The_Capt

Fair but also at risk of undersubscribing. This sort of military doctrinal nihilism - "Its all been done before," can risk missing just how profound an impact the introduction of air warfare had. In fact modern surface warfare, both land and sea profoundly changed as a result of air warfare, forever. Within the next 5-10 years we will reach an equilibrium but it will likely look nothing like the one we currently have. 1914 did not look anything like 1940 for very good reasons, even though levels of equilibrium had been achieved, it was a fundamentally new equilibrium. And it is a major mistake to think this is all about Unmanned. C4ISR likely has had the largest effect on the battlefield by far. Total illumination and ubiquitous connectivity has led to a lot of the phenomenon we have seen at the outset of this war - there were not thousands of FPVs back in Feb '22. Like WW1, it is the confluence of technologies that is creating a shifting wave. So, sure we will come up with UAS defenses. My money is on "other UAS" as the ground based solution is simply too hard and expensive. This, plus C4ISR, could create a battlespace with an entire unmanned front edge, colliding with another unmanned force edge. How war is fought in that space will be deterministic for the manned systems follow on. This is not "the same equilibrium" we had back in 2020 in the least. Mastery of that new equilibrium will be critical in the next decades.

Upon waking from a decent night sleep (free from the normal terrors of age and images of JonS - I keep seeing him as a Rocky Horror Picture Show Tim Curry in a gunnery instructors hat)…this guns versus drones argument is a bit silly. In reality they are likely the core components of a new emerging combat arms team. Essentially they can do things the other cannot but when mutually supporting are able to dominate a land battlefield. At least for now. Perhaps once we get fully autonomous very smart unmanned air and ground, artillery will become hunted to extinction. However I suspect it will simply evolve to greater ranges. Nothing says “hello” like a plunging artillery round and no amount of Chinese lasers are able to effective stop it. I suspect Infantry will remain on the the third leg of the stool because nobody has as much fun as people and the human brain is still the most powerful processor we can put into the field. Now let the healing begin…

Steve forgot a fifth one: logistical weight. Guns are still big steel tubes with complex firing mechanics, towed or self propelled and heavy. That is fuel, spare parts and a lot of heavy ammunition. Not to mention human crew costs - but FPVs also come with crew costs as well, still not sure how these stack up against per-firepower compared to unmanned. Drones are not zero weight but do not need all that dense weight. Makes them far more distributable and much lower support bill. They are highly precise, more so than even artillery PGM - have not seen many 155 round make a U turn on a road to hit a tank from behind. Ranges are comparable now, but may get longer for tac UAS over time. FPVs can be massed produces cheaply, artillery ammo can as well but not the guns themselves.

Maybe? To my mind, setting aside the whole “loose nukes” problem which is definitely a global destabilizing issue, I think it is a question of good ole money. With a functioning and weakened central Russia state apparatus, China can cut deals to access Russian energy with a macro organization that can still marshal the infrastructure and security to access that energy and sell it to China. If Russia tumbles into a bunch of provinces/regions/warlords access to that energy gets a lot harder and more expensive. China would have to negotiate with a bunch of goons of various levels of stability (and possibly in conflict with each other) to try and get the energy out of Russia and back into China. Also smaller warlords cannot necessarily run oil and gas industries. China might have to go all Africa and go in and do it themselves. This all drives the access cost up. China may be able to do some land grabs. But these come with all sorts of problems, not the least of which are a bunch of angry Russians. I think we have a fundamental flaw in our western thinking that nations invade other nations for resources. I mean, “yes” technically it can still happen, but in this day and age it is far more advantageous just to have a target nation roll over and sell you the stuff while they also go to the trouble of taking it out of the ground too. China has seen what “you break it you buy it” looks like from our misadventures in Iraq and Afghanistan, so I am not entirely sure they are ready to jump on a colonial bandwagon. Especially in a failed-state Russia - this is akin to trying to bathe a cougar, sounds like fun right up until the damn thing starts getting wet. But hey, could be China has done the math and thinks it might work out. But I still lean toward China is looking to make lemonade out of Russian lemons at this point.

