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And how far down does a nation sink for police to shoot a suspect in the kneecaps?

I...literally...have no idea what you're talking about. Control vs. freedom has nothing to do with anything you've just written. There are no knots to be tied into. I'll leave this now. Happy to join in on a thread about how to measure political ideologies (NOT debate them, just how to compare them) if you choose to start one. Let's get back to the brave (freedom loving) Ukrainian fight against the Russian (controlled by an autocrat) invasion.

A much more useful measure of politics uses a different spectrum. (BTW, "right wing fascist" was a label used by the Communists in the '20s to differentiate two different forms of socialism). The spectrum to use is linear. On the far right is total individual liberty. Call it anarchism. On the far left is total government control. Using that, one can see that fascism, socialism, communism are much more closely related than democracies. There are variants on this, but freedom vs. control is a much more useful measure. It shows that "right wing fascists" are really just a form of left-wing totalitarianism. (And, boy, do they hate being reminded of that.) Back to the fight: Izyum is, once again, the focus of a huge offensive. This is key to Russia's move to try to encircle the Ukrainian salient just south of there. And what a great opportunity this presents. When the Russians attack, the Ukrainians can slaughter them. Post-war: Clearing out the Russians from the Luhansk/Donetsk/Crimea would be important. Would it be possible to tell the pro-Putinists living there that they need to move to Russia? Similar population shifts have occurred before.

All very true. It is VERY expensive to maintain an armed force at the levels that, say, the US does. In fact...no one else does. Look at Europe: tank fleets (of tanks equal to or better than the Abrams) number ~200 per country. The US has an active duty fleet of several thousand Abrams. And, as pointed out, it's not the metal, it's the meat. It takes a year (at most) to produce a modern weapon system. A new private? At least 18 years. After that, it takes about 4 years to get him proficient. Then, the cost to KEEP him proficient is equal to that initial cost. And that is a recurrent cost, year after year. It is MUCH cheaper to train some conscripts, mandate a year (or two, depending on Putin's mood and the Duma's feelings), then cycle 90+% out, only keeping a few. The whole Red Flag concept of training is being borne out in real time in the Steppes. The motivated, trained, military outperforms the larger, better equipped one that has poor morale and poor training. When you see the cost in blood, material, and national prestige that occurs on the battlefield when untried and poorly trained troops undergo combat, then those re-enlistment retention bonuses look pretty cheap when running defense budgets.

Exactly. That was my point...that Putin defines things in terms that no one else recognizes.

Sigh. I did not change my position. Putin is a dictator in all but name. Putin controls Russia. There are some institutions left that have a semblance of independence, but if push came to shove, Putin would co-opt them, directly or indirectly. Putin has the power (REAL power) to send conscripts into Ukraine. The law in Russia is a joke. If it affects Putin, then it becomes whatever he wants. If it does not affect him, then he doesn't care. Figments of the West's imagination: that the rule of law matters in Russia. Putin is calling it a "special operation". Is it that, or is it the invasion of one sovereign entity by another? To directly answer your question 1 is trivial. Putin can claim the "special operation" is an internal matter. That Ukraine is a breakaway republic subject to Russian laws and control. LOLz... (This is the PRC view of Taiwan, so there is precedent.) if Putin does that, then ipso facto, the borders of Ukraine actually become the borders of Russia IN HIS VIEW. Thereby allowing him to use new conscripts "within" the borders of Russia, to defend against a guerilla war funded and supplied by the Hitlerite West. 2. Putin is throwing everything he can at Donbas because he does not want to, nor can he afford to, lose face. When the Syrians, Chechens, and anything else he has FAILS to achieve that face-saving, then he will not hesitate to tell Russia that the Hitlerite West needs to be stopped in the breakaway republic of Ukriane (which he will sell to Russia that Ukraine is begging for Russia's help). Then he'll shove more bodies into the breach. Why is he not doing this already? Because up until the withdrawal from Kyiv, he's been living in fantasy-land. Now, perhaps, he sees how bad it is going. I'm really not sure why you think I've changed my position about Putin being a dictator and having the ability to send Russian conscripts into battle in Ukraine. Will there be difficulties with doing so? Of course. But he has the capability. What am I missing that has you so put out by my comment?

