The_Capt

Well it sounds like an EW swarm, and a lot of possible points of failure. Of course if one can get 2-3 unmanned systems on a single enemy platform, why bother with EW? Just kill the thing. I mean with the amount of effort we are talking about to blunt one system it will likely be easier to simply hammer it. Even if it is another UAS, if you can have three other UAS in an array to corrupt its signal (and if it is fully autonomous it is really the ISR data feed) then it would likely be easier just take out the enemy UAS outright as you have 1) found and fixed it, 2) can track with multiple targets so you do not lose it in trees or terrain and 3) are already projecting low level energy at the thing. Why not just use one of the array UAS to directly engage? The advantage of high energy systems is they deny really wide areas. But they also are highly visible. I think you are describing an area network of EW, all low level energy and very precise - I can see applications in SOF work for specific jobs, however in conventional warfare c-UAS swarms would probably be a better (and easier) way to go. Now if it is a conventional platform like GSR or C2, again easier to simply guide in PGM than try to speaker/microphone the thing in what sounds like a pretty complicated plan. Finally, if your opponent mounts it comms network on a mobile dynamic UAS mesh net, you are going to need 2-3 times the UAS to blind it using this approach, that does not sound very practical when one takes into account terrain. We have not even started on UGS or got into higher altitude systems. And the we got space to worry about.

I think I would need to see an example of this fielded. As I read this we are talking low energy precise signal jamming. It has to defeat anti-jamming (eg frequency hopping) and somehow remain undetected or be mounted on a light unmanned platform. This would mean basically jamming at an individual level - so one jammer per system being attacked, as opposed to the broad area jamming now. I would like to see what that looks like. And then there is direct LOS systems - https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/44037/the-air-force-wants-laser-communication-pods-to-securely-link-fighter-aircraft-with-satellites I mean I like the idea but I see a lot of counter moves and hurdles.

This is interesting but I am really not sure how it would work. For example, I have an ISR platform out there sniffing around. I can jam the link between platform and ISR architecture, the link between operator and platform or the link between operator and architecture. The aim here is to effectively stop the information flow be it platform guidance or intel feedback. So spoofing is feeding false signals within that triangle. But every modern military operates with encrypted systems. So you can either insert enough noise into the signal (high energy) to jam or break the encryption and insert a false signal (low energy). I get the point on low energy being more precise and that would be very cool on a unmanned platform but I do not understand how a low energy EW system could spoof or confuse unless it had access to the encryption. It would simply be filtered out as low level noise. “Looking like the real thing” would mean breaking an opponents encryption completely. This would basically mean hacking the signals of an opponent, which is also a cool idea but these are hardened self-contained military grade systems so that is easier said than done. Beyond that is basically massive EM surges (which I am not even sure are EW) but these can also be shielded against. GPS is also an odd example. Open GPS, sure but militaries also all have encryption backbones. So if you are posing as a false GPS signal trying to throw off a guidance system, you need to be pinging as a positive encrypted device. Now of one had Quantum decryption in play (and everyone is chasing that) then it is a different game, but we are not there yet. And of course they are working on the next bound - too much at stake: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post-quantum_cryptography Or is there a third way I am missing here? [edit. Thought of one, cyber infiltration and exploitation operations in support could break encryption and then hand off to EM. Of course cyber has to actually be able to pull it off. And frankly if one can get that deep into a system one could hijack platforms without bothering with all the EW stuff in the first place.]

You are very much welcome. FYI the scenario I did up for the tourney is on a Pete W creation for CMCW BAOR - a bit of a teaser. The scenario planned for it is very different (first off there will be Canadians on it) but we thought putting one out there for the tourney would be kinda cool.