Sorry for taking so long to get back to you. Missed this one. So NATO never really had a “Reagan Line”. It was pretty much “painful tripwires” all the way back to the French border. The intent was to bleed the Soviets out over the entire distance with a series of defensive positions and fights, shifting efforts to best effect along different axis. Then when AirLand battle kicked in they matured this to stretching the Soviets out and then hitting them deep to break the system. Soviet offset was tac nukes. My sense is, as far as CM can model, the NATO strategy would have worked. The Soviets likely would have bogged down and run out of gas well before France and the English Channel. Seven Days to the Rhine was a pipe dream without tac nukes but those weapons would have led to serious escalation risks that no one really wanted to take.

Ah, so here we are! Except it is no longer really true. If I were thrown into a random situation in combat, I want C4ISR to detect the tank before it can even get within range and coordinate precision fires to stop the tank before it can get into range. Enter unmanned systems and PGM. If I see an enemy with tanks, I want dispersed precision fires and unmanned systems right now, not another large hot 40 ton beasts that my opponent can also see and hit before they get within range. So, no, I would not choose the tank. I am not saying I want zero tanks, but I would put them 4th or 5th on the priority list. In fact tanks within my inventory would be specialized equipment. Employed only in specific circumstances, the big one being, "only when my opponents C4ISR and unmanned bubble collapses."

I think a key factor here is “smarts”. So a bullet only has a brain attached to it right up until the point the trigger gets pulled. An NLOS or FPV has a brain attached to it right up to detonating. So one key factor of options appears to be smarts, and then the ability to translate smarts into energy delivery alterations as far forward in the process as possible. So to your curve, one might need to add a “smarts” factor as it is a driving element of options as close as possible to a target. Along with all the other energy aspects of the system. A smarter system can keep options open even when the energy-curve is not flat…PGM artillery does this.

I think we have gotten far too comfortable with our “superiorities” over the last 30 years. To the point they stopped being a factor and simply became basic assumptions. Cam-paint for example. When I first joined up we were always wearing cam paint in the field because we trained to both hunt and be hunted. Then we got rid of cam paint and frankly I only just saw it for the first time in a long time in training ex pics in Latvia. We assumed levels of superiority that are unstable. We cannot always have air or firepower superiority. If we believe that we always will, then why even bother with psychological operations? Or we box up psychological operations into “hearts and minds” soft and fuzzy stuff that does not jive very well with killing people. This essentially alienates psychological to a weird niche when before, as you note, it was all over the place. I think it is on a long list of things we need to re-learn as we head into far more competitive warfare environs - right along with capacity and attrition.

The why do we still hear this mantra coming out of western militaries today? We had a MGen declare this exact statement at the opening of an Operational Symposium last month. I have heard this mantra as the primary reason to have tanks for years now. I agree entirely that history - and this war in particular - clearly demonstrate that 100 years of worrying about tanks has created a world where tanks are being hunted into extinction by a multitude of systems. I also think we have a cultural block we cannot get past.

I strongly suspect - even thought it is still quoted as a mantra - that this war is demonstrating that the best thing to kill a tank is not another tank. It would appear that artillery, ATGMs and FPVs are winning that particular argument quite well on their own.

Except when it is strapped onto an FPV. The it appears to do the job so well that Russian tanks need to try to be turtles.

