Paco QNS

Hey, Michael, on the case of the dutch roadblock, you know the say: "Half work done. No work done, at all". Happens the same with a single roadblock in CMBO, with good terrain and dry ground. No purpose. On the matter of the tragic opening act of Operation Cobra, see this page (credit on the "tally-ho"-spotting belongs to Ari, from the topic Good Reading) ((CAUTION: needed fast connection and Zen patience)). Note that: "Germans could not react effectively to U.S. maneuver units (especially armor) that went back into action on 26 July. German artillery fire, for example, now had to be preplanned. Forward observers had lost their links to German firepower. By 27 July, two days after the bombing, General Bradley assessed the battlefield and concluded that the enemy's defenses had now been penetrated." Close Air Support in World War II: The Roots of the Tragedy in Operation Cobra Dr. Michael D. Pearlman Combined Arms in Battle Roger J. Spiller General Editor ((Pertains to the period covered by CMBO the following chapters compiled by Spiller: 1.Arnhem; 11.Exec. of GI Slovik; 15.Moselle crossing; 17.Bulge; 18.Remagen; 19.Op Cobra; 21.Aachen; 22.Lanzerath; 23.Huertgen; 27.Seine river; 28.Rapido river; 30.Op Pegasus; 33.Op Market-Garden and 34.Op Husky))

Hilltopper asked: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>why sending a barrage of 8 inchers into a forest wouldn't level it somewhat to run tanks through it?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> A bit of overkill, if you want to prune the forest. Better use the 105 or 155 VT. That´s the dream of a "cra-la-zy" gardener! As tells JasonC, such an idea only worst the way. I supposse that it is taken into account in CMBO. (I have bogged in open fields -cratered- with a heavy AFV). In a forest is only worst. A real lucky shell can uproot a tree (moreover with retarded fuze) and the Roadblocks (the thorough ones, not the quick-upturned-wagons) are made with a handful of big enough trees. ((Germans use these obstructions in a strategic level during WWI, and I think tactical-operational in WWII)). JasonC said: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Blown down trees are artificially produced by engineers with explosives when they want to block roads.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Quickly!, you mean. Otherwise I suppose that´s the fast-noisy-expensive american way! ((you love the 4th of July)). AFAIK, normally the engineers use their saws ((one of their main weapons)). and also: <BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>It makes it into a moon-scape of mud, through which practically nothing can move.<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Nothing=no vehicles. Agree. But infantry can and, in fact, must. Instant multiple foxholes to progress across in cover. In a wet climate, in the rainy stations is quite slow -because of mud-. But in dry land, summer-end, it is a heavenly present. Remember, unlike the WWI, in WWII were quite rare the inmense -and prolonged for months and years!- fire concentrations needed to create a moon landscape. [ 06-02-2001: Message edited by: Paco QNS ] [ 06-02-2001: Message edited by: Paco QNS ]

"Depende". (it depends...) The rule was a O,50 in HMG for AA defense (case of M 4 Shermans, M 24 Chaffee, and the various TDs). The exceptions were all M 3: * Grant/Lee (four 0,3 in MGs: one in a commander cupola, the coax, and two in the hull; case of Lee); * Stuart (at least in the M 3 A1 model, five 0,3 in MGs! : a coax, the AA one, the front hull and "two fixed in the sponsons for operation by the driver" -the last ones were depleted with the M 3 A3, exchanging them for more driver space AND thicker armour (original was 43 mm maximun)); *and some (the less) of the M 3 HT, IIRC, were also armed with two 0,3 in MG (instead of the common mix) The combo is justified for its "flexibility". And -truly is very useful, just until you deplete a kind of ammo. Then it is a "logistical nightmare". ((Einstein´s Law of weapon relativity)). Regards.

