Grisha
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Posts posted by Grisha
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Lt. Hortlund,
Regarding Soviet superiority against the Germans, that's not quite the correct picture. One of the big problems for Vatutin was in determining the German main axis. He didn't quite get it right, and it showed. Nothing against Vatutin really, since the Germans did have a number of directions to pick from in the south. And though the Soviets knew pretty much when Zitadelle was going to happen and where to a general degree, knowing the actual main axes is a big deal. The Soviets later used this to great effect against the Germans in 1944-45, masking scale and location, for the most part, in their offensives.
Another thing to bear in mind is that the attacker determines the location of the attack, thereby creating initial favorable conditions in numbers and surprise. What saved the Soviet was in the deployment and employment of their reserves. Without them the German assaults would've been much more devastating.
As to the SS panzer divisions not being at full strength, this may be the case to some degree, but they still were all assigned an additional heavy tank company that was very large, as companies - even German companies - go.
von Manstein was an amazing military commander, and his intuitive understanding of operational art was on par with anyone at the time. However, I'm not so sure he could have pulled off a miracle, which is what he would need to do. I'm at a loss as to what he could've done, since he would've been making a breakthrough from a single point. Certainly, he would've wreaked havoc, but from an operational-strategic level any move that went too deep into the Soviet operational depths would be very dangerous. There were still very strong Soviet forces on the flanks of the Kursk salient, and they most definitely would've been employed in containing von Manstein, or even cutting him off. At the very most, the result might've been a trade-off: destruction of the SS Panzer Corps for the calling off of the Soviet counteroffensive.
Another point to note regarding von Manstein is that the Soviets were learning fast. In late 1943 after the 3rd Guards Tank Army broke out of the Lyutezh bridgehead north of Kiev, von Manstein conducted a 'backhand blow' at Rybalko's tank army. It failed.
I really think the most favorable result the Germans could've realistically expected would've been a stalemate. And since you speak of psychology, I would expect any extended attempts by the Germans to turn the south pincer at Kursk into an operational victory as an operation bathed in extreme angst. The north pincer has failed utterly, and all that remains is an attack sector, 50km wide, that must somehow do amazing things in the Soviet operational rear without being cut off.
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I posted this not too long ago actually. . .Originally posted by Bruceov:Anyone have a picture of this weapon. Was it fired or thrown.
http://www.battlefront.com/cgi-bin/bbs/ultimatebb.cgi?ubb=get_topic;f=23;t=004398
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Lt. Hortlund,As I said, I agree that the Kursk offensive failed. It was a strategic offensive that failed due to the inability of the northern pincer to meet any of its objectives. The offensive was cancelled due to strategic considerations (Sicily). But the advance on the southern pincer was never stopped by enemy resistance, therefore I think it is wrong to hold up Kursk as an example on how the blitzkrieg failed. Frankly, I dont think Kursk has anything to do with Bitzkrieg at all, since there is no German attempt att "blitzing" or how you want to put it. Manstein knew he could not blitz those defenses, instead what we see is a slow but steady advance led by II SS.The southern pincer was not stopped when the operation was called of, but it was going at a snail's pace. The Germans would plan for an attack, planning to use specific units for that attack, then never see some of those units, because they had to respond to a Soviet attack on the flanks of the spearhead. Because of a lack of sufficient forces, German gains would be minimal, and sometimes even lost after a counterattack. German progress on the south pincer was painfully slow by German blitzkrieg standards.
Soviet losses were large, 6:1 to 8:1, just take a number. That they were large is not particularly surprising. That a German offensive in mid summer was halted was world news in 1943. German losses were nothing compared to the Soviets, but on 13 July tank totals for some SS units, including repairs, were:</font>
- Leibstandarte - 50 tanks, 20 assault guns</font>
- Das Reich - 83 tanks, 24 assault guns.</font>
- Totenkopf - 54 tanks, 20 assault guns.</font>
When you realize fully equipped SS Panzer Divisions had around 290 tanks (command and light tanks included), the numbers above are telling. The southern pincer was extremely narrow and fragmented - mostly due to Soviet counterattacks. Could this single push by a depleted armored force continue on in the face of three fresh rifle armies and a tank and mech corps (one rifle army was deploying on A.Det.Kempf's right flank, the rest were positioning themselves NE of Prokhorovka)? That's the question.
