michael kenny

Allied tanks in Normandy: 6 June:British=1045 US=433 7 June:British=1326 US=526 8 June:British=1669 US=526 9 June:British=1669 US=916 11 June:British=1669 US=952 12 June:British=1669 US=969 13 June:British=2004 US=1005 15 June:British=2256 US=1005 16 June:British=2256 US=1098 22 June:British=2323 US=1098 23 June:British=2323 US=1524 28 June:British=2414 US=1541 29 June:British=2414 US=1617 30 June:British=2666 US=1746 1 July:British=2666 US=1835 2 July:British=2666 US=1871 3 July:British=2906 US=1871 4 July:British=2906 US=1907 5 July:British=2906 US=1924 10 July:British=2906 US=1958 11 July:British=2906 US=2222 12 July:British=2906 US=2258 13 July:British=2906 US=2557 15 July:British=2906 US=2610 17 July:British=2906 US=2663 18 July:British=3146 US=2739 19 July:British=3386 US=2774 20 July:British=3386 US=2808 21 July:British=3386 US=2884 22 July:British=3386 US=3072 23 July:British=3386 US=3108 25 July:British=3386 US=3371 26 July:British=3729 US=3371 30 July:British=4072 US=3371 31 July:British=4072 US=3407 1 August:British=4072 US=3670 6 August:British=4192 US=3746 7 August:British=4192 US=3763 8 August:British=4192 US=3835 9 August:British=4192 US=3852 10 August:British=4432 US=3852 11 August:British=4432 US=4115 12 August:British=4541 US=4115 24 August:British=4541 US=4267 25 August:British=4541 US=4343 31 August:British=4541 US=4415 American units that came ashore by day: ------------------------------------------------------------------ 17xIndependent Tank battalions [each with 53 Shermans, 6 Shermans with 105 gun and 17 light tanks for a total of 76 tanks] 6 June=70,741,743,745,746 7 June=747 16 June=759 29 June=712 30 June=744 11 July=709,735 13 July=737 18 July=748 6 August=702 24 August=701,736 25 August=774 21xTank Destroyer Battalions [each with 36 M10s or M18s] 6 June=899 11 June=702 13 June=803 23 June=813 30 June=634 1 July=703,893 2 July=629 4 July=635 11 July=654 12 July=644 13 July=704 15 July=818 17 July=705 22 July=603 23 July=630 31 July=628 8 August=773,814 31 August=602,631 16xCalavary reconn. Squadrons [each had 17 light tanks] 6 June=4 7 June=102 12 Junr=38 16 June=24 28 June=125 30 June=106 1 July=113 5 July=15 10 July=6,28 15 July=17 17 July=121 20 July=2,42 7 August=43 9 August=3 2xHeavy Armored Divisions [each with 232 Shermans and 158 light tanks for a total of 390 tanks] 9 June=2 23 June=3 5x Light Armored Divisions [each with 168 Shermans, 18 Shermans with 105 gun and 77 light tanks for a total of 263 tanks. 11 July=4[37TB with 76 tanks] 13 July=4[HQ, 8TB and 35TB with 187 tanks 19 July=6[HQ with 35 tanks] 21 July=6[69TB with 76 tanks] 22 July=6[15TB and 68TB with 152 tanks] 25 July=5 with 263 tanks 1 August=2 French Armored Division with 263 tanks [this unit was part of the American forces] 11 August=7 with 263 tanks The breakdown of the 4415 American tanks that went ashore in Normandy is then: 2205 Shermans 192 Shermans with the 105mm gun 1262 light tanks 756 tank destroyers As of 20 August 1944 ETOUSA had on hand: 2,423 M4 75mm and 76mm 163 M4 105mm 1,696 M5 37mm 763 M10 3" TD 179 M18 76mm TD As of 20 August First Army had operational: 865 M4 75mm 218 M4 76mm 69 M4 105mm 691 M5 37mm As of 19 August Third Army had operational: 782 M4 75mm 17 M4 76mm 90 M4 105mm 365 M5 37mm ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ German tank/Stug/Jagd.Pz strength Normandy: 6 June=122 7 June=220 8 June=405 10 June=504 11 June=535 12 June=580 13 June=653 17 June=663 18 June=859 21 June=872 27 June=880 29 June=1124 1 July=1329 3 July=1374 6 July=1594 10 July=1647 19 July=1662 20 July=1707 21 July=1729 23 July=1746 24 July=1859 25 July=1869 26 July=1945 27 July=1959 31 July=2004 3 August=2035 4 August=2222 5 August=2232 10 August=2245 12 August=2248 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Allied Losses in Normandy: US to August 5: 463 M4 (75mm) 18 M4 (76mm), 4 M4 (105mm), and 144 M5, Total = 629 US to August 20: Shermans [75mm and 76mm] lost=748 Shermans [105mm] lost=5 light tanks lost=209 tank destroyers lost=52 Total=1014 From 6 June to 1 July (26 days), First Army wrote off 187 M4-75mm and 44 M5. From 2 to 29 July (28 days), First Army wrote off 208 M4-75mm, 12 M4-76mm, 4 M4-105mm, and 67 M5. From 30 July to 2 September (35 days), First Army wrote off 237 M4-75mm, 38 M4-76mm, 6 M4-105mm, and 69 M5. From 3 to 28 September (26 days), First Army wrote off 123 M4-75mm, 33 M4-76mm, 10 M4-105mm, and 34 M5. From 1 August to 2 September (33 days), Third Army wrote off 221 M4-75mm and 94 M5. From 3 to 30 September (28 days), Third Army wrote off 48 M4-75mm, 61 M4-76mm, 2 M4-105mm, and 37 M5. From 9 September to 5 October (27 days), Ninth Army wrote off 2 M4-75mm. Thus roughly: ‘June’ 231 ‘July’ 291 ‘August’ 665 ‘September’ 350 Total = 1,537 ========================= British losses to June 23: 206 Sherman 75mm 22 Sherman 17-pdr 58 Cromwell Total= 286 To August 5: 537 Sherman 75mm 79 Sherman 17-pdr 185 Cromwell 75 Stuart 83 Churchill 6-pdr and 75mm 8 Churchill 95mm 19 Churchill VII 32 AVRE Total = 1615 British monthly losses: June – 146 July – 