The_Capt

I really do not think the US or China are in a good position for a major economic war at this point. Both are in post-COVID recovery. I think China can push...but just enough. Same goes for the US but maybe can push a little bit harder. As to NATO/western arming up and re-thinking...too late. I think this is why China is actually internally PO'd at Putin for starting all this, and then getting bogged down. Of course us re-arming is going to mean buying more stuff from the Chinese (like steel).

China is in a weird spot. They need Russia weak and dependent so they continue to have access to cheap energy (and maybe the odd land grab). But they do not want Russia to totally win, it would 1) really set off the US and West, and 2) A re-energized Russia doesn’t sell cheap energy as easily. And then they do not want Russia to completely fail and fall apart - see access to cheap energy. They are kinda threading a strategic needle like we are, but from the other direction. If they had to accept “less” from their perspective it is likely a Russian short win the West signs off on. They avoid economic punishment from the West and still have a shot to access cheap energy because a Russian short win would likely still see the West no longer buying said cheap energy. Whereas the West likely wants a Ukrainian short-win. Russia taught a visible lesson and still in penalty box. But in a slow decline, not a full on freefall. And China’s problem in the longer term.

It has been remarkable to watched unmanned systems evolve in this war. We started with them being employed as mass ISR, which frankly would have been enough to move the needle. Then the days of gravity dropped mortars and ICMs. Then the wave of FPVs, to the point they are beginning to rival indirect fires. UGVs have made an early appearance. And now the possible emergence of full autonomy. All in two short years. We may see anti-drone drones used at scale before this is over. Swarms of fully autonomous anti-radiation UAS could be a game changer. Ukraine stood up a separate Unmanned Service as a result of this war and it will be interesting to see if any western militaries follow suite. I suspect we are seeing a greater emergence of what Information Age warfare really means and it will change this terrible business in ways that we probably can barely imagine.

And even if a drone did not get it the EW beast is going to be the prime target for ATGMs. I see no way to wrap enough around or on tanks to really get what we need out of them anymore. Sniping, glorified infantry guns and indirect fire seem to be how they are being employed in this war. No one has been able to mass them and use them for manoeuvre, breakout or breakthrough. This means that one of the pillars of the combat arms is essentially been broken. Air denial means air-land is also out. I simply cannot see how a US or western ground force is going to far any better against an opponent armed with thousands of drones. Especially if they have fully autonomous capabilities. I suspect we will create drone swarms to kill their drone swarms so our mech and armor can do their thing. Until someone figures out that if we have defeated their drone swarms, why not just send in more swarms to kill them too. I don’t think heavy is going to die because they can die or war is lethal. I think it will die because we are seeing the beginnings of something that can get the job done faster and better.

Are we talking fully autonomous when they say "machine eye"?

This is a bit of an unknown right now. We saw how the RA had to dramatically shift its logistical system when HIMARs were introduced in the Fall of ‘22. I suspect that the UA is still using them and other long range strike assets to keep RA logistics hopping but we really do not see a lot on this from open source. The RA cannot really use mass above the company/Bn level right now, so I suspect they are under pressure from deep strike on any massing of logistics as well. My guess is that the Russians have spread out and thinned out in order to defend a really long front line. And they only concentrate in small bursts to keep pressure on limited tactical objectives. If one looks at Oryx we can see that Russia has lost around 3200 logistics vehicles (including 175 fuel trucks!). That number is higher than tank losses. So clearly the UA has been effectively targeting logistical lines to effect. Finally, this is one of the primary reasons I suspect that we are not seeing Russian breakouts. To do so would mean creating and protecting a long support line, which will likely be cut to pieces by long range strike assets. This could actually expose any break out force to being cut off and wiped out. Both sides in this war have taken the safer path of incremental bites in hopes the other side folds back.

If that is his point then he is definitely not a SME in this business. It was a small miracle that Ukraine survived Feb-Apr ‘22 and managed to repel those initial Russian assaults. Somehow crushing the RA to the point they would never come back is not a reasonable expectation given conditions. The RA was severely damaged and still pivoted down south. To attrit the RA past the point where they could do that, given the depth of reserves in Russia, means that the only way to effectively knock Russia out of the war in the first three months militarily would have meant offensives into Russia itself. Ukraine did not have the capability nor allied support for such an operation. As to “strategy” vs “tactics” - the first one is about theory, the second about application. The middle, operational, is about keeping those two in the same room and on speaking terms. Not sure how that applies here.

