The_Capt

I think we kind of beat the Russian economy to death a few pages back. I am not so confident that they can come out of this better than they went in - the material costs of waging this war alone are significant. And the full effect of sanctions, energy price caps etc have not fully set it. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/01/31/imf-improves-economic-forecast-for-the-eurozone-and-russia-amid-energy-crisis-and-raging-w And as with everything economic, it really depends who you ask. https://www.reuters.com/markets/russias-more-gradual-economic-contraction-extend-into-2023-2022-12-02/ https://blog.oxfordeconomics.com/content/a-darker-economic-scenario-from-russias-war The answer is simply - keep at them, pressure those doing business with Russian anyway we can and make Russia’s economic life as difficult as possible.

Ya matches what we have been hearing. Bakhmut is a meat grinder, no way around it. The attrition calculus is still not clear. The UA has been losing but how much and what is the impact? If that is the Cost, what has been the Gain? Pulling in the RA and forcing them to increase troops density in one area at the cost of others, we have seen this UA tactic before. One could argue, although much deeper analysis needs to be conducted, that the bleeding at Severdonetsk allowed for the collapse of the line at Kharkiv. So there is more going on here. UGVs. Oh man, here we go. The Ukraine War is really starting to turn into the US Civil War or Franco-Prussian War as far as emergence of next generation warfare.

Sure, I was pointing to the tone and errors in the twitter post (and WSJ if that is what they are saying). There are no "international sanctions" on Russia right now. What we have are a lot of bilateral sanctions, and the EU, which while technically an international body, does not speak for the entire international community. For that one needs an UNSC Resolution. Now what we are going to do about India and China's continued trading with Russia is another topic entirely.

The other thing that is weird is the smaller lines of attack. RA doctrine is not that different from ours, overwhelm and then annihilate. The attacks last summer followed that model of hitting all over the line. This winter there are a lot fewer lines of attack - feels like really expansive probing, but does not match probing tactics. One does not normally use human wave assaults to probe.

Well the problem here is that they really were not "international". We have no UNSC Resolution or anything else from international bodies (correct me if I am wrong). So this is not "illegal aid", this is "trade between two nation states, one of which we really don't like and the other who is also on our sh#t list." We have a lot of Western sanctions but other nations such as China and India did not sign on. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_sanctions_during_the_2022_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine#:~:text=With the commencement of attacks,transfers%2C exports%2C and imports.

Well if it is taking “14 waves to take an area” then perhaps the UA is already effectively defeating this scheme. Based on maps and reports Russia is back to retaking inches of the Donbas. They have not achieved an operational breakthrough after months of continuous trying, despite significant losses. Honestly the UA should just keep doing what it is doing and we should support them in any way to sustain that. Further what is different about last summer is the lack of Russian artillery superiority. They used infantry assault then, but only after blasting an area into pulp with WW1 levels of guns. That appears to be missing this winter. In fact it was noted in that same write up that integration with the guns was spotty. So the Russians have gotten poorer at this game, not better. Finally, Russia has mountains of steel. AFVs and tanks (albeit older) stacked up all the way back to Siberia. After a year of warfare Russia has still not solved for combined arms manoeuvre? Reinvented the BTG construct to marry it up with all these masses of infantry? More to the point, why is Russia using a 20th century mechanized force like a WW1 infantry force? The whole “well Russia sucks” narrative is starting to strain here. Yes they do but they have all the tools and can read last I checked. Why are they using the very detailed human wave attacks while all their armor is parked in the back? I don’t know if the tank is really dead, but for the RA at least, I think it is in palliative care.

“Wires” is a broad descriptor harking back to another time. So physical obstacles still work - like lakes and rivers, or man made like barbwire (an oldy but a goody). And the modern equivalent in encrypted comms - although a copper communication wire (eg field phone) is still one of the most secure and safe ways to communicate on the battlefield - low signature and hard to hack or disrupt, problem is range. Regardless, the ability to coordinate fires and reserves is key to countering human wave assaults. AP fires - have we not come up with dozens of ways to do this? Air burst, DPICM, MOAB. Hell the HIMARs has a tungsten shotgun nightmare round or the flying blender Hellfire blade: https://www.reuters.com/world/little-known-modified-hellfire-likely-killed-al-qaedas-zawahiri-2022-08-02/. Add to this claymores (command detonated of course) and sharp language, I think we can cover off on the requirements. And of course the good ole MG…Ma Deuce, long may she reign.

AP mines won’t work, you will never get the density to fully stop a mass of infantry. You can canalized them. Short answer is - same thing it was in WW1: wires, MGs and artillery. Wires as in obstacles and communications to coordinate fires. And the other two are pretty obvious but for artillery it needs to be back to front. Deep strikes on logistics and any massed breakout troops, and then the AP stuff up front. A problem I am seeing here is that we have dehumanized the Russians to the point that we are no longer considering the impact losing 1000 people a day is going to have on their home front. I am not convinced in the least that Russia as a society is some sort of homogeneous zombie mass, even if their troops are starting to act like it. Russia has a willpower breaking point and tactics like this are pushing towards it. Disinformation will only go so far. Everyone is talking about Ukrainian exhaustion but what about Russian exhaustion? Unless Russia can actually turn these human wave assaults into a breakthrough, and then breakout which is a big ask given the ISR disparities, then this strategy only accelerates the negative internal pressure on the nation.

