Vanir Ausf B

That dovetails with what "the academics" (well, some of them at least) have been saying: This war also reinforces the importance of experience. Ukraine’s army is now one of the most experienced in the world, but it still lacks experience co-ordinating offensive action on a large scale. What on paper is an attacking brigade of several thousand men is, in practice, a couple of reinforced companies of no more than a few hundred men each—a smaller force that struggles to establish superiority over entrenched defenders. Although Ukraine can conduct combined-arms assaults at the level of a platoon, this begins to come apart when attempting to scale up to the level of a company or battalion. Ukraine’s armed forces remain uneven because of losses and several waves of mobilisation. Experienced brigades can correct artillery fire and conduct reconnaissance and suppress enemy positions in advance of an attack. Newer units are unable to put those pieces together even when provided with the best Western equipment. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/07/28/franz-stefan-gady-and-michael-kofman-on-what-ukraine-must-do-to-break-through-russian-defences

ATACMs are off the table again. Or maybe they were never on it. _________ But U.S. defense and administration officials familiar with the issue said that despite what one called a growing public perception of “some sort of slow, gravitational pull” toward approval, there has been no change in U.S. policy and no substantive discussion about the issue for months. The Pentagon believes that Kyiv has other, more urgent needs than ATACMS, and worries that sending enough to Ukraine to make a difference on the battlefield would severely undercut U.S. readiness for other possible conflicts. The number of ATACMS in American stockpiles is fixed, awaiting replacement with the next generation, longer-range Precision Strike Missile, called the Prism, for PrSM, which is expected to enter service by the end of this year, officials said. Lockheed Martin still manufactures 500 ATACMS each year, but all of that production is destined for sale to other countries. “The problem now is not their ability to strike deep” into Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, Kahl said. “They have that ability. They are doing it now. The Russian command and control, their logistics, have been disrupted in the deep.” “The problem is not a hundred kilometers away, it’s one kilometer in front of them with the minefields” https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/22/ukraine-us-long-range-missiles/

Thanks for that. Kofman does echo Gady's observations about how the UA operates. The key difference is that he doesn't see it as a problem in need of solving. In fact, he spends a good 5 minutes pooping on the whole idea of training the UA in AirLand battle.

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please. Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December: Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072

Someone should probably point out that the unpopular Kofman opinion getting kicked around didn't come from Kofman. It was written by Franz-Stefan Gady.

Update on the F-16 timetable from Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Dmytro Kuleba: https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/viyna-nato-vilnyuskyy-samit/32499810.html

Most recent posts are regarding battlefield utility, about which there is some uncertainty.

From all I have read Teplinsky's dismissal had nothing to do with battlefield performance and everything to do with him clashing with Gerasimov. Teplinsky seems to be well-respected by almost everyone beside Gerasimov but this war will not be decided by generalship.

And this right here is the actual meat of the matter rather than the moral hand wringing everyone is focusing on. The Administration has stated that maintaining coalition unity is why they have been hesitant to supply DPICM. That is not an unreasonable concern given that these munitions will probably have to pass through the territorial waters or airspace of at least one signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions on their way to Ukraine. 1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to: Use cluster munitions; Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions; Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. https://www.clusterconvention.org/files/convention_text/Convention-ENG.pdf#page=2 Don't ask, don't tell?

They're trying.

This. It's also possible that Russia is moving them around between airbases (what the US Air Force calls reactive maneuver).

Something like 80% of ATACMS have a cluster munition warhead. I suspect this is the primary reason why Ukraine doesn't have them yet.