231 August – 834 September - ? Total = 1,211 (est. 1,568) ===================================== German losses to July 27: 224 PzIV 131 Panther 23 Tiger 60 StuG Total = 438 To July 31: 406 Panzer (all types) 60 StuG Total = 466. German Monthly losses for June/July: June 1 PzIV(k) 124 PzIV (l) 80 Panther 19 Tiger 27 StuG Total = 251 July 1 PzIII (l) (Befehlspanzer) 139 PzIV (l) 125 Panther 14 Tiger 68 StuG Total = 347 Thus a total of 598. German monthly losses to September: German losses were: June – 1 Pz-IV(k), 124 Pz-IV(l), 80 Pz-V, 19 Pz-VI (L56) = 224 July – 149 Pz-IV(l), 125 Pz-V, 14 Pz-VI (L56) = 288 August – 49 Pz-IV(l), 41 Pz-V, 15 Pz-VI (L56) = 105 September – 12 Pz-IV(k), 581 Pz-IV, 540 Pz-V, 72 Pz-VI (L56), 23 Pz-VI (L70) = 1,228 Total = 1,845 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Using the above you can work out the loss rates and it is clear that no matter which set of figures you use Germany always had lower losses than the Allies. The figures are all official and compiled for differing dates and criteria. Thus they do not exactly match up. They never will be definitive. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Breakdown of loss by cause: ---------------------------------------- Now as far as American tank losses in Normandy go we have the following data from various reports: In terms of the cause of loss, in June of 32 tanks examined, 18 were to ‘AT guns’ (56.25%), 9 to PF/PS (28.13%), 1 to mines (3.13%), and 1 to ‘artillery’ (3.13%). Unfortunately we do not know if the AT guns were just that or if they were mounted on armored vehicles of some type. However, we do know that 6 of those 18 were lost on D-Day, so cannot have been lost to anything other than the emplaced guns of the beach defenses. In July, of 73 examined, 41.1% were lost to AT guns, 32.88% to PF/PS, 16.44% to mines, 4.11% to mines and 4.11% to unknown causes. In August, of 130 examined, 55.38% were lost to AT guns, 18.46 to unknown causes, 13.08% to mines, 6.15% to artillery, 5.38% to PF/PS, and 1.54% to mortars. Overall, losses to ‘AT guns’ appear to have been somewhere around 50% in Normandy (the monthly average is 50.91%) and were not far off the ‘norm’ of 46.2%. For the British cause of loss in Normandy we have but a single document that appears relevant. That is O.R.S. 2 Report No. 12, Analysis of 75mm Sherman Tank Casualties Suffered Between 6th June and 10th June 1944. That document reports that of 45 Sherman tanks examined a total of 40 or 89% were lost to ‘AP shot,’ 4 or 9% to mines and 1 or 2% to unidentified causes. Another British loss table: I have reference to WO 291/1186, "The comparative performance of German anti-tank weapons during WWII.", an OR report dated 24 May 1950. The percentage of tank losses, by cause, for different theatres is given as follows: .............. (tanks)..Mines.....AT guns....Tanks....SP guns....Bazooka...Other N Europe(1305)...22.1%.....22.7%......14.5%.....24.4%.....14.2%......2.1% Italy.........(671)...30%........16%..........12%......26%........9%.........7% Africa....(1734 )..19.5%.....40.3%......38.2%.....nil............nil............2% Mean values.......22.3%.....29.4%.......25.3%....13.5%......6.1%.........3% destroyed..........20.3%......29%.........24.4%....12.7%.......5.4%......... - damaged............2%..........0.8%........0.9%.....0.8%..........0.7% ........ - Caution is advised over the "damaged" figures because of variability in reporting. It is stated that tanks and SP guns should be considered together, as war diaries often show doubt over what exactly caused a tank loss. Percentage personnel casualties, by type of tank: Tank type.............Mines.......AT guns....Tanks........SP guns.......Bazooka Sherman...............24.6%......41.4%........60.5%.......54.3%.........44.7% Churchill...............14.7%.......45%..........46.7%........30%...........14.7% Stuart...................34.6%......29.8%........51.7%..........*...............* Crusader.................*............38.5%........41.7%................................... Cromwell, Valentine, Matilda, Grant........17.4%......34.4%.......25.6%...........*...............• Mean values...........21.8 %.....40 %.........46.4%.......48.4 %......38.6 % Of which killed.......4.8%........18%..........21.8%.......20.4%........18% Of which wnded.....17%.........22%.........24.6%........28%.........20.6% An asterisk indicates a sample smaller than 30. These are included in the mean values. I have no idea why Shermans should apparently find. tanks more productive of crew casualties than AT guns or SPs, nor why it should be apparently so (relatively) safe to be knocked-out by an AT gun if riding in a Stuart. Overall, though, being in a brewed-up Sherman appears to be not much more dangerous than being in an average brewed-up tank. All the best, John D Salt. All the above is culled from posts on other forums by Ron Klages, 'Rich' Anderson and John D Salt. That should keep the calculators busy for a few hours! [ October 28, 2006, 11:47 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

