dgaad

Offhand, If I recall the divisional numbers correctly, I believe that in the roughly eight weeks between D-day and the Cobra breakout, the toothless old men faced by the Allied Expeditionary Force included the doddering octagenarians of: Five SS Panzer divisions (1st, 2nd, 9th, 10th, 12th) Three Wehrmacht Panzer divisons (2nd, 21st, and the elite Panzer Lehr) One SS Panzergrenadier division (17th) Two elite parachute divisons (3rd, 5th) Four front-line infantry divisions (91st, 352nd, 353rd, 77th) All of whom surrendered without firing a shot when the Allies offered them free dentures and afternoon naps. </font>

Relative Strength of Air Forces 10 May 1940, deployed for French Campaign German Fighters : 1016 Bombers : 1562 Other (Recon, etc) : 1056 French Fighters : ~ 764 Bombers : 143 Other : 792 British : All aircraft deployed for French Campaign : 500 Belgium / Holland All aircraft deployed for French Campaign : 160 Totals German aircraft : 3634 French/Brit/Allied : 2613 Comments : Fighter strength was approximately equal. Bomber strength was in favor of the Luftwaffe by a ratio of more than 4 to 1. [ October 15, 2002, 05:00 PM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

Hubert has spoken. Let me recommend that for civility's sake, as well as for accuracy, that we would all do best to remember that defeat of Nazi Germany was an effort that involved Russia and the Allies both, and that we owe the protection of our way of life to millions of people in Russia AND millions of people in the Western countries. We should even to this day remember that the collaboration of West and East was a mark of hope for all humanity, not division and oppression.

Awakening : Tactics II, around 1973, followed closely by Third Reich (1974) and Gettysburg. Digital Awakening : "Civilization", 1991 Side notes : 1. Grandfather, US merchant marine 1943-1945. Uncle #1 at Attu, 1943 and Bulge, 1944 (yes he was shipped from Alaska to Europe!), Uncle #2 at the Bulge 1944 (they never saw each other). 2. Why do large wargames on the floor or on beds look like litter boxes to cats? My copy of SPI's War in Europe was the site of several evacuations of my cat's bladder and bowels during a weekend getaway. War in Europe : victory went to the Giant Cat after the Bowel Movement Offensive of 1940 destroyed most French and German divisions in France. [ October 15, 2002, 04:40 PM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

Oil was THE strategic resource of the war, and remains the single most important natural resource today, aside from oxygen. There simply isn't any comparison to any other resource. No major strategic military decsions were made about iron ore availability, etc. Even in Grand Strategic games, Oil is usually factored in as a delimeter in some way, even if its abstracted. The game in its current form is totally unrealistic on this point. Unlimited numbers of air fleets and mobile units can be produced and used regardless of the amount of oil, or even resources, the player has. I don't care what solution is implemented, and tend to agree that mine might be too complex. But something must be done here. The problem with bombing right now is that you have an equal probability of inflicting a few MPP casualties or sustaining 20-60 MPPs in casualties. This is all mucked up. In the game right now there is absolutely no sense in doing any strategic bombing at all. I like the idea of a straight abstraction with no units involved. This has also bugged me, but I was aiming for the really large issues in this post. Thanks for your intelligent comments, though.

I have a degree in History and Education from the University of Michigan (1988). Maybe you've heard of it. I also have a Law degree from McGeorge School of Law (1992). I'm guessing you have a degree in Agitation from Patrice Lumummba University. [ October 15, 2002, 04:09 PM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

Where is the rest of your AAR CvM, which you promised LAST WEEK.

I also make a special award of the "DEFENDER OF LOGIC AGAINST HOPELESS ODDS" prize to . . . . [drumroll] Jeff Heidman.

What the HELL :eek: is that? I apologize in advance for my harshness and vulgarity but what kind of BS Bolshevik Propaganda have you been reading?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!?!? . . . Without the American 8th airforce, German industry wouldnt have been brought down. Without Our ships the UBoats wouldve brought england to its knees. Without the American Expeditionary force, the invasion of Europe wouldnt have been possible. In the Pacific: Without our defense of Bataan and Corregidor, the Japs wouldve been in India by May 1942, knocking on the doorstep of English Persia, and the Caucases. America, despite all of her flaws, both in the past, and now, is the last bit of hope, the first and last line of defense against tyranny, oppresion, and persecution, that this pathetic world we live in posesses. </font>

I award THIS post the "MOST ACCURATE POST IN THIS THREAD" prize.