I actually do not know what that looks like. We have seen lasers and guns being sold as point defence, but they fall into the same trap as EW - blazing away at bird sized UAS is going to get one lit up pretty fast. Further UAS are going to go more autonomous so zapping them will not get so far. My sense is that the best defence against a drone swarm will be another drone swarm. Then when UGV show up we are going to have the same problem against small kamikaze ground systems that jump out of bushes and strike - a highly mobile and autonomous mine. Then add the systems with a Javelin mounted and denial ranges get out to some crazy distances. There is a crowd that are pushing C-unmanned and APS as a way to somehow reset things back to the way they were, the whole “we have been here before with ATGMs” cynicism. Problem is first, we never really saw the full expression of ATGMs outside of some very early Arab-Israeli wars. We did not fight the Cold War (outside CM) and really have no reference point for just how much those older systems would have impacted warfare, let alone next gen fire and forget. (Hence why this war it being watched with so much interest) Second, one has to protect the entire system which for heavy formations can extend back 10s of kms. Slapping APS and EW dazzlers on all ones tanks is useless if the fuel trucks are naked. So the bill to shield the entire system drives the costs up dramatically. To the point that I am not sure it will be viable. We will end up spending more to protect a tank/AFV/whatever than the platform is worth itself.

Problem with current EW is it projects a lot of energy into the environment. This basically is the equivalent of the old IR spotlights, so EW, like direct energy weapons essentially become c-fire magnets. Further as unmanned goes fully autonomous what E are we W-ing? We can already harden military IT systems from EMP so an autonomous drone that ignores big beams of EM pointed at them is going to happen. While one can see the EW emitter from space. EW has become this magic wizards wand in gaming but in reality it has a lot of weaknesses especially in denying large areas. The RA has been able to establish narrow regions of EW superiority, but how much that cost them is a key question in this war.

The problem will be the “flash”. You will need to concentrate faster than an opponent can see and counter-hit, which frankly the laws of physics do not support well. Artillery simply flies faster than a ground unit can move. Another option is to stay distributed entirely and rely on corrosive warfare but speed up attrition and precision.

Not a crazy idea but how do you support this? Logistics is normally a series of centralized nodes (e.g. Resupply points). The further one distributes mass the wider the logistics network has to become. And like everything else if you concentrate logistics you wind up just becoming targets. We will need to be rethinking a lot of things in this sort of scenario.

Game difficulty settings become the battlefield: I want mine to be Recruit while forcing my opponent to play Veteran.

This is fundamentally the modern warfare problem. We have a lot of our military capabilities on things that have evolved too slowly in comparison to the technology able to find them and hit them. We have ISR systems that can see far better than we can hide, and shooters that hit much farther away with greater precision. Worse, the things that can still hide the best are also the things that can do the seeing and hitting. This puts us into a massive Denial dilemma with current capability. Now I think the RA has been so eroded (or will be) that traditional conventional mass may work, but we cannot count on this for the next war. The tank being dead or not is irrelevant - concentration of mass has become toxic which shifts some pretty fundamental concepts of warfare.

Goes some way in explaining why no one is protesting this war in the streets of Moscow. Putin has clearly been building this internal security architecture, and likely using it for years. The difference now is that it is under new levels of strain. Russia is a big country and the potential blowback from this sort of system failing is not small.

Good lord, the damn things will be knocking on the hatch soon.

And the Javelin is last-gen tech. This is just one reasons of many that we need to rethink combined arms and the concept of mass.

"Within each town the TOG would appoint a garrison commander from the Russian military who would have an assigned detachment of garrison troops. These troops would occupy a building – usually the police or fire station – and set up facilities for detention, processing, interrogation and torture.70 The fact that the layout of these facilities is consistent throughout the country, and the equipment used in torture chambers, including specialised electrocution machines, were the same across multiple oblasts demonstrates that this was a systematic plan and not improvised sadism." https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf (pg 22)

Among the other tasks that Major General Kulinich is alleged to have received from the FSB through Sivkovich was to exert influence on the higher political leadership of Ukraine to convince it of the need to abandon the course of joining NATO and to adopt a neutral status just prior to the invasion.30 Refusal to join NATO, according to the Russian special services’ plan, along with other Ukrainian concessions to Russia, should have been the impetus for anti-government protests, similar to the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, when President Yanukovych refused to integrate Ukraine into the EU. Mass protests were intended to simplify the task of the Russian special services to destabilise Ukraine internally and paralyse the system of state and military administration, providing the conditions for a Russian military invasion. https://static.rusi.org/202303-SR-Unconventional-Operations-Russo-Ukrainian-War-web-final.pdf.pdf (pg 9). So when your opponent is working this hard to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and EU...we should probably do exactly that. Further this piece is presenting a lot of evidence that Russia was going to do this thing one way or the other. Once does not defensively build decades old networks and cells aimed at the level of general political buggery happening here - and even if it could be sold as defensive, one normally waits for an actual crisis before pulling the trigger, not a Tues in Feb because "reasons".

