The_Capt

Switchblade 600 - now we are talking! https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AeroVironment_Switchblade Hits like a Javelin but out to 40-69 km. That Altius looks new, multi-role beast (very ISR/EW) and has a 200 nm range (!) https://areai.com/wp-content/uploads/ALTIUS-600-22-Slick-Sheet.pdf Jump 20 is a MALE with a 185 km range and 14 hour endurance. https://www.avinc.com/uas/jump-20 Cant find anything on the K8 but it is by these guy (unless they mean the X8) https://cyberlux.com/unmanned-aircraft-solutions-uas/ So if China wants to play proxy war unmanned systems…

That is one weird engagement. First off it appears that the RA are out of RPGs or any effective AT really. Also was that the tank coax hitting those trees or were those air burst from something else (maybe the tank had frag loaded in its launchers?). Problem with AT mines is you have to mine the front of that entire wood line…that is a lot of mines. Seriously bizarre, the UAS must have been the determining factor. Whoever was flying it could probably see the RA lacked AT.

IT Mission: The 3G Roll Out. Ya know when you think about it…

Oh ya, forgot about the scientist…I mean climate change, right?! That is why guys who sell out like Macgregor are so freakin toxic. I mean every profession has quacks, but once they get on the internet and start telling some people what they already want to hear... It is one of the reasons I have left my military resumes largely out of this whole thing, discussion should centre on evidence and focus on trying to figure this thing out collectively. And of course we are accountable to the taxpayer in the end, so there is that…but there are days.

You know here I was think “nope, poor ol LLF has had enough this morning”…I can’t let this one slide. Ok contrary cool kid…how did the UA manage to pull off three operational level offensives in which the RA basically collapsed (or in the case of Kherson “withdrew with vigour”)? Clearly it wasn’t ISR or an ability to maul RA logistical lines at will, which shaped the RA’s already pretty brittle system. It was not pulling them laterally all over the battlefield from Kharkiv to Kherson. It wasn’t western sanctions because we are basically helpless. So what was it? Angels of Mons? The UA passively sat around until it happened…three times, two of them simultaneously? Oh and then just happen to have the forces to exploit at Kharkiv? This is exactly the same as the “Russia is invincible”crowd. They pull some weak tea opinion out of somewhere, do a drive by and then we spend pages doing all the work to disprove it. Nope, not playing. So present your thesis of what actually happened, citing credible sources and a logical framework or tuck your tail and get back to your squeaky toys.

Damn, read this after my post…my work here is clearly done. Excellent response.