You are a riot. Jeff "Heidberg"</font>

A few points : 1. The Impact of Lend Lease is usually easily overlooked by amateurs. Its true that the Allies sent enormous amounts of weaponry, such as the tanks and planes mentioned by Jeff. Its equally true that many of these were a poor fit into Soviet operational doctrine, and a substantial portion remained unused. The main effects of Lend Lease to the Soviets boil down to three main advantages : a) The number of trucks and jeeps sent, together with massive numbers of tires (Soviet built tires were notoriously poorly constructed and had a tendency to blowout after a few hundred miles) gave the entire Soviet war machine a mobility which in very short order exceeded the mobility of the Wehrmacht. The Soviets used the Allied vehicles in their best units, and in their forward logistical systems; the effect of this added mobility is easy to see by looking at the amount of territory Soviet advances gained and sustained (in space and time). Food - Food required an enormous number of people to produce in the Soviet Union, particularly after the Germans overran the Black Earth portions of the Ukraine. Allied food shipments literally kept the Russian population from starving, and reduced the manpower they had to divert to food production, thus freeing up even more manpower for the Rodina. c) Focus - The bulk of Allied shipments to Russia were not weaponry, but the various and sundry supplies needed to sustain a war effort. Because of this, a signficant amount of Soviet manpower was freed up from industrial labor to work in direct war industries producing planes and tanks, and other industries producing other items were significantly reduced or shut down entirely. If Lend Lease, according to some, was so insignificant, why did Stalin himself say otherwise? 2. Combat Losses and Import of Fronts Its very true that about 80% of German *GROUND* combat power was tied up on the Eastern Front. However, this is not the end of the story. The vast bulk of the Luftwaffe was, by 1943, tied up in Germany defending against the Strategic Bombing Campaign. Moreover, the persistent threat of Allied invasion required German divisions to guard against. Had the Western Front been non existent and Germany been able to fully concentrate all her industrial and military resources into defeat of the Soviet Union, it is in my opinion unlikely the Soviet Union would have survived in form, and this was the key fact and indeed the point of the war from the perspective of the Germans, the Soviets (of course) and to some extent the British and US(see below). 3. The Point of the War Hitler and Germany's strategy, from the time the Nazis came to power, was to divide all potential enemies from each other diplomatically, economically, and militarily. In the first 2 years of the war, this strategy is very obvious. At each turn in the road, first against Poland, then against Scandanavia, then against France, and finally against the Soviet Union, Germany brought overwhelming combat power to bear against a single bloc of enemies, while the other blocs were essentially powerless or prevented by "agreements" from assisting or interfering. These German successes came to a halt, never to be repeated, once the Soviets successfully defeated the Germans in their counter-offensive of 1941 (edit : which offensive, I might add, only AFTER the Soviets were able to pull the Siberian divisions to the European theater, something which was only possible because Japan attacked guess who?). In strategic terms, the Soviets remained in the war and were likely to remain belligerent for at least the next 6 months, and by this time now the US had joined the other, isolated, bloc. It was evident to everyone in early 1942 that the key point of the war was now the fate of the Soviet Union. The Allies realized that it was in the first place possible for the Germans to knock the Soviets out of the war in 1942, and they also realized if this happened there would be serious consequences to the Western powers. It could mean a German dominated Europe for at least the next few generations, or at worst it could mean in the long run a buildup of German power to the extent that direct threats to Britain, and even the United States, would also be possible. The Success of the Allies, and of the Soviet Union, was remaining allied to each other, staying committed to the defeat of Germany, and doing their absolute best to insure they helped each other to the extent of their military and economic capability to defeat Germany. All strategic level planning in the Allied camp revolved around the key question of keeping the Grand Alliance together, and the execution of those plans succeeded. All Revisionism aside, lets take comfort in that : it was indeed a joint effort, and our world is what it is today because of that vision and the efforts of millions of people in both the West and the East to defeat the Nazis. World War Two was not about "who" would rule the world, but HOW it was to be ruled. 4. A Challenge to the Naysayers I would like you to research and quote the following : a ) The total amount of US tank, plane and divisional formation production during the war. b ) The total amount of supplies, by major type and including non-military supplies such as food, sent to the Soviet Union by the Allies during the war. c ) The number of German divisions committed to the various fronts by year as follows : 1941 : Eastern Front, France and the West, the Mediterranean. 1942 : Eastern Front, France and the West (including garrisons in Benelux and Norway), the Mediterranean. 1943 : Eastern Front, France and the West (including garrisons in Benelux and Norway), the Mediterranean. 1944 : Eastern Front, France and the West (including garrison in Norway), the Mediterranean. 1945 : Eastern Front, France and the West (including garrison in Norway), the Mediterranean. d ) The total number of strategic bombers produced and used for Strategic bombing by the Allied powers, as compared to the total number of similar bombers produced by the Soviet Union and used similarly. e ) the total number of men in US and British military forces in each of 1943, 1944, and 1945, as compared to the total number of men in Soviet forces in each of those years. f ) the total number of casualties inflicted on Germany, and prisoners collected, by the Allied Powers in each of 1943, 44 and 45 as compared to Soviet numbers in the same categories. Until you do this, persistence in denigrating the total Allied effort in Europe will fall on deaf ears. [ October 15, 2002, 04:05 PM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

