Keke

Wait a minute! The position from which the Finnish forces would not retreat was reached 21st of June, and the ceasefire was signed 4-5th of September. Do you understand my point? Haven´t you heard about the battle of Tali-Ihantala, the largest battle in Scandinavian war history Some facts about the battle of Tali-Ihantala (22.6.-4.7.1944). The battlefield comprises 100 sq. km. The Finnish defender had 31 battalions and the Soviet aggressor at least 108 battalions. (50 000 men against 150 000) At the focal point the five Finnish divisions were fighting against 12 Soviet divisions. So the battle was larger than that of El Alamein, for example. [ May 10, 2002, 05:10 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

Nice to see more expertise about the Continuation War, but there was one mistake in your writing. The German defensive doctrine didn´t include retaking of the first defensive line. German High Command couldn´t care less about this, but the doctrine, based on eastern front experiences, was represented to the Finnish commanders during the war. What happened was that the Finnish Army didn´t take it seriously either! So the result was that the delaying lines at Karelian Isthmus in 1944 were unprepared, and all the plans were based on the hitlerian principle that the first line of defense should be kept at all cost. This was evidenced by the futile counterattacks made by Finnish forces during the first days of Soviet offensive (4th Strategic). After the collapse of the first line became evident, the Finnish Army had to improvise 100km of delaying action before the VKT-line, which was now ordered to be the main defensive line. The succesful improvisation of this resulted in textbook adaption of the original German doctrine: 100km of delaying action before the main defensive line. And it was this improvisation where the Finnish Army distinguished itself.

I second that. I have said this in some other forum before, but I have always wondered, why is it so hard for some people to accept the fact, that Hitler´s meddling with operative decision making caused major catastrophes for the German Army. Stalin did the same thing for the Red Army, but Soviet Union was a superpower, and in fact the only country which could survive after such catastrophes. Germany couldn´t and didn´t.

Who said that German operational-strategic planning was superior to Soviets? It was the weakest link in the German war machine!!! Added: Main stress on the word strategic. [ May 10, 2002, 11:25 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

Yes, it was quite disgraceful how stalinist inquisition treated fe the most competent partisan leaders who distinguished themselves during operation Bagration.

That´s right. It´s quite amusing to observe how these threads `mutate´ after the original subject. Back to the Soviet´s implementation of a doctrine... Didn´t this `trial and error´-method of training officer staff began already in 1939? Fe Chuikov was a veteran from the 4 months long Winter War against Finland.

Antony Beevor presented these not so exact numbers (Stalingrad, p 428):

That is a very good question. Maybe Fionn can answer it. Btw, implementation of various doctrines are naturally more important than the actual doctrines. Human wave attacks were used in so many occasions that one could easily thought them as a to be a significant part of the Soviet doctrine. Fe a US general (sorry, don´t remember the details) asked a Soviet general just after the war, how Russians delt with German minefields, because they caused so many problems on the western front. The Russian general answered that after three wave of infantry attacks there were not so many mines left anymore. Here´s one, not so good example of Soviets use of manpower. During the heavy fighting at Karelian Isthmus on June-July 1944 Russians tried to outmaneuvre Finnish defensive lines by landing operations at Bay of Viipuri. Before this the numerous small islands of that bay had to be cleared from Finnish troops. One rocky islet which had no military use whatsoever was invaded by a Russian platoon. Finnish artillery FO noticed this on the other side of the bay and ordered a mortar barrage to hit them, because he knew the Russians would be annihilated without any cover from mortar shells. And so happened. After a while came another platoon with motorboats to the same islet. The Finnish FO ordered another barrage with the same results. Much to amazement of the FO there came yet another platoon to that same islet and were blown away. After that some Russian officer must have realized that the invasion of the islet was a futile thing, because it was not invaded for the fourth time. I want to ask how essential part of the Soviet doctrine(s) was the use of well-armed Komsomol volunteers and NKVD detachments as a blockin groups behind the front lines? Their job was to prevent any retreats and they often just machine gunned stragglers from the frontline. And don´t forget that Russian officers had the acceptable right to shoot to kill as "an extreme measure to be used only on active service when a Red Army man refuses to fulfil a military order or retreats from the field of the battle". And this right was often used very harshly: Antony Beevor, Stalingrad (p 169): [ May 10, 2002, 07:04 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

Sorry about that. I´m no pro with smileys. :cool: Oops, wrong one again...