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I'm certain that Zetterling hasn't read Glantz' book on Kursk (though the opposite can't be said - Glantz did look over Zetterling's book before recommending that it be published as part of his series from Frank Cass). As much as some like to point out the differences between Glantz and Zetterling, both books come to similar conclusions. Both books state that there was no single massive tank battle at Prokhorovka (it was actually more of a large number of meeting engagements), both state that Soviet losses at Prokhorovka and elsewhere were large compared to German losses. Glantz states that the key to Soviet victory at Kursk was from the operational level. Namely, that the Germans were continuously denied the ability to consolidate its forces for a concerted push - mostly through the use of incessant counterattacks and the timely use of reserves. Looking at the situation of the southern pincer on 12 July 1943, this becomes acutely obvious. And, though German losses at Kursk were nowhere near the level of Soviet losses, German losses were still substantial, if not heavy.Originally posted by Leutnant Hortlund:Im not arguing that the Germans won at Kursk, that would be as pointless as arguing that the Germans (somehow) won ww2.
Interesting question you raise about II SS Panzer (corps) however. I suppose it is because Kursk primarely is known for the tank battle outside Prokhorovka, and the only German unit involved in that one is II SS Panzer Corps.
Another reason why it might be valuable to take a closer look at the results of the southern pincer is because many hold up Kursk as the definitive end to the Blitzkrieg. That the Soviets had managed to contain and control a dedicated blitzkrieg-type offensive. The truth might be more complex than that.
Finally, a last point Glantz makes wrt the southern pincer. On the day Hitler called off Zitadelle, three unidentified (read: undetected by German intelligence) Soviet rifle armies were deploying NE and E of Prokhorovka along with a tank and mech corps.
Now, it wasn't the smashing Soviet victory that has traditionally been printed in numerous books, but I would not categorize it as a 'near thing' either. When one considers that the northern pincer was stopped cold, and that the southern pincer still had to deal with three fresh rifle armies and a fresh tank and mech corps (all of which were closer to the frontline than 5th Guards Tank Army on 5 July as subunits of Steppe Front), the prospects of any substantial success from von Manstein's pincer were highly unlikely - especially when there usually needs to be two pincers to form an encirclement.
[ January 03, 2003, 01:12 AM: Message edited by: Grisha ]
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Seaton does good work.
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Eggnog? Eggnog's for the weak, Dorosh. We're going into the New Year with Jameson's.</font>Originally posted by Seanachai:</font><blockquote>quote:</font><hr />Originally posted by Michael Dorosh:
Still not out of holiday eggnog, eh? I (sniff) love you too, man....
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I think the key word in this paragragh is "felt." For the Germans, it was a conscious decision to limit their military art. As events turned out, the Germans showed quite a capacity for putting their country on a war footing, so it wasn't that the Germans couldn't, it's just that they wouldn't. One can't have ones cake, and eat it too - especially in such a serious endeavor as world-wide war. You seem to be unaware that the Soviets actually had fewer key resources then the Germans in WWII, yet they out-produced their enemies quite handily. Yes, it was a case of the Germans not 'wishing' to go the extra distance.Originally posted by KNac:All the operational and strategical german doctrine was limited by their resources and manpower. They had to conduct fast wars because if they felt in a war of attrition (like it did in Eastern front eventually) they would lose.
This is a weak argument for the simple fact that Nazi Germany initiated hostilities with just about every nation it fought. By the time the Nazi Party had taken over Germany the Army was fully developed and trained with its new combined arms tactical doctrine. No one questioned the wisdom of this military 'short-cut' for a nation about to embark on a campaign of European domination, yet that was the very thing that needed questioning: can we maintain a war that might take the form of several fronts? Like so much of German planning in general, the General Staff and Hitler both never bothered to address this issue in depth, preferring to make the assumption that they would just have to make sure everything went like clockwork. Run anything like that and you will lose out 90% of the time - unless you have the genius of Alexander the GreatHere comes again the "Germany against the world" topic. You can't ignore the fact that the allies had infinite resources and manpower compared to egrmans, that their prodcution was much higher, and in general, they could aid each other. While the production and movilization for war was a bad error of Hitler, you cannot blame germans for their inferiority of manpower and resources, which in definitive forced them for "fast wars". Germans had to hold several fronts, but soviets only had to hold one of them. Maybe if Germany had only attacked the soviets thing could have changed.
