cassh

Good online map of central damascus http://www.syriantours.net/Maps/Cities/damascus_big.jpg

Mount Qassyoun (Qassioun) http://www.damascus-online.com/Photos/sham/DSCN3531.jpg Google Earth 33 32'07.41" N 36 16'25.52 E Overlooks the entire city!

Dan - Speak for yourself. How do you propose a ground force will be deployed against a Taliban regime with nuclear weapons? As soon as any concetration occurs you just present the fanatical enemy with a strike target for their nukes. It would be a very dull game as US airpower and seaborne deep strikes would be the only viable power projection in theatre until the nuclear threat had been neutralised. At that point Pakistan would be on its knees anyway. The CM-Pakistan battles would pretty much all be clearing out light infantry resistance in urban or mountains - fun, but limiting. If this is what you are after why not call it Afghanistan and have real combat upon which to base these small infantry skirmishes?

I'll get the ball rolling... Mezze International Airport in Damascus Google Earth 33 29'00.00" N 36 13'46.00" E Looks like foxholes and communication trenches dug in on the grass between the apron and taxiways!

I've been looking closely at terrain in Syria using "Google Earth" and for me I'd like the first game's single player campaign to be set there as it presents some really interesting challenges. As long as the enemy force has a realistic TO&E and operates in a way consistent to their abilities and doctrine I'll be a happy bunny.

"18mm lens is quite common" 18mm lens is equivalent to 35mm on many digital slr cameras where ccd sensor area is smaller than the actual frame size of traditional 35mm film plate - hence the lens is wider but the focal length remains eqivalent to a longer lens.

XM307 airburst ammo is gonna chew through enemy dismounts!

Oh - just thought of scaling ladders, ropes and grappling irons. Very usful in MOUT. What were the grappling iron mortars called used at Point Du Hoc? Infantry illum systems such as vary pistols and shmuley[spelling?] flares.

vincere - Good God - PG tips - those poor bastards. Tarkus - "This isn't about what is sound or not tactically. This is about the origin of a myth." Point taken - you're quite right. rudel.dietrich - yes we're sensative about tea, cricket (not the winning or losing - but the game as an institution) and the Queen (the monarch not the band)!! Cross any of 'em even in jest and the hackles are got up. Actually if one wanted to start a war with us I suggest the best method would be to kill the Queen at teatime by smacking her round the head with a cricket bat.

No, I’d say it is because you don’t have a clue. Your naivety is gob smacking; and for someone who espouses intellectualism and derides the military for their inability to think you repeatedly demonstrate that very facet yourself. What makes you think the British redeployment is about just smuggling? If a bunch of Iranian and Iraqis want to get together and move CDs or Levi Jeans or any civil commodity across the border the British Army are not going to be too concerned about it. It’s a police and customs matter. However, when its weapons, explosive and the machinery to support an INSURGENCY then operations put in place to reduce this activity are called... wait for it... counter-insurgency (COIN). Okay - look at the first clause of the sentence where you indicate that the insurgency is not important. Now look at the second part where you say smuggling is business as usual. So if that is the case - and smuggling in its wider sense to include all smuggling is the focus of the British border deployment, why did they not do it in 2003? You've said it yourself - smuggling in this area is omnipresent "business as always". Yet they waited all this time and suddenly though - hang-on, lets police the border and stop CD and Levi smugglers. This is to do with the Mahdi's militia getting support from Iran. This increases sectarian violence, weakens security and destabilises the region. It means more civilians, Iraqi policemen and security force and MNF personnel are at risk. Therefore the commanders in the British sector are attempting to counter this insurgent threat with a range of measure - amongst which is deploying the QRH battlegroup into the border area to patrol. That's your glib way of saying the British should pull out and let the Iraqis sort their own security nightmare is it? Bit of a problem if the violence is sectarian as the targets are civilians - ethnic cleansing is not nice and civil war would be beyond tragic. Your throwaway suggestion would have blood on its hands. I think this outlook indicates a smugness that is both callous and crass. It's easy to mock when you don't have people's lives in your hand. Your whole linguistics argument is tripe as countless successful counter-insurgency campaigns have proven you don't need to have perfect language skills to make a human connection and build trust and cooperation. Your argument about smuggling being an omnipresent background activity that cannot be affected also stands in the face of contrary evidence from successful counter-insurgency campaigns where this sort of activity has been controlled. Quote me one reliable source that indicates that the insurgents have all the weapons they need? Have you inspected any insurgent weapon stashes recently? Had a chat with the Mahdi's QM recently have you? Know what the insurgents are planning in the next six months and verified they've got the kit to do it? What a crock of inventive ****e. Make up all the facts, figures and reality you like - it doesn't wash though mate. Your flippant remarks and statements merely underscore your BS. You can imagine the world to be any way you like and pass of your flights of fancy as fact; but in reality most of what you've said in this thread is weak supposition base on bull**** facts and a lack of any real knowledge of the subject. Thank God the members of the board are better read than most, as in the public domain your bollocks could gain currency - at least here there's enough people who know what's what to smell ****e when they read it. I am sorry, I usually try and be quite civil where possible, but I find I cannot be with you Bigduke6. I shall refrain from any further responses as I think discussing issues where you make such bones arguements is futile.