I have never seen any TII with equipment stowed externaly. Common practice for Allied tankers but rare for the Germans. Myth I would think?

My dear chap I 'started' by using September loss figures but you disputed this and said June and July were the relevent months-that is why I used the 'low' early figures. Now of course you dismiss them! The point is however you shuffle the pack one thing stands out. Nowhere does it support your absurd claim that the US always got the better of the Germans in tank losses. Low numbers/high numbers the Germans always come out best. Nope. I posted some Goodwood figures. I never said anything about either Ally being superior to the other. In reply I got some garbage about US kill superiority and claims that Commonwealth Armoured Formations were 'stuffed'consistently and US Armour truimphed in every action. Whatever.................

A straw man introduced by you in this post and not related to anything posted previously. You are arguing with yourself I said part of it was Oh well on the join line and comitted to the US sector Two and a half Panzer Divisions instead of one and a half. It was in reserve south of Caen then sent to St Lo on July 28. But I am talking about July 17th SS Pz.Grenadier Division.....Not a Pz.Division. Who said they were? 900,and you know they all were victims of US action...... what happened to the other 1000? again who said they lost a few hundred? Ditto. You repeat the figures I posted at the top of this page. Now perhaps you could back up your claim that the US knocked out more German tanks than it lost........oh, I think I get it. You are claiming every abandonned German tank as a US 'kill'! But the US loss figure is still higher than the the German loss total. Care to explain how the US losses are higher (just)than British losses? PS how do you know the exact position of every abandonned German tank? Can you give me a figure for Panzers that made it over the Seine? How many Tigers made it back? Could you draw me a line for the Falaise pocket so I can see which wrecks were in the US sector? [ October 19, 2006, 09:03 PM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

some confusion here.It was Jason who was boasting that the USA always got the better of tank v tank encounters. I just wondered how he explained the figures not confirming this. The figures are like for like comparisons so your query is rather odd. If you 'break through' into an area that is empty of the enemy you are bound to score less than someone fighting through a heavilly defended area. It would confirm the superiority of the US Forces. A superiority so apparent to Jason. We should be reminded how Patton 'stuffed' Germany-all by himself Sorry, I assumed it was because Bradley was afraid the retreating Germans would simply trample over Patton and destroy his troops. I assumed that was what the 'hard shoulder' analogy meant.

On 24th July 1944 the following Panzer Divisions were facing the British. Ranged from Villers Bocage to Caen were: 21st Pz.Division. 116th Pz.Division. 12th SS Pz.Division. 1st SS Pz.Division. 9th SS Pz.Division. 10th SS Pz.Division. PZ.Lehr Pz.Division.(some Units) 2nd Pz.Division was in reserve in the British sector. Also in the same sector 3 Tiger Abteilung. sSS PzABT. 101. sSS PzAbt 102. sPz.Abt 503. Facing the US sector were: 2nd SS Pz.Division. Pz.Lehr (not the complete Division) This was the situation at the start of COBRA.

Yes very interesting. Total speculation, rounding up and assumptions aside can you explain how you get the figure of 'around 1000' for German tank and AFV losses when I can only get your mumbo jumbo to 760 odd? Further as you wish to ignore the August and September loss figures can you explain why, if the US 'always came out on top' did the US lose 522 tanks in June and July when the 'stuffed' British only lost 504? Oh and as the Goodwood losses (you say) are over 500 did the 'stuffed 'Brits only lose 4 other tanks in all of June and July? If the US always got a better exchange rate than the Germans why are German losses only 377? Finaly to amuse us can you post the claims that Patton made for the destruction wrought by his Army 1944-45? I believe the totals were in excess of all German casualties in the West combined. Any Idea why it was believed Patton would be flattened if he tried to 'close' the gap at Falaise? Surely his own commanders would not for a minute think he would have been well and truly 'stuffed' if he happened to get in the way of the retreating Germans?

Did they? Perhaps you can give me the figures because I read it as ELEMENTS of 5 German Divisions rather than the complete formations. In this link http://stonebooks.com/archives/001126.shtml (used because it is available online) you can see that the total tank strenght for the Mortain offensive is given as less than 112. As you said earlier 'The comparison is absurd'.

Read it again. "To summarize, UK forces began with approximately 139,000 men, 1,369 tanks, and at least 732 artillery pieces. Losses were 4,120 men (2.97%) (844 KIA, 2,951 WIA, 325 MIA) and 493 tanks (35%). Only 361 of the tanks were knocked out - that is, they were either written off or were so damaged as to require long-term repair, 132 were damaged - that is, they required less than 24 hours for repair. At the end of the battle tank strength was 1,047." You take the top figure and add to it to get the magic 500. I see 361 but I think you 'need' the higher figure to fit your theories.Perhaps you could give us the German figures INCLUDING the one only damaged and repaired in 24 hours? Really? Rich again: "in Normandy (the monthly average is 50.91%) and were not far off the ‘norm’ of 46.2%. From 6 June to 1 July (26 days), First Army wrote off 187 M4-75mm and 44 M5. From 2 to 29 July (28 days), First Army wrote off 208 M4-75mm, 12 M4-76mm, 4 M4-105mm, and 67 M5. From 30 July to 2 September (35 days), First Army wrote off 237 M4-75mm, 38 M4-76mm, 6 M4-105mm, and 69 M5. From 3 to 28 September (26 days), First Army wrote off 123 M4-75mm, 33 M4-76mm, 10 M4-105mm, and 34 M5. From 1 August to 2 September (33 days), Third Army wrote off 221 M4-75mm and 94 M5. From 3 to 30 September (28 days), Third Army wrote off 48 M4-75mm, 61 M4-76mm, 2 M4-105mm, and 37 M5. From 9 September to 5 October (27 days), Ninth Army wrote off 2 M4-75mm. Thus roughly: ‘June’ 231 ‘July’ 291 ‘August’ 665 ‘September’ 350 Total = 1,537 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- British losses are given as: June – 146 July – 231 August – 834 September - ? Total = 1,211 (est. 1,568) Unfortunately I have been unable to determine the British September totals, but given the overall similarity with the American figures it is probably not unreasonable to suppose that they were about 350 as well (if the proportionality with June-August were maintained, then it would be 357. If we presume that the above cause of loss was consistent for June and July, then about 336 were probably lost to ‘AP shot,’ which is probably an underestimate. If we presume that percentage applied throughout, then a total of 1,396 were possibly lost to ‘AP shot,’ which is probably an exaggeration. Using the total ‘AP shot’ weapons from WO 292/1186 (61.6) we would probably derive a more accurate estimate of 966. On the other hand, if we accept the figures from WO 291/1186 by type of AP weapon, then we can estimate that only 227 were lost to ‘tank guns’ and if that figure is applied to the Allied total loss, then perhaps only 450 were lost to ‘tank guns.’ Thus, we may estimate that the upper limit of Allied tanks lost to ‘AP shot’ (tanks, AT guns and assault guns) was perhaps 2,176, while probably the lower limit lost to ‘tank guns’ was about 450 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- German losses were: June – 1 Pz-IV(k), 124 Pz-IV(l), 80 Pz-V, 19 Pz-VI (L56) = 224 July – 149 Pz-IV(l), 125 Pz-V, 14 Pz-VI (L56) = 288 August – 49 Pz-IV(l), 41 Pz-V, 15 Pz-VI (L56) = 105 September – 12 Pz-IV(k), 581 Pz-IV, 540 Pz-V, 72 Pz-VI (L56), 23 Pz-VI (L70) = 1,228 Total = 1,845 Cause of loss for German tanks is given for a select set in O.R.S. 2 Report No. 17, Analysis of German Tank Casualties in France, 6th June 44 – 31st August 1944. In that report, for the period of 6 June-7 August a sample of 53 tanks resulted in 48% lost to ‘AP shot.’ For 8-31 August 1944 that dropped to just 11% due to the high number of abandoned tanks in that period. From that we may presume that the June-July total loss to ‘AP shot’ may have been about 246, while for August-September it may have been about 147, for a total of about 393 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Thus, using these very rough methods, we can assume that the upper limit of the ratio of Allied to German tank losses to ‘AP shot’ may have been as high as 2,176-to-393, or about 5.54-to-1. Probably closer would be an ‘AP shot’ ratio of roughly 1,746-to-393, or about 4.44-to-1. The tank-versus-tank ratios are possibly similar although it could be argued to be as low as 673-to-393, or 1.71-to-1, aboutthe same as the overall loss ratio. Nevermind that this comparison is probably irrelevent. Overall then we may postulate a total of about 3,105 Allied to 1,845 German tanks written off, or about a 1.68-to-1 ratio of losses, again, a number that has nothing to do with the relative effectiveness of the Allied versus the German tanks. However, it is probably very relevant in terms of the overall Allied-versus-German combat effectiveness" ================================================= so then if the US lost 1500 tanks up to September and the Germans lost 1800 then by your calculations only 300 German tanks fell to the British? Perhaps adjusting the figures to 'discount' all non tank v tank losses and exclude all German 'self-destruction' claims could help you arrive at a toal that would better fit your claim? Of course it is. How could anyone doubt that the US took 'all of France'?