I can see there is a lack of understanding here regarding the operational level and operational art. It was not something as vague as "operational thinking." It was a distinct level of military art: tactics, operational art, strategy. The importance of recognizing operational art made the process of logistics and overall strategy more refined, streamlining the planning and conduct of a nation going to a war footing.In definitive we can see that germans lost because their grand strategy (management of industry and resources, movilization, etc.) more than by their operational thinking. Germans had, even with each time worse trained men, the tactical advantage almost to the end of the war. Even if you see lots of soviets victories, you can also see how germans managed to close the gaps and breakthougth several mre times (it sound like victor writing History again), if not ask Glance, as much as you like it.It was the logistics, as Fionn has already said, and production/resources (in definitive Hitler, who controlled them) which made them lose war, not their operational thinking.
In order to understand this one needs to understand operational art, since this was the missing piece of the puzzle that revealed the scale of production needed and the logistical structure that had to be in place to support the military sector in war. And the way it did this was by taking a good, hard look at operations, and seeing exactly how they could be best used to furthering strategic objectives. The Soviets' solution was to use them as a continuous set of 'stepping stones,' each operation individually planned and supported to accomplish precise operational objectives. Start thinking of using operations in such precise and defined terms, and it won't be too long before somebody says, "Gee, this is going to take a lot of logistical planning. Yikes, and that means we better have a major industrial base from which to feed our military logistical structure, too!"
I'm not saying that other combatant nations couldn't figure out the need for heavy production and a comprehensive logistical structure. I am saying that recognizing operational art made that job a lot easier to develop, because it put much of it in proper perspective. Because the Germans limited their military theory to the tactical level, they couldn't know beforehand the critical need to be on a total war footing as a nation involved in modern war among fellow industrialized nations. Most other nations still held onto the WWI experience, seeing war as a long haul where production and manpower would be great demand. While it took them awhile before this was refined, this experience held them in good stead.
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The German combined arms concept popularly referred to by the vague term blitzkrieg began development in the 1920s, led by Hans von Seeckt of the Reichswehr. When Hitler assumed the chancellory in 1933 he inherited what eventually became the Wehrmacht. There was little Hitler had to do by this time to develop or train the most advanced army in the world.Originally posted by Sgtgoody:The main cause of German failure can be traced directly back to Hitler. Hitler felt that Germany lost WWI because of collapse back home (the famous "Stab in the back."). This caused him to seek a better way of fighting than those of the Great War. The "Blitzkrieg" seemed to offer that better way. Unfortunatly for Hitler (and fortunatly for the rest of us) the concept of lighting war became not only military but political doctrine as well.
Again, this was an outgrowth of the development of German military art, first begun in the 1920s. While it was underdeveloped as I stated in my previous posts, there was a reason for that: the Germans believed they could conduct successful wars of brief periods, thereby skirting the problem of modern war’s massive scope and scale. The question of attrition was intentionally circumvented, and left unanswered.The German economy was not mobilized till about the middle of '42. Nearly all research into strategic programs was discontinued (heavy bombers being the most obvious) as unnecessary. Conquered nations were to by looted for usable supplies and then governed as Germany saw fit. This all translated into a Wehrmacht that was high powered but short ranged. It was the only one of the major powers to rely as heavily as it did on horses for transport. For all its percieved technological prowes it was in actuallity the most backwards of all the armies from an overall point of view. While it had some standout weapons, most of its systems were inferior to their allied counterparts. German troops prefered the superiour Russian submachineguns and came nowhere near matching the Russian cold weather equipment. German radar was so inferior to British and American sets that the Germans underestimated the capabilities of the Allied units for the entire war. The American M1 Garand was the best rifle of the war and the Germans were amazed by our field radios. Most important of all the Germans never designed an easily manufactured gp truck to compare with the American duce and a half. It was these trucks that carried the Allied armies and all their supplies to victory. Conversly it was the lack of them that not only hampered but destroyed any hope that the Germans had of supplying their invading armies. This lack of motor transport effected the German war effort at all levels by depriving troops of mobility (during the Battle of the Bulge, 2 Panzer was forced to mount one of its PzGren Bns on bikes because of lack of transport) and depriving its armies of supplies. This lack came directly from Hitler's unwillingness to mobilized the country behind the war effort.
