John D Salt

Correctly correctington. But you're a brave man to mention tripods. The Germans would actually indicate the difference between light and SF roles by designating the beasts lMG-34 or lMG-42 and sMG-34 or sMG-42 respectively, the little letter standing for "leichte" or "schwere" respectively. British practice, in contrast to German and American, is to call rifle-calibre tripod MGs "medium" (MMGs) and reserve "heavy" for weapons of 12.7mm (0.5") calibre and above. I believe the Russians also designate HMGs in a similar way. All the best, John. [ November 15, 2002, 09:17 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

Which helps you how?</font>

Do you think this wasn't how attacks developed? Ever heard of "reconaissance by fire" or "prophylactic fire"? I must say, though, I'd like to see it possible to re-distribute and re-supply ammunition for infantry at least. An ammo re-distribution, including taking ammo from friendly dead and wounded, has been a standard part of British infantry battle-drills at the end of every section attack since I-don't-know-when, and I doubt that other armies just left the ammo just lying around. Ammo resupply would also give some point to all those light armoured vehicles like SPWs and carriers that are otherwise little more than ATR targets. Then again, I'd really like to be able to plan and shoot a proper creeping barrage... How many historical examples can you point to of attacking troops spotting a static enemy before they opened fire? All the best, John.

How? From my TA days, I remember one hasty ambush where we bounced our opponents from a range of about 5 metres. Our total camouflage preparations were our normal personal cam plus five minutes with local foliage and face veils. In woodland, under surprising light cover like a thin screen of ferns, as long as you don't belch, fart or sneeze, you can lie still within spitting distance of other people for as long as you like. Another time myself and one other rifleman held up a platoon on a convex slope covered in standing wheat for about half an hour. Alternately shooting and monkey-running back, we got in dozens of shots at them, at ranges of 15-25 metres, and they afterwards said we would probably have shot the lot of them. Nobody in the entire platoon ever saw either of us. The rule of thumb we used was "You won't see the enemy until he opens fire, and often not even then". All the best, John.

Given that Battlefront's products knock all the others into a cocked hat, you'd certainly hope so, wouldn't you? I'd like to add my thanks to the list. It is tempting to say, when you see such a superb game as CM:BB, and recognise the foundations of thorough research and expert software development that it must be built on, that "It doesn't get any better than this": But, due to Battlefront's very sound policies of "continuous improvement" and actually listening to their customers, in fact, it does! Are we lucky, or what? Now, if Matt would like to add "change the unit information display for the ZiS-3 so that it shows a calibre length of L/41 instead of L/52" to the patch list, then Trofim Vissarionovich Picksky will recommend him and the rest of the crew for the Order of the Magnificent Bolsheviks for Heroic Production of Really Neat Stuff. All the best, John.

The British Army did not use the phrases "keystone document" or "capstone document" in 1950, and would probably have coughed uncomfortably at the suggestion that it had anything so continental and religious-sounding as a "doctrine". "Infantry Training" was, however, the definitive document on infantry training. When did the double-tap become fashionable? That's new to me. I don't know how much the fashion has changed since I trained for this sort of thing, but when I was in it was made very clear that halting and returning fire was to be done only under effective fire, not any fire at all. As one of my sergeants told me, "Salt's section stops, the whole platoon stops; the platoon stops, so the company stops; the company stops, so the battlegroup stops; the battlegroup stops, so the brigade stops; the brigade stops, so the division stops; and before we know it the whole of the NORTHAG advance has come to a halt because you're frightened by a couple of stray rounds." I wouldn't blame the Canadian army for it, as this particular piece of advice seems to be British in origin. I don't know whether the document Mike has is identical with Infantry Training Volume IV 1950, but the parts he quoted are, word for word. Since Infantry Training Volume IV was written at a time when the British Army had an enormous wealth of recent, varied and successful high-intensity combat experience against first-class enemies, I rather doubt the "foolish staff weenie" hypothesis. Looking at the whole of the rest of the document, I'd say it is much better-written and more useful than any written piece I have seen emerge from DGD&D (the Directorate general of Doctrine & Development), and while I wouldn't claim to have read everything DGD&D has put out, I used to have a CD full of the stuff, and I've read a fair amount of it. As I've already said elsewhere, I think this advice is intended to refer to getting past enemy DFs. Elsewhere, in a section headed "Section battlecraft for the attack", the document says: "The section, moving in groups as above, comes under effective enemy fire and each man carries out any anticipatory orders he has received from the section commander. If there are none he drops flat and crawls to a fire position, unless other orders are given. All riflemen return the enemy fire independently until ordered to stop." All the best, John.