No we are not. I have not posted my military resume for some very good reasons, but let’s just say it is extensive. And there are a lot of other business experts posting here as well. A guy I work with noted that we are one of the few professions that has to put up with this much amateur armchair quarterbacking - pretty sure chest surgeons are not on a forum trying to explain by-pass surgery to a bunch of guys who played Surgeon Simulator 2, and then get accused of “talking down”. (Who am I kidding it is 2023…) Ok, so the “curve” you are boiling this down to appears to be a magic 65000 troops to do a break out battle in the south before the RA can (and here you get a bit muddy) - get reinforcements or Chinese-backed capability in place to deny it until the Second Coming? So a force generation competition “curve” with some pretty vague components. Or more simply put “the curve of the UA generating Attack faster than the RA can generate Defence” and based on your assessment Ukraine is behind that “curve”? Ok, let’s just put all the other inconvenient facts about force generation to the side - because why would we need any of that getting in the way? - and roll straight into your simple model. Yes, your wargaming experience has taught you well….attacking is hard and costly because you have to get out of your hole, move in the open into defences that are by-design aimed at skewing force ratios…at a tactical level. At operational and strategic level Defence becomes far more costly because of frontage and depth. Now if all you have to do is defend a narrow defile in Greece - with a ridiculous Scottish accent - your problem is pretty easy. If you are defending about 800kms of frontage in depth of land you stole, from an opponent with all the ISR and accelerating levels of precision strike while your own AirPower is not working and getting blown up in strange smoking accidents…well let’s just say your Defensive curve is pretty f#cking steep. So while we are clearly at “Amateur Pearl Clutching Day” again - oh, I tried polite, but the gods of Dunning-Kruger and “I have an internet connection” clearly rule these lands, so we are at “Grasshopper”; unfortunately you are not in range of a well aimed rice bowl being tossed at your head - just employing your adorable little model, Russia’a defensive problem is absolutely enormous. Like epic historical big. Way back we did some back-of-cigarette-pack estimates that the RA would need around 1.5 million troops in-country to secure that line in something that resembles completely air tight. And last I checked they are no where near that “curve”. In fact even employing old Defensive ratios the RA would need around 20k effective troops (meaning at equal or better quality) to defend against this 65k being generated in the UA backfield…in the right location and able to react quickly enough, and supported/enabled, to counter along a 800km front. So you tell me, in your well informed opinion, just where the RA is on their force generation curve to solve that one? Ok, back to UA problem. 65k troops is the number that came out of that EU report. It is roughly 3-4 Divisions, really a modern Corps and a heavy one. If the UA had that force today on top of what they are employing to bleed the RA white, this war would likely be over in a few weeks. In all three major UA operational offensives the UA did not need anywhere near that level of mass. All three were variations on the theme of corrosive systemic collapses that were projected onto the RA, they were done with frankly baffling force ratio closer to 1:1 or in the case of Kyiv completely upside down. So what? Well first off Attack-Defence ratios are in the wind, at least on the UA side. They retook Kherson at a 1.5:1 attacker to defender ratio, while successfully defended Kyiv at as high as a 1:12 defender ratio. The RA has had nearly an inverse result, massive overmatch ratios do not work, nor do traditional defensive ones. The determinative factor appear to be ISR advantage, combined with an ability to generate ersatz Air superiority through deep precision strike. Bottom line, there is not much good news for the RA with respect to mass. Next, corrosive strategies are a thing. The RA did not simply “over-extend” they were made to be “over-extended” by cutting up their entire military system front to back. Even if they dig in - and based on the ground they have to cover, it will be shallow - they are not immune to whatever this thing is. All those minefield are useless if the guns covering them are dead or cannot get ammo. Nor can the RA plug holes if their C2 is slow (it is) their LOCs visible and hittable (they are) and they do not have robust logistics to sustain a counter move (they do not). So when I hear Ukraine shooting for 65k, I do not think “hmm clearly this is what they need to win this war”, I think “hmm, Ukraine is already thinking about the next one”. Regardless, based on the steady stream of hints - ATACMS training, whisperers of engineer equipment and a steady stream of troop training going on all over freakin Europe, I am betting the UA is actually ahead of “the curve” for a spring-summer offensive when compared the the RA problem-set. Will it be easy? Of course not. Is the UA demonstrating that is is near a breaking point - not even close. The large drunken guy swinging in the bar right now looks like he also has stage 4 pancreatic cancer, and it ain’t Ukraine. Now I would really like to unpack the southern axis Melitopol problem based on what we do know but that will have to wait a bit.

Well it ain’t small. Depends on how they are going to use them but armoured bridges are notoriously finicky regardless. Driver training is the same as the chassis - maint, operation and manoeuvre have a few quirks but basically are the same as the tank itself, but without a gun of course. It is launching and trafficking the bridge which takes training, not just the mechanical systems but understanding the limitations of the bridge and then securing it and running a crossing site. You can get a basic vehicle crew likely trained up in weeks, but the practical stuff of integration within a combat team takes practice and exercises. AVLBs can be employ for crossings or breaching ops. Both have distinct challenges and requirements. If you abuse the bridge or play fast and lose you can knock the entire system out of battle (the launcher mechanisms on the tank are pretty fussy), so crews really need to know what they are doing before going out live. This whole thing speaks to all arms assault operations, which is a whole suite of activities. My bet is the UA is training up units in the backfield to get them ready for an offensive, and we are starting to see more and more specialized equipment being pushed in for that job.

Unclear what sort of clearing equipment they are talking about. Keep an eye out for explosive breaching equipment, if they are going that way they are definitely lining up for a major push-back. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mine-clearing_line_charge

It was all the jobs lost in the US defence industry that would have blown up in faces. But you do make a good point - never underestimate stupidity when it can create good theatre.

I believe that he is referring to the pretty complex factors at play within force generation. These are more than a simple target number, which is pretty much entirely quantitative; however, even that has to be taken into account with respect to both attrition and requirements within force employment models - more simply put “how many people are Ukraine losing, compared to how many they need, compared to how many they can produce?” At least three dynamic “curves” there, and we have not even rolled in the curves for the Russian side of this as we have two systems in competition. More broadly, there is also demographic and other elements of national power at play - your posts seem to suggest that all Ukraine has to do right now is fight, but that have a lot of other things going on to support that, or simply exists as a society, which all take human capacity - running of government, industry and trade etc. (and it ain’t all “the women folk” who are doing it). And then there is the qualitative dimension. On paper Russia is producing tens of thousands of invading troops, but what is that troop quality compared to the fewer Ukrainians (if it is indeed fewer)? This just scratches the curves of troop specialists and critical enablers. The UA is not just stamping out infantrymen they have to train up engineers, gunners, medics, logistics, Recce, intelligence, HQ staff of all shapes and a sizes - everyone of these have a “curve” of both production and how “well” they are prepared before they are operational. And then there is equipment production curves versus losses. These need to be linked to human force generation as we do need to arm them with something. And then there is “how much is enough” training? Is qualitative demand being met, that is a feedback loop from the field that constantly needs to be adjusted. And then there is the qualitative curves effects on quantitative, and vice versa. This in it self creates a curve over time in comparison of the RA. And then there is force integration - how much can the existing system absorb effectively….a lotta curves. Basically he is suggesting, somewhat sarcastically, that your analysis and assessment was a little shallow, and your deductions/conclusions may need a revisit. The fact that he can do that in one sentence should suggest that the individual has a level of expertise on the subject, and perhaps is worth considering the point.