I think we still do because of the slippery concept of effects. The primary purpose of employing weapons systems is not to destroy or damage - the main purpose is to deliver an effect. The effect of a naval gun is the threat of damage more than the damage itself. This can shape the battlespace by forcing an opponent to manoeuvre or avoid certain conditions. The reason for all that volume of fires was more than simply to kill other ships. It was to get them to do what we wanted to do. So the employment of all this energy is to create effects options spaces, which I suspect may be much more complicated than energy-time. For example in your dive bomber example, the dive bomber has both fewer and greater effects options depending on when and where that dive occurs. In the dive, they have very limited targeting effects flexibility coming in at those speeds, less after weapons release. But before final attack the very presence of dive bombers creates an effect - ships must be looking up, AD manned and ready, and at speed to avoid. Add sirens and one can get a psychological effect. These options are less about the energy over time being applied, they are about the potential energy being applied. The potential energy of those bombers is higher earlier, which creates options spaces. Once committed, those option spaces appear to shrink.

Hmm, not sure this tracks. They can be made less efficient through defensive manoeuver but naval warfare simply added volume. Up until modern missiles they were the primary weapon system for ships of the line. We still put them on ships for a reason. A/C took primacy due to range, even thought they lost volume. Missile offset with range and accuracy. So naval gunnery expanded its options spaces through volume of fires effectively. Firing many salvos to reduce defensive options. This is how Jutland happened. Just pulling these metrics together - range, energy-time, composition, accuracy, volume, agility. These are looking at lot like modern military High Level Military Requirements (HLMRs). To my mind these are the framework for an options space. Precision as "small energy at the right time" of "smart energy" really resonates.

Ooo these are good ones. For example, not all explosives are created equal. Also, what do we mean by “options”. Mines actually have significant options potential before they are placed. - they can be placed pretty much anywhere, even underwater. But once laid and in their lowest energy state and over the longest period of time of their employment, they do indeed have very little options left; basically explode or not. So there are pre-deployment options and post-deployment options on the table. Here we likely could introduce metrics of agility and flexibility, which are more likely a function of size, shape and material, as well as potential energy.

Ok, but doesn’t your second example invalidate your thesis? A naval artillery shell does not appear to have a flat energy-time curve but of all your examples it is likely the hardest to defend against. In fact ballistic weapons appear to be the hardest to counter and none of them have what I think you are describing as a flat curve. Energy is definitely part of all this but I think how that energy is translated into effect is the core idea you appear to be driving at (we should leave aside effects for now as that is a pretty complicated concept in its own right).

And the thermal signature has to be seeable from freakin Mars. That whole metal thing will heat up from the exhaust. It is basically a big glowing shield.

I have no doubts China is taking notes on this war, just like we are. The levels of C4ISR and impact have to be noted alone. I do not know if they have sent observers but I would not be surprised in the least. I suspect China owns any space based ISR and may be sharing with Russia, just like the US is doing with Ukraine. I suspect we are going to see an AI/precision arms race after this war as all sides see what is happening. Any military that does not keep up could find itself obsolete overnight.

That is just insane. Forget situational awareness and they cannot swing the gun. Sure it may stop FPVs but now gets lit up by ATGMs and artillery. It has to be really bad for vehicles if the Russians are trying out stuff like this.

What ticks me off is that he is going to go off and sulk now, muttering about how we are all “high on copium” and “smother alternative views.” I resent the echo chamber accusation immensely. Many people have put in a lot of time and effort to keep up with this war. We are definitely pro-Ukraine but we also try to avoid the blinders as best we can. If they do not want to get beat up, come in with stronger arguments…and maybe some actual facts. Is Russia still in this thing? Definitely. I am not sure exactly how but it is undeniable that they are still holding and even capable of tactical advances. However as many from this individual’s camp are prone to do, there is a double standard against Ukraine in just about all things. I am willing to bet Russia winds up taking about as much as Ukraine re-took last summer. To them this is a clear sign “Russia can never be beaten!” Meanwhile when Ukraine did it last summer, “see they will never push Russia out!” It really doesn’t matter what happens the conclusions are always the same. Ukraine is holding on just as well, if not better than Russia. The UA is undergoing reforms. The West is slowly getting its act together - this NATO collective mechanism for support is a good idea, if it doesn’t get weighed down in bureaucratic sludge. Russia is not “getting better” by any stretch. Advances come at horrendous costs. Losses continue to stack. They do appear to have some concerning glimmers of C4ISR daylight but they never really coalesce. Ukraine continues to demonstrate significant strategic strike acumen. As to the finish line…who knows? Could Russia operationally collapse…sure, they have twice before. Can the full on strategic collapse…definitely. They did in 1917 and 1991, they can do it again. Hell Priggy’s wild ride had real potential. Will they? Again, we do not know. The second anyone from either side of this goes “this is how this war will end”, I for one, stop listening. All we can do is hold on and hold fast.

