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Skipper

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Everything posted by Skipper

  1. Sometimes people ask whether soviet soldiers used captured german RPGs. They obviously did, as evidenced by this picture: The caption says: "Private Vataman clubbed 10 hitlerites with a faustpatron in hand-to-hand fight." [ 06-05-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]
  2. Roksovkiy: If your nick is after Marshall of Soviet Union K.K.Rokossovskiy, check your spelling. Then we'll talk.
  3. SU-76M had ZIS-3 gun as well. Only 170 original SU-76s were produced, and after "trial by fire" this design was modified to SU-76M, which became the second largest AFV manufacturing program in USSR after T-34. There was also ZIS-30 SPG with 57mm ZIS-2 gun, about a hundred produced.
  4. > I have some printed sources at home that > also state a ROF of between 1 and 2 per > minute. For the tank(IS-2 or IS-122), yes. For the SPG on same chassis with same gun (ISU-122) - no, owing to the second loader and much bigger combat compartment (superstructure). [ 06-04-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]
  5. > There's some doubt about just who blew up > those buildings that provoked the 2nd > Chechenya invasion. It was very, very > convenient timing for the powers-that-be. BS. It was "provoked" by the failed chechen invasion of Dagestan. Miitary action of some kind was clearly necessary even before that. By the way, contrary to popular belief, Chechnya was not conquered, but joined Russia by the way of treaty some 300 years ago. Chechen elders made an oath on Holy Quran to the russian tzar. Mainly they promised to stop stealing people, cattle and property. What Russia wanted from them in 1999 was more or less the same thing. Blowing those buildings was a negotiating tactic (exactly the same tactic as palestinians try on jews these days). Unlike modern day jews, Russia dealt with this tactic directly. Of course, it was an obvious thing for chechens to blame this on evil KGB.
  6. Rune, what I am saying does not contradict what your quote is saying. Here's why: > Further, after the first encounters of the > IS-2 with German heavy tanks, it turned > out that its pointed 122 mm AP round - the > BR-471 - could only penetrate the frontal > armour of a Panther within 600-700 metres. SU-122 that I was talking about was armed not with D25T gun, but with M-30 howitzer. The latter had no AP round at all (for apparent reasons). Hollow charge round for it was produced from May 1943. Btw, there is at least one known german account of a Tiger KO'd by SU-122 earlier than that - multiple HE (plain HE, not HC) hits. > After this, it produced only the IS-122 > with the new 122 mm gun D-25T with a wedge- > shaped semi-automatic breech, which > allowed an increased rate of fire from 1- > 1.5 shots per minute to 1.5-2 shots per > minute IS-122 was a tank. We were talking about self propelled guns. The key difference was tha SPGs had two loaders, whereas IS-122 had only one. I think, that's where most of the confusion is coming from. [ 06-04-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]
  7. Oh, yes, all these SPGs (except SU-100) had a separated round and two loaders.
  8. Of course, SU-100 was a better tank killer than SU-122 and SU-152. For a simple reason that the gun it carried was developed as an AT gun in 1944, and the whole thing is primarily a long range tank killer. OTOH, SU-122 is a 122mm field howitzer on a tank chassis, developed for taking out fortified MG nests and such. They did have a HEAT round which could KO pretty much anything germans fielded during 1942, but due to a slow initial speed (it is a howitzer, after all) it was extremely difficult to hit anything with it from any but close distance. Mattias: The pictures are from http://armor.kiev.ua. It is all in russian, but it has a huge number of pictures like this, for a huge variety of armored vehicles from WWI till today.
  9. err... would anyone mind tranbslating it to english?
  10. Zveroboy. But that's nickname of SU-122, iirc. This beastie: [ 06-03-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]
  11. The lower photo is ISU-122 in Lodz, Poland, 1945. ROF of ISU-122S with well trained crew achieved 5 shots per minute.
  12. I think you stated that ISU-152 had rate of fire something like 1 shot in 1.5 minute. I have a contradicting informtion,. Namely: Voznyuk, Shapov "Bronetankovaya tehnika", 1987; quoted from http://armor.kiev.ua/Tanks/index.html (in Russian) +++ Heavy SPG ISU-152 (1944) Heavy self-propelleg gun ISU-152 (photo 79) differs from SU-152 only in the chassis, which was from hevy tank IS-2. Combat compartment of this machine had a 152 mm gun-howitzer ML-20. Ammo load, consisting of 20 separated rounds, included HE rounds of 43.5 kg and AP rounds of 49 kg weight. Rate of fire was 2...3 shots per minute. Except the 152 mm gun-howitzer, this SPG, as well as its predecessors, had a 12.7 mm AAMG. +++ So, are you sure? [ 06-03-2001: Message edited by: Skipper ]
  13. > Might be nice when you target an enemy > unit that in addition to the "Use Main Gun > Y/N?" dialogue, you also got one that > reads "Use .50 Y/N?" That's gamey. IMHO, when an unbuttoned TC sees a soft target at an appropriate range, he would normally shoot without much thinking about ammo conservation.
  14. FAEs can do parking lots (helo pads, at least), but they are post WWII.
  15. > but my 32meg Nvidia TNT2 was about 66 > dollars and it works for any game I've > tried so far Ditto! More than enough performance for your list of games, and great compatibility.
