The_Capt

So a bit of a semantics argument really: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Counter-offensive This is debating technicalities really - strategic vs operational. I would argue the good general is being too narrow in his definition - not sure why but could be simply German doctrine. When talking scale and context Kharkiv and Kherson are each operational counter-offensives; however when take together, they sum to strategic. The strategic objective appears to collapse the RA back to 2014 lines before the weather turns. It also has another strategic military objective, directly supporting political - demonstration that the UA is capable of seizing the strategic initiative and conducting successful complex operational offensives. So of one is extremely narrow, then technically Kharkiv on its own is not a strategic counter-offensive; however when taken with everything else going on it easily meets the current doctrinal definitions.

It is even more inaccurate. A withdrawal is an operation in itself. It comes with a lot of sub-plans like deception and passage of lines. Further is is characterized by ceding control of terrain at the time and place of your choosing. It has things like covering forces, feints and even tactical offensives. Then there is the whole joint force angle, so air cover plan - the RUAF should have surged to cover the “withdrawal”. The end of Gallipoli was a withdrawal - this was more akin to the French and British in 1940, an operational collapse. No screens or covering forces and enough hardware left behind to equip another army. Even Dunkirk had an outer perimeter and some air cover - Kharkiv did not even have that. So, no, “in strict military terms” this was not a withdrawal, it was at best a retreat; however, the loss of equipment and POWs suggest it was a rout.

Only thing I would add beyond the solid replies so far is that Ukraine has a significant - some may say decisive - ISR advantage. This means that RUAF aircraft are being spotted likely as they are rolling out the hanger doors, or in some cases as they are being prepped. The multi-layer defence of the UA combined with better C4ISR means the UA can position point defence well ahead of RUAF sorties. Clearly this is working as has been noted the RUAF is basically doing stand off attacks and almost zero CAS. There were rumours that the RUAF had been effective in blunting UA offensives but no one ever had any proof of this, nor do the events of the last week and half support the idea. My guess is that we have a situation of air parity thru denial right now so both air forces have largely been held back or used in standoff attack roles. Kind of a "if it flies, it dies" parity. The Western and UA answer is HIMARs and deep strike systems that are basically acting in the role of airpower at increasing ranges. Russia does not have the same thing, its missiles are largely focused on terror attacks which are more often than not decoupled from operational or tactical objectives.

Ah, well there you go. Looks like #6 was the dealbreaker. However, considering that Europe had been teetering, particularly after the Balkan Wars, the whole thing was a done deal pretty much after the shots were fired in Sarajevo. If it hadn’t been that it would have been something else.

It was on the list of demands the Austrian-Hungarian Empire sent to the Serbs after Ferdinand got assassinated. I am not sure if it was teachers or simply a change to the educational curriculum. It wasn’t the deal breaker though, it was the demand to oversee the investigation and prosecution of the assassins, in Serbia, which was an egregious violation of Serbian sovereignty. Of course the whole thing was a long time coming, this was just the kicker.

Well I cannot say what they will do with any confidence; however, if they stick to their A game they will keep trying to hold onto every inch they took in something that resembles a military operational seizure. I doubt they have a unified Army command, let alone a Joint one. Rumours of direct political micro-managing abound so it is very likely we have multiple chains of commands competing with each for resources and at cross purposes. So with that I suspect that they will set themselves up for an even worse collapse, the question will be whether they can make it to the wet season when the UA will probably have to go firm and consolidate - however based on the UA trajectory I am half wondering if an amphib or airborne op isn’t in the cards. The RA could easily collapse before the end of Oct at the current rate but that is a lot of ground to retake and the UA will likely be stretch to do it in a single big bite. Here is hoping.

This is my guess as well. The cutting of the infamous land bridge is not only symbolic but it cuts the AOs off from each other. My only question/concern is just how much gas does the UA have left in the tank? At what point are the risking over-reach - and as Bil H will tell you I am a famous over-reacher, so I know the pain. That is three operational axis to pull that off - have UA logistics gotten that robust? Then there is the question of what will be left in reserve if they pull that trigger? But the pay-off would be huge, could be talking back to 2014 lines before Halloween - and then the arguing can start.

Hey it is ok to disagree. So how many troops are we about here? You mention that they are better equipped etc but how many are we talking about? Honestly, though, once the RA scuttles a back to wherever they wind up, this force is going to be holding out on its own and UA can give these guys their full concentration. Unless this Prigo fella has a magic shield that will make these guys HIMAR proof I think the best they can hope for is to die later. But this has been a weird war, so I won’t bet the mortgage on my predictions just yet.