I cannot take any credit. I merely reposted Rich's work. The reason I reposted Rich's Goodwood post was because it showed that the myth about 'Losing nearly 500 tanks' is groundless. Rich clearly pointed out that the losses were around 361 and of these 160 were a total loss. This is far below '500'. Christopher Dunphie, in his book 'The Pendulum Of Battle' points out that the ground gained during the 2 days of Goodwood was the same as it took the US Forces 4 days to take during the start of Cobra. This is remarkable when the US faced 100+ Panzers and the British 600! The tank loss ratio for Goodwood would be about 2;1 in the German favour.

Total US Sherman losses from: http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=11051&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=60 we may find the following facts about the situation of M-4 tanks by the end of the war (VE-Day). A.) Actual on hand and unit requirements were: Total on hand with units of 12th AG as of 5 May 1945 was circa 3,738 Total T/E 12th AG as of 30 April 1945 was 4,184 Total on hand with units Seventh Army as of 30 April 1945 was 996 Total T/E Seventh Army as of 30 April 1945 was 1,029 Total T/E 15th AG as of 1 May 1945 was 561 Total T/E PTO as of 1 May 1945 was 789 Total T/E CONUS and en route was 240 Total on hand with units was circa 6,324 Total T/E with units was 6,731 B.) Known losses were: Total Losses 12th AG to 12 May 1945 was 3,255 Total Losses 15th AG to 14 September 1944 was 588 Partial Losses 6th AG 15 August – 1 May 1945 was 295 Total Losses II Corps, Tunisia, 15 March-9 May 1943 was 60 Total Losses Seventh Army, Sicily was 8 Total Losses 1st AD, Tunisia, 14-21 February 1943 was 94 Total Known Losses was 4,300 C.) Reserves required and known reserves/transits were: Reserves required for Seventh Army, 12th and 15th AG (total T/E 5,774) was set at 35% or 2,021 (As of 20 March 1945 12th AG reserve requirement was 1,704 of which 848 were in theater and another 2,629 were on release, but not received – i.e., were in CONUS) (A total of 4,384 M-4 were received by ETOUSA – 6th and 12th AG – 1 February-20 May 1945) (As of 29 April Seventh Army reserve requirement was 342 – including 2eme DB – of which 63 were on hand) Reserves required for PTO (total T/E 789) at 35% = 276 Reserves required for CONUS (total T/E 240) at 0.5% = 12 Total reserve requirement was circa 2,309 D.) Total Lend-Lease shipped were: Total Lend Lease shipped was 22,098 (It is difficult to identify when the last LL shipments went out. However, it is known that Britain had received 33,246 ‘tanks’ from “overseas,” including 5,381 Canadian production by the end of the 2nd QTR 1944. Given that the total ‘tanks’ shipped by the US to the Commonwealth –the only other source for ‘overseas’ tanks – were 30,267, then it seems likely that the bulk had been shipped by May 1945. ‘Tanks’ in this context included SP AT guns and SP artillery.) Total other were: E.) Total M-4 conversions through 2nd QTR 1945 to M-36, T-5 ARV and various MX was 3,610 F.) Total M-4 rebuilt 3rd QTR 44-2nd QTR 45 was 3,735 (no rebuilds are known to have reached a war theater) Thus the total ‘consumption’ (total with units, total reserve requirement, total Lend-Lease, total in re-build, and total conversions) of M-4 through about 8 May 1945 was 42,376 (6,324+4,300+2,309+22,098+3,735+3,610). G.) To this may be added all or part of those M-4 ‘just completed,’ which were: 1st QTR 1945 4,076 2nd QTR 1945 2,687 These last two (F and G) represent the bulk of the ‘intangibles’ in this equation. It may justly be said that G is probably partly duplicated in C (in transit), although those ‘recently built’ in E and F are excluded from G. However, we may also say that although B probably includes the bulk of the M-4 losses, it cannot be said to include all M-4 losses, and thus may balance any error in overstating the totals in E, F and G. Thus we may estimate that the total ‘consumption’ and ‘just completed’ M-4 to about 8 May 1945 was +/- 49,139. Given that total M-4 Production through 2nd QTR 1945 was 49,204, we may assume that the ‘balance sheet’ is substantially accounted for and that there are no ‘missing’ M-4. We may also fairly assume that the ‘excess’ of M-4 amounted to +/- 6,422 (the rebuilds known to have remained in the US and probably the bulk of the 2nd QTR production), most of which were likely in CONUS as of May 1945. Other sources have indicated that there were "7,000" M-4 in CONUS as of 1 February 1945. Given that 4,384 were shipped to ETOUSA after that, and that production was 4,096 February-April 1945, it is unlikely that the 'excess' could have been reduced much below 6,700 by 1 May 1945. Although it appears likely that the ‘excess’ of M-4 in the US probably amounted to over 6,000 (it is still possible that my original off the cuff estimate of 9,000 could be valid), it cannot be claimed that the US Army had ‘more than they needed’ since the end-users – the units in the field – were still experiencing shortages through VE-Day. 12th AG was at 89.3 percent of T/E and Seventh Army was at 96.8 percent of T/E – even after many of the bottlenecks had been eliminated and after massive shipments (note the number received by ETOUSA) to rebuild the losses suffered that December and January had been received. Shortages during earlier periods had been severe and had been masked in part by expedients such as the decision to delay the replacement of 9 M-8 HMC Assault Guns in the armored divisions in December and the elimination of the 'replacement' tank sections in 2nd and 3rd AD. One final requirement probably weighing on the minds of Army planners was that much of the armored force in the ETO and MTO were slated for the invasion of Japan. This may account for the retention of much the 'excess' in CONUS, since it was impracticable to ship tanks from Europe to US east coast ports, ship them by rail to the west coast and issue them to the units reconstituting for the invasion. In other words, they did in fact have to plan for at least 'one more war' - even if that war was never actually fought ================================================================= The 'real' Goodwood losses from: http://www.feldgrau.net/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=9009&postdays=0&postorder=asc&highlight=tank+losses+normandy&start=30 Here's what I have for GOODWOOD - originally this was a posting I made at TankNet. Sorry, but the middle is missing because I had a disk problem and haven't been able to go back and correct it yet (and can't find the