The_Capt

This really makes no sense. If a “tank” is simply the most lethal vehicle then right now an infantryman with an ATGM or artillery with PGM are “tanks”. A tank provides a combination of three things: survivability, lethality and mobility. They are all uniquely high but come at a high cost to produce and sustain in the field. The core issue is that Survivability is pretty much in tatters in this war. Tanks are highly visible and are being hunted into extinction. Too many things can see and kill them or their support system to easily. Mobility - see 1) minefields and 2) denial of the tank by long range systems that can see them and kill the at greater ranges than the tank can respond. Lack of tank freedom of mobility is a freakin hallmark of this war. Lethality - maybe the only thing the old girl has left but it is being replaced by precision artillery, missiles and UAS. Dress is up however one likes. Apologize for no air superiority all day long. Blame the Ukrainians and Russians for “not being combined armsie enough.” That equation up there is not going to suddenly swing back in favour of heavy expensive metal moving forward. We may even see a major armour breakout in this war but that won’t validate their existence, it will be a swan song. Finally from a strategic perspective other factors come into play but the biggest one is that tanks are just too damn heavy…blame gravity. They are hard to move and mount. They are very costly to support. Problem now is that an opponent can move and mount the denial system for the tank much faster than we can mount and move heavy forces. So What? Every time we deploy the armoured fist somewhere, cheap and many lethal systems to counter it will have been there for weeks. And the technology behind those system is going to be an extremely high priority because they can deny what is the core of our current western military ground force …they watched the Gulf War and Iraq 03 on tv same way we did. So add it all up. Tactical, Operational and Strategic - the whole thing does not look good for the entire heavy system. Lighter, faster, cheaper, deadlier and unmanned is a wave of change that no one is going to be able to stand in front of. In my opinion we are watching the re-definition of “combined arms” unfold in front of us daily in Ukraine. The re-design of what combat power means and warfare itself is going to be fundamentally changed.

Dude, c’mon. We know what tanks were for but nothing in this war aligns with our current doctrine. Armour has largely been relegated to a fire support role, and noted as no small amount of “indirect fire support”. The internet is filled with invest “tank-people” explaining and complaining right now but I have yet to hear a single coherent theory as to why armour has not worked as it should in this war. In fact there is a long list of stuff that has not worked as it should in this war - airpower, cyber, and engineering are also on that list.

Well modern day cavalry is looking a lot like UAS. Everyone is getting all hot and bothered as to armour and whether this war is an anomaly or a preview. All the while no one really takes about fundamental shifts. The next war NATO fight in will be fundamentally different than what we planned for before. It will likely have elements of this war but evolution of technology is happening very fast. What we do know: C4ISR has changed the game. Battlefields are entirely illuminated and surprise is pretty much dead. So is heavy hot mass, at least as far as being able to hide it. This is not an opinion…it is physics. Unmanned has changed the game. Combining with ISR, unmanned systems are going to spread and expand in scope as quickly as they are able. No military on earth after this war is going to try and go in without unmanned support. Precision, reach and lethality. Closely linked to the first two, the over the horizon capability of small (read hard to find) and deadly systems are going no where but upward. Ok, so what? Well the other shoe to drop is Shield. What can we do to better protect the force from these new realities? This is going to happen, definitely in the short term. We have far too much sunk cost in our existing systems to simply drop them and run. Shield will buy time to pivot. The challenge will be the fact that technology does not really help us here. The ability to put little brains on things that can be taught to target is just too far ahead of any viable counters right now…and it is getting worse. This war is no where near Spanish Civil War in impact. That war did see modern AirPower come out of the closet and we drew a lot of wrong (and some right) conclusions. The shifts being observed in this war are far more dramatic. Further they are all pretty much extensions of previous trend we saw in other wars. That all said, there are a lot of unknowns. For example, next wars might be even faster. If someone can achieve ISR, unmanned and PGM superiority they will be able to cut through an opponent very quickly - neither side has been able to achieve that trifecta yet in this war. AI has not made a full entry yet. A lot of what we are seeing in this war is last generation. Some of these systems are already being replaced. So, I agree, the next war NATO fights will not look exactly like Ukraine - it will probably be crazier and even further from what we recognize.