Well I guess we will see. This is not about small groups holding out, this is about whether or not the RA, as whole, can re-establish a level of operational integrity. If it can't do that, then smaller isolated forces, relying on an ersatz volunteer logistical corps may be heartburn tactical problems but they are not going to be able to hold the UA back. Also now that Ukraine is winning, the west is likely to double down on support to finish the job - hopefully we conduct a decent follow through. No one is questioning giving aid now - our guy is kicking ass. My guess is that maybe the RA has one good defensive left in it. If they were smart they would pull back the entire western front into that bottleneck at the Crimea and try to hold onto what they took in 2014. That is really messy ground up there and they would stand a chance, even as shot up as they are. As to LNR/DPR - the trigger will be when they split from Russia and we start hearing rumors of side negotiations. I am not sure Ukraine would want them back because they sided, at least a significant number did with the invading force. However, that is a Ukrainian political decision with all sorts of issues that I would not even try to unpack. When/if the UA can cut a third axis towards Melitopol and cut the two AOs, then we will really know this thing is coming to an end.

Ok, one follow up and then maybe it is best we agree to disagree because this is really going no where. I will take your map as gospel. So we have a pretty hard rock in the ol shoe there, some real toughies in a box. Looks like they have a river in front of them so positioning is nasty. Looks like they are holding about a 50 km frontage in that bubble - a citadel of nasty. This is a tactical problem. For example, who is securing their LOCs - which are about 100kms long back to Russia? These guys are tough but without ammo they become a hilarious nuisance. How is that logistical system doing? Is it robust, multi-corridor, dynamic and self-healing? Do these guys have any Deep Strike capability to threaten UA supply lines? What ISR do they have beyond tactical? I will give them the benefit of the doubt that they have decent tactical. So what we really have is a really tough, well motivated tactical set of units (maybe a formation?) that cannot secure its LOCs north. Its ISR is limited by range, while the UA can see them from space. I am sure they will die bravely, or better yet, if they are that switched on they should be able to see how untenable their situation is and pull back.

Ok so this is better how? Are you telling me they picked up on the UA planning a Kharkiv offensive weeks ahead of time...and did sweet FA to stop it?! Aaand we are back to broken operational military system. Look I am sure these RU Nat volunteers are true believers and really cagey tough guys; however, if they have been part of this debacle then I am a little less than concerned about them walking out of a phonebooth and becoming a super army. If they can surprise...they had better start doing it. If this clown show picks a fight with the EU, it will escalate to NATO and frankly from what I have seen we could cut thru what is left of the RA - RU Nat volunteers included like **** through a short goose in a long weekend. The references you are making are making it look worse for them. They saw but were unable to do anything about the UA taking back what is now being reported 6000 sq kms, in a week. I don't care if these guys are each super-soldiers who can do one handed chin-ups with no hands - their operational level ISR, C2 and logistics suck well beyond repair in the timeframes of this war. They are going to be living proof that dedication and belief comes second to hot steel in the right place and right time. And what if they are really in league with the mole people and conduct a sub-terrainian flanking?! Like I said these a$$hats are well positioned to pull of a nasty insurgency/guerilla war in the LNR-DPR - maybe, if local support holds. Beyond that they are living in fragmented...and getting more fragmented by the day, military organization. What is likely to stop the UA at this point...is the UA. They are going to need to re-set logistical lines and consolidate but so far from what I have seen the RA is not part of this equation. In reality these clowns have the making of a VEO network that will go underground and make everyone miserable once this thing is over. Good thing we have about 20 years worth of experience hunting humans in this context. I gotta be honest, I am really tired of the freakin "boogy man of the week" right now. We are jumping out of our seats because everything is really dangerous and really scary: - The Russian Army with all that hardware - The Black Sea Fleet & the Russian Air Force - Spetznaz and Wagner clowns - Russian cruise and hypersonic missiles - Russian cyber Pearl Harbour - Some General Jack-in-the-Box who was a jerk in Syria. - Russians parked around a nuclear power plant. - Nukes!! - the Russian 3rd Corp - Russian mobilization!! - the other hand coming out. - Russian escalation dominance. - RU Nats - whoever the hell they really are - Ukraine is going to fall - Ukraine is going to hold on but the war will still be on when my grandkids graduate from college - Ukraine can't possible take in all this kit and hold on. - Ukraine can defend but could never pull off an attack I have to be missing something. Every week in this war we find something be be scared of, and it has all turned out to be complete and utter BS. How about we look at the situation, as it unfolded for what it is - a historic military debacle that is likely to break the current Russian regime. It was doomed from the start, and has only gotten worse. Sure things could still swing and will likely get uglier but the RA in Ukraine is in death throws - it is keeling over to die, not coiling like a steel spring. All war is negotiation and right now the Russians are negotiation just how ugly this loss is going to be. Unless these RU Nats come with an entirely revitalized equipment fleet and logistics backbone to support it, a competitive integrated ISR system, and a completely new military doctrine...you will excuse me if I am not worried.