archived thread at TankNet ). Hope it supplies some more food for thought. Can't wait for a Mortain discussion. One of the recent mental excursions I have wandered into regarding Normandy is the generally accepted view of the results of Operation GOODWOOD. The general consensus regarding the battle is that - regardless of Montgomery's initial intent - it was an unmitigated disaster for British arms...right? But, when I began digging into the actual results of the battle - in terms of the relative numbers of casualties inflicted - I began to see a very different picture. The following is a summary of my research to date. It is difficult to directly compare German and Commonwealth strengths and losses in GOODWOOD, mostly because there is a dearth of accurate and timely casualty reports for the German units involved. However, we do have extensive data for the UK forces and (thanks largely to the untiring work of Niklas Zetterling) a considerable body of data on the German forces. To summarize, UK forces began with approximately 139,000 men, 1,369 tanks, and at least 732 artillery pieces. Losses were 4,120 men (2.97%) (844 KIA, 2,951 WIA, 325 MIA) and 493 tanks (35%). Only 361 of the tanks were knocked out - that is, they were either written off or were so damaged as to require long-term repair, 132 were damaged - that is, they required less than 24 hours for repair. At the end of the battle tank strength was 1,047. German strength may be estimated with some accuracy as 79,750 men, 325 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT, and 291artillery pieces (not including infantry guns), 160 heavy Pak (including at least 51 8.8cm Pak 43/41), 56 8.8cm Flak (note that the generally accepted "144" 88's on Bourgebuis Ridge may include both the Pak 43/41 and an exaggeration), and about 230 Nebelwerfer. Our primary source for German casualties for the battle actually covers the period 11-20 July. However, it is likely that few of the casualties in that report were actually incurred prior to start of GOODWOOD on 18 July and none of them appear to be inconsistent with the minimums that would be expected. The exception is the losses of 16th LW FD (51 WIA and 8 MIA). Zetterling estimated that it lost a total of 2,500 men in Normandy, of which about 500 were lost in operations around Caen in early July. The casualties reported by the division for the month of July (in a 5 PzAOK report) were 368 KIA, 759 WIA, and 2,496 MIA, which is probably closer to the actual total casualties of the division in Normandy. Also, it is well documented that the division was broken up and used as replacements after GOODWOOD, being formally disbanded on 4 August 1944. Furthermore, all of the regimental commanders, most of their staff, and 36 company commanders were counted as losses in GOODWOOD, implying that 50+ officers alone were casualties in GOODWOOD. The report for 11-20 July gives the number of officer casualties as one, while the July report gives officer casualties of 92. Finally, the British PW reports indicate that the German MIA are undercounted by at least 1,495 (8 Corps alone reported 1,628 EPW while all 2 Army units involved reported 2,827 EPW for the battle) and it appears likely that most of these were incurred by 16th LW. From this, I conclude that the casualties of the 16th LW FD during GOODWOOD totaled about 3,100 men, over 1,500 of those being prisoner. Total German losses were about 6,500 men (8.15%), 86 tanks, assault guns, and SP AT (26.5%), and at least 72 Nebelwerfer, Pak, and artillery pieces (9.77%). Unlike the British losses, it appears that almost none of the German personnel losses were replaced before the Germans began their withdrawal from Normandy. And, it appears that the German AFV losses were more or less permanent as well, the majority of those recovered and repairable were abandoned when the German retreat began. The artillery losses were also irrecoverable (9th Werfer Brigade lost 47 Nebelwerfer during GOODWOOD, nearly one-half its operational strength). Armor losses to AT mines cannot be definitely excluded, however, it is interesting to note that no vehicles losses were recorded for the two specialized mine clearing units that participated in the battle (22nd Dragoons and 1st Lothians). Furthermore, the total personnel losses in the two were 2 KIA and 10 WIA, or 0.79 percent (0.26 percent per day) of the 1,513 man strength of the units. Engineer troops totaled 4,457, losses were 6 KIA and 48 WIA, or 1.21 percent (0.40 percent per day). And now to dig further into the British (or in this case, Commonwealth) casualties. The heaviest hit - in terms of whole percentages - was 2 Canadian Infantry Division. On 18 July 2 Canadian Division had a succesful day, partly clearing Louvigny, west of the Orne, and successfully bridging the Orne at two locations at Caen by 1200 on 19 July. The division suffered moderate losses of 21 KIA, 43 WIA, 3 MIA - mostly in 4 and 5 Brigade. There were an additional 43 KIA and 75 WIA suffered by the Royal Regiment of Canada in the two-day battle for Louvigny, which was not cleared until late in the morning of 19 July. Operations to cross the Orne at Caen and clear the western edge of Vaucelles cost the division an additional 39 KIA, 136 WIA, and 3 MIA on 19 July. In the first two days of the battle the inexperienced division, with minimal armor support, had achieved most of it's objectives for a loss of 363 casualties. Based on a divisional strength of roughly 17,000, that equates to about one percent per day, an unremarkable rate of attrition for a division. Even the hardest hit battalion, the Royal Regiment of Canada at Louvigny, only suffered a loss of 7.05 percent per day, less than the 9.50 percent per day norm found for battalions in World War II. However, the picture changed on the last two days of the battle. On 20 July the reserve 6 Infantry Brigade was brought up to continue the attack south towards the tiny village of Verrieres, perched on a 88 meter height just west of the Falaise Road. The advance of 6 Brigade was up an open, gentle rise and was exposed to observation and flanking fire from Hill 112, west of the Orne, and to the German positions in Verrieres itself. To make matters worse, shortly after the attack kicked off in the afternoon, a torrential rain began. The fields were quickly reduced to quagmires, limiting vehicular movement to the hard-surfaced roads. As a result, when the Germans counterattacked from Verrieres with an estimated four tanks (which may have been Panthers since they retained