I wouldn’t say that. However, they probably have a better sense of what works and what doesn’t right now as they have been a lot more up close and personal than we have. I have seen too many posts and threads of “well why are they not just doing X” while completely ignoring the environment they are in. The UA, and even the RA have been learning and evolving with this war often while the west sits on the sidelines and critiques. I am also interested in why they succeed or fail. However, my starting position is not “Western doctrine equals success” as I think we have move to far away from fundamentals that underpinned that doctrine.

So basically older capabilities took a long time to die? And yet they still died. I know the myths of Agincourt but in the end cheap mass won out that entire argument. And kept winning it right through to about WW2. The fact that cavalry held on by fingernails in WW1 is not proof that they somehow were still a viable arm of manoeuvre. In fact the narrowing of cavalry over the centuries could be what we are seeing in armour in much quicker time. Firing line formations died at the Civil War, and yet militaries held onto them (and their ridiculous bayonets) for decades (we already argued this on that other thread). One can “whatabout” it all one wants but military capabilities clearly have a failing trajectory. There are elements of cost, effectiveness, utility and decisiveness at play in that calculus. Large armoured cavalry as an example. Its decisive role began to fade, arguably, in the Middle Ages. Its utility was definitely compressed by the 19th century and by early 20th century they had been relegated to logistical support and flank security. By mid 20th they were pretty much only logistical and after that ceremonial. You can trace any obsolete capability along similar tracks. They take time to die…but they do die. Cost effectiveness is a significant factor and cheap that can kill or deny expensive is on the right track to render it obsolete. However, it is not the only factor at play. Tanks look to me like they are in the beginnings of a death spiral, particularly if we are talking long term attritional warfare. They take too long to produce, and cost too much for what they are able to deliver right now. As Steve notes, they are also being supplanted by a lot of other things that are a lot cheaper to manufacture. ”Well infantry are easy to kill and have not gone obsolete”. Well 1) they are a lot cheaper than armour, 2) they are actually really hard to kill. They may be soft squishy humans but they are like sand and get into everything. Hard to find and fix, and extremely replaceable. 3) They are also nearly impossible to fully deny..see sand, and 4) they have not been supplanted, in fact they have been dramatically augmented with modern UAS and ATGMs. Tanks on the other hand are really expensive, getting more so just trying to keep them alive. East to spot…big lump of hot metal and ceramic. Easy to deny. Hard to replace at scale. And now they are being supplanted. However, like a lot of military capabilities they will take some time to die. On could argue that have been dying since the 80s but I am not so sure. This war has definitely not been good news for amour or mech and everyone knows it. In fact it has not been good news for manoeuvre warfare itself. Now modern militaries have a couple choices: adapt or hang onto legacy capability for “reasons”. We are really good at that last one.

Gawd, I hate all economist. A quick internet search and one can get the full spectrum of “Russian economy is doin fine” to “It is collapsing right now.” I guess the thing I worry about in all this is where are people getting the data from? Objective numbers on the Russian economy appear hard to find. The rest are supplied by Russia. For example, how much is Russia spending on this war a la GDP? Well that number is not going to come from an outside audit. It is going to come from Russian sources. And Russian sources are notoriously full of crap. If I was in Russian leadership I would want nothing more than to project an ability to outlast Heaven and Hell themselves in this war. We can get objective reality data - exchange rate of ruble, imports and exports. But any internal metrics are going to be heavily skewed by Russian information ops. The economic end of this war is like everything else as far as I can tell…we will know when it happens.