  16. > you should use the word offensive. Sovet sources call this whole story "operation". > It was clearly not a single "attack" that > got blunted and then abandoned. Of course not. But it was all carried out by the same two fronts. > They could have taken Finland out of war > simply by accepting the old (pre winter > war) borders. This is all Finland wanted. This apparently was not an option in Stalin's view. I still think that he started the whole 1940 affair primarily to push the border further west. > Why all this trouble? The Soviet Union had > to have something more in mind. Maybe, but not necessarily. It looks like something we'll never know. > March/April terms were not quite achieved. Yup. When you sell something, your first quote is always above your bottom line. > But had the opportunity presented itself, > I don't think the Soviet Union would have > refrained from capturing the "centers of > political and economic activity" Shtemenko > talks about. Affordable opportunity. I fully agree. Consensus, consensus!
  17. > I think the rate of success adcheived > depends which set of objectives you use, > the ones set before the attack or the ones > set after the attack had stalled. No, those intial objectives were set in the planning stage. Particularly: Tasks 7th Army - 23-24.06 to capture Olonets, then advance on Sortavala and by 2-4.7 to capture Pryazha, Kolat Selga, Pitkyaranta. 32nd Army - 23.6 to capture Medvezhyegorsk, by 29.6-1.7 to capture Krasnyy Pakhar' area (Porosozero), Koykary, Kondopoga. Both armies to capture Petrozavodsk. Actual results Olonets was captured on 25.6; Petrozavodsk on 28.6; the rest of the above listed locations - by 30.6; except Krasnyy Pakhar'.
  18. > So when the dogs were let got on the > battlefield and they were given a choice > between a T34 or a PzIII to run for, > well... At the time this program was tried, I dont think they had a choice very often. Soviet troops saw own tanks very rarely then.
  19. > They might have considered it [Vyborg- > Petrozavodsk operation] a success. They actually didn't - I am corrected. First stage went according to the plan, second went wrong. One thing demonstrated by 1940 was that RKKA formations badly lacked mobility. Ie, there were fast tanks, but there weren't any means to haul infantry, artillery and supplies around with the same speed. And you can't put an infantry squad on a T-26 or a BT-5 as riders - those were too light for that.
  20. > Just wait to CM 2 comes out and russian > Rifle Bn's can have 3 platoons of 3 > mortars each in most cases!! During liquidation of the encircled 6th army in Stalingrad, it was calculated that KA had one artillery tube per two infantrymen. > it was their main, virtually only on-call > arty. Just the same as for the Germans. Especially if you include soviet guards mortars and german 6-tube mortars in that statement. Regimental guns were mainly used for direct fire, and larger calibers - in preparatory fires and counterbattery work.
  21. killmore: >1) Before winter war Finns started to build >a huge defense line with long range guns - >Soviets thought it was a threat to them. Mannerheim line itself had field guns, not long range. Long range (naval) guns were in other places. I dont think these could reach Leningrad, either. The perceived threat was not the LR artillery, but the fact that an attack launched from the pre-1940 border had very good chance to capture Leningrad and cut Murmansk railroad in a matter of days. Both were extremely vital from soviet military planners point of view. Besides, Finnish Gulf islands could effectively lock soviet Baltic Fleet within the harbour. Only prototype KV (five different prototype KVs, iirc) took part in 1940 war. The most successful tool for taking out bunkers turned out to be a high caliber (152mm or more) gun in direct fire mode, concrete piercing round. zahl: Shtemenko is the book I dream to put my hands on. As I understand it now, what Meretskov tells in his book was the objectives for the first stage (which was more or less successfully achieved). 1944 operation actually had further goals, which were not achieved. So, what is the final conclusion about strategic outcome of 1944 fighting? Soviet primary goal in that sector clearly was to take Finland out of war, thus releasing several armies for operations in West and South West directions. That's why peace negotiations took place both in April and in August '44. Ie, right from the start, Stalin was prepared to accept an armistice. This objective was achieved, and it was enough. Secondary objective was to encircle and destroy finnish main forces, which could have led to a possibility of occupation. Which did not happen, and this was essentially blamed on Meretskov and his subordinates. As for 1940 campaign, it still seems to me that after Mannerheim line was breached, there was a possibility of occupation, which soviet side did not exploit for reasons well beyond the military domain.
  22. > This is why the Nazis and the Bolsheviks > hated each other so much: because they > realized how similar they were, and > neither one could stand heretics. Wrong. From all accounts, they hated each other because they had extremely different ideologies. Otherwise, both Stalin's USSR and Hitler's Germany were despotic state regimes - which accounts for the similarities you listed. > they're not perfect by any means, but > they're usually tolerable. > Perhaps you have a different opinion. I have a first-hand experience of living in USSR, and I do have a different opinion. I would live there, and there are many enough republics where I would not. In fact, they are probably more numerous than those, where I would. Republican democracy works for North America and Europe - fine. It doesnt work for, say, Africa. Whether it'll work for Russia is an open question.
  23. > I will have to disagree with you on tanks > having a large effect on the war against > Chechnia. Especially the first war. Their presence pretty much determined that insurgents had to withdraw from "proper war", which they initially attempted to wage, both in 1995 and 2000. Guerilla warfare has as many disadvantages, as advantages for them. To use CM analogy, imagine that we you have to assault on a map which sports an impassable ridge across most of the map, with a narrow passage in the centre. So, you are forced to go through this passage, with all the relevant consequences. To say that tanks were unimportant to chechen war is same as to say that this ridge was unimportant to the scenario. But, on top of that analogy, there were many enough tactical engagements with tanks involved.
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