Can't see the thread but looking at his posting stream I am not ready to add him to my list of "trusted SMEs" anytime soon.

I think it is the “just one more push” mentality. The Russian theory of success here is that Ukraine will eventually run out of capability to resist. They need to keep pushing to that end. I am also sure there is a dimension of “must continue to demonstrate offensive action” to reinforce the narrative of “Russia cannot be beat”. So here we are.

Looks like the UA as figured out mines.

This is not the first time we have seen evidence that the Russians are depleting their Soviet legacy reserves to stay in this war. The slow but steady downgrading of equipment and troop quality is consistent. The impact on this war are yet unknown. Are Ukraine and Russia in a “race to the bottom”? Not if the West can get its act together and ramp up production of modern systems. We can easily crush Russia in a modern force generation war, the real question is whether or not we are willing to do it. The “so what?” for the next war is that Russia as a regional threat (side stepping the nuclear equation) has been demonstrably reduced. The spectre of hordes of T62s and T55s is laughable in this day and age. Russian military production is constrained and they are not going to be able to rebuild a modern offensive force quickly. In fact we are not even sure what a modern offensive force really looks like but I do feel safe to say it is not whatever Russia has left. Next gen will demand higher levels of technology: unmanned air and ground, distributed space based capability, AI supported C4ISR, PGMs everywhere. All that takes a lot of investment and pivoting for a Russian military industrial complex designed to make tanks and IFVs. This projects Russia into a serious security dilemma after the war: completely re-tool after the war, or stick with former conventional metrics and try to rebuild what hey had on 21 Feb 22. In both cases they are heavily burdened by western sanctions and pressures. Neither is a great option or easily done in anything less than a decade. Another metric that Russia has essentially “lost” this war - they have likely dramatically reduced strategic post-war options as a result of this as opposed to expanding them.

But isn’t a “domestic” enemy someone whose position is forbidden? There weren’t a lot of protections granted communists in the US back during the Cold War. For example, if one was a firm communist they were not going to be employed within the defence department. Roll forward to modern era, devoted fundamentalist Muslims did not fare much better. This “freedom” concept really appears to be selective when viewed through a historic lens. Sure, a US citizen can be free to express whatever they wish, but to do so without consequences from both private and public sectors has clearly been demonstrated as false. Once a society allows for negative consequences as a result of free speech or association, it is no longer “free”. This inconsistency appears migratory and frankly unfairly applied historically. Try being a black civil rights movement in the 1930s in the South. Not a whole lot of freedom of speech and association in that period for that demographic. LGBTQ in the 50s? So what, as it relates to this war and situation? Within the US, and other modern democracies, I do not think this is a case of “autocratic control” but you are very correct in calling it out as a slippery slope. I think it is a case of “when does speech and association become a threat to national security?” When is it honest political discourse in an open and fair democracy, and when does it become too dangerous to tolerate? Obviously sharing information on how to build and deploy a WMD should not be covered in “freedom of speech”. Nor should sharing of classified information. But when does political discourse cross that line? The US currently has elected officials who are pretty actively supporting a foreign powers agenda. To the point that they are blocking military aid to an ally in the middle of an existential war. At what point does this stop being “open and free political discourse” and become “paid foreign lies by a domestic enemy?” I honestly do not know. I have watched my country wrestle with this. I think our “hate speech” laws are in fact dangerous. But clearly there is a point, even within free democracies where we cannot tolerate free expression. For this war, where that line is drawn could very well impact its outcome and what the region looks like.

Ok, that is a hat wearing a hat. Just trying too hard.

If valid - this my friends it what drone superiority looks like.

Each to their own. However, I will disagree if people start to frame this war as a lost for Ukraine if they somehow fail to accomplish this. Restoration of 1991 borders has been a larger long term objective of Ukraine. To my mind “above and beyond” this specific war itself. If it can be done through this war, absolutely great. If it cannot, we should not have another parade through here of politically motivated trolls declaring this war a net loss because they are unable to accomplish a goal that they never really were planning to accomplish through this war in the first place. Further, there is risk assigning it as a current war goal. This could be twisted into some sort of Ukrainian conspiracy to start this war and drag the West into supporting them to re-take back to 1991. There is no evidence of this and I honestly doubt it was what Ukrainian political leadership were thinking on 23 Feb 22. Now where it may be a goal is for the West, as we are more likely to benefit for a hard re-set in line with the rules going all the way back to the violations of 2014. But I am not sure it is what we had in mind from the offset either.