Well yes, and no. Cheap bowmen rendered very expensive knights obsolete. Not sure the cost of muskets versus pikemen. A single machine gun has to be cheaper than a squadron of cavalry. The question is less “can it be killed” and more “how much value does it render before it dies”. The cost equation is one factor. In warfare things become obsolete for what appears to be at least two main reasons: - Denial. The capability advantages of the thing are denied to the point it becomes a liability - see Battleships v Carriers. - Replacement. The capability advantages of a thing are replaced by a capability that is not denied - see Battleships v Carriers. The modern tank is currently being operationally compressed…significantly. It has become very apparent that one can wage Defence and Denial without tanks at all. The big question is, “can one wage Offence?” The modern tank is definitely seeing Denial in Ukraine, however, as an offensive weapon we are not seeing a replacement, yet. I personally do not think the tank is entirely dead but it utility is definitely on a one way trip. The role of the tank is becoming much narrower - currently a rapid, well protected indirect fire system. And this is bigger than tanks. We are not seeing a lot of IFV/AFV success either. We do still see them in infantry support roles, however, they are also blunted. The entire mechanized portfolio is currently getting compressed into a capability with a much narrower role. So where do we go from here? It is weird how in times of disruption in warfare we always seem to fall back on basics. In this war it has been infantry and indirect fires (including UAS etc). These are two capabilities that still work. Both sides appear to be wrestling with the fact that the other elements of mechanized combined arms are not working - armour/mech and engineering. The modern battlefield also appears to be denying two major principles of war - concentration of force, and surprise. This is not small. I suspect UGVs and some sort of Shield capabilities will be combined to break the deadlock, and get Offensive manoeuvre via mobility back on the menu. We are far too deeply invested not to try and buy our way out. My sense though is that others are too deeply invested in taking away the cornerstones of the western way of ground warfare. So in the end the tank will become obsolete because there is a lot of incentive to make it go away. Then the race to master whatever comes next will be on.

Oh let it rain combined arms fratricidal impulse. I get your point entirely. I think what the OP was pointing to was the fact that the realities of this war could be seen as a forcing function to relook at some of these “secondary” design considerations. Artillery is very likely another big winner - the effect on armoured vehicles alone needs a serious overhaul. Better or more sophisticated fire planning is also a “must”. So rather than turn on each other let’s crush the hopes and dreams of the armoured corp because the tank is clearly best employed as a museum piece!

Ok, I read this twice and honestly cannot understand you position here. Of course Russia “did this to themselves”….so what? If we take a binary approach to victory conditions as you describe - total defeat of either side is the only outcome for either side. Then this war will likely never end. Russia is not going to be able to achieve military victory by your definitions. Ukraine is not going to be able to totally defeat Russian ability to keep this war going in order to keep Ukraine out of western hands. Even if Ukraine takes back every lost inch and digs in at the border, Russia can keep attacking and lobbing shells and missiles into Ukraine for decades. And we have not even begun to discuss subversive activities. By your opinion this will mean EU and NATO will “never let Ukraine in”, under those conditions…so at least one Russian strategic aim is nearly unavoidable. So the only other option in your framework is for Russia to stop being Russia - it is built in. Every time we discuss this the absolutist crowd does a lot of hand waving and “well it won’t be that bad”-ism. However, the task of causing a total Russian collapse is in itself a very long and risky commitment that we would essentially be trying to conduct via proxy. We may get “lucky” and Russia breaks itself to pieces softly but more likely Putin will drag this out and point to “bad ol NATO” as a reason to stay in power. So what is the plan. “Support Ukraine”…ok, got it. “Russia Bad”…again, zero argument. What are we doing beyond that? Zero War = Ukraine in NATO, means Zero Russia in this framework you have cooked up. I argue we still have options and off-ramps as this thing progresses. We are not the only war in human history without them. This does not mean capitulation or surrender, but it also does not mean an endless conflict either. Best case, Russia backs off and self-removes the main driver of this nonsense, Putin and his power structure. They then put in a bunch of jerks we can live with who are willing to back off or be bought off. Then we try to pull Ukraine into some sort of security mechanism. This is not easy, very hard in fact, with a lot of points of failure. But compared to “Ukraine must engineer the total defeat of the Russian state and then good things will happen”…it is looking like a much better strategy.

This happens every time anyone even suggests adding an extra bridge let alone more realistic obstacle game play - “Ya but now we may as well call it Combat Engineering Mission!!! “ I have a modern contemporary war in Europe that say “yes, if you want a realistic modern wargame then obstacles need to be an integral design consideration.” Adding in realistic minefield breaching ops is hardly “throwing down” on battlefield minutiae. But yes, let’s scrub all that inconvenient reality so we can go back to playing “Smash Tank Go Boom”.