Unless they lost contact/control. The manoeuvring of these things is actually quite sophisticated so this one basically drifting speaks to a loss of control. Unless the Chinese built in a fail safe (which can also fail) then we are back to…

Well I can only hope they are not smoking the same stuff as Russia. I would not have pegged Russia as dumb enough to engage in a land war in Europe when they had been so successful on the subversive front…yet here we are.

I argue that this, if it was a surveillance platform, was a pretty big mistake, not some deliberate strategic machinations by the unknowable Chinese grand strategy. Sure Chinese have been poking and prodding, intel gathering and playing reindeer games around the globe, so were the Russians...we get it, you guys are flexing. But this stunt is way above a lot of thresholds. An incursion into NA airspace with intent (assuming the thing isn't just a weather balloon and all this is so much theatre) is not a small escalation. Further to do it with a blatantly overt platform, which is now causing all sorts of diplomatic pain does not track along with Chinese methods to date. So it looks more like a weird error that is going to end up costing China, as their best play was - like Russia - to keep us all divided on the actual threat. For example, China is still Canada's second largest trading partner. So we talk tough and make noise but how much are we really willing to sacrifice here if we are not entirely convinced China is really a threat? Well plopping balloons all over the place over NA soil, which we shoot down and then show all the evidence to the planet, is just about the worst way to keep us divided on the issue. So China either decided to throw down and escalate for "reasons" or it was an embarrassing screwup.

A potentially crippling national...nay, continental security crisis. And we have to ask ourselves...how long before Chinese-made balloons swarm over the Ukrainian border? (Actually as a stand-off operational platform they start to make a lot more sense.)

Yup already on mainstream news as well. https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/u-s-downs-chinese-balloon-over-ocean-moves-to-recover-debris-1.6260109 Well I hope the 3 little guys inside made it out - but no mention of parachutes. Of course if this was a intel platform, we are going to see why it is a terrible freakin idea as the US military collects all the evidence and equipment.

A manned high altitude SIGINT platform, moving at about 120 khp visible by amateurs with telescopes? Considering the economic footprint China has, combined with cyber capability, I can think of about a hundred better ways to collect SIGINT data than whatever this is. The biggest problem with the entire idea is the fact that we are all talking about it. It is extremely high profile, on many levels, which is the exact opposite of what you want in a strategic ISR collection platform. If this is a Chinese SIGINT platform, it is pretty much one of the worst way to go about it. Hey if anyone wants to start covering their roofs with aluminum foil, go for it. But just know the Chinese already had a lot of capability without going to all the trouble of a freakin balloon. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yaogan https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tongxin_Jishu_Shiyan https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-ramping-its-electronic-warfare-and-communications-capabilities-near-south-china-sea https://www.thespacereview.com/article/4453/1 And this does not even start to unpack their cyber capabilities. https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/china https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberwarfare_by_China Or their HUMINT capabilities: https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2019-11/Chapter 2%2C Section 3 - China's Intelligence Services and Espionage Threats to the United States.pdf https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_intelligence_activity_abroad But ya sure, "let's send a giant balloon that every bored yokel from Alaska to the Eastern seaboard can see and track across social media."

Oh that is good. Sanctions are not a tap that are turned off, they are wires that are pulled that force and opponent to re-wire. COVID messed with global supply chains, and now we are projecting a continuation of this onto Russia.

This is the Russian Rabbit theory, that Russia has held back some sort of combined arms formation(s) that will spring when the conditions are right. We know that this is very likely for the UA right now, the fact we are pushing enough western equipment and trained troops is a pretty good indicator. However, for the RA things are a lot less clear. First issue is that, "will combined arms even work for the RA?" It has had a terrible track record along those lines in the first 6 months of the war - remember "Russian's suck" versus "Warfare has moved on" discussions? So even if the RA does have a nasty rabbit, whether or not it will even run is a big question. The fact that the RA is pretty much helpless to stop UA ISR means that any rabbits are going to be highly visible as they form up and that will mean deep strikes etc. Second, does Russia have the capacity left for a meaningful combined arms heavy force? I suspect they do but it is going to be of much lower quality than what we saw at the beginning of the war. I would not be surprised if they can pull together some really elite looking units, but entire formations when their best forces were really badly chopped up could be a stretch. Let alone the sustainment and support needed to make them competitive. As to why the narrower lines of operations happening now - well one answer is deliberate, the other is imposed. In the end neither really matter as the narrower lines of operations are not really working any better than the broad ones we saw last summer. The RA has not achieved breakthrough or a tempo that is outstripping the UAs ability to respond - at least not that we have seen. We have seen extremely modest gains 5-10 km in a month is glacial, and not going to dislocate the UA who still has functioning transportation infrastructure and the deep pockets of the west for force generation and sustainment. I think in the end this war has taught me that war is really a continuing negotiation with reality for all sides. That reality is one produced by this enormous collision of human social systems - so artificial. Right now both the RA, UA and West are negotiating with the reality of the situation. Everyone is trying to evolve and adapt to a dynamic environment faster and better than the opponent. Russia is likely doing human wave type attacks on narrow frontages because that is the best they can do while negotiating with this reality in the Donbas. These do not look like probes or feints, they are all out assaults leading to WWI levels of daily losses (quiet days on the Western Front to be sure). The UAs best play is to go defence. (Weird eh? We were thinking it was going to go the other way this winter.) And let the RA crash on the their shores. We will see a shift in negotiation strategies but remember they are going to be built on the current ones - you have to carry the baggage of the past with you.