Yes because advancing tanks alone up a highway against German AT guns and deployed defenders is really sound. They'd have been sitting ducks - and you can hardly rescue someone when you're on fire! You don't think the delay might realistically have been due to the tanker knowing they couldn't progress without infantry and arty support as a combined arms package was the only way to get up the highway - as they had found thus far?

So we do nothing do we; walk away and let the Iranians instigate a civil war and a sectarian bloodbath - is that about right - or did you have an alternative to doing nothing? Let me just follow your logic here - 1. We need less well trained soldiers 2. If they are not fluent in Arabic (glad you got the actual language right this time) then they serve no military or operation purpose in COIN operations in the border zone? 3. That the British belief is that one can actually "seal" the border; rather than make life more difficult for the insurgents and reduce the volume of weapons and support coming across the border? 4. That the decision to redeploy the QRH battlegroup was from / at the behest of the HM Government as some kind of PR stunt / propaganda ploy rather than an in-theatre operational decision? Wow. That really is something you got going on there Bigduke6. I suggest you ponder and study the following: 1. Training, doctrine and the utility of force - why better trained soldiers are more flexible. 2. The history of successful COIN campaigns - and the interrelationship of language vs. people skills, understanding local politics, history, customs and culture. 3. UK command system and decision making processes within the armed forces. 4. Logical argument - difficult when most of your premises are false.

Bigduke6 - You've set out a wonderful false logic where squaddies, NCOs and officers should be fluent in Arabic (not Farsi or Persian [sic]) and conducting ostensibly intelligence work, the interviewing of suspects and even interrogation. All of which are handled by "the intelligence community (skilled linguists)", the Iraqi police and the Iraqi security forces. Bigduke6 said - They don't speak the ancient language Persian, or even the Iranian language Farsi but Arabic - hence the name "The Marsh Arabs" - see Thesiger for some background reading. http://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/product/0140095128/202-8615798-4351818?v=glance&n=266239&s=gateway&v=glance Interpreter - One who translates orally from one language into another What if he works closely with American law enforcement officers and has an Interpreter for discussions that are more complex and questioning should he need it? You've constructed a false logic where ever squaddie must be an Oxford Don specialising in the linguistics of the Marsh Arab dialect. If you halt a party coming toward you, exchange pleasantries, ask the odd question and maybe search them if something seems up - how is this not possible with an Interpreter and some basic Arabic? Hmmm - could it possibly that the land rovers are actually more suitable to the terrain? God forbid someone actually do something that is not sinister with a subtext of some dastardly government sponsored ulterior motive. How can it be a publicity stunt and propaganda on the one hand and a covert "black ops" type affair on the other. It cannot be both? Your humbug and conspiracy theory-chippy outlook is I suppose your cross to bear.

Ah film myths - God bless Hollywood.

