Hon John Howard MP LLB

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Hon John Howard MP LLB: Thanks missed te operation against Tito BUT glider and parachute landings were generally intermixed even though individual "enagements" may have been one or the other. For example Eban Emal was glider assult but was part of and concurrent with the parachute drops on the Rhine Brigdes. (as was "Pegasus Bridge", Merville Battery and the parachute drops). Grand Sasso was rare - only glider borne. Were there parachute drops asssociated with "Dragoon" ?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> By the way this gives me twelve individual operations "...in the entire Western Theatre of operations....". A few more than originally quoted ????? By the way - did not count the drop(s) by the SAS in their first ops in the WD. After all that is where their name came from....

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Oh, and did you mention the raid on Tito in Yugoslavia?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Thanks missed te operation against Tito BUT glider and parachute landings were generally intermixed even though individual "enagements" may have been one or the other. For example Eban Emal was glider assult but was part of and concurrent with the parachute drops on the Rhine Brigdes. (as was "Pegasus Bridge", Merville Battery and the parachute drops). Grand Sasso was rare - only glider borne. Were there parachute drops asssociated with "Dragoon" ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> There were exactly four airborne operations in the entire Western Theater. Three were carried out by the Allies, one by the Germans. <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Actually I can count the following: Eben Emal and the assult on the Rhine Bridges (German 1940) ??? Viaduct, Sicily (British 1941) Bruneval Raid France (British 1942) Corinth Bridges Greece (German 1941) Crete (German 1941) North African Landings (Torch followon) (US/British 1942) Sicily (US/British 1943) Rescue of Mussolini (German 1943) Normandy (British/US 1944) "Market Garden" (British/US 1944) Rhine crossings (British/US 1945) Does not count Eastern Front or Pacific. Missed any ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by argie: Some not too much reliable sources I have say that flsils were deployed in platoons of 4 or 5 vehicles. 2 or 3 flails in line do the clearing, with another 2 in reserve, as was expected that some flails were lost by the obstacles or enemy fire (an obsctace not covered by fire is not an obstacle ). Usually were deployed in a way to allow to open two lines for Battalion. That gives us an estimate of 2 Platoons (8 to 10 vehicles) for Battalion in an assault operation. I will look if I can found a table I saw somewhere on how effective is this kind of breaching, but with modern mine rollers, though <HR></BLOCKQUOTE> And then as they were British equipment (in the timframe of BO)let us talk in troops, squadrons and regiments and banish this US-speak........... (though the RTR did use a battalion in lieu of the regiment as ther was only one RTR !)

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: So, and item that takes 120 minutes to set up is ok for inclusion in CM for example, since it could be used in the time limit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I seem to remember from another thread the mention of a "30 min time scale" by your good self. As I have not seen this mentioned elsewhere in game doco, et al, my interest was picued but I did not act on it at the time. Where was this figure (of time drawn from), what was thre rationale for it (the time limitations), and what of use of something that could fit inside this time limitation (for deployment) and will allow bridging of obstacles greater than the minimum 20m which apparently another design limitation ? (And yes it was the SBG bridge not the Bailey though were not some or all of the parts interchangeable ?)

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: Mike is bringing this up from an earlier proposal that Bailey bridges were common used at the front and well within the scope of the CM battle. Bailey Bridging, at least tactical use of it, has been pretty well discredited as part of the standard CM action, except that such a bridge could possible show up as a map peice or in an operation. It still crops its head up even though most times to build are 6 hours and up, and attempts to use it at Rapido resulted in several days of heavy casualties.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> "...has been pretty well discredited as part of the standard CM action...." Discredited is certainly the wrong term. CM is built about "quick assaults" factoring up to about 30 mins action (something that is somewhat of a drawback with the design in my opinion). Bailey bridge construction does not fit inside this paradigm. However to throw a cat amongst the pigeons how does the "skid" Bailey go as used in the final campaigns in Italy?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero: Originally posted by Spook: [qb]So when trying to fly a tour of thirty missions with a 95% chance of survival each mission (averaged), this works out to a 21.46% chance of surviving a full tour in that timeframe without being killed or captured. Pretty damn harrowing. Driving to and from work every day makes you wonder how the statistics creep up on you and when they are going to catch up with you. So far so good. But to expand these to armoured ground operations: is there any way to determine statistical AFV crew survivability based on losses/replacement rates and number of engagements to extrapolate similar statistics that are drawn from the airforce stats ? Just so that a scientific data gan be presented to show the extent and validity of the gut feelings the people at the time had and how it might have quantifiably affected troop morale.[/QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> The only study that I am aware of was one done by two RMO's of one of the British Armoured Divisions right at the end of the war. They looked at hits on vehicles that they could examine, by weapon (where this could be identified) by casualties to the crew by type/serverity. Apparently much as expected except that the Panzerschreck was not the "killer" it is claimed. Where one hit "fair and square" it did cause fatal damage to crew and vehicle BUT there were many more fired which obtained only glancing blows at best. They ascribed this to the problem of "holding one's nerve" to ensure the hit. One proviso - I have not seen the actual study just excerpts from it. (Full title "Survey of Casualties Amongst Armoured Units in North West Europe" by Capts Harkness and Wright published JAN46

