c3k

Think drones the size of dragonflies, with cameras and low-power transmitters. They'd relay signals from one another until a ground station gets it. Try finding those at 100m. That is one idea that has been forwarded. Pervasive observation of the battlespace is a dominating concept. It has already been advanced far beyond what "reasonable" professionals imagined it could do when the idea was first put out. It will only get more and more powerful, useful, and survivable. Counters? Vehicles that don't look like vehicles, or one other (every vehicle is unique, so pattern recognition algorithms won't be able to spot them); emissions controls; kinetic and EW attacks; APS; etc. Anyone thinking UAVs aren't going to be a fixture for every future conflict is seriously deluded.

The human brain does not "work" in energy terms. Famously, during the US Civil War, I think the First Bull Run (when it was almost a social occasion as people flocked from D.C. to watch the first "real" battle), a group of Union officers were on a hilltop. An errant Confederate cannon ball (solid shot), came rolling along. One officer put his foot out to stop it. The cannonball took his foot off and kept going. His brain obviously saw speed and thought it was well within his physical "norms" to be able to stop it. Mr. Physics taught him an indelible lesson. The terms MJ are hard to internalize. The results, however, do tend to imprint upon one.

The time-sink is in the preparation. Me? I'd create a pinpoint location for each target AND I'd add a correction grid as an overlay around each target. Once that's done, THEN I'd perform the shoot. If the round misses, just note where on the correction overlay it landed, and you've got a near-instant correction to feed back to the firing element. At least, that's my amateur opinion on how I'd do it... I'm sure professional artillerists would find the above to be elementary and they alreadyhave a better system in place.

The good news? After all these poor souls are gone, getting back to the pre-2014 borders will be much easier with all the pro-Russians' lives having been expended by their masters in Moscow.

Nothing says "here's some love" like 8". Not sure if the daylight scenes are anything other than peacetime exercise? (I -know- the US had reasons for standardizing on the 155mm, but the 175mm and 203mm sure seem like they'd still be pretty useful.)

^^^ That is the crucial part of your cogent analysis. The pure length of the front the Russians have created is insane. They will, no doubt, try to smooth out the lines and reduce the linear distance...but that only changes the scale of the problem, not the problem itself.

The next phase of this war will be Ukraine pushing the Russians back. Obviously, the operational plan will not be a straight "push", but Ukraine will need to begin their own offensive. Steve has done some great work laying out why Russia is NOT the one with the manpower in this fight. So, using the 100,000 Ukrainian OR1 which will come into this fight...how's that going to work? Does Ukraine have uncommitted long-range systems? (Drones and arty, etc.) Or, are these 100,000 supposed to attack with their rifles and grenades? They must be integrated into a modern OFFENSIVE system. Current Ukraine forces are incredibly well-suited to the defensive fight against Russia's attack. As the Russian spearheads dig in, and Putin's generals reinforce the supply lines (with Syrians and Putinjugend?), the Russian lines will harden up. It's great that Ukraine has a vast reservoir of motivated fighters to call up. But just sending infantry in against the Russians is NOT the answer.

The Russian BTGs are kind of a hodgepodge of all of those types of vehicles. So, I'm not surprised to see them destroyed near each other, if caught on the move. Otherwise, I'd expect the resupply, indirect fire, and air defense vehicles to be "in the rear" (wherever that may be).

^^^ In Gulf War, allied air was able to create "gorilla" packages of ~80 aircraft and push in and destroy their targets. Russian air rarely practices more than a two-ship and the largest (parades excepted) would be a four-ship. It takes a lot of time and money to create proficiency in planning and executing a true air campaign, from the HQ down to the individual pilot. A -lot- of time and money...