The only reason I leave this off the list is that it really was not an initial strategic objective for Ukraine going into this war. I think it evolved out of realizing that they might be able to pull it off. Much in the same way that Russian strategic objectives of “take the Donbas and de-Nazify” are also off the list. I would not let Putin or Russia off the hook on some re-drawn objectives, and I am not really comfortable with putting Ukraine on a hook for 1991 borders. But hey if they can pull it off, more power to them. Personally, I am not sure it is entirely a good idea at this point - we have had long discussions on the potential serious pain of reintegration on these break aways. But that is really a Ukrainian decision. Now whether the West will support this stretch objective is an open question. I think if the UA got the momentum we would get onboard. Further if Ukraine can get enough moment it won’t even need western assistance to roll the RA all the way back. Of course for this to happen we are basically talking a full on Russian collapse. As we have also discussed this also comes with some significant risks.

And also “absolutely”. We should track loses, terrain etc as exactly that, indicators. In sums they can signal trends, which are extremely important for telling wind directions. Where things get weird is when people take these trends as actually metrics of victory and/or defeat. Adiivka was a long brutal tactical offensive that really has not yielded an operational consequence, at least not yet. It is a data point within the war. Not a fundamental sign any one side is “winning or losing”. Ironically, those using Russian advances over the winter as an indicator that “The Hot Thread Has No Clothes” are using “heuristics”. Which we have been all schooled upon as our own original “sin.” The reality is that we need to see operational level decisions that change strategic options before we can say the tide is shifting. If Russia could have translated Adiivka into an operational manoeuvre and was at the gates of Kharkiv right now, with a view to splitting Ukraine in half…well then we are definitely into “uh, ok something has really shifted here” territory. Ukraines strategic options would be collapsing in this scenario, which to my eyes is a real metric. Taking Adiivka or Bakhmut as signs of Russian winning, resolve or invincibility, only demonstrates a serious lack of understanding how war actually works. And strangely, where were these people when Ukraine was making similar small limited tactical gains last summer? Oh wait, they were here crowing about how “Ukraine is done!” There is a clear double standard in some western political circles. And this part really makes me angry. Real people are suffering and dying in the largest conventional war we have seen in a long time. And the first thing some people are doing is viewing it through the “I will do the opposite of what the other political party is doing because they cannot win.” Not what is morally right or wrong. What is best for their personal political calculus. That is what really makes me react to these trolls. They do not have the best interests of anyone at heart, but their own. It is an extremely selfish way to approach something as brutal and unjust as this war.

On victory and defeat - because it is the basis of so much “proof” on the opposing sides of this thing. In warfare victory and defeat are very slippery concepts. One can win a war by all metrics and wind up losing in the long run (see European Allies after WW1 and 2). The vice versa is also possible (see Japan). So whenever someone jumps in with the “Ukraine is obviously losing, Russia is winning” or vice versa, without clearly defining what that means, I get suspicious. For now the best way to try and determine what victory/defeat means in this war, one needs to come to a common understanding of what the initial political and strategic goals of this war for each side were and were not. When I am looking at the “winning/losing” equation I am using the following objectives. For Ukraine: - the survival of the state as independent and sovereign. - the creation of a narrative of effective resolve and resistance that draws in international support. - shape and set the conditions for enduring security integrity at wars end (this one is key to effective reconstruction and recovery). For Russia: - the complete political absorption control of Ukraine as a vassal state or sub-state. - a clear demonstration of Russian power within its Near Abroad designed to push back on Western encroachment and reinforce the notion that other states within this region need to “stay in line”. This one plays to both external and internal audiences. - any and all erosion of NATO unity and resolve, as well as a draw back of US influence in the region. For the West (we often forget we have a win/lose calculus here as well): - A clear demonstration of the western rules based international order. Russia must be forced to get back in line and face punitive measures for an illegal invasion that violates the rules we constructed. To this end we support Ukraines objectives; however, we do not need all of them in full to achieve ours. We do need a clear demonstration of western unity and resolve as a foundational underpinning for that western rules based order. - Any opportunities to expand western influence and control - see Sweden and Finland. - the reduction of Russia as a security threat to Europe and globally. - Avoid a catastrophic collapse of Russia at all costs as it would make the overall regional situation, and possibly global one much worse. You will note that for me none of these are tied directly to lines on the ground. I do not believe that where this war ends drive those strategic objectives (within reason of course - if Russia takes Kyiv the viability of Ukrainian state is greatly diminished). By my metrics, Russia has already pretty much “lost” this thing. They can hold onto to what they have now but none of their strategic objectives are accomplished. They end the war in worse position than when they started it. Their only Hail Mary is that western support and attention dries up over time and they can exploit that to try and pull this one out of the dumpster. The odds of full Russian control over Ukraine by this point are pretty damn low. Much worse than at wars beginning. Ukraine has two out of three, that last one of setting conditions for enduring security has not been accomplished. Ukraines long game is to enter into western economic and security mechanisms. They definitely have earned that but we have the thorny issue of Russia still able to make trouble and project that into Ukraine. We can live with a level of this a la South Korea, but I suspect we will need this thing to hold more water to work. The West is doing well but we are not there yet, and things could still go bad quickly. We definitely have shored up influence, control and unity. And we have managed to reduce Russian threats pretty significantly as the Russian military has been shattered. What we do not have are the conditions for long term stabilization. Russia is neither a zero-threat nor stable in the long term. So to summarize…on victory/defeat so far: Russia - nope. Ukraine - OK, but not there yet. West - meh, so long as we don’t blow the whole thing up. I hope this is useful for the next time someone rolls through here with “well obviously Russia is winning” due to some headline about a tactical twitch somewhere. They likely are not using the same metrics I do and in many cases have ulterior motives for painting this war in a certain light.