On the dual role of light AA guns, I cite a few excerpts of doctrine. From the "Normas generales para empleo táctico de las armas de acompañamiento de infantería y caballería" Instrucción E. 8. approved 24, June, 1940 (distributed 30, October, 1940) Spanish Army (very german influenced since the Spanish Civil War) (General guidelines for the tactical employ of supporting weapons, Infantry and Cavalry): ""Anti-air machineguns 20 m/m 74. The general missions of these weapons in combat are two: Main mission, defense against airplanes and secondary mission, antitank. 75. Their main missions are: Defense of marching or stationary units. Idem of materials. Idem of depots. Idem of AA batteries. Idem of field artillery units. And in general, of everything that, needing AA defense, don´t have any guns for it. 76. The little charge of shells and the fuzes used (ultra-quick or anti-armour) makes them poor suited for use against land targets. Only exceptionally they can be used against nests or observatory points, exclusively using their excellent precision to hit their slits. Mission Anti Air ... Mission Anti Tank 79. Their effective range with armour piercing ammo is 500 metres, corresponding with the lighting trazes. To this range it can pierce a 20 m/m armour and, their precision for a 50% hits percentage is 0,5 metres vertical and 0,25 horizontal. The traze permits to correct fire easy and quickly. 80. Their main targets are light and semi-heavy tanks, whose high mobility requires to use automatic fire weapons with traze ammo. 81. Their main purpose are: Attack the aforementioned tanks, when protecting the enemy infantry advance. It must be remembered that this antitank mission is secundary, it can´t overrule their main purpose, and, then, generally, the weapons will be sited in the better anti air emplacement, and in case from it they can acomplish the anti tank role, as a secundary mission this latter, and, of course, always in short and medium ranges. Employment ... Defensive 86. In general, they will be employed in the resistance position, so sited to defend first the main line of resistance, the support line and the stopping line, and, in case is possible, the Regiment reserves line. Their emplacements will form a rectangle in the majority of occasions. 87. In special cases, when the advance position is ordered to resist, a gun will be assigned to it, siting the other three in the resistance position, forming an equal triangle to protect effectively the main, resistance and stopping lines."" So, to this light, I don´t see as "gamey" the reasonable use of light AA guns (that is, not more of six for a reinforced infantry battalion, and siting them in dual role emplacements). In fact, the main protection of the supply lines will be by daylight camo and moving only by night. A few AA guns will only "draw fire" to them. Nonetheless, the idea of buying them and siting them off map to protect artillery and reinforcements has merit, IMO. [ 06-02-2001: Message edited by: Paco QNS ]

a) Best Tech: I usually go to Level 0 and looks from various sites until I "see the other side of the hill". Then go back until you can´t, and the previous one is the hull down position. (Same as RenoFlame, so.) Forms of "hull down": I suposse you can (1)from reverse slope; (2)from the top of a plateau -against units sited down-; and (3)from a stone wall. (I recomend the web mentioned below. It is an excellent theory of "Hull-Down-logy" Categorization of Intervisibility Lines c) Vehicles not allowed: I think only the half tracks not turreted. Not completely sure about others, though. A few tactics I use: One -for fragile vehicles-: "Hunt" until you get to the HD point and "Reverse" to obtain a "Turret Down" position of safety; and repeat the same orders -changing a bit the HD point to left or right-. Two -to surprise your enemy-: Give a "Pause" of 30 to 45 seconds and apply the tactic One. Employing enough vehicles, it gives you concentration of fire and flexibility. and Three -just invented, must try it-: Use Tactic Two alternating vehicles with different times of "Pause".

I think that the dispersion of rounds in unspotted fire represents a tactic directed to "harass" your target. At least a minimal percentage of your barrage impacts it. IMO it is military logic: instead of an "all or nothing" dice throw, you obtain a "less than best" result over your target. (All of this pertains to artillery fire non in close support of friendly troops). The reason to disperse fire: since the moment your FO can´t see the fall of the spotting rounds, it is "unspotted fire" on map coordinates, and applies the tactic explained above. But, hey, you can spot fire (in your example in the treeline) and then add the oportune correction. I suggest to permit "corrected fire" (with green line-of-sight) even into and unobserved area -and deny ulterior corrections- (since it is unobserved fire). Finally, an spanish say: "The Artillery is especially effective killing infantry; preferably the enemy infantry".