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: Mike, Abandonment was, according to "Dieppe 1942" by Whitehead, often due to bogging in shelled ground. Penetration may not occur, but lob enough HE and a long, heavy tank, and it gets mired in, flipped over, or otherwise wrecked. There was no solution found for this during the war -- execpt don't let your tanks get shelled in a closed space. No tank was immune to shelling in areas where they could no deploy. Usually though it was not "miring" (except for possibly large marshes of the "OST" Front) but rather destruction or obstruction of the escape routes which meant that they would then receive a due saturation ("Fire for Effect"). Any tank could be "flipped" or destroyed by a direct hit if the explosion was large enough. Dieppe showed one of the failings of the Churchill - tracks that could not stand up to pebble beaches (hence the "Bobbin" series). They had problems on ice (slipping), mud (build up under track guards) and with other conditions BUT they were very good at standing up to the "shot and shell" and they did perform well when called upon (eg from “Longstop” to the Reichwald). The funnies never could truly solve the shelled ground problem, except on the edges, when the shells were actually coming in.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> ??? The funnies were there to make sure that obstacles did not create the "choke points" and to make sure that when assaulting a position that the attacker could take the maximum advantage of the ground. One of the priciples of the defence is to maximise his potential through use of the natural and created features. If you can circumvent this through bridging/destroying/carpeting/flailing/etc your way through the obstacles..... By these means (the funnies) the maximum firepower could be brought to bear on enemy position (while in themselves being comparatively weak in firepower they were "force multipliers" to use the modern parlance). You must remeber that one of the reasons for the funnies was the inability of the UK to absorb large casualties beacuse they did not have the manpower reserves or the morale to face another WWI.

[QB]Oh, and BTW, exactly how would the AVRE carrying the fascine know it was under fire? Afterall, the view out of an AVRE with a fascine is extremely limited. Only the driver and his coie can see forward (and that is limited) and the commander is limited to vision to the sides and rear. If it was then left to the detechment commander to determine if the carrier needed to drop the bundle, then I'd suggest he'd decide if it was needed to be dropped, not SOP's. {/QB] I got lost in the thread and I don't know where the above quote was taken from but I wish to comment. AVRE commanders habitually sat on the fascines ! This was particularly true of the approach march from the FUP to the Start Line (fascines were loaded as late as possible because of the lack of visibility - ie the FUP). When they came under fire they could retire to behind it (and stand watching over the top - most fire would have been from the front 90 degrees or so..). When they were sure that the driver could see his "target" they could retire to the turret to "fire" the bolts. There was a periscope designed for the commander but apparently disliked because of lack of field of view, vibration and ease of loss or damage. Casualties were not noted as being any more servere with AVRE commanders compared to the general populace (of tank commanders) so it must have been no more dangerous.... I note that Churchill crew casualties overall were much less by proportion than Sheram/Cruiser tank crew casulaties. It was slow(er) but tougher and did not burn as easily (even compared to wet stowage versions of the Shermans).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Kim Beazley MP Ma: The only reference I've ever seen to them being used was in India - a regiment was sent out there in late 1944/early 1945 and ended up patrolling the streets of an Indian city during riots with their Grants. Can't remember where I read it though, I have to admit.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I have seen references to them being deployed to provide "artificial moonlight" during the crossing of the Rhine and possibly earlier in opertions prior to the crossing - perhaps the Reichwald ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: We fought actions just like these some time ago about this same argument. We found that infantry in defense were king if they just kept there heads down and made the tanks come to them. The Infantry were the only branch which could fight unsupported. Armor alone did not have the ability to dislogde determined infantry especially in close terrain, while a lot of artillery of course never could do the job alone either..<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> And in real life. Look to the first attacks by the DAK against the Tobruk perimeter in 1941. Infantry held their ground, armour (and that is how it is spelt too ;)over ran the positions and advanced in the then conventional idea of paralysing the enemies rear areas. Supporting infantry was stopped by the "over run" troops while the armour was stopped and destroyed by anti-tank and tank forces. It depended on the morale of the troops holding the front lines to be successful. Contrast against similar actions against the perimeter in 1942. Troop morale failed (or was it in reality their commanders morale ?) and the port fell. On the other hand, infantry had a great deal of difficulty developing an attack of any sort unless the ground was completely rugged. Interesting...