I take offence to the term "research". I have reviewed your thread and clearly you had a conclusion and then set about picking information to support it. This is not "research" it is "spinning" - I have failed staff college students for doing what you are proposing as "research", applying half the facts, largely out of context. For example: "Russia already controls large swathes of Ukraine with valuable minerals..." and linking this back to Chinese motivation to keep Russia in this war. This is one enormous theory hanging on very little substance. We have been through the "Ukrainian goldmine" theory before and it was categorically debunked. Let's take Metals: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/UKR/Year/LTST/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/by-country/Product/72-83_Metals So before this war Ukraine was already selling Russia about $1B a year in metals and about 345M to China. A quick scan says it looks like Ukraine was doing about $10B in metal globally. Meanwhile China is importing $144B a year in metals globally. Mostly from Indonesia, Congo and Japan: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-product/metals/reporter/chn?redirect=true China does not need Ukrainian metal, they already have global access an order of magnitude beyond the entirety of Ukraine production. The we get into detail like Titanium. Yes, Ukraine has got healthy Titanium reserves: https://inventure.com.ua/en/analytics/articles/titanium-in-ukraine:-military-and-economic-context#:~:text=What are the reserves of,%2C rutile – 2.5 million tons. About 8.4 million tons. Wow, sounds like a big number and no doubt Russia and China want to get their greedy hands on it. Whoops: https://finance.yahoo.com/news/titanium-reserves-country-10-biggest-155049656.html#:~:text=China is the largest producer,largest vanadium-titanium magnetite deposit. China is the global leader in titanium production. Why on earth do they want more Titanium from Ukraine on the market? Lithium? Yes. Ukraine has about 500k tons which are largely untapped. Wow that is a big number: https://kleinmanenergy.upenn.edu/news-insights/lithium-the-link-between-the-ukraine-war-and-the-clean-energy-transition/ Well unless one considers global Lithium reserves - Ukraine has about half as much as Canada: https://natural-resources.canada.ca/our-natural-resources/minerals-mining/mining-data-statistics-and-analysis/minerals-metals-facts/lithium-facts/24009 You will note that China is sitting on 2M tonnes. And then there is the thorny issue of where that lithium is located in Ukraine: https://www.renewablematter.eu/articles/article/ukraine-all-lithium-reserves-and-mineral-resources-in-war-zones This is where these wingnut theories really break down. Russia was already occupying a couple of these deposits in Donetsk. Lets be generous and say they took enough to grab 4 new deposits. Woo-hoo. Now a few thorny questions: what shape is the infrastructure in these areas look like right now? How much is it going to cost Russia to get these sites up and running? How much actual money are they going to make from this sweet lithium? When can they expect to see any money? And finally, the big one, how much does all that compare to the costs of sustaining this war? Last count the war in Ukraine was costing Russia between .5-1 B$ per day. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economic_impact_of_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#:~:text=In November 2022 it was,%24500 million to %241 billion.) So your theory here is that China is going to spend effort, money and diplomatic points to secure access to lithium, which they do not need and is costing Russia likely far more than it is worth at this point? In fact the same could be said for just about all Ukrainian metals. Comparing modern day China to Nazi-Germany is just plain dumb. Maybe pre-WW1 Germany - ignoring socialist ideologies and about four thousand years of history and culture. The idea that China somehow masterminded this whole thing (with zero proof, I might add) is laughable. China is stuck on the other side of this mess and is trying to deal with it on their end. They are going to pursue and promote their interests, just like we are. Russia and Putin are throwing up all over themselves in some weird attempt to rebuild an Imperial Russia...and are failing brutally. Sure, Russia could "hold on" until we see some sort of Armistice. They will have gained a grand total of an additional 6-7% of Ukraine from what they controlled on 21 Feb 22. It only cost them around 500k men, most of their modern military equipment and diplomatic/geographic isolation that may last several decades....brilliant.