Great, they will be well positioned to run a nasty insurgency. It is not about tactical level capability - it won't matter if the "RU Nats" get laser guns at this point. The Russians have failed at creating, projecting and employing a functioning operational military system. The symptoms of this are: - In Phase I - got bogged down and eventually collapsed on operation offence, frankly their best shot at actually winning this thing. Noted shortfalls were logistics and ISR - e.g. the Russians had lobbed 2000 "precision" cruise missile systems by end March I believe, yet Ukraine still had 1) functioning transportation infrastructure and 2) functioning information structure. That, and all the abandoned vehicles, this tell me that the entire system left of effect (remember this?) Is not coherent, nor did it work. - In Phase II, they abandoned manoeuvre and dislocation entirely, likely because they had too, and devolved back to literal WW1 levels of dumb-mass attrition...and it did not work. The UA was hurt in some units/sectors, but freakin obviously not anywhere enough to weaken their operational system. The Russians decided to waste their remaining, and dwindling, supply of Deep Strike on terror strikes - likely a combination of incoherent doctrine, dis-jointed C2 and crappy ISR. Again operational offence = fail - they never reached their operational objectives in the Donbas after significant costs. - In Phase III, we get to the real fun stuff. First, I do not want to diminish the UA's accomplishments - not one bit, conducting a complex double operation 500+kms apart is really hard to do for any military, let alone one that basically had to mobilize to this level in 6 months. However, what is clear to me is that once again Russian ISR is crap - they could not see where the UA forces (Division apparently) were massing and last I checked even light vehicles need gas. Second the Russian logistical system has been hammered so badly it probably can't tell which way is up right now - Oryx shows almost 200 engineering vehicles and 1549(!) lost logistical vehicles (a number that is freakishly high, but we know is lowballed as most strikes occurred well back from the front). Just for reference an entire Soviet MRD had about 2000 logistical vehicles (count them:https://irp.fas.org/doddir/army/fm100-2-3.pdf). So the RA has nearly lost an entire MR Divisions worth of logistics vehicles - that we know about, and we also know their current BTG orgs are very light on log vehicles to begin with. This does not count ammo dumps and whatever else got HIMARed. Then the RA got bounced between both ends of its ridonkulous frontage like a dirty tennis ball, getting smack at both ends and in the middle for good measure. And then fell inward like a rotten garden shed and lost 3000 sq kms on what looks like at least 100+km frontage - Russian operational defence = fail. So at this point I do not care if the RA hires the freakin Sardaukar - if they cannot rebuild an entire operational military system en par with the UA's, they are done.