In 1944 there was a Fuehrer Conference in which US production was discussed. An officer of the Wehrmacht had been in charge of an office studying Allied economics and war production. Since we have a record of this conference and the document presented, we now know that these figures were almost completely accurate. For example, the report stated that in 1943, the United States, alone, produced 40,000 aircraft. This number exceeded the total of all German aircraft production since Hitler came to power ten years earlier in 1933. By the end of the presentation, most of the circle of the Fuehrer's advisors were alternating between furtive looks at the Fuehrer and outright laughter. It was the opinion of the Fuehrer and his ruling circle that this particular Wehrmacht officer had gone insane or had fallen victim to Allied propaganda. The officer who made the presentation was severely disciplined. His figures were accurate, the Germans simply could not concieve that they were. [ October 15, 2002, 06:19 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

This post is directed at offering suggestions for SC that are in keeping with the scale and general design. The suggestions are largely directed at adding features that would more accurately represent the grand strategic military and economic issues. 1. Looting (change) Current Function : Upon conquest of a nation, the conquerer is granted MPPs in the form of loot, based on the MPPs typically generated by the vanquished. While not immediately clear what the forumula is, it seems to be roughly equivalent to 7 or 8 turns of production or about 1.5 years. Proposed function : Looting should be a much lower value, perhaps the equivalent of 3 months production. History : Looting did in fact occur. Poland, France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Norway all suffered from varying degrees of it, not to mention Russia. In game terms we would be interested primarily in looting that resulted in enhanced military production capability for the looter. France in particular provides an illustrative example. The Germans captured thousands of French tanks, trucks, and airplanes, many small arms, etc., and incorporated them into their forces rather effectively. Six Char B1bis tanks, for example, served on the Russian Front(!), while approximately 100 Hotchkiss armored hulls delivered to France from the United States were converted to Self-Propelled Artillery. The vast majority of equipment remained in France and wound up being of relatively little use. The tiny Renault tank was used as a gun puller for example. However, much of this loot cost a great deal of time, money and training to use effectively, and occurred over time. In SC, it happens immediately, and the conquest of Benelux and France gives the Axis player a gigantic one-time infusion of MPPs (on the order of about 1300, enough for 3 airfleets and some rebuilding) which they use to build up research and / or a large airfleet and army to crush Russia. IMHO this is the main reason that 80% of games typically result in Axis victories. The main problem with this reward is its size and the fact that it comes all at once. The reality was far less appealing for the Germans. Nearly all of the captured AFVs had to be reconverted in German factories, and it took years to do this. The infantry carriers and trucks were quite useful to the Germans initially, but as the war went on they lacked the gasoline to use them. The main economic advantage to Germany for the capture of France was the ability to continue to provide consumer goods in Germany (from French factories) while German industry continued gearing for war. The game benefit in terms of loot is far too rewarding, too immediate, and is not justified from my understanding of the economics actually involved at the time. 2. Oil Current Function : None, there is no Oil resource in the game currently. Proposed Function : There are a host of ways to incorporate this single most vital resource to WW2. an example scheme ) limit the total number of air fleets and panzer units to the total number of "oil points" currently owned. Note : you would have to adjust allied and soviet oil points to reflect off map access to oil. If a player has produced more of these units than he has oil points (because he has lost some) he can produce no new ones until the numbers are rectified (he can still replenish existing ones). History : Oil was *the* critical resource of the war. Several major strategic decisions made by the belligerants during the war were due to oil considerations including but not limited to : a) The entire Japanese decision to go to war was based on their perceived shortage of oil due to the US embargo. The Caucasus campaign. c) The Egyptian / North African campaign (both Allied and German). d) The Strategic Bombing Campaign targetted oil refineries and synthetic petrol factories with what I am sure was a frequency uncomfortable for the Germans. e) The Lake Balaton Offensive f) The Russian invasion of Rumania in 1944 g) The German Crimean Campaign of 1941/42 - and the order to hold the Crimea during 1943 and 44 (to protect the Rumanian oil fields from bombing attack). In essence, its difficult to find a single year, or even a single major strategic offensive, which was not in some way connected to oil. In SC under the current scheme the German player can build and use without restriction an unlimited number of air fleets and mobile units, and most German players do build quite a few, which would have impossible historically. 