I think this may be what is mainly intended in the piece originally quoted. It depends on exactly what value you give to the words "defensive fire". To me, from what I know of British Armyspeak, that would tend to indicate a DF task, rather than aimed fire from individual defenders. The fire would, therefore, whether from MGs or HE weapons, be falling on a pre-determined location rather than aimed at individuals. In those circumstances, getting away from the grid registered for the DF as quickly as possible makes a good deal of sense. All the best, John.

Agent-based programming. All the best, John.

I should imagine it is the point where the fire team leaders will give the order to throw grenades and rush individual enemy positions - ie "Number two rifleman, take out enemy trench".</font>

I should imagine it is the point where the fire team leaders will give the order to throw grenades and rush individual enemy positions - ie "Number two rifleman, take out enemy trench".</font>

Yes, but the key to what? I am happy to accept that more battlefield experience maps to a more accurate perception of danger and a greater tolerance for disorganisation, but not that it produces a greater willingness to go forward under fire. The work on combat fatigue refers to individuals, and you can't really get smaller units than that. A good point; I believe the ability to mix battle-tested NCOs with fresh soldiers and combine the advantages of both is often considered to be one of the reasons the Wehrmacht retained a high degree of combat effectiveness in the face of very substantial atrition. All the best, John.

These I would have fitted into the model I describe by assuming them to be Fresh -- and so willing to take more risks than more experienced troops -- and of a very high training/selection level. I would also see their training as including not only their military training, but also their indoctrination in the Hitler Youth from an early age. It depends on what you define as "fanaticism". If it means a complete disregard for one's own continued survival, then clearly one way such feelings are produced may be through the psychological breakdown occasioned by combat fatigue (I think Farley Mowat touches on this in "And No Birds Sang" when he describes how people become casualties performing acts of suicidal bravery because they no longer care whether they live or die). However, I believe that you are right that this is not the only cause of disregard for one's own personal survival, which may be due to good old-fashioned heroism. The distinction I would make is that this kind of hero continues to care whether he lives or dies; but he has decided that there are some things worth more than his own life. This distinction may make no practical difference to the outcome on the battlefield. All the best, John.

Actually the WRG 1925-1950 rules don't quite do that, but it's possible to analyse them in the way you've described -- as I did, so we're obviously thinking along similar lines. The WRG use the categories INEPT, GREEN, STUBBORN, DASHING, SKILLED, THRUSTING, FANATIC and IRREGULAR. Within the classes STUBBORN, DASHING, SKILLED and THRUSTING, you could reasonably say that the DASHING and THRUSTING troops are aggressive, and the SKILLED and THRUSTING troops are well-trained. The WRG also use the idea of different tactical repertoires to reflect levels of training; STUBBORN and DASHING troops cannot use Skirmish mode, and GREEN and INEPT troops cannot use either Stalk or Skirmish. All the best, John.

Very sensible: I'd just like to add the words "and selection". AIUI the difference between paratroops and glider men in both the US and the UK, and between Army Commandos and Royal Marine Commandos, was that although all received comparable training, Paras and Army commandos were hand-picked, whereas glider men and Royal Marine Commandos were drafted en bloc. To some extent one might regard Territorial or National Guard units as more highly selected than draftees, because of the element of self-selection implicit in volunteering. A very astute comment, and just what I was going to suggest. It should, I think, be the training level rather than the experience level that determines how extensive a repertoire of orders troops know how to obey. It might even be worth attempting to separate out skill-at-arms training and motivational training or selection; I imagine the early war SS, for example, and Russian infantry for much of the war, as fiercely well-motivated but tactically inept. All the best, John.

Holmes mentions Graves mentioning (apologies for these references-within-references, but I don't have my own copy of "Goodbye to All That") that once an officer had reached a certain point the best thing to do was send him on a course in order to give him a few days' rest. However, from what I've read of Moran's work elsewhere, I believe that once a man has reached the breaking point, he will never fully recover. It is therefore important to rotate men out of combat before they go over the edge. This points up the importance of the contrasting troop rotation policies of the different nations. I believe that the British and Germans tried to rotate individuals. The Amercians and Russians, I believe, kept soldiers with their unit until they were made casualties or the war ended. What other nations did I have no idea -- troop rotation policies are not glamorous, and Osprey don't print pretty picture-books about them. The British also had a policy of selecting a proportion of a unit's personnal to be LOB (Left Out of Battle) for specific actions, based on WW1 experience. The idea behind this was always to have a cadre of men to re-build a regiment destroyed in action, but presumably it gave people intermittent rest as well. All the best, John.