Honestly I am really not understanding your point here. What am I supposed to disagree on? Territorial integrity for Ukraine means that Ukraine law can be applied across that territory without foreign interference and the nations sovereignty is recognized. They would need this as a precondition to true open and free referendum and constitutional reform on any Donbas question. And it appears - from your own citation - that they never got it. “10. Pullout of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and also mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine under OSCE supervision. Disarmament of all illegal groups.” Yet, ”American Defense Department official Michael Carpenter said on 2 March 2016 that at least 430 Ukrainian soldiers had died since the signing of Minsk II, that Russia maintained "command-and-control links" over the DPR and LPR, and that Russia was "pouring heavy weapons" into the Donbas.[68] Deputy head of the OSCE mission in Ukraine Alexander Hug said on 25 March 2016 that the OSCE had observed "armed people with Russian insignia" fighting in Donbas from the beginning of the conflict, that they had talked to prisoners who said they were Russian soldiers, and that they had seen "tire tracks, not the vehicles themselves, but the tracks of vehicles crossing the [Russo-Ukrainian] border".” Russia never left the Donbas. The entire thing was in bad faith. Any elections and constitutional reform was happening while Russia held guns to heads. In fact the entire scheme has the hallmarks of Russian incremental warfare strategies. The West dithered and failed to actually engage back in 15-16, and here we are. So what is your point here? The referendums in Donbas, while they had Russian troops on Ukrainian soil, was legit but the West doesn’t like them so did not recognize it? And what does Croatia back in 91 have to do with any of this? Croatia was during the total collapse of Yugoslavia as the West grappled with the fallout. States such as Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro all successfully separated and Europe was desperately hoping Croatia could do the same. (No one held out much hope for Bosnia, which was totally accurate.) What was left of Yugoslavia disagreed and tried to pull Croatia back in by force…and hilarity ensued. So Donbas was a break away province that held fair and free elections but Ukraine tried to pull them back in by force? Russia was simply trying to intervene and protect them? While grabbing the Crimea at the same time? And ignoring years of Russian interference in the region under the waterline for years? You will note that modern day Croatia is not occupied by another nation. And no western powers has declared Croatia a province…like Russia did Sep ‘22 for Donbas, Crimea and Kherson (no less). What I do not understand is your actual position here. What is your theory? These are some pretty disjointed point of information from where I am sitting. Honestly, please stop being oblique and just come out and state your theory here. How did this war start? What is the Russian side of the story according to you? What partial justification did Russia have for the invasion of ‘22?