3. Allied Sea Transport to Middle East Current Function - there is no way to transport units "round the Horn". Units sent to Egypt must do so by the traditional transport method through the Med, which quickly becomes impossible once the Italian Navy and axis airfleets are deployed. Proposed Function - Allow some kind of operational or strategic movement from Britain or any Allied port in Britain to Egypt. Create a port city at the location of the Suez. It should take either an additional turn or two, additional MPPs, or both. History : It has been estimated that fully 90% of all men, supplies and equipment arrived in the middle east during the war (after June 1941) by strategic movement either by ship from points south of the Suez, or via the Tadakori Air Route linking the US with Brazil, Nigeria, Chad, and ultimately Egypt. The ability of the allies to ferry supplies to this area was the major reason the middle east was successfully defended. The way the game currently functions, there is almost no action whatsoever in this area because for the Allies its too risky to get troops there, and for the Germans they gain little or nothing by its capture (see the "Oil" point, above). 4. The Battle of the Atlantic Current Function : Subs are units, units can't stack, therefore the sub must occupy a hex, sub is easily and almost always detected by moving allied units in the first few turns, subs are easily destroyed. Essentially, subs are just another naval unit which can be easily detected and destroyed. Proposed Function : Subs should be a ghost unit. Detection based on proximity of allied ships to subs, and the relative detection / evasion technology. Detection results in automatic movement to contact for nearest allied ship at option of player, that player gets a single opportunity to combat the sub. If the sub evades that attack it resumes ghost status. If it does not evade that attack, it suffers the appropriate damage and resumes ghost status. Net effect : it would be almost impossible to destroy a sub unit (which actually represents about 25 subs) with a single detection. It would take several detections over time. Idea : instead of "ghosting" the sub (or a lend lease fleet, see below) perhaps have a special hex or group of hexes which represent commitment of the unit to its specialized mission (convoy raiding for subs, convoy protection for ship units, or lend lease convoys for MPP transfers). While in that special "box" different routines are implemented to reflect the specialized nature of that type of operation. For example, the German player moves his sub to the group of six hexes representing committment to convoy attack. The Allied player moves one or more ship units into the same group of hexes. This group of hexes or a "box" is symbolic, in reality the subs or ships are ranging all over the Atlantic on their mission. At the end of the turn, a special phase occurs where sub detection and damage are calculated and then graphically displayed in a manner similar to a sea battle. The player has no control once they are committed to the box, except that during his movement phase he can choose to move units OUT of the box, or move additional units into it, but the combat and results happen automatically along the lines mentioned in the proposal. A "detection" event would be symbolic of those periods during the Battle of the Atlantic where the German Naval code was broken, and many subs were lost in short periods of time. The special "box" would be some distance out from european ports, so the German would still have to move subs normally to and from that box, and they could be interdicted during that movement. This would force the German player to protect his ports with air units, as they did historically, and when that air protection does not exist or fails, the moving German subs could be hit by air power (again, just exactly like the real situation was strategically and operationally) as the game handles it now. History : I don't think I need to talk about how important this aspect of history was, do I? Churchill rated it as the single greatest threat to England's survival in the war, bar none. A few notes : if the proposed scheme is implemented, some testing and adjusting might be needed as to their economic effect for balance. 5. Strategic Bombing Current Function : "Bomber" units can target resources and cities, but these hexes have devastating intrinsic defenses. A sucessful hit usually causes 1-3 MPPs in damage, but a single hit to the bomber causes 20 MPPs in damage. Proposed Function : Since the hexes repair themselves rather quickly, the hits to the hexes should be triple or quadruple what they are now: that is, the hit to the hex should be 4 times what it currently is. This would generally balance the MPP cost / benefit to more historical levels. Note : the net effect of this scheme would be that IF the allies (or the Russians) invested HUGE amounts of money into researching range for fighters and bombers and IF the allies expended enormous amounts of money on building bombers fleets, it would then be possible to target most industrial / MPP targets in France, Germany and Norway on a rotating basis and severely hamper the German war economy. with 6 bomber fleets and escorting fighters, about 1/5th of the MPP capacity of the Axis could be targetted every turn or every other turn. With the increased damage levels, this would in