Eh? I always thought that, other things being equal, capped shot performed better at high angles of impact and uncapped at near normal. Of course, other things aren't equal here, because of the FH plate. All the best, John.

There has been much discussion about the way infantry react to fire in CM:BB as compared with CM:BO. I don't propose to re-hash the arguments about whether infantry in CM:BB is “too brittle” or whether this is “realistic”. I don't think “realism” is often a sensible topic where simulation models are concerned even when one has lots of trustworthy historical data, and in the question of people's reactions under fire is an area where we have very little numerical data of any kind. Instead, what I'd like to suggest is that the way the experience system works in CM:BO and CM:BB (and for that matter in almost any historical or fantasy game with any kind of experience levels at all) is, in at least one important respect, backwards. CM (and almost every other game I know) assumes that the more battle experience troops have, the more resistant they are to being suppressed or neutralised by incoming fire. The assumption seems to be that there is some kind of “hardening” process involved, and that prolonged exposure to combat accustoms men to it and makes them more psychologically resistant. Indeed, some of history's less competent military commanders have evidently believed that inexperienced troops needed to be “blooded”, or, like young gun-dogs, “shot over”. For all that it is a wargamerly convention, this does not seem to me to match the known facts. Lord Moran (quoted in Richard Holmes' “Firing Line”, Jonathan Cape, London, 1985, published in the USA as “Acts of War”) says: “A man's courage is his capital, and he is always spending”. It is pretty well accepted that troops will suffer combat exhaustion after a period of 60 days or so in combat. “Firing Line”/”Acts of War” shows a nice graph due to Swank & Marchand, 1946, and similar material is to be found in various books I am too lazy to chivvy out of the bookcases right now (I'm thinking of John Ellis' “The Sharp End of War”, Peter Watson's “War on the Mind” and Hugh McManners' “The Scars of War”, but there are probably many others). Swank & Marchand's graph shows a rising curve of effectiveness for the first ten days as the soldier becomes “battle wise”, then a period of maximum efficiency lasting until 30 days, after which it reduces steadily through a “hyper-reactive” stage until it reaches a “vegetative” stage of complete exhaustion where the man is completely ineffective at about 60 days (the actual number of days varies by author; Swank & Marchand seem to have been dealing with especially intense combat). There is no doubt that soldiers need to become accustomed to the sights and sounds of the battlefield before they can be fully effective -- that is the idea behind “battle inoculation”. The thing I imagine that soldiers acquire from experience is not greater courage, but an ability to assess more accurately the hazards present on the battlefield (and my reading of Holmes supports this). I would therefore expect that “green” troops may often be more willing to expose themselves to danger than veterans, even if the veterans are not worn-down by combat fatigue, because the “green” men may not realise how dangerous are the things they are doing. The most striking historical example of this, from a British perspective, is doubtless the first day on the Somme. Most of the men who walked through the machine-gun fire on that day were Kitchener volunteers, who had never been in combat before and had little idea of what to expect on a modern battlefield. However, there are plenty of other examples of “green” troops showing great determination and being prepared to accept high levels of casualties without giving up. The “Kindermord bei Langemarck” (the “Massacre of the Innocents”) provides a WW1 example from the other side. 6th Para, the US 101st, the 12th SS “Hitler Jugend” and 47 Royal Marine Commando were all in action for the first time in Normandy, although admittedly these were formations with special selection criteria. The performance of the US 95th Infantry Divison at Metz, however (see Anthony Kemp's “Metz: The Unknown Battle) provides an example of a normal division performing very well on its first outing. One might also recall that the British divisions that did less well in Normandy tended to be those made up largely of the “old Desert hands”. As the old saying has it, “There are old soldiers, and there are bold soldiers, but there are no old, bold soldiers”. Another old saying, used to “encourage” student pilots when they start learning to fly, is that you start with a full bag of luck and an empty bag of experience, and your aim is to fill the bag of experience before you empty the bag of luck. I think that a comparable view of infantry morale might be that you start with a full bag of courage and an empty bag of experience, and you progressively fill one as you empty the other. I also suspect that the shared experience of combat builds social cohesion in small groups, and so I would imagine that troops who had been exposed to more combat would not only take cover quicker than green troops, but, having got used to the idea that combat is always completely shambolic, would re-organise and try again more quickly after each time they are driven to cover, and be less prone to spreading panic. This opinion is harder to substantiate from references, but I seem to recall that Eric Bowlby's “The Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby” gives something of the flavour of this. Instead of the Conscript/Green/Regular/Veteran/Crack/Elite levels of CM, then, I would imagine experience levels matched roughly to the phases of the Swank & Marchand graph: Green (0-5 days of combat): Poor at estimating risk from enemy weapons, and so liable to reckless courage through sheer inexperience. Liable to spreading panic, and, once panicked, find it very hard to recover. Fresh: (6-10 days of combat): Still bold and keen to prove themselves, but now with a better idea of the true dangers posed by different weapons and a more circumspect approach. Experienced (11 to 40 days of combat): Make sound estimations of how dangerous things are, and so take cover promptly when the situation warrants, while ignoring wild or ineffectual fire. Recover fairly quickly from suppression or neutralisation. Sticky (40 to 50 days of combat): Increasingly unwilling to take risks, over-estimating the danger of fire and taking longer to get going again having once gone to ground. Fought out (50 to 60 days of combat): Inert, emotionally withdrawn from reality, taking no part in action even to ensure own survival, having lost all hope of survival. The only question is whether they will be evacuated as a psychological or a physical casualty. I would imagine that the actions described as “fanatic” in CM would be those performed by soldiers in this last category who had somehow been goaded into action and, having lost all hope, demonstrate the “courage of despair”. Holmes recalls from Robert Graves' memoirs that units in this state “waste men wicked”; I would see this as being the psychological state of Japanese soldiers participating in Banzai charges or having to be killed in their spider-holes instead of surrendering, or of the soldiers in Russian or German punishment battalions. There is plenty more to say on this subject, but I think I'll shut up and let other people say what they think about it before blethering again. All the best, John.