A reason for this is that computer sims cannot be argued with. They roll the dice and something happens. If an expert has context that may shape that outcome and the computer does not have it programmed in, it is hard to get it rolled in during the wargame itself. It really depends what one is doing. If you are doing a staff wargame to explore COAs/Options Bil’s table top systems is definitely the way to go. An e-table to make that easier is always nice. If you are doing training, sims can be very valuable in compressing time and space while getting students to exercise the skills they will need. It also gives them a feedback loop to hone skills. The trick is ensuring the sim does not teach the wrong lessons or build in dependence that won’t be there in reality. If you are doing Operational Research then a very high resolution simulation may be invaluable, but these tend to be much narrower in scope. So if you want to know what a certain new system is doing to do to your larger organization for example, a simulation can be very effective.

Good points but I disagree here. First off, this falls into the "Russian total defeat" trap. By this criteria, Ukraine will never be allowed to join NATO/EU without a total defeat of the entire Russian state. By setting this as a condition we actually incentivize Russia to keep an open wound in Ukraine as a counter to their being pulled into the western sphere. Russian force of arms could "unsettle territorial issues" indefinitely even if they do suffer major battlefield defeats. Second, NATO is not that binary. We left Greece and Turkey in after that little tussle down in Cyprus. We pulled Finland into NATO in months after people went on about how it will take years. There is a whole lotta "NATO will never" going on, which has been challenged quite a bit as a result of this war.

It is not the frontage in contact, it is the mounting. You have to get that Battalion with enablers to the front line on visible LOCs. So vertical density, not horizontal. It is what killed the RA last summer. As to UA capability, I have heard similar tactical anecdotes but the UA has already demonstrated an ability to conduct large scale manoeuvre last fall at Kharkov. They also used the "Coy - bites" approach at Kherson, which also worked in the end. I know they have senior officers on some pretty high level courses in the US and Canada, so they have the command skills being taught. I am not sure how anyone is supposed to cram several coys through minefield belts kms deep while their opponent has eyes all over the sky, long range ATGMs that cannot be cleared and artillery. Toss in a few helicopters able to hit out to 10kms and I think the "NATO perspective" may be the problem. The act of driving such a force to the front is going to set of all sorts of alarms and counter-fires...and this is the RA we are talking about. It also answers the question as to why the RA has not been able to conduct massed formation manoeuvre even though their doctrine is built on it. This whole NATO "everyone is doing it wrong except us" is a really bad way to go in my opinion.

Why UA is not massing? Well it may also be for the same reason the RA has avoided it, mass is dangerous. The few times last year the RA tried massing they got severely damaged doing so. We saw the UA go through the same thing earlier this summer. The reason is that massing dramatically increases ISR signatures and opens one up to counters. There has been a drive towards higher distribution of forces this entire war and I do not think it is a question of coordination or ability as much as it is that concentration of forces is a good way to lose them. The UA’s current “small bites” is not that different from the RA’s over the winter, albeit delivered via different tactical capability. I suspect they are small-biting until the RA are eroded to a point that UA massing cannot be countered, then we may see a larger concentrated break out. For now I am not even sure traditional air superiority would do it as ISR is everywhere and unmanned/PGM cannot be countered by conventional air systems. I have heard this “well why are they not just doing X?” from western military experts and the answer is likely “because they tried that and it does not work”. I also am starting to believe that “not working” is not due to UA shortfalls in C2 or training after 18 months of western support and lessons learned from this war. Instead it is likely due to shifts in warfare itself.