effect reduce the German MPP output by about 8-15%. Sound familiar? That's because that's exactly the historical sequence that occurred. History : The Strategic Bombing Campaign has been the source of great debate, and I don't want to start a new one. Let me just say this : the great mis-conception about the SB Campaign was that it was conducted to destroy factories, that it failed to destroy enough factories, and that therefore it was a failure. The truth is, as I have researched it, is that while the SB campaign DID cause substantial damage to industry, that was not its main effect. The Germans, particularly under Speer, were able to counteract the loss of industrial infrastructure by distributing the means of production more widely, and moving critical tools underground. Rather, the main effect on the economy of Germany was the hit to the Transportation industry. Industrial targets were usually the locus of transportation nets of various kinds, mainly rail and river. These were devastated by the raids, and actually had a greater impact on the war economy than destruction of the means of production itself. Often entire railyards river channels and ports were completely destroyed, and rebuilt rapidly but with greatly reduced capacity. Factories churned out military goods or parts, but they could not be moved rapidly enough to meet demand. This is why production figures for tanks, for example, remain high until about November 44, but the reality was that it became extremely costly and difficult to move those completed tanks to training centers and the front. Where a single train carrying tanks could be run, it was usually by then sucking up a good portion of transport capability for other things like airplane parts or gasoline, because most of the other transport capacity had been destroyed. These observations are borne out in numerous historical sources. As the game currently stands, the Allies can never develop anything like a bombing campaign of any import at all. 6. Lend-Lease Current Function : there is no way to transfer MPPs from one faction to another. Proposed Function : Allow the transfer of MPPs from the Allied to the Soviet Faction by some means. No more than 10% of MPPs in the sending faction's "pool" (that is what they have sitting around) in any one turn. Transport requires one naval unit (which then becomes non functional and ghosted for the next two turns). There is an additional MPP surcharge cost to the sending player (10% of the total MPPs sent that turn). The Axis cannot interefere with this movement of resources. History : Again, the effect of the Lend-Lease program was and is a source of great debate. What is not in debate, however is the amount of resources sent to Russia. It is a staggering number. While the Russians did receive some tanks and airplanes, they were not suited to Russian operational doctrine and were of limited utility. What did matter was everything else sent. Thousands upon thousands of trucks, thousands of tons of medical supplies, bedding, tires, rations, specialized lubricants, even several million rifles, manufactured in Vermont, were sent, along with countless other items. Many modern historians credit the generally increasing mobility of Soviet armies during the war to the presence of the US 2 1/2 ton truck, which effectively gave the Russian infantry an unprecedented (for Russians, anyway) mobility. Increasing morale, resiliance and combat power were largely due to improving Russian experience levels and tactical doctrine, but the effect of plentiful sundry supplies, particularly the morale effect of combat medical products, can't be underestimated either. Mainly, though, the US and British support efforts enabled the Soviet industry to concentrate on their main items of war. Without Lend-Lease, more and more of Soviet industry would have been tied up producing the various and sundry items of war needed, as well as reduced manpower pools due to the need to keep minimal food stocks growing and on hand for the population. Some may take issue with the notion that the Axis cannot interfere with these shipments. The reason I propose it this way is because of the game scale. 7 out of every 8 ships sent in total via Murmansk convoys made it safely. Almost 100% of supplies sent via the Persian Lend Lease route made it to Russia without incident. The facts are that despite significant effort on the part of the Germans to stop these shipments, more than 95% of the supplies sent made it through. This carries the German interdiction efforts into the realm of statistical insignificance. ===== Well, that's it for now. Intelligent comments from players appreciated. Hubert is listening I hope. I'm sure there are other suggestions which are both critical to the game's success and possible to implement in the current framework. As I think of more, I will post them here in THIS post -- which will be edited. So, recheck this top post for changes and edits. Hubert : I don't flatter myself to think that any of these ideas are possible, much less acceptable to your vision of the game. I've been in the IT development world and I know suggestions from the outside are usually treated with contempt, so I understand your situation. You are probably very busy with TCP/IP conn and other matters. However, please give them more than cursory consideration with a view towards a significant patch down the road. [ October 15, 2002, 06:50 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

