busboy

Without digging out my book on the Tiger, I thought that the Binocular site was phased out in its production, so a CM "late" Tiger (if meaning late production, not just late serving). I could simply be wrong here, just what I recall. But in general, I salute the post for bringing forth the question in an excellent manner not often seen in gaming communities. Furthermore, I do think it is an important issue, not just as it satisfies the "hardcore" players, but as optics do have actual effects on the game. I'm looking foreward to future debate and BTS comment.

Suggestion...post a spoiler warning. I didn't read it as I haven't played the scenario, though I did catch the fact that there is a particular German unit involved. (shouldn't hurt me too much when I play that scenario.) Other than that, I wish I could discuss it with you.

Well, I think we have two big points of debate, how much did the minefields help the Germans, and how valuable were the Italian forces? The minefields...due to the terrain, the British really didn't have much choice but to go through them. But, how long did the Germans have to set them up? That minefield seems to me to be awefully extensive and at the same time very close to the front line. It seems unfortunate that the Germans were able to build such a powerful "fall back" position not on the defence, but on an attack. Certianly, Montgomery delayed the action until he felt he had superior force, and as Hart notes, he waited longer than Churchill cared for him to, but Alexander supported Montgomery. I certianly need to read more about the battle, that is for sure. One thing, though, that is a big point of debate is actual strength vs. effective strength. My opinion of Axis effective strength is low, while you argue it should be higher. I think I'll have to bow to your superior knowledge for the time being, though I am not convinced. It does, however, interest me, I shall certianly persue it more in the future. I can atleast start by reading all of B.H. Liddell Hart's account of the battle. One thing I think is fair to note, and I'm note sure if you're aware of it (though I bet you are.) Hart was British, and one of the few backers of theories of mechanized, mobile warfare between the wars. He wrote a inter-war biography on the great Roman conquerer Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanius and in addition to (in my opinion) proving Scipio to be the greatest general of the ancient world, he exactly perdicts the future of warfare with air and mechanized ground by reffering to battles from 2000 years ago. Its an excellent read. But he is British. The question that can be raised is how accurate are his accounts (Italians deliberately left out to make the Axis seem weaker?) The book is copyrighted in 1970, dunno if this was he first publishing. That would make Hart very old when it was published. But I get the impression, though, that the book was written sufficiently after WWII that hindsight could come into play. Its all still up for debate, certianly, and I certianly am not equipped to drag out the debate. But there still are elements to discuss. Those are, in my opinion: Was the extensive German minefield something that the British could have prevented? How effective were the Italian forces operating with the Germans? How much further did logistical weakness and strengths judge the outcome? Finally, with all these things considered, could El Alimain have been won in a better fashion?

The R-35 would make a good FT-17, that hungarian 75mm thing would make a decent St Charmond (sp?)

Oh I agree. Even though I may not care for certian elements about Montgomery, only a great narrow minded fool would be unable to admit that he was a great leader and motivator of men. That is the first step to being a good general. There are many good tacticians, but it takes someone unique to get men to do what they want. As for changing British armored philosophy, I'm not really suggesting that literally, it just seems that in WW2, the British and Russians performed sort of an "assault/follow up wave" compared to the American and German thrusts. Am I simply inaccurate in this? As for El Alimain...here are some numbers that I have, from a good source. B.H. Liddell Hart's History of the Second World War, pp. 298-299 British 8th Army fighting strength: 230,000 Africa Korps: 80,000 (only 27,000 German) British tanks ready for action: 1229 German tank strength: 260 (20 of which are under repair, and 30 of which are PzKw IIs) "Only the 210 gun-armed German mediu tanks could be counted upon in the armoured battle-so that, in terms of reality, the British started with a 6 to 1 superiority in numbers fit for action, backed by a much greater capacity to make good their losses." British air strength: "more than 1,500 first-line aircraft." (this includes all commonwealth nations, not just British) German and Italian air strength: "only 350 servicable in Africa to support the Panzerarmee." It then goes on to talk about German lack of supplies from convoy harrassment, noting in particular a fuel and artillery ammo shortage. I think my recollection of this account is what I was drawing those "off the top of my head numbers" from. The book goes into additional details such as armored divisions, notes about the tanks, explinations of Rommel's health, and so on so on. It makes me feel a bit better about my memory that I didn't just dig those numbers out of my posterior (accept maybe the artillery...this source doesn't note artillery strength that I see). A bit for fuel on the fire I suppose.

Hmm, I don't recall that. I do remember that Mr. Cooper constantly praised the M7 Priest. One of these days I'll need to reread that.