These are good questions. Some thoughts: - Trains. We do know the trains are running in both countries and make up a significant portion of their military SLOCs. We have not really seen a persistent campaign to strike rail infra on either side. Ukraine has limited long range munitions for strikes into Russia so they appear to be hitting higher priority/lower density targets - oil refineries, ships and aircraft. Rail infra is large, complex and can be repaired quickly against point strikes. Why Russia has not focused all those missiles and Lancets on rail is frankly beyond me. It should have been a priority targeting area right from the start of the war. - Ukraine and mines. Have seen no evidence but I suspect they are. Ukraine had a stock of mines before the war and likely have bought more. Mines work. Mines plus ISR and artillery…really work. Ukraine learned this last summer and would be crazy not to employ them to deny Russia options. - GLOCs. This is likely one of the biggest unknowns in warfare right now. Given ISR and long range unmanned systems/strike…how does anyone keep GLOCs open. I have some ideas on how to break this but we are really off the map. - Urban operations. We can see from Gaza a few hints. UAS definitely have an impact but dense urban operations may actually provide a break from the ISR problem. UAS don’t appear to be able to navigate a complex building internally but that will likely change. My sense is urban operations may remain more in line with how we understood it before the war. It may be one area that is shifting slower. Of course I might be totally wrong on this one.

Wait a minute. So the Minks agreements: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minsk_agreements These were drafted after Russia had taken Crimea and Donbas. The first one failed after Russia broke it. This casts serious doubt as to Minsk 2 and whether it was conducted in good faith by either side. So your theory is that Minsk Treaties were designed to allow Ukraine to go in and “finish the job”? With western support? This would be after Russia basically used conventional troops to back the rebel forces. Minsk 2 was largely viewed as held together by bailing twine and frankly most are surprised it lasted as long at it did. Even if this somewhat dubious theory held water, how does this justify a full scale invasion of Ukraine along 5-6 operational axis, including the capital by Russia? They did it to protect LNR/DPR? That does not make sense. If Russia wanted to intervene to stabilize a potential Ukrainian ethnic cleansing there are a lot of way to do this that do not involve a full scale invasion. Also, what proof is there that Ukraine was preparing to go into the Donbas? Reports from the opening days of the war show how unprepared Ukraine really was. This was not a state reading for a large scale military operation. So, we have an opinion here that really does not add up based on what we think we know. Do you have other facts or analysis we are missing?

Just can’t stay away. I think you secretly like us and want to be on this thread. But maybe someone hurt you? C’Mon, admit it - this thread is far more fun than that other one. To answer you question: Find a wide array of open source beacons. Internet is full of them. Our real strength here is we have people in-country who can access the RUS sphere and translate. Filter out the clearly partisan ones. Objectivity is out there, you just have to work. ISW, RUSI, War on the Rocks, Oryx to name a few, all have pretty solid reputations for presenting either raw data, or good professional analysis by people actually in the business. Cross check, a lot. We usually get an X video or somesuch but one needs to get a bunch of eyes on it. Weigh opinions and merits of actual arguments as they relate to observed phenomenon. Find some experts. You are not an expert. An internet account does not make you one. I am an expert. But…and here is the main point, you don’t have to agree with me. Instead you should weigh my assessment against other experts…somewhere in the middle is likely the best guess for a truth. Spend some time on “what we are not seeing but should”. A lot of clues and details in the negatives. Roll that all up, take notes, do the work, ask real questions. Then keep your eyes open because this whole thing is likely going to change…and fast. The whole point of this thread is to try and make sense of the first real conventional peer war of the 21st century. Its aim is to try and cut through the noise and find signals. Big muscle movements in thought at this point need big proof. If you think Russia is winning and going to win, you need more than “well let me tell you”. Most importantly at this point you need to shush. Type less, read more. Come back with some good questions in a bit and you might get some civil answers.

Ah well, that makes sense. The “anti-Hot Thread, thread.” So this looks like a case of “time to go in there and show these college boys a thing or two.” Can Ukraine still lose this thing…sure. If the US cuts off all aid including C4ISR and Europe does the same. If Ukraine were isolated in a box with Russia, we could actually see the RA make major gains up to taking Kyiv. But Ukraine is not in a box, so no point getting too worried about it. By all accounts Russia’s ability to run a military in this war is on a clock. The entry costs for a modern military have gone both down and up. Down on hardware, way up on software. Russia is losing the former, and never really had the latter (2nd time used former/latter today…vey proud of myself). Hopefully we see some daylight on the US support front. My hopes are on some sort of unmanned mass that we have not seen before. And maybe some sexy sleight of hand down near Kherson.

It is like trying to debate a parrot that has been trained to only say “you’re wrong!”

So I know a couple people who got hit by whatever this thing was/is and this whole thing is just bizarre. In both cases they had never heard of this thing and suddenly started showing weird symptoms. Maybe it is like Gulf War Syndrome (know a couple people with that too) - a combination of factors that become so tangled that we never really can pin down a single cause. I have heard both sides of this whole thing and it remains a mystery to me.