I think most historians would agree that modern mass media lacks true analysis, and that in terms of reliability it is probably less reliable than the Anglo-Saxon Chronicles. I also think that if we can read the stories of the winners, and the losers, and the non-participants, we may approximate the truth, and that is the best we can do. [ October 15, 2002, 03:42 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

While I agree with the larger point that human flaws lead to misperception, I disagree with the underlying philosophy that all stories are equally truthful, and would even more strongly disagree that serious historical research is not possible because it is impossible to find out what really happened and when. Modern historical figures, in particular, had staffs and keep voluminous records on their day-to-day activities. We have transcripts of every "Fuehrer Conference" ever held during the war, except for the one at Wannsee. And so on, and so forth. Unlike average people struggling with the heavy challenges to everyday existence, historical figures have a responsibility to, and in many cases do, document events, thoughts, decisions, and rationale. Organizations do the same thing, particularly military ones.

Every US divisions, once you count non-divisional assets, was roughly three times the size of an equivalent Soviet division. For example, every single US Infantry division ahd, as a matter of course, more tanks attached to it than a German Panzer division. Just one example. The Soviets at no point ever had 500 divisions in the war, or anywhere close to it. They never fielded a Navy to speak of, and every modern historian understands tha massive impact lend-leas had on the Soviet economy. I suggest you go read some actual hisotry, instead of Soviet Cold War propoganda. Jeff Heidman</font>

I caution people not to consider EB's posting as any kind of serious expostion of history of economics. The way you can tell is by his persistent chest beating statemetns like "absolutely true" or "just silly" "we know this to be a fact" and other statements like this. No one who has studied history at a university would ever present history like this. Stalin was a paranoid megalomaniac who killed about 20 million people. There are MILLIONS of families in Russia that would take issue with the idea that his domestic policies were completely sane. There are tens of millions of souls who, if they could speak, would tell of years of untold paranoic horror under his regime.

Russ : Truly a relief to see a serious and objective reply with which I agree wholeheartedly. The losses to the Luftwaffe are not broken down by source, but one can add up the kills and probables from FAF air to air action, and get a sense of a group of airmen struggling hopelessly against great odds, who did the best they could and who did make serious contributions to the course of the war, although they probably didn't know it at the time. docd : "absolutely wrong" ? The book on Kesselring is a biography of the man written by Kenneth Macksay, who interviewed Kesselring numerous times himself. I quoted one of the GERMAN Luftflotte commanders, not a French one. Its a mistake to "believe" one book over another in serious historical analyses, as you say "I believe my book because (whatever)". You need to expand your sources and base your opinions on objective assessment of those sources. I cannot tell you the number of times I have encountered bias and completely wrong understandings of events, bias that I believe comes from lack of serious study, propaganda, cultural biases, and movies. Let me list for you some facts that popular misconceptions have completely wrong : 1. "The Polish charged German tanks" - completely fabricated by Josef Goebbels. An action took place involving Polish lancers which destroyed two German infantry battalions, which Lancers promptly withdrew upon the appearence of Wehrmacht reconnaissance vehicles. The next day, Italian journalists were invited to the dressed up site, and took photographs of the recon vehicles surrounded by the (now moved) Lancer corpses. 2. "The Germans had the best tanks". Also completely wrong. A German Wehrmacht study conducted immediately after the French Campaign, in 1940, proclaimed the French Somua S-35 as the best tank of the campaign in the West. It was faster than every German tank except the Pz II, had much more armor, and a devastating 47mm main gun which could kill any German tank then in existence. There are dozens of other examples, the idea that the French airforce had no influence on the war and was wiped out without a fight being just one of them.