This is pure gold.

Depends on the dog, there are some pretty shady dogs. To this list I would add “Identity” - who we are. So much of this war has been about Russian internal identity that I am beginning to think of it as the major cause. Ukraine was one of Russia’s best customers: https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/ukr/partner/rus And this was even after 2014. We have already debunked the resources grab argument. There is no real ideological difference here. And ethnicity is also pretty weak as they were essentially the same ethnic parity as Canada and the US. So we are back to identity. Russia started a war because of who they think they are and a driving need to sustain that certainty. It was in direct collision with Ukrainian certainty about who they are. And here we are.

Any number of military FLIR and SAR type systems. What is weird about this thing is that is sounds a lot like it was written by ChatGPT or somesuch. A lot of technical terms and buzzwords (Kinetic Action) being used out of context or in an odd context.

Someone is going to claim it was UA SOF because they could operate that deep. No western trained SOF is going to blow cover 30 km behind enemy lines to scare a couple civilians. ”The Statue of Liberty is kaput!”

It was a trick the Taliban taught us back in the day.

Do it know as to #2 but as to #1, good question. Both sides have smoke ammunition but we have not seen it being employed that often. My guess is that smoke on the modern battlefield acts as a big flashing sign “hey look over here!” If both sides have tac UAS and ISR a bunch of smoke anywhere is going to draw a lot of attention. It may blind locally but once it pulls in a half dozen UAS any advantages kinda go out the window. What I am interested to see is if either side starts using smoke as a feint mechanism drawing attention in one place while putting main effort somewhere else.

1. The author is an intel guy, which should make one’s skin crawl a bit, and these guys have a somewhat “different” view of the world at some pretty fundamental levels. 2. He is not wrong, but he is also not right either. Military the question on the table is one of culmination. Has the UA culminated? Has the RA culminated. These are the driving factors of the ongoing negotiation space of this war. 3. Unlike the environment this guy has been operating for his entire career, military power is dominant within context of this conflict. So somewhat slimy back door “good enough” deals are not how the game is played. Things are more stark than that. All war is personal on a massive scale and this one is very personal to both Ukrainians and Russians. So half measures are getting harder and harder to pitch. 4. There will need to be a hard “friendship” conversation in the future but it is not the right time. Why? Because if it happened now both sides would be left with wondering “what if” which will lead directly to the next war, one way or the other. A clearer end state likely needs to be established. It is obvious that the UA is not done yet. The list of equipment being pulled in is looking very offensive-y (assault engineering). So they are looking to keep going. 5. Russia is still getting weaker not stronger, Ukraine is going the other way. The argument that “Ukraine is as strong as it is going to get” does not track. Until the UA and western support culminates the actual negotiation strength remains in the wind. 6. The only thing about this guy’s narrative that makes sense and he does not say is to try and engineer are soft defeat for Russia in order to avoid worse. Again, I am not sure we are there yet - Russian infamous resilience may work for us on that one - or that it may not even be possible given the political situation. 7. The hard friendship discussion will center around Donbas I suspect, maybe Crimea. But it will happen after culmination, not before it.

Pro: At least we seem to be agreeing that Russian defeat is the strategic objective. And we have the escalation advantage here. Con. Beyond the somewhat challenging scenario in manufacturing Chinese attribution for airstrikes in the Russian west, blabbing the plan all over Texas is sub-optimal.

Well they really, really wanted that trench. A whole lot going wrong for the Russian assaulters, not to mention some pretty basic errors and missing pieces (e.g. No fire base I could see - did not “win the fire fight”, bunched up on the advance - which went bad when mortars came in, no indirect fire support of their own, no AFV or Armor support, likely little to no ISR support, big losses and not much to show for it). This little action looks like it could represent the entire Russian Winter offensive.

The man is a saint in my country now. Well most of it. https://toronto.ctvnews.ca/u-s-president-joe-biden-says-he-likes-canadian-teams-except-the-leafs-1.6328028