Not heresy in the least. The lines have not moved much despite all the action, no disputing that. We have not seen an operational breakthrough, largely tactical pulses which have not added up yet. So a couple thoughts/questions: - If this whole offensive is a road to nowhere…why is the UA still pushing? The UA has a lot to lose and knows that they must preserve their forces. They cannot afford the human wave wastage Wagner and the RA demonstrated last winter. Yet they are still pushing…why? My only guess can be that they still see achievable objectives and their picture of the RA supports this. - We have seen a lot of indications that the RA war machine is in trouble. To the point that I am not even sure what is still holding it together. This may be an example of that Russian steel everyone was going on about at the beginning of this war. Right now the RA appears glued together by pure stubbornness. Their losses have been historic and a lot of capability is simply gone. The central question is, “are they close to tipping?” No idea but I am pretty sure the UA and western military support “inside the box” have a much better bead. - Ok, the UA offensive of 2023 fails…now what? Well, we might have to start thinking about frozen lines and a much longer conflict. So what does that look like? How do we support that? There is no “cutting and running” on this one yet, our sunk costs are too high and the opportunity to continue to cripple Russia too good. One thing we do need to get out of our heads is the idea that “not retaking every inch of pre-2014 Ukraine = losing”. That was a dangerous binary position to take and it will not serve well moving forward. Losing is an Ukraine no longer able to decide when and where to prosecute this conflict. Losing is an Ukraine no longer able to be independent of Russian Will. Losing is western powers surrendering strategic initiative. All war is negotiation. With the other parties, with oneself and with the situation as it evolves. My read is that Ukraine is continuing to negotiate from a position of strength and no matter how this year’s offensive turns out, if they can sustain that then we still have options.

https://www.amazon.com/lamp-oil/s?k=lamp+oil https://store.steampowered.com/app/1480560/Lawn_Mowing_Simulator/ For the average “I just want things to go boom” player, perhaps. If you want a serious realistic wargame simulation then obstacles and breaching ops are clearly a requirement.

A major strategic implication is on escalation. Recall at the beginning of this war there was a lot of concern about a Russian “red line”. Putin dropped all sorts of threats and the info-sphere lit up. We continually see Ukraine strike deeper, higher and harder into Russian territories - Crimea definitely counts in Russian books. The question now is “ok, so where is the Russian red line?” Some will say “there isn’t one”. I do not believe that, however, it is clear that it is also not hair trigger either. This speaks to the myth of Russian escalation dominance. They do not own the ladder, we do. Now a concern is narrative and tipping points. My sense is that Putin et al are really crisis managing right now. Playing all sides as best they can. To some the loss of these two ships in a high profile strike is a catastrophic loss. To others it is justification that Russia is indeed standing on its own against NATO and the US. How these strikes are playing out inside Russia is definitely something worth watching out for. Second is tipping points. I do not get the sense that “clear strategy” is on the menu at the Kremlin right now. So if there is a red line it is probably blurring and moves around. It is also likely very relative. Hit another 5 ships, no problem…hit the 6th and hell breaks loose because…Russia. And then there is a solid theory that Russia has run out of escalation room. They have fired all the missiles. They have blown all the dams. Nuclear power plants are all upwind. WMDs are a non-starter unless they want WW3. What is really left in the chamber? Mobilization? Maybe but it would have to be national…all industry and manpower. That is a big step and they have shown no indications of doing it, let alone being able to do it under the current conditions. What can Russia do now except make quacking noises and lob more missiles at apartment buildings? Plant more mines? This whole thing has a boiling frog strategy feel to it.