some mobility off road) the leading battalion (South Saskatchewan Regiment) was unable to get AT or tank support forward and was quickly overwhelmed. The brigade reserve, the Essex Scottish was overrun in turn when it tried to recover the position. Significantly perhaps, it was only at this time that 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade was placed under command of 2 Canadian Division. The losses on 20 July were 98 KIA, 294 WIA, 50 MIA, exceeding the combined casualties of the previous two days. On the morning of 21 July, with the heavy rain still falling, the Germans continued their armored attack, inflicting heavy casualties again on the Essex Scottish and on the Camerons of Canada and the 27 Armoured Regiment at St. Andre. In the evening the division counterattacked, supported by 6 and 27 Armoured Regiments of 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade. Losses for the day were 78 KIA, 260 WIA, and 143 MIA, another very intense day of combat. These two days did tremendous damage to the infantry of the division. The Essex Scottish had only lost 11 men on 18 and 19 July. But, on 20 and 21 July, 318 men were lost or 19.09 percent per day. The South Saskatchewans, which had only lost one man earlier, lost 201 on 20 and 21 July or 12.06 percent per day. Overall, the division lost an average of 2.71 percent per day on 20 and 21 July, over two-and-one-half times the rate of 18 and 19 July. Meanwhile, 3 Canadian Division attacked on the right flank of 8 Corps, attempting to seize the Columbelles steel factory complex on the east bank of the Orne, and then drive south towards Vaucelles. The division paid heavily for it's success, losing 60 KIA, 234 WIA, 9 MIA on 18 July, a loss of about 1.8 percent, significantly higher than the divisional norm of 1.0 percent. However, once Columbelles was captured the advance went well. Vaucelles was seized against light resistance on 19 July and only 7 KIA, 35 WIA, and 7 MIA were lost. On 20 July the division was lightly engaged in mopping up and occupying the positions seized by 11 Armoured Division, and suffered only 6 KIA and 20 WIA. It was more heavily engaged on 21 July - mostly by intense German shelling - and suffered 17 KIA, 84 WIA, and 11 MIA. On 19 and 20 July it appears (my source, The Victory Campaign, is hazy on the actions of 10 Armoured Regiment) that 2 Canadian Armoured Brigade supported the attack of 3 Canadian Division on Columbelles with the 6 Armoured Regiment (1 Hussars), holding the 10 Armoured Regiment (Fort Garry Horse) in reserve, while the attack by 2 Canadian Division on Louvigny was supported by 27 Armoured Regiment (Sherbrooke Fusiliers). The armor units lost 7 KIA and 32 WIA, 10 tanks knocked out and 1 damaged on 18 July. After Louvigny was secured on 19 July, it appears that 27 Armoured crossed to the east side of the Orne, supporting attacks on Fleury and St. Andre. The rest of 2 Brigade supported mopping up operations in Vaucelles and Ifs. The operations on 19 July cost 1 KIA and 3 WIA, only 2 tanks were knocked out, although 10 were damaged. On 20 July, when the German counterattack so roughly handled 2 Canadian Division, 27 Armoured remained defending St. Andre, while the rest of the brigade remained in the 3 Division sector east of the Falaise Road. The brigade suffered 3 KIA and 3 WIA to German shelling, while apparently losing no tanks. On 21 July the brigade, finally attached to 2 Division, counterattacked to stabilize the division front, losing 5 KIA and 12 WIA, 17 tanks knocked out and 7 damaged. Overall, it does not appear that the Canadian losses can be attributed to a lack of armor support or to inadequate tanks. Rather, it appears that the heavy losses on 20 and 21 July were more attributable to poor decision making. The 6 Brigade attack was executed without armor support, even though the supporting armor was close at hand, available, and unengaged. Failing to attach 2 Armoured Brigade to 2 Division on the morning of 20 July when the attack to Verrieres was ordered is inexplicable. The apparent failure of the division commander to request armored support for an advance up the open gentle slope of Verrieriers Ridge is equally inexplicable. Also, the fact that the AT guns of the South Saskatchewan's were overrun while trying to move up can only partly be attributed to bad luck. Trying to move forward the vulnerable guns and prime movers in poor visibility, in the face of the enemy was simply asking for trouble. So, would the presence of Churchills have made any difference? It's doubtful, since no tank has value in combat unless it's where it can actually particpate in the combat. Organization 8 Corps (64,448 men: 255 KIA, 922 WIA, 59 MIA = 1,236; frm 8 Corps rpts 1,357 cas) 11 AD (14,389 men: 159 KIA, 531 WIA, 55 MIA = 745; frm 8 Corps rpts 930 cas) 29 Arm Bde (Start 214, End 132, KO 140, DMG 30) (2,826 men; 67 KIA, 189 WIA, 33 MIA) 159 Inf Bde (2,599 men; 55 KIA, 261 WIA, 6 MIA) 2 N.Yeo. Recce Rgt (Start 72, End 46, KO 32, DMG 5) (662 men; 14 KIA, 26 WIA, 10 MIA) Other (19 KIA, 50 WIA, 1 MIA) Inns of Court AC Rgt (782 men; 1 KIA, 5 MIA) 22 Dgns (Sherman Crab) & 26 Asslt Sqn RE (att frm 79 AD) (705 men; 3 KIA, 5 WIA) 7 AD (15,183 men: 39 KIA, 154 WIA, 2 MIA = 195; frm 8 Corps rpts 154 cas) 22 Arm Bde (Start 216, End 199, KO 15, DMG 33) (22 KIA, 89 WIA, 2 MIA) 131 Inf Bde (5 KIA, 31 WIA) 8 Huss. Recce Rgt (Start 72 ) Well here is where my disk failed and corrupted the data. 101st SS Pz Bn (~ 500 men: start 1 Tiger I? End 6 Tiger I, KO&DMG 0?) 272nd ID (~12,700 men: losses 11-20 July; 44 KIA, 131 WIA, 153 MIA, July; 242 KIA, 951 WIA, 982 MIA) 16th LW FD (Start 2? StGIII) (~ 9,300 men: losses 11-20 July; 51 WIA, 8 MIA, July; 368 KIA, 759 WIA, 2,496 MIA) 7th Werfer Bde (110 werfer on 1 July) (~3,700 men: losses July; 58 KIA, 204 WIA, 25 MIA) 101st SS Art Bn (~500 men: 4 21cm, 6 17cm) LXXXVI AK (-) (~24,750 men) 346th ID (Start 8 StGIII & 6 Marder? End 8 StGIII & 6 Marder? KO&DMG 0?) (~[1/2 7,500] = 3,750 men: losses 11-20 July; 121 KIA, 531 WIA, 219 MIA, July; 152 KIA, 627 WIA, 192 MIA) 21st PzD (Start 50 PzIV, end 22 PzIV, KO&DMG 28, 16 Pak40 SP, 24 10.5cmStG) (~12,900 men: losses 11-20 July; 162 KIA, 394 WIA, 832 MIA, July; 239 KIA, 714 WIA, 996 MIA) 503rd Pz Bn (~500 men: start 39 Tiger, End 20 Tiger, KO&DMG 17) 9th Werfer Bde (~120 werfer, 47 lost 18-21 July) (~3,700 men: losses July; 46 KIA, 153 WIA, 163 MIA) 1039th PzJg Bn (~400 men: 27 Pak 43/41 8.8cm, 12 lost 18-21 July) 1053rd PzJg Bn (~300 men: 16 Pak 40, 13 lost 18-21 July) Art Rgt Staff Autun (ARKO 118?) (Losses July: 39 KIA, 96 WIA) 555th Art Bn (~400 men: 12 12.2cm how) 763rd Art Bn (~400 men: 9 17cm) 1151st Art Bn (-) (~300 men: 8 12.2cm how) 1193rd Art Bn (~400 men: 12 14.9cm how) 625th Art Bty (~200 men: 3 17cm) III Flak Korps (~1,500 men) 11700th FlakKG (8-12 8.8cm) 12400th FlakKG (8-12 8.8cm) 13399th FlakKG (8-12 8.8cm) Strength ~79,750 men ~325 tanks, assault guns, SP AT Losses (personnel losses for 11-20 July) ~6,500 men (8.15%) (Note: 8 Brit Corps rpt 1,628 EPW, all PW rpt 2,827 for period) ~86 tanks, assault guns, SP AT (26.5%) GOODWOOD planning: 1000 hrs 13 July Dempsey meets with O'Connor (8 Corps), Crocker (1 Corps), and Simonds (2 Cdn. Corps). At that time 59 ID withdrawn from 8 Corps and 7 AD substituted. Reason was Monty's instruction of 10 July to Dempsey and Bradley: "Second Army will retain the ability to operate with a strong armoured force east of the River Orne in the general area between Caen and Falaise, For this purpose a corps of three armoured divisions will be held in reserve, ready to be employed when ordered by me. The opportunity for the employment of this corps may be sudden and fleeting. Therefore the study of the problems arising will begin at once." Following was a second conference on the morning of 14 July at Creully. Then on the morning of 15 July Dempsey visited O'Connor and delivered to him a copy of Monty's: "Notes on Second Army Operations 16th July-18th July 1. Object of this operation. To engage the German armour in battle and 'write it down' to such an extent that it is of no further value to the Germans as a basis of the battle. To gain a good bridgehead over the River Orne through Caen, and thus improve our positions on the eastern flank. Generally to destroy German equipment and personnel. 2. Affect of this operation on Allied policy. We require the whole of the Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas. A victory on the eastern flank will help us to gain what we want on the western flank. But the eastern flank is a bastion on which the whole future of the campaign in North West Europe depends; it must remain a firm bastion; if it became unsatble the operations on the western flank would cease. Therefore, while taking advantage of every opportunity to destroy the enemy, we must be very careful to maintain our own balance and ensure a firm base. 3. The enemy. There are a lot of enemy divisions in the area south-east of Caen: 21 Panzer Division 16 GAF Field Division 1 SS Panzer Division 272 Infantry Division 12 SS Panzer Division Another one [116 Panzer Division] is coming and will be here this week-end. 4. Operations of 12 Corps and Canadian Corps - 16th and 17th July. Advantage must be taken of these to make the Germans think we are going to break out across the Orne between Caen and Amaye. 5. Initial Operations 8 Corps. The three armoured divisions will be required to dominate the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville, and to fight and destroy the enemy. But armoured cars should push far to the south towards Falaise, and spread alarm and dsepondency, and discover 'the form.' 6. 2 Canadian Corps. While para 5 is going on, the Canadians must capture Vaucelles, get through communications and establish themselves in a very firm bridgehead on the general line Fleury-Cormelles-Mondeville. 7. Later Operations 8 Corps. When 6 is done, then 8 Corps can 'crack about' as the situation demands. But not before 6 is done. 8. To sum up for 8 Corps. Para 5. Para 7. Finally. Para 6 is vital. B.L. Montgomery 15-7-44 At 0300 hours 16 July the 8 Corps Operations instruction was issued. The intention laid down in the instruction was: "On 18th July, 8 Corps will debouch from the existing bridgehead east of the River Orne with a view to: (a) Dominating the area Bourgebus-Vimont-Bretteville-sur-Laize. ( Destroying any enemy armour or other forces encountered en route to this area. © If conditions are favourable, subsequently exploiting to the south." On 17 July Dempsey issued the following summary to all of his corps commanders: "Second Army Operations Commencing on 18th July West of the Orne. 1. 12 Corps will hold the whole of the commanding ground on the general line Evrecy-Esquay-Eterville. They will establish a force on the spur south-east of Evrecy and develop a strong threat on the axis Evrecy-Amaye. They will do all they can to lead the enemy to believe that Second Army intends to cross the River Orne on their front. 2. 30 Corps will improve their positions on the front Vendes-Noyers-Missy, and operate with light forces in the direction of Villers Bocage. Their operations will be designed to draw enemy reserves into the thick country on their front and to contain them there. East of the Orne. 3. 1 Corps will establish 3 Division in the area Bivres-Traorn-St.Pair-Emieville-Touuffreville, and will hold this area against enemy attack from east and south-east. 1 Corps will also occupy and hold the villages of Cuverville and Demouville. Patrolling and exploitation will be carried out to the east and north-east of 3 Division area, but main bodies will not be moved from this area without reference to me. 4. 8 Corps will establish armoured divisions in the areas: (a) Vimont ( Garcelles-Secqueville © Hubert-Folie-Verrieres. The task of these three divisions will be to get their main bodies so establsihed that there can be no enemy penetration through the ring, to destroy all enemy troop concentrations and installations in the area; to defeat enemy armour which may be brought against them. Vigorous patrolling and exploitation will be carried out to the east and south-east to the line of the Dives-to the south in the direction of Falaise-to the south-west as far as the River Orne at Thury Harcourt. Main bodies of the three divisions will not be moved from areas (a), ( and © without reference to me. 5. 2 Canadian Corps will capture and hold Vaucelles and Gibreville with one division and build bridges over River Orne at Caen. This is a vital part of the whole Army operations. They will be prepared, on instructions from me, to advance their front to the line Fleury-Cormelles and may start to employ another division for this task. Their operation of expanding the Caen bridgehead will include a junction of their forces east and west of the River Orne on the line Eterville-Fleury. M.C. Dempsey, Lieutenant-General, Commander, Second Army 17th July, 44" Andreas did you link your AHF thread earlier? If not: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=81359&highlight=tank+losses+normandy