This whole NATO 2% thing is a political game. First off 2% GDP is not a signal that a country is contributing to collective defence. https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/nato-spending-by-country As you can see from the top 10 we have a mixed bag if you unpack the numbers. Some like UK and France have large effective militaries - for some very good reason. Others like Greece are using military spending as a form of green welfare - massive pers costs do not translate directly to capability that can actually be contributed effectively. The former US presidents angle was less “do your part” and more “buy American”. The threat to pull out of NATO was empty and everyone knew it. The US is the biggest arms producer and exporter on the planet (https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/29/arms-sales-united-states-nato-russia-ukraine-war-the-arsenal-of-democracy-is-back-in-business/) - and NATO is a huge market ( https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/29/arms-sales-united-states-nato-russia-ukraine-war-the-arsenal-of-democracy-is-back-in-business/) So pulling out of NATO would mean that STANAGs would no longer apply nor would US influence in that arms market, so ya…really dumb idea and no one really took it seriously in the business. As to freeloading on collective defence, well we could build monuments to that over the last 30 years. Not sure what the answer is, but 2% is a red herring. I think Putin has done more to push for effective NATO spending in a year than US pressure has done in a decade, but we will see how long that lasts.

Where is that guy who did a drive by a hundred pages back on how the Russian economy was invincible?

No I meant “still” as in AirPower appears to have been working like it was designed to on day 1. Unknown is the ISR, could have been a lucky find, crowd sourced or western fed - knowing the west we would have linked AirPower into ISR first because those are the rules we play by. And then at some point it all stopped working, for both sides. It has been termed “mutual denial” or “denial parity” but when was the last time we saw a high profile airstrike like this? There were others but then they dropped off. “Why that happened?” is just one of the big questions of this war.

You want macho? Oh we can do macho…

So: 1. Water for Crimea appears to major concern 2. That is an incredible amount of military engineering hardware they will not get back. 3. Air strikes still working but AD clearly still effective - but also obviously not entirely. This must have been a special air mission likely picked up by operational ISR, that target was too sweet to miss.

So this is a bad idea but not in the way it is being presented. AT mines do not come with the fuses in them. Last thing anyone wants it to lose an entire mine dump because of a faulty fuse. So those are inert lumps of explosives in steel casings. It is a bad idea not because of a risk of explosion but denting the casing and damaging the explosives inside. This could lead to a partial detonation or it being messed up and not taking out the vehicle like you want it to. Or you could damage the fuze wells and wind up not being able to arm the thing.

Why man, just why? I mean we were doing so well... Hard to tell but having a tank blown out underneath you and being in a wet, cold hole with two shot up guys is perfect timing for a sarcastic "glory to Russia" stream post where I am from. Also hard to get jacked for it afterwards, I mean he is saying all the right words, technically. Or maybe he is a true believer and the other guys are like, "whatever, should probably turn the phone off before we get lit up, again idiot."

Are we sure he wasn't being ironic? I count four guys in that hole, Russian tank crews are 3, so possibly remnants of several vehicles.

God that C4 cooking story is as old as time: https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/fishing-with-grenades-and-cooking-with-c4-a-veterans-vietnam-food-memories-104572114/ Been hearing that one for years. I am sure some troops tried it, but no professional NCO is going to put up with it today. Plus modern MREs come with boiling bags: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flameless_ration_heater https://newatlas.com/mealspec-flameless-cooker-boil-water/32061/ The other guys aren't looking at him in awe because he is so hardcore, they are wondering why the f#ck this old fossil is burning HE to make coffee! I mean the US has shipped hundreds of thousands of these things to the UA.

So this guy is an EW specialist too?