Bigduke6 opined - You do like that metaphor don't you. However, in the real world when people are being bombed and murdered the controlling power/force in that region is responsible for trying and prevent or at least reduce murder, sectarian violence and unlawful behaviour. The army's job is to support the forces of law in this endeavour. In order that political measures and institutions of a restorative nature can be developed and embedded one has to try and establish a level of security and peaceful normality that allows at least the edifice of civil society to take root. Without this politics, economic activity and normal civil social existence are impossible. The British Army are not conducting border control in the sense you mean of physically controlling the border region and crossing point. It is more of a stand-off role where surveillance and reconnaissance are key and detecting who the insurgent operatives are and where they support network lies. The overt presence is there to change the pattern of enemy modus operandi - which make life easier for the counter-insurgents. More than you think. Also they have access to local interpreters. On what basis do you make that judgement? Have you interviewed soldiers, NCOs and officers on the ground in Iraq? I doubt you are any more qualified to judge the British Army's understanding of local cultures in southern Iraq than a fish is to take the Pepsi challenge. It is something that the British Army takes very seriously in counter-insurgency operations. As this type of operation is the British Army's modus vivendi for the past half-century - it's what they have done day-in day-out all around the world as part of our de-colonisation, Northern Ireland and peace keeping duties . I doubt morale will suffer at all. If the locals are laughing at them then it will be a small minority. Most Iraqi's want peace and security. The army's job is not to arrest people - it is to ensure the police can carry out their duties. The Iraqi police are responsible for law and order. Fighting patrols yes, recce patrols and OPs no. As most of the work is reconnaissance the general rule would be for smaller patrols (2 - 4 vehicles ). If insurgents go "off road" then there are more efficient ways of tracking someone that bimbling around with hapless foot patrols. From 20,000 feet a loitering UAV can see almost everything below in open terrain. A fighting patrol or three or four sticks can be on top of a potential smuggler by helo in two shakes. The Bedouin are indeed a crucial element in this conundrum - and I would expect commanders to quickly establish this and make getting the local Bedou clans on board with various enticements and / or coercion explaining the financial / legal / practical pitfalls for them of supporting the insurgents. This is not a flight of fancy - gaining support of local tribes and indigenous peoples has been done so many times by the British in these types of situations that it is almost second nature. It is one of the keys to successful counter-insurgency. If the insurgents are then reliant on the Bedouin whose loyalties you have secured by whatever means - then you can start to get some actionable intel about who the players are and what is being moved about, and to where. Why can the operation do nothing about corrupt Iraqi border officials? Why can the operation not seek to secure the loyalties of the Bedou clans? Yeah you're right... Because trying to attain security and stop senseless killings of civilians, policemen and government officials is a waste of time and money in a counter-insurgency campaign. How stupid and naive of the British Army to want to try and weaken the insurgents and help establish the genuine rule of law. I'm sure the Chief of the Defence staff sleeps well at night knowing you razor sharp analysis is on the case. No. They inform. Otherwise, they become the insurgent's enemy and are less useful. This is unlikely if they don't make it obvious they are informing. I hope you don't mean that literally. Having internal-affairs type police unit and by upholding of the rule of law by which ALL are equal under the law means brutality in the literal or figurative sense is unnecessary. A successful policing policy where corruption exists is to bring in officers from other regions so a mix of local knowledge and external incorruptibility co-exist. Bigduke6, having vented your spleen at this cynical propaganda exercise by Tony Blair's government I hope the local command staff in Basra can take on board your advice and now adopt a policy of hunkering down, doing nothing, and blaming Bush and Blair for all the deaths in the region. You make judgements about things you do not know or fully understand such as British Army methodologies and practices in these circumstances and opine that it is all a propaganda stunt in a sneering, cynical and churlish tone that is not flattering you in any way. Possibly, if you were ask pointed questions such as "How do you think the British plan on controlling and securing the activities of the Bedouin?" rather than rubbishing the whole thing before it is even tested you will find yourself on sturdier intellectual ground.

My name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die My name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die My name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die My name is Inigo Montoya. You killed my father. Prepare to die

Will any Brit mods (WWII or any period) have a "fetch brew" command for hot beverage replen?

If you want sources see the PMCs - it's a small world...

Correct - it is not the frequency - but the nature of the IEDs that is the cause for concern and there is indeed a greater threat. However, the frequency of incidents has diminished. The Iranians have introduced sophisticated shaped-charge technology IEDs - and this is what the covert British Army surveillance teams are trying to curtail. Once these devices were first detected it was clear the local insurgents were receiving some pretty sophisticated help and the military intelligence, surveillance and covert ops teams were called into action against this threat. It is a direct result of this technology in bomb making that the threat level is higher. Quite so. If you recall a couple of British soldiers dressed as Arabs were compromised on an operation and detained by local police who made wild claims about them planting bombs or some such bollocks. They were held in prison as terrorists. I think the intervention of a British armoured battle group squadron to break them out of prison speaks volumes about the trust in local authorities and rule of law.

Awesome!

