Vanir Ausf B

It's going to be #2, obviously.

NATO standard

There's a lot we don't know, but satellite data suggests that the line of fortifications around Robotyne is the first of three "belts" (broadly speaking) between Ukraine's starting positions and Melitopol, and they are building more all the time. https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=1rRKs40IEbGRsV0Fhky25l5OkPJ_vUvQ

Cope cage on a Challenger? Sacrilege!

Ukraine needs more sappers. _____ In an urgent appeal to allies, Oleksii Reznikov told the Guardian his soldiers were unearthing five mines for every square metre in places, laid by Russian troops to try to thwart Ukraine’s counteroffensive. He said the vast minefields could be traversed, but that it was critically important that allies “expand and expedite” the training already being provided by some nations, including Britain. The number of sappers in the Ukrainian armed forces was nowhere near enough to get through the complex Russian defences on the vast 600-mile (1,000km) front, with mine clearing units targeted with heavy fire. Serhiy Ryzhenko, the chief medical officer of the Mechnikov hospital in Dnipro, where many of the most seriously wounded are treated, said he was receiving between 50 and 100 soldiers a day, with mines being second to artillery as the cause of their injuries. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/aug/13/ukraine-desperate-for-help-clearing-mines-says-defence-minister

It's not much of an exaggeration for the Republican period, at least up to about 100 BC. After the professionalization of the legions loyalties shifted significantly.

"Most of the prepared UA brigades have now been committed to the offensive according to my notes. There are reports of 46th Air Mobile Brigade and 82nd Air Assault Brigade at the frontlines." https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1690299316072587264

Maybe since June 5, but not recently.

F-16 training update: the first 6 pilots should be ready by mid-summer 2024. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/08/11/f-16-fighters-ukraine-training-delays/

The way it works is abstract and not intuitive, but there are sound reasons for it to be the way it is. I think the biggest problem is the official documentation is sorely lacking on details about how the C2 system works in-game, leaving players to make assumptions that are often not correct.

Contrary to speculation in that thread that this is a bug it is in fact WAD. My source for that is BFC

I'm not sure why he thinks that. Taurus has about the same range as Storm Shadow/SCALP EG, both of which out range ATACM.

The CM spotting model has a high degree of variability. It's just the way it is, and it's definitely WAD. That's not to say that tactics don't matter. They can weigh the dice heavily one way or the other but you can do everything right and still lose on bad dice rolls. That's X-COM Combat Mission, baby. Units share spotting information with other friendly units within about 32 meters (4 action spots). This doesn't happen instantly and it doesn't guarantee the enemy will be spotted by the unit receiving spotting information. Rather, it gives a 50% bonus to future spotting checks against that enemy unit. So again, bad dice rolls can still kill you and sometimes will. Also, this info sharing only matters if the receiving unit has not previously spotted that enemy unit or had C2 information on that unit shared with it, because after one of those things happens the friendly unit will have the spotting bonus for the rest of the scenario even if the relevant enemy unit moves to a different location.

The interviewed Lt. col. mentioned this recent Russian switch of targets. The Russians have adapted their tactics to avoid Patriot batteries, he said, focusing on striking cities far from the capital, such as Odesa, which are not yet covered. They are also upgrading old missiles with advanced technology and radar-absorbent skins. In recent weeks Moscow’s focus has been trying to take out the Ukrainian airfields from where British Storm Shadow missiles are launched, hitting command and logistical centres deep inside occupied territory. “The strikes on airfields are a tribute to Storm Shadow. Thank you very much, UK, because they really proved to be very effective. With Storm Shadow, you launch a trap missile and an anti-radar missile. All at the same time in the same direction. So the Russians, if they try to intercept Storm Shadow, get an anti-radiation missile hit on their radar. Plus traps. Very, very effective stuff.”

Relevant text: He disclosed that in December Ukrainian authorities had been on the brink of ordering the complete evacuation of Kyiv due to the intensity of Russian airstrikes. “Not many people know this, but Kyiv was on the verge of evacuation,” he said. “There was one battle that, in my opinion, determined the fate of Kyiv and the Russian campaign to destroy our energy sector, when 49 cruise missiles were launched at Kyiv.” In a desperate 15 minutes on December 16, Ukraine fired dozens of missiles from its Soviet-era S-300, American Nasams and German Iris-T systems to save the city from total blackout in freezing temperatures. “If we had allowed this strike to succeed, Kyiv would have had to be evacuated. And it is very difficult to evacuate two and a half million people,” the colonel said.

Interview with an unnamed Lt Col. in Ukraine's air defense command. Some interesting bits. Last December, prior to the arrival of Patriot missile batteries, the Ukrainians were considering the evacuation of Kyiv. Recent Russian Ka-52 loses are likely from British ASRAAM fired from trucks. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/russian-bombers-us-patriot-surface-to-air-missiles-ukraine-dh6x8vcgn

You mean this one? https://community.battlefront.com/topic/140931-how-hot-is-ukraine-gonna-get/?do=findComment&comment=2004579 Location doesn't match, and that tank was hit on the right side. I found two other videos of Lancet hits on Leo 2A6s but their locations don't match with Girkin's either. https://www.reddit.com/r/DestroyedTanks/comments/14601r1/leopard_2a6_abandoned_and_struck_by_lancet_drone/ https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/15h9rt2/german_leopard_2a6_tank_taken_out_by_the_lancet/

Speaking of language barriers...