Ukrainian and Russian forces both advancing. Slowly. __________ Deputy Defence Minister Ganna Maliar said that Russian troops were advancing near Avdiivka, Mariinka, Lyman and Svatove. "Fierce fighting is going on everywhere," Maliar wrote on social media, adding: "The situation is quite complicated". Maliar also said Ukrainian troops were advancing with "partial success" on the southern flank of Bakhmut in the east and near Berdyansk and Melitopol in the south. In the south, she said Ukrainian forces faced "intense enemy resistance, remote mining, deploying of reserves" and were only advancing "gradually". "They are persistently and unceasingly creating conditions for as fast an advance as possible," she said. ____________ https://www.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-says-russian-troops-advancing-180434450.html

Comments regarding armored vehicles from battalion commander "Spartanets" with the 37th Marine Brigade. On the AMX-10: "There was artillery shelling and a shell exploded near the vehicle, the fragments pierced the armour and the ammunition set detonated." The crew of four inside were all killed, he said. "The guns are good, the observation devices are very good. But unfortunately there is thin armour and it is impractical to use them in the front line (attack)," Spartanets said. "There were such cases when a 152-mm shell exploded nearby and the shrapnel penetrated the vehicle," he said He added that the French AMX-10 also had issues with gear boxes breaking down, possibly due to their use on dirt roads. On the MRAP and British Husky: One had some minor shrapnel damage to the hood, which he described as a "weak" point. "Otherwise, in terms of protection, the vehicle is very cool," he said. If one runs over a landmine, "a wheel flies off" but the vehicle remains intact, he said. By contrast, when a Soviet infantry fighting vehicle (BMP or BMD) drives over a tank mine, "it is very sad for the crew and the vehicle", he added. https://www.yahoo.com/news/thin-armoured-french-tanks-impractical-110407784.html

If this was feasible it would have been done already. In fact, something similar to this was Plan A in the days following the March '22 invasion but Saudi Arabia and the UAE noped out.

He was the first one out. You can see him disappearing into the brush at the :26 mark. The other 3 meet up with him at the end.

I made a little map of airbases Russia is known to be using for operations in Ukraine. This is not comprehensive but should give an idea of what a difference ATACMS could make. Henichesʹkyy and Berdyansk are already in Storm Shadow range. Yeysk, Taganrog and Millerovo probably are as well, depending on how close to the front lines Ukraine is flying their SU-24s. So the difference in capability comes into play in southern Crimea, including the Kerch bridge if Ukraine is allowed to target it.

That was horrible. I don't understand why they couldn't back up the Bradley closer and drop the ramp right next to the soldiers. Hell, dropping the ramp ON the soldiers would have been preferable. It's almost like there's a 3 meter safely regulation they must obey.

And why wouldn't he renege? The "Prigozhin won" theory only made sense if Wagner remains more-or-less intact with Prigozhin at it's head. Without Wagner Prigozhin is a nobody and Putin has zero motivation to honor any super secret deals.

I think Prigozhin "backed down" because he got what he wanted: to keep Wagner, which was otherwise going to be subsumed into the MoD.

RE: Prigozhin, Girkin is pissed. https://twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1672239980347785216

FT article (paywalled) talks a little about it. _________ “I personally saw how, during our assault, the enemy [fighter jet] aircraft immediately fired on our advancing troops using laser guided bombs from a far distance,” said Stas, a soldier with an elite drone surveillance unit helping infantry regain lost territory in the south of the country. It was not an isolated incident, he said. Russia’s use of helicopters to attack armour was a “very powerful technique” to which Ukraine had no parity, said Stas, pleading for the west to provide Ukraine with US Apache attack choppers, in addition to F-16 fighter jets. “Manpads are not very effective at night,” said a Ukrainian air force pilot. “We need systems with detection and guidance — radar or optical-electronic systems,” the pilot added. The Alligator is also highly vulnerable to surface to air missiles when in range. Russia has lost at least 35 of them since February last year, according to Oryx, which documents equipment losses in the war. Colonel Yuriy Ignat, spokesperson for the Ukrainian air force, claimed four had been shot down in the last week. Ignat played down the threat from Russian attack helicopters during the counteroffensive. “The Ka-52 is absolutely not a helicopter that establishes air superiority,” Ignat said, nor did it deliver “the kind of firepower that is decisive on the battlefield”. The greater aviation threat to Ukraine’s forces came from Russian fighter jets which had more powerful radars and longer-range missiles than Ukraine’s older Soviet-built aircraft, Ignat said. __________ https://www.ft.com/content/d8fe8941-3703-433d-ac7a-dab9ba500481