Yup - gunner and gun commander. Gunner - GPMG, barrel bag, 200 - 400 rounds of ball or 1-and-4, hessian sandbags (empty) Gun Commander - SA-80/personal weapon, tripod, C2 sight case, 200 - 400 rounds, binoculars, target sheet, indelible OHP pens or chiagraph pencil, hessian sandbags (empty), non-issue laser ranger finder, non-issue spare mounting pin. Three two-man gun teams per section, with a section commander (7 men), three gun sections per SF platoon (9 guns 21 men) plus HQ section (PC, PS, signaller, two runners). To give an example of ammo scales and consumption when firing SF - I've fired off approx 11,000 rds per gun in just over an hour in live fire exercise (manoeuvre not range) in Canada. A rate of about 140 - 160 rpm or 7 to 8 20-round burst per minute. In game terms of 30 or 40 turns that would mean each gun would need about 4200 rds (30 turns x 140rpm) at the bottom rough approximate and 6,400 rds (40 turns x 160 rpm) on the gun position to sustain fire throughout the game. If we take the German MG-42 six man squad as an example that would be the equivalent to 700 rounds per man at the bottom end or 1,066 per man at the top end. I don’t know if you have ever picked up 200 round ammo box for belted 7.62mm – but they are not light. In fact shifting a four-slab 800 rd pallet of these from your wagon onto the gun position is back-breaking work. So having the equivalent of five boxes of belted ammo broken down about your body, and then being expected to haul arse tactically is on the edge of practicable. Now if you have ever had to haul a mortar handbag (green plastic case that carries two 81mm mortar bombs) or worse two or three forward to drop off for the mortar platoon during an attack then the problems of the SF gunners pales into insignificance. I’d be seriously impressed with a six man team carrying 40 bombs forward – plus tube, bipod, base plate, sighting unit and other crap (AGLS, TLE, aiming lamps, survey post etc.) as it takes two men to just carry the mortar – that leaves four men 10 bombs each to carry. That doesn’t sound a lot until you add the first pair at 4.2kg or 9.25lbs each to your bergan (18.5lbs). So 10 bombs of HE would equate to 92.5lbs or 42kg of load per man – and that’s a **** load of a load. Hence my call for an injection of ammunition reality for heavy weapons.

Sandbagging and trenches - depends how long you've occupied the position - as the third phase of defence when you introduce overhead cover you'll use sandbags to hold the corrugated iron in place and damn the topsoil that covers it before replacing the turf and any camouflage. Also entry points and corners are often sandbagged to prevent erosion / damage to the ground from use. The Hessian sacking is obviously more resistant to the comings and goings of a soldier than raw earth (dirt I believe in America?) and therefore a simple way to ensure the structure retains some degree of habitability.

I really want to see ammo re-supply and access /proximity to supply source such as a vehicle covered in the game model. The timescales of the game are irrelevant as running low on ammo is an omnipresent problem when heavy contact is expected (as will be the case in most CMSF and CMx2 scenarios). For MOUT ops that I think may dominate CMSF this is a critical factor. He high rates of expenditure required to suppress enemy locations and allow FF movement mean you quickly run low on small arms ammo. Where your next slab of 5.56mm is coming from is very important – and it will make the Strykers much more important as military assets in game terms. It will also mean more realistic use of heavy weapons etc where ammunition scales and supply are key. The need for sustained-fire machine-guns (SF GPMGs/tripod mounted M240) and mortar teams to be near their wagons and bring ammo up to the firing point is one of the real life limitation that in CMx1 is modelled a little unrealistically. The ability in CMx1 of a gun team to haul vast amounts of ammunition about the place gives the commander too much flexibility and means there is a lack of consideration for deliberate moves forward of support weapons to establish overwatch. In reality the company and battalion command teams not only need to get their heavy weapons in place to support any advance – but they must also ensure the heavy weapon’s ammo comes forward too. Now with 25,000 rounds per gun as an SF GPMG gun team’s wartime ammo scale you can see that this cannot be carried forward by hand! I’m with Kip to a degree. I have always been uncomfortable with the accelerated combat times alluded to above and feel that certain key aspect of infantry combat were abstracted in CMx1 due to the hardware considerations at the time of development. There is no realistic modelling of heavy weapon ammunition requirements which means rifle companies and their heavy weapons move about the map with far too great a degree of flexibility as mortars and machine guns can be moved about willy-nilly. In reality you’d be thinking “I cannot put my guns there as I won’t be able to get their ammo wagons in close as there is no covered approach.” In CMx1 you just move them where you want them. Ammo weighs a **** load and is awkward to carry, and most SF GPMG gun teams (two men in British Army) would be hard pressed to carry more that 600-800 round plus their guns (GPMG and assault rifle), tripod, barrel bag and sight unit. In CMx1 there is no linkage to ammo dumps or ammo carrying vehicles which would make things much more realistic. Move the gun teams up on their own without their ammo wagons, or move them away from their static ammo dump and their ammo supply should drop dramatically. So where a mortar or MG team is in close proximity to their ammo vehicle/dump they have 120 ammo units, but if they become isolated or move away from the ammo source then their ammo available is only what they can carry – say just 20 ammo units. This is not meant as criticism of CMx1 in anyway as I fully understand many things had to be abstracted due to processing power. I also fully understand that Charles maybe is already operating at the bounds of the processing envelope as it stands now without these additional details. I merely ask that it be considered for later CMx2 releases as the effects of Moore’s law kick in.