I stand by my comment. You said : "the French Air Force wasn't worth a damn". The FAF caused substantial numbers of damaged and destroyed Luftwaffe aircraft during the French campaign. The numbers of planes lost or in need of repair was so great, that the Germans could not start the air attack on Great Britain in earnest for at least 6 weeks after the bulk of fighting was finished in France (around June 14). This, in turn, affected the ability of the Luftwaffe to conduct a successful air campaign against Britain. In sum, the FAF contributed to the victory against the Luftwaffe in the Battle of Britain, in no small way. Your assessment of the FAF contravenes the comments of many historians and analysts, to say nothing of the actual participants in that campaign (see "Kesselring - Master German Strategist of the War", by Kenneth Macksay). [ October 14, 2002, 03:22 PM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

What what what? You have me confused with the thread starter.

Just because a military force is defeated does not mean that it was of little consequence or no effect. Indeed in military terms the effects of minor actions can sometimes be completely disproportionate. Victors are often defeated by their own assumptions and actions following their victory. As the Romans said : "Sic Transit Gloria". [ October 14, 2002, 05:53 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

As to the basic point made by the thread starter, each air fleet probably represents about 1000 planes, as they appear to roughly correspond to the Luftflotte sized unit. As such, the ratio of German to French planes is about right. [ October 14, 2002, 05:51 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

How trite. The FAF had 740 effective modern fighters and 140 effective bombers in May 1940, including the Dewoitine 520 which many aeronautical analysts contend was better than the Me109. The Germans, on the other hand, had 4500 aircraft of all types, including about 1200 fighters. Some 500 RAF planes participated, mostly during the Dunkirk evacuation. A total of 853 Luftwaffe planes were destroyed in the campaign. Feld Marshal Kesselring wrote that after only 3 weeks of combat starting on May 13, 1940, most Luftwaffe units were at 50 to 70 percent below effective strength. This contributed, in part, to their inability to destroy the RAF in the Battle of Britain. Because France surrendered, Luftwaffe pilots who bailed out were mostly recovered; the same would definately NOT be true in the coming Battle of Britain. However, the months necessary to replace and repair machines proved critical. The Curtiss-Hawk were the most significant segment of the French fighter force and were in action from almost the first day that the war began in Europe. On September 8, 1939, the Groupe de Chasse II/4, operating Hawk 75As succeeded in destroying two Messerschmitt Bf 109Es, the first Allied aerial victories of World War 2. However, during the invasion of France in May of 1940, the Hawks were generally outmatched by the Messerschmitt Bf 109E. The Hawk 75A served with Armee de l'Air Groupes de Chasse III/2, I/4, II/4, I/5 and II/5, these units claiming 230 confirmed kills and 80 "probables", as against losses totaling only 29 aircraft destroyed in aerial combat. Although these figures are probably over-optimistic, it seems likely that the French Hawks gave better than they got. The Hawk 75A was neither as fast nor as well-armed as the Messerschmitt Bf 109E, but it was more maneuverable and could take more punishment. The leading French ace of 1939/40 was Lt Marin La Meslee, who scored 20 "kills" while flying the Hawk. Read "Hunter in the Sky" by Jean Marie Accart (French fighter pilot who personally shot down 11 German bombers) "The Forgotton Air Force : French Air Doctrine in the 1930s" by Lt. Col. Anthony Christopher Cain (USAF). Here is a link to a host of books on the FAF during WW2. http://www.au.af.mil/au/aul/bibs/france/france.htm I wouldn't exactly call the FAF a non-factor, and neither did Kesselring. [ October 14, 2002, 07:03 AM: Message edited by: dgaad ]

Statements like this are indicative of a gap in knowledge.