Oh it is not so hidden, but nobody seemed to really care. Other than some nasty terrorist and some screwed up countries that are always screwed up, most westerners were not thinking about conventional warfare at all in the last 30 years. The few times we did get into a conventional fight it was against tethered goats like Iraq and over in days. So western democracies gutted defence spending over time. In fact most of the hubbub over NATO and 2% was less about collective deterrence and more about economic gains in defence industries (“jobs!”). So here we are, again, playing catch-up and scrambling. Problem is now that we are not even sure what we should be scrambling for, governments want to look strong on defence while militaries are trying to figure out what that means. And the news media was absolutely no help. They polarized and really just told target audiences what they want to hear, as opposed to any real analysis of the situation. So people retreated into their echo chambers, and most are still in them. Add to all this the worst pandemic in a century where western society went legally insane for about 3 years and we are here in 2023 trying to figure out a conventional war that has brought us all closer to the brink. Meanwhile in East Palestine Ohio… https://www.factcheck.org/2023/02/multiple-federal-agencies-supporting-east-palestine-contrary-to-partisan-claims/

Well if the past is any indication, the UA will lead with Light Inf and SOF, heavy on unmannned systems support, to do infiltration first, those are huge frontages on that Jomini of the West map and not a lot of RA troops to cover them. Find your opponents quickly, and hit them hit precision artillery. At the same time operational ISR is illuminating in depth and they conduct a deep strike campaign on RA artillery, C4ISR and logistics. Minefield are going to be a challenge but there are ways through them. Have not seen any real discussion on explosive breaching or even mechanical breaching support. The UA is going to be needing assault engineering to break through those belts, but the lighter infantry and SOF will likely find or make gaps first. This may drive back observation and cover fire on those minefields, which makes breaching a lot easier. And then once you get enough forward moment, and corroded the RA - while pinning them down elsewhere, you go for manoeuvre and try for a breakout. Nothing easy about any of this but that is the order of the day to break the back of the RA.

Pearls are just glossed oyster poop. Ah, well perhaps I see the problem then. In military parlance we get into J35 versus J5 space. Step 1 - is likely in the J35 space, while Step 2 - Crimea is in J5. We do both at once, not liking to plan things just before we do them, we push planning out and adjust as required. That, and there are capability/force generation decision that will need to be made now to support Step 2 - so it behooves to have an idea of what one wants that to look like. For example, if the west gets all scope eye on tanks (and we sure as hell did here), they could wind up short-changing the actual capabilities needed for Step 2. We will have mountains of steel and a 10km nightmare corridor without an ability to choke out the peninsula. Of course you need to balance with Step 1, but how can you balance if you have no idea as to Step 2? To my mind Step 1 is pretty much a done deal. If it is not well then we have a much larger problem on our hands. If the UA cannot re-take Melitopol and/or a good chunk of the Northern shore of the Azov then their options space starts to shrink. Ukraine could try broad corrosive warfare along the Donbas, surging and pulling to try to accelerate RA collapse. If we think choking out the Crimea is a tall order, doing it along the entire Donbas, and southern front is even harder. The RA supply lines get shorter with more of them in Russia, which opens up the potentially nasty eventuality of sustained strikes inside Russia itself. I think the odds of this conflict freezing go up, unless the RA fails completely which is not impossible but pretty hard to predict. Frozen conflict will only shaken western resolve as this thing drags on, it kinda plays into Putins gambit, so not optimal. So the UA needs to cut down center. It dislocates the two theatres. It takes away a major strategic objective (the land bridge) and sets the conditions for what happens next. If the UA take Melitopol, they threaten the back end of all the forces still on the south bank of the Dnepr. They will have to turn and fight - and face northern pressure and crossings, or pull back to the Crimean choke point. The UA slugging it out in the Donbas could get very expensive and end up going nowhere. I think we may see diversionary ops in Luhansk but main effort will likely be Melitopol. That is not going to be easy and will have to be a hard going assault, I suspect this entire defensive dance at Bakhmut and surrounding is trying to bleed the RA white to set up for Melitopo, much in the same way Severodonetsk did for Kharkiv. So the UA pulls off another major offensive gain at Melitopol and establishes conditions for the battle of Crimea, or this thing might just stall pretty close to where it is now. We can hope that broad corrosive warfare will continue to collapse in the Donbas and lead somewhere. I think even at Melitopol there will need to be an element of corrosive warfare but how much is anyone's guess - it may be happening already. So Step 1 is already written, or start making "other plans". I mean if anyone else has any ideas shout them out - but we are talking about the road to a UA victory here. RA collapse could happen at anytime, so lets just put that one up on the "hope" COA. The good news is that the RA already looks kinda strung out in the center compared to what is going on further east: (Thank you Jomini of the West) So Step 2 - Crimea or Donbas...pick your poison. To my mind it is Crimea, (and apparently Gen Hodges as well). So start thinking about what that is going to take, and begin to build it now.