F-16 training going nowhere fast.

https://time.com/6294670/us-strategy-ukraine-prioritizing-asia/ Caption reads "A M142 HIMARS launches a rocket on the Bakhmut direction on May 18, 2023 in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine."

Ukraine continues to cement their reputation as the Noah's Ark of military hardware. __________ Ruslan, a Ukrainian artillery commander, said the North Korean munitions were not favoured by his troops because of their relatively high dud rate, with many known to misfire or fail to explode. Most were manufactured in the 1980s and 1990s, according to their markings. One Ukrainian Grad unit member warned the FT not to get too close to the rocket launcher when the crew fired the North Korean munitions because “they are very unreliable and do crazy things sometimes”. https://www.ft.com/content/96e1f526-ae3d-4cff-bc37-8f9dd7d5975f

That dovetails with what "the academics" (well, some of them at least) have been saying: This war also reinforces the importance of experience. Ukraine’s army is now one of the most experienced in the world, but it still lacks experience co-ordinating offensive action on a large scale. What on paper is an attacking brigade of several thousand men is, in practice, a couple of reinforced companies of no more than a few hundred men each—a smaller force that struggles to establish superiority over entrenched defenders. Although Ukraine can conduct combined-arms assaults at the level of a platoon, this begins to come apart when attempting to scale up to the level of a company or battalion. Ukraine’s armed forces remain uneven because of losses and several waves of mobilisation. Experienced brigades can correct artillery fire and conduct reconnaissance and suppress enemy positions in advance of an attack. Newer units are unable to put those pieces together even when provided with the best Western equipment. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2023/07/28/franz-stefan-gady-and-michael-kofman-on-what-ukraine-must-do-to-break-through-russian-defences

ATACMs are off the table again. Or maybe they were never on it. _________ But U.S. defense and administration officials familiar with the issue said that despite what one called a growing public perception of “some sort of slow, gravitational pull” toward approval, there has been no change in U.S. policy and no substantive discussion about the issue for months. The Pentagon believes that Kyiv has other, more urgent needs than ATACMS, and worries that sending enough to Ukraine to make a difference on the battlefield would severely undercut U.S. readiness for other possible conflicts. The number of ATACMS in American stockpiles is fixed, awaiting replacement with the next generation, longer-range Precision Strike Missile, called the Prism, for PrSM, which is expected to enter service by the end of this year, officials said. Lockheed Martin still manufactures 500 ATACMS each year, but all of that production is destined for sale to other countries. “The problem now is not their ability to strike deep” into Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory, Kahl said. “They have that ability. They are doing it now. The Russian command and control, their logistics, have been disrupted in the deep.” “The problem is not a hundred kilometers away, it’s one kilometer in front of them with the minefields” https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/07/22/ukraine-us-long-range-missiles/

Thanks for that. Kofman does echo Gady's observations about how the UA operates. The key difference is that he doesn't see it as a problem in need of solving. In fact, he spends a good 5 minutes pooping on the whole idea of training the UA in AirLand battle.

That's a terrific podcast but I did not remember Kofman saying that. After reading your post I went back and re-listened to his sections and he never mentions the UA needing better training, or anything else about UA training. Maybe it was Lee or Alperovitch? If you can find it give me the time stamp, please. Kofman has been openly skeptical of the efficacy of western-style combined arms training for the UA since it's inception, so the idea that what the UA needs is more of it would be a rather un-Kofman thing to say no matter what his traveling companions may think. Here's something Kofman really did say about UA training by NATO forces back in December: Understand US is trying to find ways to improve outcomes and reduce UA dependence on high rates of arty fire. Less attrition, more maneuver. Training to do combined arms at company/battalion level is good in and of itself, but it won’t necessarily solve this problem. I have no doubt UA can learn combined arms maneuver, and saw elements of this at Kharkiv. However, without USAF air superiority, US logistics, C4ISR, etc it’s a bit hard to ‘fight like Americans.’ How well would we do without airpower? More importantly, it misses that attrition is what enabled maneuver in UA offensives. Against a well prepared defense, with sufficient density of forces, it wasn’t nearly as successful and casualties were high. This is why Kherson was so difficult compared to Kharkiv/Lyman. UA way of war depends on fires, exploited by maneuver. It is a successor military to the Soviet military, which was arty centric, and in that respect is much closer to the Russian military than our own. You have to work with what has proven successful for your partners. Deep strike, precision, better ISR, can help improve UA performance. My bias is that I’m wary of seeing a solution that implies trying to turn that military more into us. That said, there’s no easy answer here. The US is not optimized to support a protracted artillery-driven war in Europe. Folks can also judge for themselves, looking at the history how good we are at converting other militaries to ‘fighting more like Americans' https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1606637882994819072