Yes that was indeed done, especially in theaters where tanks were not too operationally effective. (Italy, for example, M10s were used for artillery, sometimes direct line of sight, sometimes not.) In particular, the later stages of the Korean war tanks were used in this way. The trick to get the most range is to get the gun at a 45 degree angle, and most tank guns can't aim that high, so they had to build a ramp. Exactly how common this was in WW2? I get the impression that it wasn't that common. For example, in the Western Front, you have M7 Priests for SP artillery, why tie up armored assets that could be on the front? Besides, tank guns are generally inferior artillery weapons due to the smaller size of their HE rounds.

Oh, I know. I don't blame you, I'm not at all offended. I don't know your location sir, but if you are an American I am sure you can find this book in the military history section of any chain bookstore, such as Barnes and Noble. Its a quaint book, not anything else. The date is obviously wrong, that is sure. I should have realized it myself, but I was just copying what was in there. (Like I should have noticed that my one bad sourse noted an inline V engine...but I'm not too inclined with the mechanical specifics of engines. Still, I know the difference.) Still, I bet you the quote is a real one, just the wrong time noted. There really is a lot of good stuff in this book, much of which you have seen before, some you haven't probably. Particularly interesting are Victor Hugo's quotes on Waterloo from Les Miserables, which is actually my night time reading (along with Dracula for school.) Again, it most certianly is a coffee table book in the sense that its not providing anything really insightful about the military...its just a collection of quotes in a small hardcover volume with a cover designed to catch the impulse buyer's eye.

Well, thats one great position to have a Mark IV in then. I'd like to see a IS-II try that! But Ivan, da gun will nyet depress that far! Do it Comrad! (clunk) (top turret penetration, knocked out) edit: "<" and ">" didn't show up, put in parenthises. [ October 06, 2002, 06:42 PM: Message edited by: busboy ]

West front interests me more as well, but CMBB is the better game in technical aspects. I'd love to CMBO brought up to snuff, I hope it'll happen though I'm not holding my breath. As for whether the Allies could have beaten Germany without Russia, yes, I'd say they could. (with greater difficulty and time, for sure.)

Such a position is possible, but the possible depression of the gun might not make it useful. (as it seems you have there...) That would be a great place to have your tank if you were using it to supplement artillery...on a target 5 miles away.

It depends how fast the pellets are going. (Therefore, the main issue is ther velocity on leaving the gun, and how far the target is, and finally the likliness of getting hit in the helmet and not a nice soft fleshy part. )

Don't forget the Centurion was a WW2 design even though it didn't see service. It is to date (with upgrades) still a very potent tank. The Comet certianly was the best British tank to see action, but it still suffered from poorly designed armor. (It was fairly thich though.) What interests me is why the British and to a lesser extent the Americans held on to vertical armor for so long. I know some thought that "Oh well, tanks won't engage each other straight on anyway, and if we slope the armor and they're attacked from a different height it might negate the effect." That arguement seems so flawed, though I suppose hindsight is 20/20, but it just makes sense. As for that quote book I mentioned, its actually a very good book. Its written by a soldier, and just compilations of quotes and such. It certianly is one of those "this looks neat" books. I bought it because its got some great quotes from folks that I have yet to have the chance to study. (Middle Age warfare, for instance, is an era I am sorely lacking.) It has great quotes on war from literature, philosophers, and warriors. From ancient history to modern. In almost all cases, it cites a work that the quote came from (as only the most modern quotes really can come from anywhere else. Not too many quotes of Caesar that we have that weren't transcribed by him or one of his soldiers that finished his Commentaries.) The Hemmingway quote, for instance, is quoted in Michael Reynolds' "Hemingway: The Final Years" (1999). Point: its not a poorly researched gimick book, but its supposed to sell as hot as one. Firefox...apology accepted. I look foreward to reading Actung Panzer.

Bastables, I am trying, I really am...give me that. I understand that no one wants another ego debate, I'm really trying to avoid that. Again, I was wondering that the figures posted above about El Alimain...were those the figures of what was actually present in the battle, or merely paper strength? I recall much different numbers. Patton most certianly did not finish off Rommel. What he did do was whip the American II Corps into fighting shape, defeat the 10th Panzer in a several day long battle, and then the II Corps was given to Bradley while Patton was sent to prepare for the invasion for Sicily. Bradley executed the Coup de Gras. Patton's accomplishments in Africa, though vital, were not all enough to give him supreme credit for any sort of victory in Africa. Certianly without the British persuit, the Americans would have had a considerably tougher time with things, especially whiel Fredentall was in command of II Corps with his nice bomb-proof HQ 70 miles from the front. Again, trying to get this thread away from an ego debate, I am curious about British armored operations and would like to learn about them. How active were the British in Italy? I've read a few great accounts of actions there, but I don't have a feel for their campeigns. (I did read about a Churchill that went on a rampage and knocked out 2 88s and terrified every German within a 5 mile radius... ) Also, other than bocage bogging and the thrust of Market Gerden, I don't know mush about British operations in the north of Europe. Market Garden really was doomed to fail if the Germans were able to mount any appreciable resistance (which they were and did) so I don't consider it a good showing of British armored tactics. (when you're on deadline, and there's only one road to go down, and its defended... yuck.)

"you wont to have Patton's baby. P.s. stop suving your nose up Patton's arse" Firefox, PLEASE calm yourself. Disagree in a logical manner, and please be nice. This is a good debate, and I don't want it locked down.

Fire-fox, I'm afriad you're dead wrong on so many issues, and so heavily so that its obvious to most people here and not even worth debating. Furthermore, your l33t d00d style is so distracting that it looks deliberately foolish, not just accidentally. Third, I don't understand why you feel personally insulted and are ritiously declaring a flame war. No one insulted you, there is no reason for insulting anyone, or anyone's intellegence. Finally, to respond anyway: A. I have Actung Panzer, actually. Its just way down on my reading list right now. I go to school full time and work almost full time hours. My leisure time is slim, but I am looking forward to reading it when I get the chance. (Maybe I should cut down on my message board posting for more reading time ) B. Well, I don't understand what this has to do with the debate about strategic use of armor. Thats a tactical point. C. Indeed they did, the majority of the German panzer forces were either PzKw 35(t)'s or 38(t)'s, or the PzKw I and II's that were completely ineffective against anything larger than tankettes or light tanks. 38(t)'s still broke down as well. D. I'll quote you: "The gun of the sherman M4A1 fails point blank on a Pz Kw III" I believe you're saying that the Sherman's gun was only able to KO a PzKw III at point blank range, in which case its the armor that fails point blank, not the gun. Regardless, this is inaccruate. First off, which gun do you mean? The short 75 or the long 76? Which mark of PzKw III are you refering to? The short 75mm gun of the Sherman fired an APC shell at 701m/sec. If I recall, this could pierce the 100mm frontal armor of a Tiger at (literally) point blank range (and by that I do mean single diget yards.) The short 75 was not a great AP weapon, but yes it could KO a PzKw III. Later, the long barreled 76mm could fire a HVAP round at 1036m/sec. The standard AP round was not really effective against frontal armor of Panthers and Tigers untill less than 500m, but it was fairly capable. E. I never ever hinted that a Sherman could penetrate a King Tiger's frontal armor. In fact, practically nothing in WW2 could have. Furthermore, if I recall, nothing is proven ever to have pierced KT frontal armor. F. This is inaccurate. If you'd like I can dig out numbers (I won't attempt to throw anything out of the top of my head again. ) So firefox, calm it own please. I'm enjoying this debate and don't want it locked because someone felt insulted. John Salt, "I have never understood why some "fans" of Patton seem to think his reputation is so insecure that it can't be mentioned without bashing Montgomery. I've also never understood why Monty-bashers so seldom bother to acquaint themselves with the facts before attacking. " Heh, every time this kind of debate comes up, I get this. I am NOT trying to turn this into a Patton vs. Monty debate, or launch into an attack on the latter. The discussion turned to that. I admit I have not studied Montgomery's campeigns in the detail that I have studied Patton's because Montgomery's methods and battles just didn't inspire any interest in me. I admit a lesser amount of knowledge, but I am not completely ignorant. As for those figures, are those the figures of what was actually present at El Alimain? Or merely operational strength? Paul Jungnitsch, thats a pretty fair point. The two characters were insulted by eachother (in fact, lots of commanders were insulted by one or the other. When Eisenhower at one time said over the BBC that Montgmery was "the greatest soldier that ever lived" Omar Bradley almost resigned. However, the differences aside, the idea you are mentioning is true. You have one commander strategically fixing the enemy, the other breaks through and persues. It works, but in history thats not how it happened. Eisenhower had to either choose between a broad front strategy in Europe, or thrusts. He chose thrusts, and from there had to choose where to send supplies to. So while Bradley's Army group had to stop at the German border, Montgomery got the bulk of the supplies. His attempt at a thust is of course well known. Market Garden could have been an outstanding sucess, but it was a fluke that they went ahead with it even when recon showed German Panzers massing in the area. I do admire the audacity and potential of Market Garden, but it should have been scrubbed. Instead an assualt petered out, and Bradley's army group paused long enough to allow the Germans to couterattack in the Ardennes. Every one thing effected everything else, thats why fans of Patton and Montgomery get sore at each other. Its not insecurity, but the whole "if my guy had more supplies, he could have done better than the other." I'm not going to get into that, thats a supposition that only rises up blood. Everyone can guess my opinions on the matter, and that is enough. The issue of Montgomery's role in changing British Armored tactics is still interesting to me, though. What were British Armored opps like after the Failiese (sp) pocket?

Thats what the book siad...I was kind of thinking the same thing, but I figured I was just not knowledged enough about it. Gee, my sources sure don't seem very up to snuff right now...I feel like burning them all and starting over... That particular quote comes out of the easily found coffee table book "The Quotable Soldier" available at any bookstore chain I've ever been in.

Thats what the book siad...I was kind of thinking the same thing, but I figured I was just not knowledged enough about it. Gee, my sources sure don't seem very up to snuff right now...I feel like burning them all and starting over... That particular quote comes out of the easily found coffee table book "The Quotable Soldier" available at any bookstore chain I've ever been in.

Hehe, unfortunately if there is a Patton vs. Monty thread, I'm usually the culprate. This is unintentional, I assure you, but you cannot bring up one without the other it seems. As for the numbers, if you'd like I can dig out my sources, but the disatvantage that the Germans, stretched thin already, were confronted with were astounding. If I recall off the top of my head, the British had a 4 to 1 superiority in armor and a 10 to 1 superiority in artillery, and something like a 3 to 1 ratio in general manpower. (again, these are purely off the top of my head, I'd have to look it up to be sure.) Simply put, Monty could not have lost El Alimain unless he had accidentally ordered all of his tanks to reverse toward the foe (CM pun intended.) The Germans attacked prepared British defenses in which they had no prayer of defeating and then, when they were exausted, the British attacked...and where tactically fuddled mainly by minefields. WIth the resources Monty had against his foe, the Africa Korps should have been finished then and there. But the war in Africa dragged on. A little Monty humor that I feel inclined to throw in. (Irony to be technical) "The great point to remember is that we are going to finish with this chap Rommel once and for all. It will be quite easy. There is no doubt about it. He is definately a nuisance. Therefore, we will hit him a crack and finish with him. -Bernard Law Montgomery, Africa, early 1940. "Montgomerys" Ernest Hemingway's expression for a shaker of martinis made with a 15 to 1 gin-vermouth mixture, sarcastically referring to Montgomery's incessant striving for a 15 to 1 advantage on the battlefield. (paraphrased) "I shall cut into Germany with a dagger thrust!" -Monty "Hah, more like a bitterknife thrust!" -Patton to Bradley on the above statement.

Oh hell yes Bastables,its a great debate, thanks! I personally happen to be a huge Patton fan and thus rather, well, anti-Montgomery. Hard to be one without the other. However, I try not to come off as an Anglophobe or something. I would say Monty was the main reason, but the only big reason? The desert enviroments he started in, and his vast logistical and numerical superiority should have allowed him to polish off the Africa Korps much sooner than he did, what inspired the trademark Monty...patience for attack? Was it merely his personality to talk big and deliver later, or was there any logic to it?

I wouldn't count Caen, it was a flop. Tough terrain considered, it still took an unfortunate length of time and resources to get to that damn town. Good observation Bastables. I know the British were also very active in armored development and the development of tactics in the interwar years. My question is, what happened? Surely the change in methodology can't be contributed soley to Montgomery.

I think there is a misunderstanding in communication here, and that we're arguing over a non-issue and, in fact, hold the same opinion. Let me add some things that should clarify my position: The German conquest of France was spectacularly sucessful, but it was delivered against split, broken foes that were expecting WW1 all over again. As good as the French tanks were, they were not deployed well, and suffered from tactical problems. It is possible to compare the Anglo-American advance to the German attack of France, but only so far. In 44, the Allies were fighting against a battle hardened foe using tanks without tactical flaw, which were well led and used in a modern fassion. I am not suggesting that one side's tactics would be lost in the face of unreliable tanks. Germany in France shows this. That I am saying is if the Allies were down to 25% armored strength in December of 1944 due to mechanical failures, things would be dramatically different. The Germans proved they were capable of mounted a compatent counteroffensive when given the breathing space. If the Allies lost tank after tank to mechanical failure and by December of 1944 were down to 25% strength, they would have been in serious trouble. Reliability doesn't effect tactics, it effects weight. That is what I'm saying. In France, it took less relative weight to keep pressing on than it did against Germany in 44. That difference must be taken into account. If the Sherman was not as reliable as it was, the Anglo-American forces would have lacked the weight to maintain such lightning advances as some commanders were able to make. On a side note, potentially opening up a new can of worms, when did the British ever exhibit an armored breakthrough and persuit? I cannot recall a single British action of the war that consisted of British tanks knocking a hole in enemy lines and then pouring through, capturing large amounts of ground very rapidly. The British approach to armored warfare seemed much more methodical, gain superiority in firepower and number, then hammer them. El Alimain springs to mind.

"Well actually France shows that neither high speeds road nor mechanical reliability were paramount requirements for successful armour operations." High road speeds? No, its of relatively minor importance, I agree, though logically faster tanks can get to the front faster, and allow a slightly faster advance, but in the long run it is not the deciding factor. Add to the above phrase "...against a foe with dated tactics or completely disorganized" and I will agree with you wholeheartedly. Could the Anglo American forces have performed their lightning thrusts with tanks that required constant maintence or broke down? No. Their advance would have been, by necessity, slower and more methodical. In short, the Anglo-American advance would have looked like the Russian one, and probably suffered proportionate casualties. I am not trying to play "what it." At no point have I proposed "what if Germany did this" or anything like that. All I have tried to do was comment on mobile warfare. That is not pointless speculation, its a discussion of reality.

"Panthers managed 45km/h (30mph). The Germans also managed the 1940 battles in France with tanks of only 25 mph top speed that broke down alot and required constant maintance." Panthers are not "ubertanks." I invented the term as a rhetorical joke. The Germans did excellently in the battle of France and, by Dunkirk, I think they were operating on only 25% of their full armor strength due to mechanical breakdowns. They were able to achieve this kind of success because they kept moving before effective resistance could be rallied and mounted. Think if the German tanks of 1940 were reliable and were backed up by a fully mechanized logistical system. There is a difference. France doesn't prove otherwise. If anything, the Fall of France only proves that focus of force and rapid movement are the replacement for massive overwhelming advance. It is interesting to draw similarities between German tank crews fighting Char B1 Bis', Sumoa 35s, and Hotchkiss 39s to the Sherman equipped Americans and English later in the war. Where the Sherman was used as an assault tank, or used in slow methodical advance, they did poorly (as would German vehicles in '40.) When they were focused and kept moving, they did very well (ditto 1940 Germans.) Actually, The Germans had considerable atvantages as well. French tanks were most deployed piecemeal and were ineffective with one man turrets. The 25% strength didn't matter because they were STILL going to have tactical numerical and communication superiority.

One thing I forgot: thanks for the note on the M1 engine. I knew that a while back a couple of NATO countries tried to develop such a hybrid but they gave up on it. No doubt the Panther was a superior mass production machine than the earlier PzKw III. Also, production was a key reason for the Germans to not use sloping armor early in the war as I recall. Once you're tooled up for sloping armor, its not so hard, but when you're looking to make your Tiger and all previous tanks have had vertical armor, you're not tooled up for sloped just yet. The Germans get sort of a bad rap for being perfectionists tinkering on the perfect tank with armor so perfectly sloped it might as well be 400mm thick protected with a forcefield with a main gun that could KO a battleship at 4 miles, all the while being forced to work iwith no more than 3 nails and a bent spoon in a factory with no roof while the allies bomb day and night. The Germans were, for the most part, practical. Furthermore, history gravely misinterprets the effects of level bombing on German production. No doubt bombing hurt German production, but it was not a fatal wound. The highest levels of German production were actually during the height of the Allied bombing. The Allies could only bomb so many cities each day and night, such bombing was not utterly devistating in all cases, and you could not bomb every day or every target when you wanted. So many little things contributed to the defeat of the German forces in WW2. Incredable odds were just one of them (I believe that the worst setback for German victory was Hitler himself.) If odds were Germany's only problem on the Eastern front, Germany probably would have KOed Russia early in the war, but winter interviened. Really, its almost like Victor Hugo's discription of Waterloo in Les Miserables. A few big things occured to decide the battle, but it would have been nearly as decisive if all of the little things hadn't played into it; and so many little things played into it in just such a way that Hugo credits the reason for the outcome of Waterloo as God.