Nice catch. Nice vids. I'm a beta. Consider it reported. (FWIW, I'll run a test, myself, so I have a savegame and then send it up.)

Agree with the friction and other difficulties. The biggest issue? Putin's ego. If he thinks he's losing, and the only way to shore up the invasion is to pile Russian bodies against the bulwarks, I see him doing exactly that. I do not foresee the Ukrainian military having the offensive capability to push Russians out of their country...as long as the Russians just sit on the defensive. They (Russians) have been vulnerable only on the attack or when their LOCs are exposed (salients, probes, unconsolidated ground behind them). I think the Donbas will resolve into a positional warfare situation, with attrition, not maneuver, being the prime characteristic. That will play into Putin's hand.

Perhaps my understanding is not as deep as I thought? to @The Steppenwulf Glad to know the conscript use is just a "promise". Let's see what Putin does when the losses in the Donbas can no longer be sustained with the force-in-being as it was when it invaded.

My point is that the only thing keeping Putin from deploying conscripted Russians into the attack on Ukraine is that there is a Russian law prohibiting such a thing. Do you, or does anyone, think that Putin would let some words on paper keep him from his goal? That he'd rather be embarrassed, stymied, undermined, perhaps overthrown, than ignore a law? A law passed by a system which he controls? And, whatever his excuses to use conscripts, if the West or anyone else (as if there is any effective internal resistance left in Russia) cries "foul", he'll resort to his usual threats. So, I think I do have a deep understanding of how Putin can leverage his nation's manpower so he would not lose face. Much like the West looked aside as he invaded in 2014 (tourists, little green men, Tigres from ebay, etc.) he'll toss out a facile excuse (Ukraine is a rogue province (hey, it's working for China vis a vis Taiwan)) and expect the West to look at their feet, mumble excuses, and not do anything. The current modus operandi of the West supplying Ukraine with light weapons has not yet changed. Will it? I don't know. But I do know that Putin is a tyrant and that he can do what he wishes and just has to cloak it in the thinnest garb for it to be accepted by Russia.

Putin, conscripts, Russian law, and declaring war. Those are all just figments of the West's imagination. Putin could just wave his hands and say, "The Ukraine is a region of Russia undergoing rebellion. We gave them some loose abilities to govern themselves and now the Hitlerites have taken over. This is an internal security matter. There is no need to declare war, nor does the West have any say on what happens. Or I'll nuke everyone." That would allow conscripts to flood the zone. (Weaponry would be an issue.) Moving the shattered BTGs from Kyiv up to the other border locations seems like a good idea (from the Russian perspective). It allows fresh troops to move to the Donbas, allows the remnants time to consolidate, and keeps some security around the periphery.

It's a good thing that Russia doesn't maintain a veto power... Oh, wait.

Ballpark numbers... Military age males are about 10% of the total population according to that. That graphic says total is ~146 million, so MAMs number about 15 million. If Russia has suffered 15,000 KIA and another 45,000 WIA, that's a mere 60k from that manpower barrel. Given that a society cannot draft 100% of the MAM into combat, unless the end is nigh (see Third Reich, about February of 1945), then let's say about 1/3 can be used. 5 million available, 60k casualties. Russia can dig a lot deeper. Can Putin survive if Russia digs deeper? Aye, now there's the question... Edited to add: and, what the hell are they going to equip them with??? I'll bet the new conscripts will have thought the days of, "grab the weapon of the man ahead of you when he falls" was behind them.