As an aside to this glorious debate, I note that Churchill AVRE were used in Korea and served until about 1960 or so in the British Army. I also note that the role has continued in other vehicles based on Centurion chassis and now with the CET a specialised chassis. The Brits must think there was something in it... (and what of the ARV/BARV use if the "landing" phase is ever introduced?)

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B: To add to Michael and Germanboy's comment's, the basic reason units like MGs and such are not allowed to fire beyond LOS is the absolute spotting model used in CM, where if one unit spots an enemy unit all other units know where it is. Allowing units to fire "blind" into areas outside LOS (through smoke screens for example) in the game would allow you to "cheat" at it because other friendly units (who do have LOS to the area) could spot the enemy units for the firing friendly units. I hope that made sense. It is an imperfect compromise for a limitation in the game necessitated by limited CPU power.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Surely not a "cheat". This comes down to the role of the observer and whether this role needed have special qualification. The could boil down to the need for specialised training and equipment. In the former case, BritCom practice was to train almost all officers and many NCOs to have the skills necessary to direct artillery/mortars/MMG (in addition to their own specialised observers which in the latter cases were NCOs and in the former case junior subalterns). Communications could be by line or radio though generally this meant the lowest was platoon HQ level. On the Allies side at least, it did fact happen with FOs for artillery calling in all available units on DF and FDF tasks through divisional artillery nets. Similarly, any sufficently trained personnel could, if in communciation, request similar action from at least battalion assets if not higher.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by tero: I quess this is why the infantry can not fire off its small arms beyond LOS (in the dark for example) even if it was physically possible.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Does the game not allow firing on fixed lines by tripod mounted MGs (or even sandbagged LMG) ? A common tactic to discourage movement throgh minefield lanes and/or to harrass known movement lines in comparatively static areas. Use of tracer was optional (scared the opposition as well as assisting to disclose firer location) particularly by the LMG if it used magazines (tracer not a common load).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Michael Dorosh: Americans????? Canadians and British first used Artificial Moonlight, if my memory serves, unless they borrowed it from the Yanks. In any event, it wasn't just Mr. G.I.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Actually it was the British who developed and deployed the only "artifical moonlight" systems. They developed the CDL (Canal Defence Light) turret for the Matilda in 1940. Original intention was to use a very powerful searchlight to dazzle the enemy. To prevent from being destroyed easily the light actually shone directly up from the floor of the turret. A mirror turned it through 90 degrees and concentrated it and an armoured shutter moving rapidly across the beam to prevent shrapnel and bullets from damaging the mirror. The shutter gave a strobe effect which they discovered actually improved its effects on defenders. Later transferred to a Grant/Lee chassis it was also supplied as a complete unit to US units. First used in the Rhine crossing and the North German Plain. One of many of the "funnies" deployed by 79 Armd Div.

Anyway - to come back to something resembling the topic in question..... No-one has yet disproved that the BritCom Forces were trained to exploit some unique features of their MMG equipment - viz long-range, sustained barrage fire. What I have failed to see in the game is the ability for this to be used where appropriate. I trust that the greater "Gods" of CM will allow for this in CM2. But will it happen ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: [/qb] Appears to be no takers. OK, here's a more connected question to the subject of the thread - what was the rifle used by the majority of the soldiers in the move Zulu?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Probably the SMLE with some woodwork removed (other that appear include Long Lee-Enfield and/or Lee-Metford rifles). Mistakes are helicopter and land-rover in the background of long shots up/down the valley and the wrist watch worn when standing to at the "ramparts".