Modern air defense certainly includes anti-missile defense. It's a little "cleaner" when looking at navies. What kind of defenses can the defending ship/flotilla/fleet put up? How many incoming missiles can they engage simultaneously, at what ranges, bearing, etc. That drives the number of missiles that will be launched to attack them. Unless your mission is just to deplete their defenses for the next attacker... For ground-based air defense, the mission is similar. It is harder to do, due to the dispersed nature of SAMs. (Or, at least, how they should be dispersed, and mobile.) It's harder to get the early warning, etc., as opposed to a ship with everything located on that same platform. But, yes, I am also impressed with how many incoming missiles the Ukrainian defenses have been able to intercept.

I think corruption goes down even lower. Platoon commanders can get ~50% pay bonus if they get some certifications...controlled by their company commanders. "So, yevgeni, sure, I'll sign you off for a 10,000 ruble increase, if you give me 3,000 of it." Since it's driven down to the platoon commander, how bad do you think it works on the conscripts in the squad? Yeah.

Radar is great...but raw radar returns are nothing but a noise-filled mess. All modern radars incorporate filters. That gives you a nice clean screen, but eliminates a lot of returns... Like birds. One common filter is a velocity-based one. Nothing below a certain speed is shown. Speed is determined by doppler effect. Filters are "notch" style (electrically speaking). That's why a common air combat tactic is to try to "doppler notch" your enemy's radar. If you are flying perpendicular to the emitter (e.g., enemy south of you, you're flying directly east), his radar filters will see 0 closure and filter you out. (<- Greatly simplified explanation and example.) Drones, slow enough and small enough, fall into the "noise" and get filtered out of returns. It takes specifically "tuned" radars to spot drones, and then of a certain size (and range, etc.). Using helos to shoot down drones would be incredibly difficult. Helos don't have air-to-air radar. So, finding the drone would be nearly impossible. Once found, to shoot it down, I refer you to WWI aerial kill rates: it would take a lot skill/luck to do so. How far away is the drone from the helo? Well...is it a big drone or a small drone? The larger, fixed-wing, drones could be vulnerable to this. But not anything smaller. Any shootdowns would be few and far between. IMO.

From release to impact, about 5 seconds. Drone height about 400 feet or 125m above the target. FWIW.

I cannot imagine any US squadron commander NOT flying combat missions (that's at the LTC level). Wing commander would do so, as well, but only on occasion (COL or one star)... (<- age and proficiency would limit the Wing commander. No one wants to be "that guy" who is a burden on his warfighters just to prove he can still go out.) So, no, I don't see it unusual that a Russian regimental commander (equivalent to US squadron commander) would be flying combat missions. That's what's meant by "leadership": get out there and LEAD.

The helos "loft bombing" their rockets: From the camera footage, it appears as if they both launched at similar angles and bearings from the same location. This is not "fire off my ammo and return". This is most definitely a long-range area-fire attack at a geographical target. Like, say, a city. The flare use and the approach, fire, and retreat were planned. This was a trained tactic (if not trained, then at least briefed on how to do it before they took off), not an off-the-cuff, let's just check a box and live to see tomorrow's sunrise type of move. Crumbling Empires If the Russian Doomsday plane has relocated, it's reasonable to think that Putin has hardened up, as well. Whether it be in a nuclear bunker in the Urals, or elsewhere. Pulling border troops from the edges of the empire to reinforce failure in Ukraine, reeks of desperation. Look at Belorus' open intransigence. The other satellite regions will note that this is a unique opportunity to get rid of Moscow's grip. Whether it takes form as open rebellion or just negotiating new terms on existing relationships is up to them to figure out. Oligarchs fleeing...because rats leave the sinking ship first. They know what's coming. Either Vlad is clinically insane and they fear nuclear war in Russia, or they think Putin will come for them....or Putin's enemies (after the coup) will come for them. Any way you slice it, those in position of power, knowledge, and ability, see that their time is Russia is at an end. Ukraine's stalwart defense has shaken the Russian Empire's foundations to their core.

At the very beginning of the footage, there is an explosion where the parallel road branches off from the main road. Regarding the running man: unbelievable that the hit and immediate brew up was survivable. But, apparently, it was. (No doubt with injuries, though.)

