total 736 so it is a confirmed 737 Units. Do the 208 M5's, 105 M7's, 200 M8' A/C,46 M8(75mm)count as 'light armour? Yes lets lump them together as that. 736 'Mediums' 379 'Light Armour' Whilst German records are incomplete they do list losses to 31 December of 222 tanks and 102 SP's Ist Army losses to 28 December M4 281 M5 72 It is not possible to get US TD/SP gun losses for the same time period but I would think about half of the overall total would be roughly accurate. TD =60 SP =60 M8 A/C = 100 US: 341 'Medium' and 232 'light armour' German: 324 tanks and SP's (note:this includes German armour losses incurred fighting other US Units as well as Ist Army and it covers 3 more days of heavy fighting than the US cut off date of 28th December) Even rigging the data to get THE VERY BEST POSSIBLE LOSS RATE you still can not get parity. Can it be that all German losses were caused by 1st Army?

To which any UK resident would reply 'get stuffed'. like Jason will be in my following reply Oh and its Xmas not Xmass. Now get back to playing battleships. The thing to do when you don't actualy have any hard data is keep your mouth shut. Spouting off just puts you deeper in the mire. The dates I used were for 20th November to 20th December.The figures are compiled with those dates and so we are stuck with them. I thought that by clearly stating 'December' you might have allowed for the skewing. But dont let me stop you making a fool of yourself because the figures for 20th December to 20th January are even higher. you asked so here they are: M4 = 614 M5 = 208 TD = 122 We now have a total of 944 instead of 779! Way to go Jason. It even tops your artificial 800 losses for the germans. Add the 2 months together and you get M4 = 1137 M5 = 342 TD = 249 Total = 1,728 for 20 November to 20th January heck add these in as well: M8 Armoured Cars = 287 Want me to continue? You must be terminaly stupid. Not content with using German figures at the very top end of the scale(600 would be closer than 800) and for the whole of the fighting on all the fronts you then procede to leave out all US light tanks and SP casualties, some 279 units. Then out of thin air you pull a figure of '300 light armour'(where did you get it from?) to boost the German losses! Gee you really are funny.[gasp!] Pardon me while I pause for laughter!(convulsive shudders and tear lined cheeks!!!!!) How about this for an encore. Sorry I could not exactly match the artificial parameters you set but hey you can't win all the time. 1st Army Tank losses for 13th December to 19th January. Medium tanks = 433 Light tanks = 108 Ignoring 3rd and 9th Army Units engaged who also had tanks and TD's knocked out we get a total of 541 tank losses. Care to quibble over them there facts boy? [ December 28, 2006, 10:03 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

Careful. The target audience may not be able to decipher your cleverly constructed insult........ I am sorry that you feel slighted because I wont play battleships with you.

EXACT loss figures are not available but by working backwards from the numbers still in service in January it would seem the Germans lost a total of around 700 Stug/tanks in the fighting. It was probably under this figure but lets not quibble. Total number of OB West tanks/Stug. peaked at 2700 in mid December and had sunk to 2500 by mid January. Obviously replacements arrived in this period and kept the numbers up This is the total of all machines including those in repair. Roughly 2/3rd runners, 1/3rd in repair There were never 250 Tigers in the West(leaving out the Italian totals) at any time. The number of Tigers was around 110 (depends on how many were in repair) German losses were substantialy lower than the US losses. In December The US lost: 523 Shermans (all types) 134 Stuarts 127 TD's total = 784 ( 145 SP Art. losses not included). The US January losses are even higher and the November losses were 400 tanks/TD's. Cole's account is very dated in regard to the German losses. All loss information supplied by Rich Anderson Sorry but I haven't got a clue what you are talking about. Any attempt to portray me as a champion of the Panzer Arm is so far off the mark as to be laughable. Those who know me from other boards know just where I stand on that subject. [ December 28, 2006, 09:33 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

Well that presumes you know what the losses were. Can I ask an awkward question? Who knows how many TD's were lost? 20 TD SP Battallions in action in The Bulge: 602 M18 603 M18 609 M18 610 M36 628 M36 629 M10 634 M10 638 M18 654 M10 702 M36 703 M36 704 M18 705 M10 773 M10 803 M10 811 M18 814 M10 823 M10 893 M10 899 M10 M10 = 360 M18 = 216 M36 = 144 Total = 720. I get 122 lost or 17% Again if you knew the figures you should post them. Obviously you know the losses or you would not make a claim that could not be substantiated. Could I have: a) US Tank losses. German tank losses. c) German Stug/JgdPz losses.

Sticks and stones my man. At least I don't have an ego problem AND tell lies! In one case I agree. In another I see bluff. The third I don't know enough about.

No sorry. I used to believe that but experience has shown me that records, when kept, are pretty accurate. Normandy in AUgust/September is a problem because the paperwork vanished in the retreat but German loss reporting is pretty good. The quibbling would be how damaged the tanks listed in the 'repair columns were. Overall around 75% of knocked out German tanks were put back into service. A point that should serve as a warning to those who equate a hit with a kill. From 6 June 1944 to 20th Feb. 1945 a total of 474 M10's, 124 M18's and 72 M36's were written off. Also in the ETO a total 3275 M4's, 788 M5's and 62 M26's were written off. Together this is a total of 4800(approx)TWO. When the other Allies losses are added in it clearly can be shown that there was no 1:1 exchange rate in the ETO. [ December 27, 2006, 09:26 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

Yes thats about half a dozen replies now where you have posted supporting Jason, we get the message!