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username: Are you for real? You named off a bunch of elite units! The US airborne was one of the most physically fit and trained units ever! they ran in boots too. The US airborne also closed with its enemy and were really shock troops. When they were forced to be line infantry, they took high casualties. They were trained to fight rear echelon battles and overcome at all means. I was speaking of modern armies btw. I understand that PT is being diversified in some armies also. Drills like carrying a buddy up a hill piggyback races (sounds like too much fun) and other toughening exercises replace 3.25 mph jogs for 1.5 miles in running shoes. I ran a mile in 6:40 in combat boots in basic. With shin splints. Not too bad. Combat shooting should be head sized pop up targets up to 100 meters. Moving torso sized pop up targets should also be used for 100-250 meters. there should be a training aid that simulates enemy fire overhead while shooting. Lewis<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Ok - a little away from modern but still relevant.... 39 Bn AMF (that's Australian Military Forces or Militia) on the Kokoda Track. Training had consisted basically of unloading ships at Port Morseby until order "up track" to Kokoda - something no white man had done before without native bearers carrying their equipment. Delayed the advance of a Japanese force of combat veterans (about 2,500 of them) for weeks while being driven back down the track (even re-took Kokoda for a time - driving out the Japanese advance guard in their first action). Releived by a Brigade they rested and reinforced to be committed to battle again a month later, fought in the "Battle of the Beachheads" where the Allies first encountered large-scale fanatical Japanes defence. When withdrawn after 3 months of fighting there were 24 men "on parade" (beating 2/48 Bn AIF after Second El Alamein with 28 men "on parade"). They achieved more ground, killed more Japanese, captured more equipment than the US Inf Regt alonside of them. In contrast 54 Bn AMF had a similar background but when ordered "up track" failed in their first enagaement. The difference was in their leadership not in their training. Good leadership can overcome many hurdles. AMF were regarded as second best to the AIF units (at the time) - they proved at least equal.

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by barrold713: I am currently reading 'Citizen Soldier' in which the tactic of using WP and the effect on the defender is vividly described. It doesn't sound like it would be very pleasant to be on the receiving end. BDH<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> And it is a sdangerous to your own side as to the opposition - rather like NBC agents when something goes wrong.....

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon:<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Brian, first the use of the Bren in the functions you assign them was limited, and it makes your own Bren experience questionable. More -- your admition to handling an MG-3 (which I did handle at the Hesterly Armory during a foriegn weapons class) but failure to realize how heat sink etc. affects rate of fire, and how the MG-42 has much more metal up front, plus your misidentification of the heavy forward section as a barrel shroud makes me how useful your military experience was. There is a saying, 20 years of experience could mean 1 year of experience repeated 20 times. OK so I have handled the Bren in .303 in and 7.62mm, MAG58 (in its original Belgian made and L7 format), M242 and Minimi, Vickers MMG, 30 cal (vehicle mounts only), .50cal M2 and M60, MG3.... I too can brag. Anyway - one drawback not noted in the barrel change debate. There is handle to handle the hot barrel for a Bren. What does the number 2 have to do with the MG34/42/3 barrel ?? So, we elevate the BAR and Bren to LMG status. Heck -- we elevate the M1 up there too, and maybe since once a guy fired a .45 real fast it gets elevated also. I suggest a new Brian method of nomenclature where all weapons are called LMGs. I even have a picture of a .45 in a tripod mount, so its LMG status is automatic. And since the M1 was used as a firepower support weapon when no BAR was near, it as I said is one also. Heck I have seen someone fire a L1A1 down range faster than an L2A1 - doesn't make either an LMG. I have used Rifle .303in SMLE No 1 Mk III, *,**,*** in a "quadrapod" ! (A rifle rest) Your unwillingness to define LMG compared to MMG compared to HMG compared to AR in a functional taxonomy, instead presenting your political desires as the sole measure of a weapon is now the issue. I think the operative word here is "functional". All parties have attempted a classification of weapons both by example and by definition but generally related to their technical charateristics. Why should be so ? Are we not attempting to recreate conditions as they were (even though we may translate them to unreal locations/scenarios)? Should we not look at how they employed ? LMG provided firpower with a section/squad MMG provided firepower to the Coy/Bn commander HMG were rarely employed outside mountings on vehicles. The first two are rifle calibre (none exceeded 8mm rifle or 9mm pistol), the last started at 12.7mm. Some weapons were used in either of the first two roles BUT required accessories for them to fulfill it - tripod, extra barrels, ammunition (heaps). Relitively, the ability to put more "rounds down range" should be an advantage for the German weapons but counterbalancing this is the need for ammunition (see another thread on this) compared to the magazine fed weapons even though a magazine weighs more ! They can then be given names associated with their roles, charcteristics based on their technical features AND employment and then you can argue which ever way you want. Note that i dno not care about how you wish the Bren was used, that was shot down on another thread, we are talking about how the design allowed it to function and how it was used in real life. As an LMG - providing the firepower of the section - how else was it used ? Taxonomy allows a game designer to decide how the weapon will function, and that can be checked against the historical record. To date many have claimed that the Bren does not perform to the historical record - therfore is its classification wrong ? Or is it that the classification system is inadequate ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Slapdragon: A barrel degrades both by heat and by passage of bullets along the rifled interior. Each bullet minutely wears the barrel down a small amount, but that wear is increased the hotter the barrel gets and the higher the recoil stress placed on the barrel. Hot enough, and the bullets can mold out the rifling in a few rounds of firing, and eventually effect the gas seal of the chamber..<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Actually it is a function of friction of the bullet passing down the rifling, heat, velocity of expanding gasses (at muzzle), corrosion due to chemical properties of the gasses, pressure on the barrel (all of the above). Recoil has no effect except on accuracy (and the shoulder of the firer !).