Gah. You are correct: I'm not sure where/why I thought it was top-attack. I'll go edit my post to reflect that correction. Thanks!

I think it's a combination: 1. Without knowing the actual numbers, I think there are fewer Javelins in-theater than Stugna-P. 2. Stugna-P is laser guided. Same ~5km max range. It is NOT fire-and-forget, and it is NOT top-attack. 3. Stugna-P is "safer" to fire. Remote launch, vs., over the shoulder. 4. Stugna-P gets set up in a static position: much easier opportunity to video and to watch the operator video link. Javelin, being shoulder-launched, the video opportunities are more fleeting, and the impact footage would be missing (depending on range and how many Russian tanks/IFVs are going to be looking for the launcher and shooting back.) That's my take on why aren't seeing as many (any?) Javelin launches/kills. Edited point 2 to reflect that Stugna-P is NOT top-attack. Thanks to @Lethaface for pointing that out.

Thanks. Regarding Russian dead/killed, I think the ~4-5000 is far too low. 10k dead, 30k wounded is where I think this sits today. Inertia will take this another two weeks before Russia collapses in combat. By then, I think 15-20k dead, 45-60k wounded. Unless the Russian forces just totally stop attacking and start mass surrendering/abandoning equipment and walking back to the border. This is nothing but a total debacle. The greatest strategic blunder since Teutoburger Wald?

This "special operation" that Putin has undertaken will lead to a total collapse of the Russian economy. How's that expansionism working now, comrade?

Look, ya'll know I'm all in for Ukraine. BUT...to prevent the echo chamber from occurring: why haven't we been posting/hearing about Ukraine combat losses? Sure, there are plenty of "look, bad Russki bomb babushka" (not making light of what Russia is doing) but, we have not seen or discussed the attrition/losses of the various Ukrainian forces here. Do we have a reliable estimate of Ukrainian losses? And, how do those affect combat effectiveness?

Great video showing the remote (25m?) location of the launcher vs. the control unit.

Interesting questions. To delve into the question about "light" infantry, dispersed, stopping mechanized forces, let's think about the requirements... 1. Widespread ATGMs 2. Long-range secure comms. 3. UAV/drones (whatever you want to call tactical, short-range (1-2km) remote controlled aerial vehicles. I like "drone") embedded within these teams. 4. Working in territory with freedom of movement/deployment. (Imagine the same battles taking place 30 miles from Moscow. How well would dispersed Ukrainian infantry fare while moving around Russian villages and towns?) 5. Permissive air support environment. (If Russia owned the airspace, these teams moving about would be easily found and engaged.) There is no doubt that the Ukrainian forces (Active, Reserve, and Territorial as well as motivated civilians) have performed magnificently. If another force tried to replicate the Ukrainian tactics, they could be countered. How? A. Active defenses against ATGMs mounted on all armored vehicles, capable of destroying top-attack munitions. B. Denying ATGM resupply. C. Massive air defense against drone targets. Sensing and engaging... Lasers would come into their own. As would EMP/EW. D. Only effective when the dispersed infantry are not spotted or supported by civilians. E. Aerial surveillance, drone, UAV, manned, coupled with air-to-ground freedom to engage (or long-range arty). Every group of people moving around or found gets fired upon. I do think the Ukrainians did a phenomenal job of studying 2014 and effectively determining what would happen next and how to counter it.

It seems to me that the Cathedral may very well have been the intended target of that attack.

Putin, in my opinion, is acting like any long-term dictator would when seeing that his country is faltering under his leadership. 1. Every member of the ruling class, down to about 3 levels (or more?) beneath him, is a potential threat or rival. 2. Foreign leaders and delegates are also enemies and need to be put at a psychological disadvantage. For those two reasons, Putin likes the "strong man" image and uses distance to reinforce his superiority over both groups. As well, distance makes it much harder to kill him. 3. Flight attendants can sit at normal distances. They are not a threat. In fact, he's trying to show "Papa Putin" image to them and the rest of the nation. That, to me, explains why he chooses the various seat placements.