Really two points to unpack here but excellent discussion: Warrior vs Killer - The traditional indigenous definitions do stress the act of direct killing of an enemy. They had traditions of taking trophies and "counting coup". This is a major problem with the adoption of the concept without a modern re-definition. (And trust me when I say, the troops are going to do it regardless of what anyone thinks.) A modern definition must recognize the role of homicide and collective burden an entire military organization must bear in its conduct. So it is not about "sticking the knife in and watching the lights go out" or other such nonsense often postured by front end operators. It is about recognition of the weight and responsibility to kill righteously. And that ethos must be shared by all members of the organization. Popular imagination is a major issue as Hollywood has done us no favors in this venture. In the end we may very well need a new word; however, there are examples of it being done correctly. The NZ forces and recognition and celebration of their Maori roots is an excellent example. Disciplined vs Individualism. This is a major myth...all stop. On a couple levels: Brutalities: The level of undisciplined...and even disciplined atrocity conducted by "soldiers" dwarfs any labels put upon warrior cultures. Warriors could be (and were) brutal; however, they were a product of their times. They also held onto deeply nuanced and balanced approaches to honor. it is particularly hurtful to look to the Roman Empire and its military as a shining example of discipline we should aspire to when one reviews their conduct. https://www.britannica.com/event/Third-Punic-War The terrifying reality is that soldiers commit genocide in shifts and in straight lines because their agency is by definition is removed. Warriors retain levels agency and independence. Of course neither side of this debate can really claim high ground in all honesty. Effectiveness: The secondary myth in all this is that "soldiers win" because of discipline built into the system. This is historically more a question of mass, not culture. Mongols won, and won big. The Germanic Tribes won at Teutoburg Forest. In reality actual results had more to do with the right tactics at the right time and place than one cultural framework over the other. The fact that a tribe of 150 natives got wiped out by 2000 US cavalry is not a cultural equation - it is Guns, Germs, Steel etc. As to overall effectiveness, well again the Mongols likely cracked the code of blending a warrior culture with a more conventional military organizational culture and the results were pretty impressive. As we look forward we talk a lot about empowerment and giving troops more agency to act which is interestingly more in line with warrior methods. Further, one can play with idea that warriors handle uncertainty much better than soldiers because their mindset is designed to embrace chaos through retention of agency. This is more likely the reason why "warrior" has taken root in SOF than any bloodthirsty sentiment. SOF, by its nature, has very high levels of agency. To the point it may be considered a negative capability. In the modern era I suspect we will need a hybridized system, like our command approaches, that balances the requirements for uniformity and discipline with agency and independence of thought in the face of chaos. Further, there is nothing saying that a "soldier" can not embrace honour or righteousness either. I honestly suspect we are dancing around a word that does not exist yet in the English language. No matter what we call it, the definition that recognizes the challenges of the military culture as it balances purpose in war with alignment within society in peace will remain a critical requirement.

Not that far off the bubble…but if I wanted to make money that would be the way to go.

Thanks, I am writing and will likely publish in the next 12-18 months but it will be the last thing people expect. I will get back to warfare and theory but am going to take a break to do other things. As to your experience. Again, we have not defined the term. It is not about combat or how close on gets to the bullets. It is an idea, an identity. A drone operator that is willing to sacrifice themselves in the service of a righteous cause is just as much a warrior in the modern sense as a door kicker. We all want bragging rights but at the end of the day, I do not care if one sits in a cubicle back at HQ for the entire war, the ethos is universal. Some organizations get it, the Marines are a good example. Everyone is a Marine first. Well I want everyone to be a Warrior first, but again we need to define a universal definition of what that really is.

Former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan.