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Vanir Ausf B: [QB] Considering how much stuff they had recieved from the US by that time I would think the Brits would have been more than eager to give a small portion back... QB]<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Intersting to find out the financial adjustments for Lend-Lease one day (was the equipment returned at "cost" or was there a bit of a "sellers" market oppotunity taken by the UK to make a "profit" ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Andrew Hedges: I've followed this thread and the other Bren thread and don't believe that any of the proponents of the Bren-should-be-closer-to-the-MG42 theory have made this case. The MG42 is belt fed, the Bren is not, and this is a huge difference.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> I have never believed than, technically the Bren should be like a BAR or an MG34/42 (or indeed any other weapons that get lumped together into the AR/LMG/GPMG clas(es)) Each weapon is a solution to the tactical needs of the forces employing it (except perhaps the BAR - I have difficulty rationalising that weapon at all past WWI). Each weapon was purchased/designed/modified to suit the tactical methods and theories of the countries concerned. In their own eyes none were ever wrong, just circumstances changed (different conditions/enemies than anticipated). Remember each war is faught of the basis of the last one - rightly or wrongly. <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR> However, it is not all bad that the Bren is not MG42-like. The absence of the heavier barrel and belt feed makes the Bren lighter, handier, and permits it to be used by one person. This would be of particular advantage at short range. These advantages appear to be reflected in CM as the following table demonstrates. Notice that at short range, the Bren has more than twice the firepower of the MG42, and is significantly more effective than the BAR as well. Presumably, this is the result of the relative handiness of the weapon; certainly the MG42 is not ideal for close combat with the 250 belt being held be assistant gunner as the gunner tries to move and find targets. Even though the MG42 had the 50-round magazine things, they were difficult to reload, as they were really just containers for a 50 round belt, and reloading meant threading the next belt through the action. The fact that the MG42 has a longer barrel, is heavier, and is not well-balanced (okay, those are three facts) would also hinder the MG42 at close ranges. Even at 100 meters, the Bren isn't bad at all, falling about halfway between the BAR and the MG42. It's only at longer ranges that the MG42 really pulls significantly ahead of the Bren. But for ranges of 100 meters or less, the Bren is not simply good, it's better than anything else in the game. And of course ranges of 100 meters or less are not uncommon on CM battlefields; if they were, people would not always be whining about SMG squads.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Which is an interesting concept. This must reflect the ability to "put bullets down range" rather than the ability to hit anything aimed at. The Bren is/was renowed for its accuracy (one of those tactical/technical requirements for the British - ammunition conservation) while the MG34/42 was designed to get them "in the area and possibily hit but ceratinly keep their heads down" (German theory - sod the ammunition!) Now then - who is to say which theory was absolutly right and for what reason(s) ?

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Brian: Ah, the most marvellous of Australian Army training films. I saw/showed it over 30 times in the years I was in. Can you name the three most obvious "errors" in the movie though? At least we knew who the enemy was, after watching that.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Yes - but then let see who else can.... And they (the enemy) do not wear red coats (coz that would be unsporting) - good god sir ! Just not cricket ! An old joke: When the West Germans beat the English in a World Cup tie a German spectator turned to an English one and said "Ve haf beeten you at your own game !". The reply was a droll "That's all right old chap. We have beaten you at yours twice...."