Got it, thanks. The withdrawal was announced prior to occurring...which is odd. (If I've got my timeline correct.) If the best conventional Ukrainian units are in the Donbas, then that means Kyiv (<- trying to keep up with the "new" spelling in English) was a classic holding action with tier-2 units. That would explain the inability to pocket/cutoff the retreating Russians. To me, that Russian penetration was ripe for some large-scale surrenders. However, as you state, the distances the Russians needed to cover to get back into protected space were not far. And, they prioritized their VDV... The speed of the Russian withdrawal was an obvious factor mitigating against a Ukrainian kesselschlacht. (Gotta love the German combat vocabulary. ) It was good to see some Russian units divested themselves of EVERYTHING. Referencing the swimmers. About the need to consolidate and rest before going back into battle, I'd think just a few days in Belarus, a day to travel to a border location near east Ukraine, meet there with new supplies/equipment which used their delay in Belarus to get shipped to that rendezvous, and then a few days to get sorted with it. That's ~7-10 days before you'll see them back in combat, by my estimation. VDV maybe sooner. As Kinophile posted (among others), the Donbas represents a different problem for Ukraine. Hopefully, their offensive systems are up to challenge. Putin/Russia will not withdraw voluntarily. They'll have to be pried out and destroyed and whatever remnants sent back over the pre-2014 borders. Luhansk/Donetsk will be another problem. Crimea, even greater. This war will not end in just a few months. Until Russia is economically devastated as a consequence of Putin's aggression, this will just occur again after Russia re-arms. And, Putin will need to be tossed out. His pride is such that he will not admit defeat. (<- total armchair psychology).

Looking at these, I'm surprised by the choice of storage location for the RPG:

The Russian retreat from Kiev. Yes, it was a defeat, and yes, some rearguards seemed to be in a rush. What is of interest to me, is the apparent lack of Ukrainian offense displayed. There were no pockets formed, no cutoffs. Were some retreating convoys harassed and fired upon? Yes, but that seems to be the limit of what occurred. Unless I've missed a massive amount of information being relayed from the area (hey, it is possible), it is disturbing (not quite alarming) that the Ukrainian armed forces seemed to be either unable or unwilling to interdict, destroy, encircle, or press the retreating forces. What does that matter? Well, it matters because those Russians were pulled out to reinforce the Donbass region. The Russians have gained territory. If the Ukrainian military is unable/unwilling to generate offensive combat during a retreat, how will they fare against an entrenched enemy? Posting these thoughts because I'm (hopefully) missing something here.

Referring to the Russians wanting a Javelin, from a supposed Ukrainian black market. Since China has been producing their own version of the Javelin, the HJ-12 (export version is HJ-12E) beginning ~2014, I would only assume that Russia has some samples at hand already.

Well, they are being redeployed because the attack on that axis has failed. That is, I think, the interpretation everyone is using. Since some of these units have already been found fighting on the east side, they have not just been withdrawn, but are actually back in the fight.

Maybe that's the problem...

"Traitor" is a fraught word when applying it to a military officer in time of war. Being dismissed is an odd punishment: I'd think execution would be in the cards... Of course, in a country like Ukraine, these men and their families are now going to have to flee. Is that really what Zelensky wants? Again...odd to just dismiss.

Some points... 1. Yes, I do think that there is widespread Russian public support for this invasion. The Russian media and other state organs have been influencing the population to think this way. 2. Ukraine will not stop until the last Russian is out of Ukraine (yes, this includes Donetsk and Luhansk and Crimea). 3. As evidenced by the strike on Belgorod, Ukraine is willing to attack targets inside Russia. (Seems more than fair since units inside Russia have been striking Ukraine since 2014.) 4. Russia will not cede anything while Putin is in office. (Every good dictator needs an external, existential, threat.) 5. Russia/Putin cannot be trusted in any way. Cease fire? Pull back? De-militarized zone? They would all be lies and just a tool to allow Russia to re-arm and ready themselves to re-attack. Nothing negotiated can be trusted. ^^^ This adds up to a much longer war than just a single combat season. Ukraine (and the West) would be insane to think that it'll all be over once the last Russian unit (or tourist or green man) has been pushed back over the pre-2014 border.

Vlad said that the Russian infantry is cowards. That the tanks LEAD the attacks and the infantry FOLLOWS. That as soon as the vehicles pass, the Ukrainians then attack the Russian infantry, who retreat. (Standing in front of a destroyed tank, the assumption is that after the Russian infantry is dead or has gone, the tanks are rife for ambush.)

The NLAW pic/video... It looks like it hit the machinegun. Notice (in the video) how it has spun from the rear to the 3 o'clock position.

At the 6-second mark, the monitor has distinct arabesque writing on the bottom. That is puzzling to me.

Full territorial integrity...including Crimea. Russian (and Belorussian) military units at least ~25 miles on the far side of their borders. Reparations. Then, after 2-5 years of "good behavior", signed off by Ukraine, international sanctions can be lifted. (Yeah, I'm in a dream world.)