I think we can safely say that there are elements of attritional strategies at play by this point. Definitely from what we can see of Russian operations. Positional warfare still aims to create asymmetry of options by incremental positional advantage. We actually are not really seeing this. We see lots of bites and nips but no one is really seeming to pursue positional advantage. The closest to this finer point may be at Kherson and those UA bridgeheads. I think we are still seeing a theme of corrosive warfare to be honest. Both sides are trying to attrit in depth, rapidly. Aiming for a systemic collapse that will create opportunity for manoeuvre. The Russian appear to be doing this less well because they lack C4ISR advantage, but they are still doing it.

I really do not think the US or China are in a good position for a major economic war at this point. Both are in post-COVID recovery. I think China can push...but just enough. Same goes for the US but maybe can push a little bit harder. As to NATO/western arming up and re-thinking...too late. I think this is why China is actually internally PO'd at Putin for starting all this, and then getting bogged down. Of course us re-arming is going to mean buying more stuff from the Chinese (like steel).

China is in a weird spot. They need Russia weak and dependent so they continue to have access to cheap energy (and maybe the odd land grab). But they do not want Russia to totally win, it would 1) really set off the US and West, and 2) A re-energized Russia doesn’t sell cheap energy as easily. And then they do not want Russia to completely fail and fall apart - see access to cheap energy. They are kinda threading a strategic needle like we are, but from the other direction. If they had to accept “less” from their perspective it is likely a Russian short win the West signs off on. They avoid economic punishment from the West and still have a shot to access cheap energy because a Russian short win would likely still see the West no longer buying said cheap energy. Whereas the West likely wants a Ukrainian short-win. Russia taught a visible lesson and still in penalty box. But in a slow decline, not a full on freefall. And China’s problem in the longer term.

It has been remarkable to watched unmanned systems evolve in this war. We started with them being employed as mass ISR, which frankly would have been enough to move the needle. Then the days of gravity dropped mortars and ICMs. Then the wave of FPVs, to the point they are beginning to rival indirect fires. UGVs have made an early appearance. And now the possible emergence of full autonomy. All in two short years. We may see anti-drone drones used at scale before this is over. Swarms of fully autonomous anti-radiation UAS could be a game changer. Ukraine stood up a separate Unmanned Service as a result of this war and it will be interesting to see if any western militaries follow suite. I suspect we are seeing a greater emergence of what Information Age warfare really means and it will change this terrible business in ways that we probably can barely imagine.

And even if a drone did not get it the EW beast is going to be the prime target for ATGMs. I see no way to wrap enough around or on tanks to really get what we need out of them anymore. Sniping, glorified infantry guns and indirect fire seem to be how they are being employed in this war. No one has been able to mass them and use them for manoeuvre, breakout or breakthrough. This means that one of the pillars of the combat arms is essentially been broken. Air denial means air-land is also out. I simply cannot see how a US or western ground force is going to far any better against an opponent armed with thousands of drones. Especially if they have fully autonomous capabilities. I suspect we will create drone swarms to kill their drone swarms so our mech and armor can do their thing. Until someone figures out that if we have defeated their drone swarms, why not just send in more swarms to kill them too. I don’t think heavy is going to die because they can die or war is lethal. I think it will die because we are seeing the beginnings of something that can get the job done faster and better.