These terms have caused pretty significant debate among western militaries, especially in Canada. The issue is really one of identity and culture, which of course has come under significant scrutiny in the post-Afghanistan, post-Iraq era. For some it is no doubt a bit of macho flexing, for others it is holding onto core identity for very important purposes. Up front, I personally fall into that latter category - but also recognized people are going to have differing positions. So to try and break it down more simply: - The term "warrior" [aside: 'warfighter' is in reality an attempt at compromise on warrior and largely has no other point of reference], has been mal-adopted and appropriated into toxic sub-cultures within modern militaries. Of this fact there is little argument. The most recent scandal in the Australian SASR and many examples of a warped or toxic use of that term are well documented. People adopt all sorts of crazy ideas as to what a warrior means and how they behave. This has to do with the fact that a modern warrior concept has yet to truly evolve so people look at history which was an entirely different context (eg we don't scalp anymore). - The actual term of "warrior" has deep roots within indigenous cultures around the world. In many it was a class of citizen with a clearly defined purpose. You can read a lot on this but the most common and prevalent definition was in line with "One Who Does War" on behalf of their people. A person whose role within a society is the function of warfare. In most cases it became part of a cast or class system. In some cultures this was seen as a sacred duty-to-protect bordering on a pseudo public service. The recent bashing of the term has drifted into colonial insensitivity in some cases as it really reads like "white folks screwed it up, so now all 'warriors' are bad" when in fact indigenous cultures have employed the concept for millennia and many, like North American natives, still hold it sacred. - The term is important because it incorporates a key pole of the two-worlds problem. Militaries are not armed humanitarian aid agencies, or slightly better armed police forces. Some nations have tried to go that way but they tend to be geopolitical anomalies. The role of any military is state sponsored and legitimized homicide. Dress it up anyway one likes, call it "self-defence", "use of force" or whatever helps one sleep at night but the core role is "murder for effect. The second a military culture, or the society that pays for them, forgets that reality very bad things happen. - Militaries that get watered down for various social or political sensitivities tend to do several very dangerous things: 1) They forget themselves. This can lead to significant collective shock when war actually happens and generations of military officers and NCOs have basically become bureaucrats. When that culture runs head long into warfare it is never pretty. I lived through such a time in the 90s and trust me it is really bad. 2) Societies go into armed conflict with eyes closed. Sanitization of war and its consequences becomes very easy when one scrubs out what it actually means. This can not only dangerously shape political calculus, it can create major flaws in military advice to policy. The reality is no matter where you may be in the kill-chain, there is blood on your hands. That is a serious burden. Those that forget it can start to make very poorly informed decisions quickly. 3) You cannot order identity. Troops in combat or preparing for combat are going to adopt an identity and culture that will provide them survival advantage and cope - find me a war where that did not happen. Problem is that if leadership does not define that identity, troops will do it themselves and sub-cultures form. Those sub-cultures can become dangerously toxic very quickly. So bottom line is, ignoring warrior reality comes with significant risks. - Many like the term "soldier" better. Feels more civilized. The term it self actually comes from solidus or coin and refers to mercenaries. The major historical difference between a solider and warrior is that a soldier stops fighting when they don't get paid. Warriors keep fighting because they don't need to get paid, they believe. There is an element of righteousness (and I do not mean in the religious sense) in the role of a warrior. Righteousness being a higher ideal held sacred (all war is sacrifice..."to make holy") by the people who sent you to fight for them. Soldiers by definition live on a more transactional contract with society. These are deep and important distinctions that often get lost in the noise. - To your point, "machoism". The problem we have with "warrior" is that we never actually define it. It gets tossed around because it sounds cool but as an identifier we do not unpack it and then teach it to people when they enter the service. It is all over the place, the US Army uses it all the time: https://www.army.mil/values/soldiers.html. Likely the closest I have ever seen is the US Army's Warrior Ethos: I will always place the mission first. I will never accept defeat. I will never quit. I will never leave a fallen comrade. https://www.army.mil/values/warrior.html Not bad, but not quite there either as it lacks definition of role as an extension of American society and elements of righteousness. So without a clear definition, the term gets hijacked into a macho "ra-ra" tag line. The reality is far deeper in speaking to balancing our two worlds - war and peace: home and away. As military we live within and are part of our own societies. I have kids, bills and go to the same grocery store. I watch the same shows and play the same game. But that is only half of my existence. The other side lives out in a place of conflict and warfare. In many ways I did not get this until after my first war. When I got home I realized that part of me would always be in those hills (and then years later, in the desert). As I see these young guys fighting and dying in Ukraine, I see them all fighting and dying in the tradition of the warrior. They are the Ones Who Do War on behalf of their people. To them it is more than a tag line and will be for the rest of their lives. So we definitely need to develop a modern definition and concept here and build a concept that not only better fits modern society but resonates. If we, as modern militaries do not, then we will get hijacked. I have already been in discussions where terms like "aggression" are being scrubbed out of our ethos by academics and civilians. If a modern military cannot define itself, someone is going to do it for us. And they will very like not understand the two-worlds problem. We are The Ones Who Do War and we need to get much better at explaining what that means in 2023.

Hessian mats for camouflage.

C’mon the climate change answer was just too adorable. Anyone who can face an impending human bottlenecking crisis with “ya but the rain still waters my grass and washes off the deer”…I mean how can you stay mad at that? S’ok, I think Steve took our new pet out behind the barn on his first day. Guess we will just have to wait for the next one.

"Boys only want love if it's torture!" (last one for today, promise)