http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/fulcrum_main.pl?database=ft_u2&searchid=109558764828166&keyfieldvalue=ADA415948&filename=%2Ffulcrum%2Fdata%2FTR_fulltext%2Fdoc%2FADA415948.pdf

All I say is the photo that for years has been captioned as a Tiger is in fact a PzIV. Were Tigers were in the area as well? Probably but there is no photos of them-which is not to say they were not there!

It is an 'A'.

http://www.network54.com/Forum/message?forumid=47207&messageid=1109808952 http://www.network54.com/Forum/message?forumid=47207&messageid=1109811050 http://www.network54.com/Forum/message?forumid=47207&messageid=1109824061 3 views of the St Lambert Panther.

Michael I know what transport tracks look like and this was not them. As I say I did hope it was from SS 101 but sadly it 'aint.

If you adjust the contrast on the photo (so only the wreck is visible) you can clearly see it has narrow tracks. Also the bow plate with the spare track on it is too high for a Tiger-in relation to the front sprocket. I really wanted it to be a Tiger as that would have been one less Tiger to track down. If you look in 'Tigers In Combat Vol II' you will see Schneider lists this Tiger as both SS 101 (page 260, 19/8/44) and SS 102 (page 332,19/8/44)! [ February 25, 2005, 11:37 AM: Message edited by: michael kenny ]

Sorry to rain on your parade but the wreck is not a Tiger. Having an interest in this tank I have blown up the pic and it clearly is a Pz IV wreck. The muzzle brake is also a PzIV type. It was only this month that I was able to confirm the ID, until then I too belived it was a Tiger.

The numbers I gave are correct (to the nearest 5)for the period up to Jan 1945. The only doubt would be the various Units flung together in the last few months of the war and even then the number of TII's would be small compared to those serving in the East. 2 Formations were indeed transfered East but Heer 503 left all its 26 issued TII's as wrecks (though doubts remain over 2 TII(p))and SS 501 took 30 TII's with them but left 29 hulks.

Up to Jan 45 a total of 149 TII's saw action in the West and 119 of this 149 were lost by May 45. In the final months various ad-hoc groups fought with a variety of TII's. So we could say 119 plus another 25(?) destroyed facing West. As 495-500 were made you can work the % out for yourself.