Sounds like a fragging.

I think we can come up with something…

That is a solid deduction. I have no doubt that there is price gouging going on with respect to Russia on both imports and exports. Russia’s trade position is pretty vulnerable as its market has shrunk pretty dramatically. As has been repeated here many times “well the whole world is not the west”, well that is true but the west does do business with the pretty much the entire world. This means that open and free trading with Russia at this point is going to get noticed and may have repercussions, both above and below water lines. Then those who do trade with Russia, they are going to be in a position to jack up prices or push exports from Russia down.

I cannot tell you how much extra work it took to do a 79 and 82 US campaign. When we started I was all “well simply roll back the clock, keep same maps and AI…voila and afternoons trouble”. It took days of work to line up 79 and 82, I was ready to quit at more than one point - the freakin uniform crisis of Feb ‘21 made the pain and suffering of COVID pale in comparison. So, maybe…if we have enough time…but do not count on it. I am leaning more towards “give them the scenarios and let them move the time line if they like”.

Ah, well from Jan you might be correct. I think ISW might be talking in the shorter term. 5-8 kms in a month or so actually sounds about right for the pace the RA has been setting.

Whole thing has a Dr Strangelove feel to it. If it was a Chinese ISR asset then this is a major blunder on their part. If shot down, and US-Canada have every right to do that, we are talking captured equipment, attribution and a whole host of diplomatic bum-pain. Compared to the WW3 brinksmanship going on in Eastern Europe this is actually kinda cute and a pleasant distraction. Now if there are any weapons on the balloon, this is going to get pulling-a-gun-in-a-bar-trivia-contest unfunny really quick.

Can you quantify this? ISW seems to think it is about 1000m https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-2-2023 Russian forces intensified ground attacks in the Kreminna area on February 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Ploshchanka (16km northwest of Kreminna), Nevske (18km northwest of Kreminna), Chervonopopivka (6km north of Kreminna), Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna), and Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna) in Luhansk Oblast.[25] This is notably a higher number of reported repelled attacks than is typical in the Kreminna area. A Russian milblogger claimed on February 2 that unspecified Russian airborne elements with the support of the 144th Motorized Rifle Division and its 59th Tank Regiment (20th Combined Arms Army, Western Military District) pushed Ukrainian forces back by one kilometer near Kreminna. This "D" also looks more like a meatgrinder. The ISW report for 2 Feb is good, looks like the RA is being pushed into "one last push" to secure the Donbas by March, which may suggest why the UA is holding back. Unless they decide to launch a spoiling attack somewhere else.

Spent time on Steel Beasts as well. For the Soviets, as far as I can tell: 125mm - not much change as the BM22 and BK-14M cover off the entire time period. They do lose the AT8 before 1979 though. 115mm - biggest change as they roll back to the BM21 vice BM28 100mm - goes from BM 25 to BM 20. None of these are overly dramatic. The Chieftain looks like it may have an ammo challenge on its hands with that APDS round, the L23A1 does not look like it came online until 1983. The L7 105mm will be firing the M728 (already in game) as it was basically the same for both UK and US versions. On the Leos it will likely be the M735 or DM23. And of course all the HESH and HEAT rounds. Oh my this is gonna be good.

https://wotinspector.com/en/webapp?targetVehicleId=57937,34898,30547,23892&mode=xray.armor&platform=pc No idea how accurate this is but like Steel Beasts the hardcore WoT players tend to be as obsessive as we are - and before anyone asks, no this is not what BFC uses in their modelling, their engine pre-dates WoT. To be honest I strongly suspect suitcase deals in underground parking lots are where the guys get their in game modelling data. Regardless, the Chieftian looks a lot like a NATO T-64 type situation in the making. Quite a beast. Now the fire control and targeting will be the thing. And of course that changed within the time periods we are talking. Oh and absolutely T-80 country…feel the flavour.