Double post, finger trouble. [ November 01, 2002, 05:40 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

Why bother? "Realism" (which is not usually a sensible thing to talk about, I prefer "credibility") and playability are not, contrary to long-hallowed faulty-reasoning, incompatible. Would you suggest having settings for maximum fun, average fun, not much fun? All the best, John. [ November 01, 2002, 05:41 PM: Message edited by: John D Salt ]

...and what "statistics" are those, do tell? I believe we have discussed the numerical untrustworthiness of S.L.A. Marshall's "Men Against Fire" findings before. All the best, John.

Never mind that. I want the LMG rocket-mine. All the best, John.

...or you might look at it another way, and say that BTS produced a game that stood head and shoulders (and most of the thorax) above anything else available, and then made it even better. I can think of ways of (IMO) improving the modelling of infantry combat still further; that's a very far cry from saying that the current model is f***ed up. There aren't "2 completely opposing theories" here; the model of suppression seems to be pretty much the same in form, but re-calibrated in CM:BB so that fire has more suppressive effect (especially from MGs). I think I'm safe ion saying that simulation modellers employed professionally by the DoD in the US and the MOD in the UK have not yet come up with anything notably better than the supression model embodied in CM, and they've had decades to think about it. All the best, John.

You heartless, callous BEAST, you. Do you realise how much money it would cost me if I bought all the Spielbergers I fancied? I;ll forgive you if you have a copy to hand and can tell me whether the basic armour of the Ausf F/8 was face-hardened or not. I always thought it was MQ, with only the applique plate FH. All the best, John.

It would be a very nice feature to have, though, specifically for infantry and their support weapons. The defence would have the advantage of being able to dump large quantities of ammunition in prepared locations. Panzerschreck gunners who had expended their last rocket would no longer have to contemplate the dismal career change to "Gamey suicide scout". Jeeps, carriers and other light vehicles would suddenly acquire much greater importance than they currently have if they could be used for ferrying small-arms ammo and mortar bombs to platoons who have depelted their stocks. The fans of the mega-whoompatah-blast-wave graphic would have a new justification for their case, as it would be necessary to model the effect of a hit on one of these ammunition trucks. All the best, John.