I am not really sure why anyone believes that "mobilization" is some sort of magic spell that will solve this war for Russia....on either side of this equation. We have covered this before but a review may be in order. Key here is the term "peer-conflict". That means a relative symmetry between military capability and architectures to the point that numbers start to matter in determining outcome. In this situation theoretically the side with the higher force ratios will have a better chance of winning. At this point this conflict is nowhere near a level of qualitative parity. Beyond the morale issues, which are legion, a loose measure of military quality is DETO - Doctrine, Equipment, Training and Organization. (Before anyone weighs in, yes there are about a half dozen national variations on this that take into account everything from policy to infrastructure, but lets keep it simple). So, yes, Russia has a big scary population base - we are probably talking 30+ million fighting age males, assuming you could tap even 10 percent of that - excess and fit-ish - that is 3+ million troops Russia could throw at this war. Assuming mass conscription doesn't trigger a major political upheaval; the first problem is you have to turn those 3+ million civilians into combat capable military formations - something the Russian have demonstrated problems with before the war. Second major problem is that one has to turn them into military fighting formations of the same or better quality than the UA. And remember the UA is already force generating and will continue to do so long after this war is over...because Russia. So Russia has to go from zero to hero faster than the UA are already doing. Now before someone spouts of "mass has a quality all its own" - a truism which has died an ignoble death in this conflict - in modern warfare one still needs relative parity for quantity to matter. I welcome any nation to try low quality human wave attacks on the modern battlefield. In fact the UA is demonstrating the exact opposite right now - high quality empowered small is kicking dumb-large to death. So now in order to mobilize Russia needs to meet a bar it did not have on 23 Feb, let alone in time to get out in front of things now. Third major problem, Russia does not even have the essential skillsets to create a peer military. And I am talking everywhere. For example, in order to create an ISR architecture on par with the West they need an entire military ISR complex that does not exist anywhere near that level. It took the US decades - dating back to AirLand Battle (hey go check out CMCW while you are at it!) - to construct the ISR architecture they are pumping into Ukraine right now. Further Ukraine has a home grown system they 1) have training and technical support for from the west, 2) have a 6 month head start, and 3) are not living under crippling sanctions. Some Iranian drones do not make an ISR architecture, it is what you plug those drones into. So Russia can "mobilize" all it wants; however, it will be mobilizing a Cold War era military, one worse than it had before this war. They will be nowhere near DETO parity with the UA for maybe a couple decades. With their new drones they can watch all those columns of T55s, driven by conscripts with a months training, supported by a rickety logistics corp get hammered by HIMARs and next-gen drone swarms. I will give the Russians points for stubborn, they have that in spades. This war is clearly at the "cut your losses" point. The RA has left as much hardware on the battlefield as the Iraqi Army did in the Gulf War - when you are in that league, get out! Mobilization will not save them, this is not 1941, it is 1905.

Best advice I ever got: strategy is not about good or bad, it is about bad and worse. A “good enough” Tsar would be sufficient at this point.

Remember when people got spooked when Russia put that one general in charge? I doubt it matters, they are all products of the same corrupt system. If Russia has some sort of military genius commander they probably filtered him out a long time ago.

Dammit Vlad...you had one job!

C.O.L.L.A.P.S.E That is solving for f#cking offence, baby!

I think that is why I think UAS doing C-UAS is the answer, it is probably the cheapest way to go. From that video just think how much damage those 40 Cl 1 drones could do on the battlefield, either directly (precision munitions) or indirectly (ISR). Now compare costs of those 40 drones with say one single MBT, or a suite of ground based lasers/EMP or some other large area system. Nope, cheapest counter will be another 40 C1 drones with small caliber guns or some such that can engage and shoot down the first 40. That is actually well within budget of many militaries. The expensive part is the ISR architecture but as you noted a bit back, Ukraine did this very well with what they already had as well.

And this is why fully autonomous is going to happen. EW kills the link back to operator, if the operator is onboard AI EW does not work as well. EMP is a lot of energy to put out, and we shield everything against it based on CBRN-E doctrine. I honestly think the solution to UAS, is other UAS.

Nice! I was wondering when this: Would become that. The future if warfare is now.

Absolutely agree. As to China’s ISR capabilities, no idea to be honest, we have been too busy counting carrier groups and fighters. China has one helluva healthy AI/ML and QC industry so I would not assume we have superiority, at least not today.

And from my homefront we have a clear demonstration of the problem with pundits: https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/ukraine-shows-military-capabilities-but-russia-can-still-hit-back-hard-military-analyst-1.6064197 I know Walter Dorn, he was a prof when I was back in staff college - his expertise is peacekeeping (look it up). And now one of our mainstream media channels (one of two really) is pulling him out as a military expert. He is way outside his lane here but let’s slap him on the front page.

And then there are the tac nukes: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60664169 About 2000 of them, some can be delivered by artillery ffs.

That is one massive assumption. So those warheads can come off, right? I mean we all read Sum of All Fears. So first problem is the people who are qualified to maintain and operate the things go into the wind and can be picked up and hired by anyone, plus their country just fell apart and they are looking for work. They probably are a little sore to at country collapsing thing and might even get onboard with the grudge thing. Then there is the talent to take warhead off missile and put in a truck, boat or airplane - pretty sure non-state can find the talent to drive those. My point being that loose nukes open up a lot of very bad scenarios that our blessed money and hopes that the things will stay conveniently on missiles in their silos, or people in a country that just fell apart will behave rationally, do not adequately address. It in fact become a C-WMD problem which are some of the nastiest we have, and have been wrestling with for about 20 years. Rogue state, pseudo state, non-state + nuclear weapons = bad with no easy button.

And we can all say it together: "Russian defensive options spaces are....collapsing! Ukrainian options spaces are expanding" just as God, nature and billions of dollars of western weapons intended.