As Zetterling stated in his analysis:

Did I touch a nerve or something? :eek: All I wanted to point out is that the Soviets made major operative mistakes too. And if you read the Glanz´s quote more carefully, you´ll find that not all of these failures happened before the summer of 1944 and were all not in a situation were the steam of the strategic offensive ran out, so to speak. I´d like to add that the 4th strategic offensive of the Soviet Union (Bagration was the 5th) was almost a total failure. It didn´t reach Helsinki as was planned but was repulsed in Karelian Isthmus by the Finnish army. Defensive doctrine used there was almost a textbook adaption of German doctrine of defending against overwhelming odds. Unfortunately for Germans, they didn´t apply the doctrine (fe 100km of fighting withdrawal before the main defensive line) themselves when operation Bagration began. German High Command had other thoughts about effective defending...

I´ll answer these views with the words of David M. Glantz:

Bastables, both of these sites offer information about the earliest T-34-models. For example: "Americans got the T-34 with a 4-speed gearbox. With a such gearbox, T-34 could use the 4th speed on a firm and even surface - i.e. on roads. Thus, the max speed on the cross-country was 25.6 km/h. On later modifications there was a 5-speed gearbox to be installed. This gearbox allowed to drive with a 30.5 km/h." And what do you mean by this? Does this mean that the losses between these two tank models were equal?

That is exactly what I had in mind when talking about T-34´s mobility. From where did you get that information?

Haven´t heard that before! T-34´s top speed only 25 km/h? In every other war history book I have read mobility and speed of T-34 has been praised, and Panther is said to have many problems with realibility. Are they just myths? :confused: [ May 08, 2002, 10:28 AM: Message edited by: Keke ]

I hope CMBB will model T-34´s mobility correctly. Its wide tracks allowed it to move with speed on terrain where most german panzers would get stuck. The other thing I´d like see modelled, is the high tolerance of T-34 to arty fire. Diesel didn´t catch fire easily. Then again, the metallurgic flaws of the Russian tanks and ammo should be modelled too.

That is a interesting question...

I want to add, that I had the effectivity of the towed Russian 76mm AT-gun in mind, not the tank version. Sorry about that.

OK, I keep on retreating like Germans in 1943. After doing some research, even I think that 75mm guns are more approriate choice for `T-34-like´ Shermans. Now I´m going to hold my ground at all cost.

So it is a meeting engagement!!!

According to Zetterling: "...[O]n the evening before 12 July the II SS-Panzer Corps had 294 tanks and assault guns operational of which 15 were Tigers (no Panthers or Ferdinands, not even in workshops)." "Depending on how one prefers to define the battle at Prokhorovka, it involved from 294 German (II SS-Panzer Corps) and 616 Soviet AFV (those engaging II SS-Panzer Corps) up to a maximum of 429 German and 870 Soviet AFV." "Rotmistrov's 5th Guards Tank Army reported that it had lost 222 T-34, 89 T-70, 12 Churchill and 11 assault guns up to 16 July. These were total write-offs." So the more precise numbers for the Prokhorova-like meeting engagement with CMBO would be: 1 immobilized Tiger, no Panthers and 7 Mark IVs for the Axis player; 12 76mm Shermans (W) and 4 Stuarts for the Soviet player.

And remember Skipper, we are talking about meeting engagement.

Yes, you are quite right. Let´s change those Jumbos to 76mm Shermans(W). Russian 76mm was as powerful as the US 76. [ May 07, 2002, 12:39 PM: Message edited by: Keke ]

With Prokhorovka in mind it should be more like 1 Tiger, 1 Panther and 6 Pz-IVs for you, 10 76mm Jumbos and 6 Stuarts for me. With better tactical use of my tanks, I could give you some ass whuppin´.

What do you mean? Doesn´t kill ratios tell something about tactical abilities? And who said that there were only Tigers and Elefants at Prokhorovka? :confused: