Claus B

See my response to Jason below. The need to penetrate 40mm at 500m was part of the design specification and the 3,7cm would have been utterly incapable of providing any support to the infantry as it had no HE round. The StuG was envisioned to have a dual role and the 7,5cm StuK 37 was the only weapon that could fill both roles. Claus B

The simple and straight forward fact is that the StuG was designed from the start with three roles in mind as I previously stated. In the design specification it says specifically that the armour penetration capability should be such that it could defeat 40mm at a range of 500m, which it did in fact do. It should be pretty obvious that using a 3,7cm or 4.7cm gun in the StuG would violate the other two roles envisioned, that of being able to deliver a usefull high-explosive round in direct and indirect fire up to 6000 meters. You also ignore other facts,namely that the German Army did not posess a 4,7cm gun at the time when the StuG was proposed and designed, just as there were no HE round available for the 3,7cm PaK. Is the concept of a dual-purpose vehicle really so hard to understand? Jason, I dont mean to be rude, but this is a-historic nonsense. The use of StuGs in independant batteries in 1940 was exclusively due to the lack of StuG vehicles. The use of StuGs in Abteilungen was the intent back in 1936 and the moment enough StuGs were available (later in 1940), they were formed into Abteilungen with three six-gun batteries for a total of 18. Jason, you are again flat-out ignoring the facts. When StuG production was impeeded with the bombing of the Alkett factory in November 1943, it was choose to cut Panzer IV production (a tank with a turret that could carry the 7,5cm KwK 40) in order to keep up StuG production in the form of the StuG IV. Same gun, same vehicle but change in configuration from turreted tank to StuG because that was what they wanted - a vehicle conforming with the StuG doctrine. Had they simply wanted a 7,5cm gun on tracks, they could have shipped Panzer IVs to the StuG Abteilungen instead of disrupting production. Claus B [ February 26, 2002, 05:28 AM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

Anti-tank use was part of the StuGs role from day 1 (see Mattias' post). It was part of the conceptual studies done by Manstein and others in 1935-36 and it was part of the design specification. The StuG was designed as an infantry support vehicle with three things in mind: 1. Direct fire support using HE 2. Anti-tank fire 3. Indirect fire under command of the divisional artillery #3 was not used much, but #1 and #2 was part of the curriculum from day 1. Being able to defend itself and the infantry it was supporting, against enemy tanks was always on the agenda and the upgunning taking place early 1942 was a direct consequence of the heavily armoured Soviet tanks it faced in 1941. The role of the StuG as an infantry support vehicle did not change, nor did the organisation in which it served or its organisational place in the artillery. You have written a fine story of the problems the Germans faced after meeting the T34 and KVs in 1941, but you are confusing the consequences it had on German AFV development. The 7,5cm PaK 40 gun was being introduced as the new standard anti-tank gun but was really too heavy for its intended deployment, especially when operating with the Panzertruppe, hence the desire to make a self-propelled version, leading to the production of "Marders". And of course the Panzer IV was upgraded as the Panzer III had reached the end of its potential. But the role of the Panzer IV remained that of the tank in the Panzerdivisions, that of the "Marders" remained those of the anti-tank gun in the Panzerjäger Abteilung and as said above, the StuG remained the quintessential infantry support vehicle and was found only in the Sturmartillerie. It was in fact three different weapons systems reacting to a common threat, but that did not change the role of each system: tank, anti-tank gun and infantry support vehicle. Not quite. The Panzer III was replaced by the Panther on the production lines of Daimler Benz, MAN, Henschel and MNH. Alkett was producing Panzer III and StuG III at the same time and switched to StuGs only as production of Panzer III ran out in 1943.MIAG begun StuG production early in 1943 alongside Panzer III production until the latter ceased. There were no organisation change in the Sturmartillerie or Panzertruppe because of the upgunning, and the changes in the Panzerjägertruppe amounted only to a new organization for the Panzerjäger Kompanie (sfl) within the framework of the existing Panzerjäger Abteilung. In the Panzetruppe, organisation didn't change until 1943 when the light and medium companies were replaced by medium companies equipped with either Panzer IV or Panther. If the *old role* is that of the Sturmgeschütz as an infantry support weapon, then I believe you are wrong. The Sturmppanzer IV "Brummbär" was not intended to fullfull any role hitherto fullfilled by the StuG or the Sturmartillerie. It was a new development, essentially a self-propelled version of the schwere Infanteriegeschütz, heavily armoured to survive when employed in the direct-fire role. They were organized under the Panzertruppe and employed in support of both armour and infantry. With only 300 produced, it was highly specialized weapon that had more in common with the later SturmTiger than the StuG. Yes, they did because they were designed and built to increase the HE firepower of the Sturmgeschütz Abteilung/Brigade. They were an integrated part of the Sturmartillerie. No, they did not. They were a new development and did not replace StuGs anywhere. No, they did not replace StuGs or take over their role in any way. They were simply the old towed 15cm sIG 33 on tracks, in effect regimental artillery. Their development is similar to that of the anti-tank weapons of the motorized divisions, the tendency going towards self-propelled mounts rather than towed guns. These developments had nothing to do with StuGs or the Sturmartillerie. As seen above, the StuG in the Sturmartillerie remained in the same role from its conception in 1935-36 to the end in 1945. No other vehicle took over that role anywhere in the German Army organisation. Rather, the StuG vehicle proved so versatile that it could be used as a self-propelled anti-tank gun in the Panzerjäger Abteilung of Panzer- and infantry divisions. I am not shure what you point is here. The importance and succes of the StuG vehicle came exclusively from doctrine, the original doctrine that it should be an infantry support vehicle that could do three things: 1. Direct fire support using HE 2. Anti-tank fire 3. Indirect fire under command of the divisional artillery The concept and doctrine of the StuG proved so succesfull that it lead to the development of a series of similar vehicles like the Jagdpanzer IV and Hetzer that both shared the dual capability (#1 and #2) of the original design. As early as 1936, it was considered that a StuG Abteilung in the infantry division could replace the Panzerjäger-Abteilung. This did not happen due to insufficient number of StuGs, but this was in fact what started to happen in 1943, when the StuG and its brethren the Jagdpanzer IV and Hetzer found their way into the Panzerjäger Abteilungen of the Panzer and infantry divisions. Here they were employed according to their dual nature as self-propelled anti-tank guns as well as infantry support vehicles, a fact made clear by German training films and combat reports. This sums up the error of your argument - it was doctrine that dictated the removal of the turret and the hull mounted gun. It was the only way to achieve one of the design parameters, low height. And this was done long before the upgunning issue ever came up - in fact 5 years before. Claus B

HE fillers in some 75mm gun shells: German 7,5cm le IG 18 = 570g 7,5cm Gebirgskanone 15 = 500g 7,5cm FK 16 = 520g, 370g 7,5cm le FK 18 = 520g 7,5cm PaK 40 = 640g 7,62cm PaK 36 = 550g US 75mm M3 = 667g (same for a lot of other 75mm guns and howitzers) 3" M7 = 390g (same for 76mm tank guns) Claus B

Take it easy, I do it only to bug you I bow to the power of "The Website". I was in error and will go sit in a corner and repent Where did you find the information that the "SprGr. 34" weighed 15 pounds? The ratio between shell weight and filler weight does not seem that small considering the type of gun were talking about (KwK 40 L/48) - the US M42A1 (76mm/3 inch) weighed 12.87 lb with a filler of 0.86 lb. In fact, I would say that the 853 grams (1,88 lb) of filler in the "Sprgr. Kw. K. (34)" is quite a lot, more than any other German 7,5cm gun including the IG 18 and the various field guns and howitzers. Claus B

The answer is found if you scroll down a bit further on that page. The SprGr Kw.K. 34 with the large HE content was for the 7,5cm KwK 37 L/24 while the SprGr 34 with the low HE content was for the 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43-L/48. The former was fired at 420 m/s while the latter took off at 550 m/s through a longer barrel which probably required a shell with thicker walls (same discussion as with the US 75mm HE vs 76mm HE). Claus B

Hogg is wrong here, as can clearly be seen from production and expenditure figures for PzGr 40 and Gr.38 Hl/x. PzGr 40 was always a marginal round for the 7,5cm PaK/KwK/StuK guns and was only used in quantity in 1943 and withdrawn at the end of that year. Gr.38 Hl/x was used and produced in much larger quantities in 1942 and 1943, before the PzGr 40 was withdrawn. Also, Gr.38 Hl/x production ceased at the same time production of PzGr 40 was stopped due to lack of tungsten. Expenditure figures suggest that the Gr.38 Hl/x was used just as much in KwK/StuK 40 guns as it was in the PaK 40. It could be suggested, though, that the bulk of those fired by KwK/StuK 40 was actually fired by the StuK variety, but so far, I haven't found any numbers that can clear that up. Claus B

Hofbauer is right, there were 4 different versions of the Gr.38 Gr.38 Hl Gr.38 Hl/A Gr.38 Hl/B Gr.38 Hl/C The different models are described by Hogg in "German Artillery of WWII" in the entry about the 10.5cm l.FH. Even though this was 105mm ammunition, I'm pretty shure that the basic design changes were the same across the board, including the 7,5cm for PaK 40, KwK 37 and KwK 40. As for the dates of introduction, I've reached the following conclusion, so far: Gr.38 Hl: Introduced in June 1940. First combat use in North Africa early 1941 (Fleischer IIRC). Apparently withdrawn from service soon after. Still, some StuG units apparently used the Gr.38 Hl (unknown model) early in the Russian campaign. Maybe only the first batch of Gr. 38 Hl was withdrawn from service? Gr. 38 Hl/A: Introduced in early 1942 (maybe late 1941) Gr. 38Hl/B: This version is mentioned in reports dated March 1943, so it must have been in use by then. Gr. 38 Hl/C: A January 1944 report one ammo expenditure for PzAbt. 116 only mentions Hl/B, so Hl/C must have been introduced after this date, though production probably began in 1943. The gunnery manual for the Jagdpanzer IV and Hetzer (Merkblatt 47b/45) of June 1944 mentions both Hl/B and Hl/C. As for the ammunition expenditure, the following data can be compiled from Hahn: "Waffen und Gehiemwaffen...": 1942: PaK 40 - Total = 118,000 PaK 40 - PzGr 39 = 42,000 PaK 40 - PzGr 40 = 0 (only 7,700 produced) PaK 40 - Gr.38 Hl/x = 13,000 PaK 40 - SprGr = 63,000 KwK 40 - no data 1943: PaK 40 - Total = 1,250,000 PaK 40 - PzGr 39 = 359,000 PaK 40 - PzGr 40 = 42,000 PaK 40 - Gr.38 Hl/x = 374,000 PaK 40 - SprGr = 476,000 KwK 40 - Total = 2,167,000 KwK 40 - PzGr 39 = 499,000 KwK 40 - PzGr 40 = 91,000 KwK 40 - Gr.38 Hl/x = 685,000 KwK 40 - SprGr = 891,000 1944: PaK 40 - Total = 3,218,000 PaK 40 - PzGr 39 = 1,276,000 PaK 40 - PzGr 40 = 0 PaK 40 - Gr.38 Hl/x = 535,000 PaK 40 - SprGr = 1,407,000 KwK 40 - Total = 3,652,000 KwK 40 - PzGr 39 = 1,083,000 KwK 40 - PzGr 40 = 0 KwK 40 - Gr.38 Hl/x = 394,000 KwK 40 - SprGr = 2,175,000 KwK 40 includes StuK 40. It seems possible that a small amount of PzGr 40 was used in both 1942 and 1944, but in numbers so small that they were not included in the report. As for the effective range of Gr.39 Hl/x, the gunnery manual referred to above sets the maximum range to 1200 meters for Gr.38 Hl/B and Hl/C. Fire for effect (Wirkungsschiessen) was possible upt 600 meters with the first round, at ranges from 600 meters to 1200 meters it was recommended to bracket the target, i.e. to establish the range by firing short and long to establish the actual range. Gr.38 Hl/x is to be used against all armoured targets, but only against "tanks, difficult to combat" if no PzGr 39 is available. I would assume that the latter comment means that targets easy to engage like stationary vehicles and vehicles at ranges shorter the 600 meters should be attempted with Gr.38 Hl/x. Obviously, trying hit a moving tank at 1000 meters with this round would be difficult! Claus B

I think it is too much to say that Chamberlain and Ellis have a "theory", they have just tabulated some numbers. But it is of course possible that they have drawn the same conclusions you did, that the PaK L/46 was basically the same as the KwK L/48. The KwK 40 L/43 = 740 and KwK 40 L/48 = 750 m/s is a guess on my part. I've seen 740 and 750 for both. There is really nothing to suggest that the StuK 40 should be any different from the KwK 40 in terms of performance in either the L/43 or L/48 version. In "Sturmgeschütze" Speilberger does give a 790 m/s muzzle velocity for the L/48, but there is nothing in other parameters given for the gun to suggest that it was 790 m/s. Its the same ammo, same barrel length etc. as the KwK 40. Possibly, Spielberger has taken the 790 m/s from the same or similar source used by Chamberlain and Ellis? Claus B

According to Spielberger, the rifling twist was the same for the PaK 39 as for the KwK 40 and I'm almost 100% shure that both had 32 grooves. Claus B

It is difficult to say, you can imagine all sorts of test rigs being used, perhaps one allowing for longer recoil. Also, it is not unlikely that the KwK 40 cartridge could hold more propellant than was actually used in the production versions. This is quite interesting because Gr.38 Hl/x appears to have been a rather unsuccesfull development. I dont recall ever reading a positive comment about it, it was not very accurate (low muzzle velocity), it took a large number of hits to guarantee a kill etc. Production ran from 1942 to 1943 and was then cut, a fact that would also suggest that is was not very succesfull. Still, about 1.8 million rounds were produced and about 1.1 million fired. In 1943 Gr.38 Hl/x made up about 50% of the armour piercing ammunition fired by the PaK 40 and about 30% of total ammo expenditure, In 1944 the numbers are about 30% of AP and about 16% of the total. Possibly, this is the reason for the passage you mentioned from Fleischer - the Wehrmacht had a large stock of Gr.38 Hl/x that was not being used while at the same time they had to produce more PzGr 39 to satisfy demand. Regarding the muzzle velocity, the Gr. 38/Hl was fired at 450 m/s, but in order to function properly, it was not to be used at short range. Possibly, the cone could collapse before the jet had formed properly? Claus B [ February 23, 2002, 07:16 AM: Message edited by: Claus B ]

You spotted the source with great skill and accuracy I found some data on the amount of propellant used in the PaK 40 and KwK 40 7,5cm PaK 40 (Hogg): Propellant for the PzGr 39 = 2.75kg 7,5cm KwK 40 (Spielberger): Propellant for the PzGr 39 = 2.43kg The propellant is of the same type in both rounds (Diglykolpulver, Rohrpulver) It seems likely that there should be a difference in muzzle velocity given the 13% extra propellant used in the PaK 40 while any difference in muzzle velocity between the KwK 40 L/43 and L/48 can only come from the longer barrel - perhaps the origin of the 740 m/s vs 750 m/s? A bit of speculation: Regarding the Meppen firing tests in March 1942 where the KwK 40 L/43 reaches a muzzle velocity of 790 m/s and the KwK 40 L/48 a whooping 820 m/s, it could suggest that the guns were fired with using an amount of propellant similar to that of the PaK 40. As the barrel length of the KwK 40 L/43 and the PaK 40 L/46 was the same, the result would likely have been the same as well. Under that assumption, the 820 m/s from the KwK 40 L/48 comes from the fact that the extra propellant made it possible to take advantage of the additional barrel length while the smaller amount of propellant used in the standard KwK 40 cartridge did not have any substantial effect on the muzzle velocity even when using the longer barrel. Claus B

I think you miss my point here. There is no "L48 in PaK form". The PaK 40 is an L/46 and uses the same barrel as the KwK L/43, the difference in calibers length comming only from the difference in chamber length. Regarding the muzzle velocities, see below. The only thing that was changed between the KwK 40 L/43 and KwK L/48 was the barrel. The motivation for doing so was not to increase muzzle velocity, but to simplify production. The L/43 barrel used a more complicated increasing twist rifling while the L/48 had the same twist to the rifling from chamber to muzzle. The small increase in muzzle velocity was simply and added bonus. You are seeing problems where there are none. All that would be required was for the gun manufacturer to start using L/48 barrels once his stock of L/43 barrels ran out. It would have absolutely no implications for the StuG/Panzer IV production lines. Piece of cake Jason Datenblätter für Heeres-Waffen, Fahrzeuge ung Gerät 1944 (ed. Pawlas): 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43 = 750 m/s 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48 = 750 m/s 7,5cm PaK 40 L/46 = 750 m/s However, the data you can find is conflicting and harmonizing it would be to ignore that it probably come from a number of different sources, German, British and American and possibly from a number of different studies. Here are a few more... Bird & Livingston: "Armour and Gunnery": 75mm L/46 (PaK 40 L/46) = 792 m/s (2600 fps) 75mm L/43 (KwK 40 L/43) = 740 m/s (2427 fps) 75mm L/48 (KwK 40 L/48) = 750 m/s (24060 fps) Senger und Ettelin: "Die Deutschen Panzer": 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43 = 740 m/s 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48 = 750 m/s 7,5cm PaK 40 L/46 = 792 m/s Hogg: "German Artillery..": 7,5cm PaK 40 (PaK 40 L/46) = 792 m/s (2600 fps) Jentz: "Panzertruppen.." vol II: 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43 and L/48 = 740 m/s Chamberlain & Ellis: "Encyclopedia of German tanks..": 7,5cm KwK 40 L/43 = 740 m/s 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48 = 790 m/s 7,5cm PaK 40 L/46 = 790 m/s The latter is the only one I could find, that bundles the PaK 40 L/46 and the KwK 40 L/48 and uses the 790 m/s figure for both. A case could be made, I think, that the PaK 40 L/46 actually had a higher muzzle velocity than the KwK 40 L/43 and L/48 because the chamber volume was somewhat larger at 3.5 liters while the two tank guns only had a volume of 3.17 liters. There was room for more propellant, but whether it was used can only be decided if someone knows the amount and type of propellant used in the KwK 40. A reduced amount of propellant would be consistent with the need for a shorter recoil in the KwK 40. Claus B Claus B

A bit of 7,5cm gun history that might clear up a few things. First of all, the Germans measured the length of the gun from the rear face of the breech to the end of the barrel, not counting the muzzle brake. The 7,5cm PaK 40, the towed anti-tank gun had a calibers length of L/46. The rifled part of the barrel was 2470.5mm long, the chamber 729,5mm. That plus the rear of the gun from chamber to end of breech amounted to a total length of 3450mm = 75mm x 46. It used a 716mm long and slender cartridge case. This gun was also used in some of the Marder self-propelled anti-tank guns. Then came the 7,5cm KwK 40, the gun used in the Panzer IV. It was based on the PaK 40 and initially used the same barrel, i.e. the rifled part. The reason was probably to simplify logistics. The breech end of the gun was different though, using a shorter, fatter cartridge case 495,1mm long. So, this leaves us with the rifled part of the barrel being 2470,5mm, a chamber that is 507,5mm + the rest of the breech end for a total length of 3233mm = 75mm x 43 (well, actually x 43.106 but you can't used that in a designation ) Early in 1942 tests were carried out with a KwK 40 with a longer barrel allowing a simpler rifling. It was intruduced from about August 1942 as the 7,5cm KwK 40 L/48. The numbers were: rifled part of the barrel 2852,5, chamber 507,5 + rest of gun for a total length of 3615 = 75mm x 48 (really 48,2 but again..... ) The KwK 40 was used in the Panzer IV, in modified form as the StuK 40 in the StuG III and IV (same length and ammo). The PaK 39 was another development, but used the same dimensions as the KwK 40 L/48, the same ammunition and was used in the Hetzer and Jagdpanzer IV. As for muzzle velocities, there is a lot of conflicting data floating around, but the March 1942 tests of the KwK 40 L/43 and L/48 might give a clue to the difference. Given the same propelling charge and firing the same shell (PzGr), the L/43 reached 790 m/s while the L/48 reached 820 m/s. The charges used may not have been the same as used in the production ammo though? The data I've seen ranges from 740-750 for the KwK 40 L/43, 740-790 for the KwK 40 L/48 and 750-790 for the PaK 40 L/46. Would be interesting to know the propelling charge and type for the KwK 40 PzGr 39 ammo, PaK 40 PzGr 39 was 2,75kg Diglykolpulver, Rohrpulver. Claus B

Regarding the first encounter between the Germans and the T34, it is a question of such trickery that even the Creator of the Panzerwaffe was confused by it: Panzer Leader p. 143: It was at the end of July, 1941, that the T34 tank appeared at the front and the riddle of the New Russion model was solved. and Panzer Leader p. 162: On July 2nd I visited this battalion personally... [sNIP] ...this was hardly surprising since here, for the first time, the enemy deployed his T34 tank... Claus B

Of course the Germans faced enemy anti-tank rifles before 1942, they even used them themselves. The only vehicles mentioned in your qoutes to be vulnerable to damage from AT-rifle fire are PzKpwI, PzKpw II, and Neubau – PzKpfw IV (i.e. Neubaufahrzeug). These tanks sported 13-15mm of armour on most surfaces, even the front. Since the Poles, Norwegians and the French were overrun with no undue losses and Germany was moving towards more heavily armour tanks, I fail to see an anti-tank rifle threat against the German army post-1940. The Red Army did not deploy anti-tank rifles against the Germans until November 1941 and then only in very small numbers. In fact, if you read on in Panzertruppen, you will find a report from 3. Panzerdivision from about May 1942 that refers to the Soviet anti-tank rifle as something new. Incidentally, the same report states that the anti-tank rifle penetrates the side hull armour of the Panzer III and IV. In other words, the anti-tank rifle threat re-emerges in 1942. If you read on until page 249, you will see a report from 24. Panzerdivision dated October 11th 1942, dealing with the fighting in Stalingrad. It says: "Most dangerous enemy weapons: a. Anti-tank rifles usually only appear at close range and are difficult to spot and combat. b. Sharpshooters." Claus B

<BLOCKQUOTE>quote:</font><HR>Originally posted by Username: Was there a german 75mm weapon in between the 75L24 and the 75L43? I vaguely remember reading about one. Perhaps a lengthened L3X?<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> There were several. Spielberger/Jentz: "Begleitwagen..." (p. 174-176) refers to a March 12th 1941 report on discussions at Krupp about an L/33 gun, a taper-bore 7,5cm-5,5cm L/45 weapon and a "7,5cm lg.s.PaK L/40", the latter for the Sturmgeschütz (same weapon is discussed by Speilberger in his book on the StuG). A WaPrüf report of December 1941 discusses firing tests of a L/34,5 weapon and another report dated 30. December 1942 discusses tests with muzzle brakes on the same gun. The latter report mentions that a 6,8kg "K Gr rot Pz" is fired and reports the effect of different types of muzzle brakes with "Geschoss Vo = 680". An April 1942 report discusses a "7,5cm kwK L/38 (34,5).." A discarding sabot round ("Treibspiegelgeschosse") is also discussed for the L/33 weapon. Plenty of fun here, but all these weapons were replaced in production with the L/43 weapon. There is one weapon which makes me curious, namely the one on the "7,5cm Sfl L/40,8 auf Fahrgestell Zugkraftwagen 5t" - an armoured 5-ton halftrack with a L/40,8 gun developed in 1934 and shipped to North Africa where they were lost. Did they actually go to combat with their 7,5cm L/40,8 guns or were they re-armed? Claus B

Its a StuG III G all right. It has the deflector in front of the commanders cupola and a "Saukopf-blende" suggesting a production date after November 1943. The lack of a coax MG puts the production data before October 1944. The location of the photo appears to be WTS in Koblenz as you can just make out the fender of the 4,7cm PaK(t) auf PzKpfw I on the right. :cool: Claus B

Can you elaborate on this confusion? Penetration stats for the different Gr.38 Hl types seems fairly consistent and introduction dates for the different models can to a large extent be deduced from various combat reports. Dont forget the 10cm K18 - it appears they actually fired more AP rounds in 1941 than did the 8,8cm Flak. While 7,5cm KwK 40 Gr.38 Hl/x could be used at long range, it was fired at an M/V of only 450 m/s which cannot have been good for accuracy. Still, gunnery manuals suggest that Gr.38 Hl/x could be used at range up to about 1000-1200 meters at which point bracketing would be necessary. On the other hand, combat reports suggests that Gr.38 Hl/x was to inaccurate at ranges beyond 500-800 meters, resulting in high ammunition expenditure in order to achieve a result. If Gr. 38 Hl/x was really an improvement over the PzGr. 39 at longer ranges, why terminate production at a point in time when the 7,5cm PaK/KwK 40 was beginning to lack in punch (1944/45)? Claus B

The Germans never used wet stowage and as Jeffs figures show, the Panzer IV was no less prone to catch fire than were the Sherman. There seems to be a common logical short-circuit in play here, namely that because allied tankers complained about their (early) Shermans catching fire when hit, then German tanks must somehow have been less prone to do this. However, one does not follow logically from the other. As a matter of fact, in the first combat reports on the German Panther it was commented that it caught fire very easily once penetrated. That "problem" persisted to the end of the war, it is just not publicized very much..... The problem with the Sherman was not that it was gasoline powered. German and British tanks were gasoline powered as well. Most Soviet tanks drove on diesel but they burned or exploded just as well. The main problem was unprotected ammunition. This can be seen from the fact that dry-stowage Shermans burned in 60-80% of cases when hit while wet stowage vehicles burned in 10-15% of cases. By the way, the mighty Tiger II also had problems with stowed ammo going up in flames. In an attack on 12/8 1944 in the Baranow-bridgehead in Poland, s.PzAbt 501 lost 3 Tigers to T34/85s. Hits set off the ammo in the rear turret causing catastrophic explosions. "In the future, gun ammunition will not be stowed in the turret". Claus B

Slightly OT Michael, but would happen to have "The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History" by John Marteinson If so, what do you think of it? I need a good, general reference to Canadian armoured units in WWII (Italy and ETO). I leafed through the South Albertas book and it looks great but at that price and its limited scope (one regiment) it is a tad over the top. Claus B

The "mixed" divisions were considered to be too light in infantry. Equipped with Churchills, it seems their role was to remain that of the infantry division in which case 6 infantry battalions was proabably too little to ensure the "staying power" of the division in combat. By keeping the infantry division with 3 infantry brigades/9 battalions of infantry and then attach a 3 battalion armoured brigade, you would maintain the durability in combat of the infantry and allow each infantry brigade to have the support of one armoured battalion when necessary. None of the "mixed" divisions ever saw combat as such (except, perhaps, the 2nd NZ division) but the 25th Tank Brigade which were part of the 43rd Division in its days as a "mixed" division was sent to Tunesia - but without the rest of the division which reverted to the "normal" configuration in October 1943. The UK 1st division was also "mixed" from June 1942 until November 1942 when it was shipped to North Africa for "Torch". In Italy, some divisions did have a "mixed" configuration but I dont think these were of the "proper" kind, more like an expedient to overcome the troubles of the Italian battlefield as suggested by Simon and Michael. The 5th Canadian Armoured has already been mentioned (5th Armoured Brigade, 11th and 12th Infantry Brigades) but the British 6th Armoured Division had a similar organisation (26th Armoured Brigade, 1st Guards and 61st Infantry Brigades) as did the 6th South African Armoured Division (11th SA Armoured Brigade, 12th SA and 24th UK Infantry Brigades). The odd one out is the 2nd New Zealand Division. It appears to have adopted the "New Model" organisation in 1943 with the 4th NZ Armoured Brigade and two NZ Infantry Brigades (5th and 6th?). Interestingly, despite having 20,000 men (and 4500 vehicles), it soon transpired that the division was too light in infantry for its role and the two infantry brigades were expanded from 3 to 4 battalions and later a third Infantry Brigade was added (the 9th) by converting the armoured car rgt(?) and the motor battalion to "normal" infantry battalions. As for the Panzergrenadier Divisions, the redisignation from Schützen to Panzergrenadiere took place in July 1942. In November 1942 the three SS-Divisions where reorganized as SS-Panzergrenadier Divisions, a status they kept until October 1943. The Waffen-SS divisions that were forming in 1943 were all designated SS-Panzergrenadier Divisions including the 9th, 10th and 12th. The SS-Divisions where not all "normal" Panzergrenadierdivisions though, in mid-1943 some had a two-battalion PzRgt, others had an attached Tiger company etc. The interesting bit is that the SS-Panzerdivisions kept their 6 battalions of infantry (Panzergrenadiere) as they converted to Panzerdivisions in late 1943 and thus had 2 battalions of armour and 6 of infantry while the "normal" Panzerdivison would have only 2 battalions of armour and 4 of infantry. Compare with the British mixed divisions with 3 battalions of armour and 6(7?) of infantry. Btw, when counting the tanks in a British Armoured division, dont forget that the divisional recce regiment was in fact an armoured regiment (battalion). So the standard British 1944/45 armoured division would have 4 battalions of armour and 4 battalions of infantry (3 in the Inf Brig. + Motor Bn - not counting the A/Tk and AC Rgt). Sorry for the long-winded reply Claus B [This message has been edited by Claus B (edited 03-16-2001).]

Do you read German? If so, Helmut Ritgen is the author of a history of the Panzer Lehr division as well as the book mentioned by highlife. May be out of print though. I think Editions Heimdahl in Bayeux have also made a history of the division. Claus B

Jeff mentioned Bill Cotton as one of the British heroes of that battle. Others you could mention were: - Sgt. Lockwood and crew who took on Wittmanns Tiger in the center of Villers-Bocage, face to face in his Sherman Firefly. In a shoot-out worthy of any western movie, Wittmann was the one who choose to leave the field while Lockwood prevailed. - Capt. Pat Dyas who managed to hide his Cromwell in a yard as Wittmann knocked out the other tanks of the 4th CLY RHQ. Then he moved out behind Wittmann in an attempt to stalk the Tiger from the rear. Unfortunately, when he ran into the Tiger, it was comming towards him as it was moving away from Lockwoods Firefly, and the Cromwell was knocked out. - Lt DePasse who was on his way to the O-Group on Hill 213 when Wittmanns Tiger came thundering down the N175. Immidiatly he ran towards the vehicles of A Coy/1st Rifle Brigade in order to fetch a PIAT. He was mowed down by MG fire as he crossed the road in front of Wittmanns Tiger and is buried in cemetery at Tilly-sur-Seulles. As Simon points out, the commanding officers of both 4th CLY RHQ, A Sqd/4th CLY and A Coy/1 Rifle Brigade were all either on Hill 213 or on their way up there, including the Cromwells of RHQ. It is probably this fact that caused the total confusion on N175. Taylor, in his book "Villers-Bocage through the Lens" has some drawings showing the exact positions of UK vehicles when Wittmann struck and it is evident that by coincidence, Wittmann hit at the worst possible time and worst possible place for the British. Claus B

It is probably the latter. Man for man, the troops of 7th Armoured Division that fought in Villers-Bocage were as experienced and tough as any of their opponents. There is no arguing that that their advance from Villers-Bocage to Hill 213 was a somewhat bungled affair, but the tea-drinking is a myth as are so many other elements of the popular versions of this battle. As for Villers-Bocage scenarios, many scenario designers use the "trick" of lowering the experience and morale of the British to a point where they flee at the mere notion of a loud bang. This is done to allow the player to replay Wittmanns initial drive into Villers-Bocage. In many cases, it is because the scenario designer is trying to re-create the battle according to popular myth, not to reality. Mind you, I am not speaking about the scenario in question here, but in general terms. As an example, Wittmann was by no means alone in his attack on the British troops and tanks on route N175. Oscha. Sowa claimed two British tanks during the attack and Oscha. Brandt claimed three British tanks and some carriers, facts which correspond well with the British accounts speaking of several Tigers moving paralell to route N175 and fire comming from the south at the same time Wittmann was driving down from the east. If the scenario designer includes these other Tigers moving on the flank of the British column instead of having one Tiger running the gauntlet down N175, I am shure that British can be made somewhat more resilient. As for the 7th Armoured being "overconfident and idle" - that is rather simplistic. Undoubtedly there were some among the officers that were not quite up the task, but the real culprit seems to be that the division was operating according to what was "good form" in the desert and Italy and had problems adapting to the new conditions in Normandy. Much of their experience and standard procedures was not cut out for the realities of fighting among hedgerows and orchards. This was seen again and again during the first battles of the division in Normandy and after Villers-Bocage the division as a whole was probably somewhat shook up. But on the individual level, there was much courage and much profesionalism. The fact that the troops in and around Villers-Bocage managed to set up a solid defence and fight a long and hard battle for the village after Wittmann had left the scene, clearly shows that they were not easily intimidated - and the Germans learned that the hard way, loosing at least 4 Panzer IVs and 6 Tigers (some repairable) during the fighting. And lets not forget that it was not Wittmann who evicted the British from Villers-Bocage. It took the bulk of 2. Panzerdivision (less its tracked elements), the 1. Kp/s.SS-PzAbt 101 and different elements of the Panzer Lehr including Ritgens battlegroup to the north to do that. Claus B