LongLeftFlank – although ostensibly analogous, the model of the Texan-Mexico border and Iran-Iraq is not quite apt. The difference in asset capabilities deployed is considerable; if we think about the U.S.’s southern border we know Federal and State funding and resources are low given the magnitude of the task. We also know that the U.S. government only really takes a special interest where serious cross-border criminality occurs. Where the activity is simple economic migration the INS, Texas Rangers and border patrols merely keep a lid on things and stop flagrant abuses of border controls. Now in Iraq we have a counter-terrorism / counter-insurgency campaign where the full resources and assets of the military can be deployed to stop state-sponsored infiltration and proxy support of Shiite insurgents. We know that UK special forces have been conducting a COIN operation against Iranian intelligence sponsored infiltration and weapon supply for some time now, and that incidents of IEDs and ambushes in the Shiite areas has dropped dramatically in the past 12 months – I think there is in all likelihood a cause and effect linkage here. Military forces conducting this type of operation have technological resources to support them that US border police could only dream of such as permanent geostationary loiter sorties by UAVs assets, ground based radar and thermal detections systems, radio / telecoms intercept and ELINT with chatter pattern automation and filtering, covert Ops and special forces operators, trained reconnaissance personnel, intelligence info, covert tactical patrolling, mobile OPs, snap VCPs and traffic control, ability to hold suspects and conduct interrogation / debriefing without convoluted legal constraints face by ATF/FBI etc. So in many ways the forces deployed on the Iran-Iraq border have much more capability and resources than one would find deployed on the U.S.-Mexican border. I think this will make a telling difference. With regard to South-East Asia and cross border infiltration – the nature of the terrain in Iraq makes life that much more easy to operate counter infiltration missions and surveillance – and since 1970s many sensor and surveillance technologies make it much more difficult to avoid detection, especially in open desert, Hamada and scrubland. There is little in the way to prevent Predator and Global Hawk type UAVs spotting a knat's bollocks moving out there in the border region - and that just one type of surveillance asset/platform. The combined mix of technologies and assets deployed make infiltration much less straightforward for the Iranian sponsored insurgents. Don’t know if many of you know about the “Claret” operations on the Borneo-Indonesian border back during the insurgency but it serves as a good example of how to conduct counter insurgency and infiltration campaigns – albeit at a very small scale compared to either Vietnam or Iraq today. Wubbits said – Remember most British Army infantry battalions have done numerous tours in Ulster (Northern Ireland), and often spent their entire time conducting border surveillance and counter infiltration operations that would require covert OPs and patrolling so this type of operation in Iraq will pose no great change of mindset or thinking. The only major training required will be in camouflage and concealment and fieldcraft required for operating in a desert type environment for covert patrolling and operations. I don’t wish to belittle this requirement, but it is one of the least challenging if your soldiers’ minds are already cued up for counter infiltration and surveillance missions. Hopefully they'll get their heads round desert camo and operating requirement quite quickly - I know most battalions have many officers and NCOs who have trained in places like Oman and the Gulf States before, and will also have got pretty clued up just being deplyed in Iraq, so it should be a "no dramas" implementation.

Smaller FOBs are unsuitable in combat areas as they lack the ability to survive genuine hostile intent. They are ideal in peaceable regions where you want to get a presence on the ground and meet and greet the people, support the civilian authorities and police in their work, shielding them as much as possible from terrorism. It possible to do this - but is it prudent in all regions and circumstances? They only really work well where the threat level is lower. The problem with a small base/outpost in hostile areas is that they present the enemy or insurgents with a target they can actually attack and destroy. This temptation often has inevitable consequences such as VBIEDs and suicide bombers conducting point attacks, improvised mortar attacks, sniping and sometimes deliberate assault/overrun. These smaller bases have little to offer in return other than getting in reinforcements - which kind of defeats their purpose. The problems of platoon strength bases are - limited perimeter limited firepower limited flexibility limited foot patrols limited vehicle patrols limited operational endurance These bases are fine for policing actions, but are vulnerable in belligerent regions. It's been seen time and again in colonial and decolonisation conflicts - some hapless base / outpost /police station gets isolated or overrun by the locals before the cavalry can arrive to rescue them. The QRF often have to be PDQ.