The size of the Soviet Union did, indeed, contribute to their salvation. But why this did had much to do with the limitations of German military art. I’ve pointed this out in my previous posts, but will attempt to do so again here.As to the Germans learning from the Russians you have to look at the track record. Up until Kursk the Russians had never stopped the Germans from achieving a breakthrough into the operational zone. In other words, while they had stopped them from siezing the strategic objectives (Leningrad, Moscow, etc...) the Germans had always broken through the initial Soviet lines. This gave the Germans little incentive to change their methodes. After Kursk they lacked the power to launch anymore massive offensives and so again there was no opportunity to change their methodes.In the end it was only the size of the Soviet Union that saved it from defeat. If the Soviet capital were Minsk or Kiev the Soviets would have been defeated. As it was they had kind of a natural defense in depth as it took so long for the Germans to get to their objectives that the Soviets could afford to make dissasterous mistakes without capitulating. The limits of the Soviet command structure and training prevented any true mirroring of German tactics but their ability to turn their entire manufacturing base to the production of weaponry (because we were making all their other supplies) insured that they could quickly build up massive numbers needed to be successful at what they did learn from the Germans. No one ever called Soviet tactics subtle but they were very effective.
If the Germans had developed a form of military art that consciously addressed the use of successive operations, they would have:</font>
- realized the need to create another middle level in military art, called the operational level, placing it between strategy and tactics.</font>
- understood that a theory based on the use of continuous, successive operations, one placed after the other like a set of waves striking the shore, would require a serious study into the support of such a huge and ongoing military action. Questions of logistics would easily arise, as would national production capacities. This, in turn, would probably draw interest into a reassessment of strategy and tactics within this larger, more consuming form of war.</font>
What the Germans had as a military art could’ve easily fit within this larger subset that was first developed by Soviet military theorists in the 1920s and 1930s.
I think what people tend to get most confused with operational art is that after WWI, most countries’ understanding of it was only the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. Britain, France, the USA, and Germany all had an understanding of operations per se, but for some reason none of them ever considered studying and developing the use of operations in the sense similar to the tactical method of bounding overwatch. Only the Soviets saw the use of operations in this leapfrog manner - a series of continuous, successive operations, each building on the advancement of the former until victory was achieved. No one saw operations in such concrete detail as the building blocks of strategy. No one studied this manner of using operations, the logistics involved to support ongoing operations, the production capacity needed to provide the logistical support, and the balance between the military front and the civilian rear. No one, but the Soviets. In WWII, most combatant nations were concerned with how to support and conduct an operation. The Soviet were concerning themselves with how to support and conduct a series of linked operations.
In the book, The Roots of Blitzkrieg (published 1992), Corum states that while Guderian was important to German military theory, he was not indispensable (Guderian was a bit of an egotist). Far more important was von Seeckt or even von Eimannsberger. Corum also states that the British military theorist who probably had most influence on German military theory was Fuller. It was Fuller’s practical advice on the use of tank forces that drew German attention (since he was the architect of Cambrai in 1917), something the Germans were eager to collect given their post-WWI restrictions. They were not particularly influenced by Fuller’s theories, however.One last thing. In the discussions of the developement of armored tactics one should look up the contributions of General Percy Hobart. His work, while largely ignored by his own government in Britan, was very influencial in Germany. Gudarian claimed to be greatly influenced by Hobart's theories. You may know Hobart best as the commander of the British 79th Armored Division better known as "Hobart's Funnies." Also about the tactical use of Airborne troops, I think Salerno was about as close as you can get to a tactical drop. -
Sorry, I missed your post, FrunzeOriginally posted by Frunze:Wasn't this produced by Germany's goals and situation in the world? That is, trying to achieve world, or at least European domination against competitors with larger areas, populations, and industrial bases. Given these facts, Germany would lose regardless in any war that did not end quickly, but turned into a contest of attrition.
As to your post, exactly. I think the fear of a recurrence of the Great War (Germany suffered horribly in WWI, particularly as the war wound down) is what compelled the Germans to look for another way of fighting - a quick and relatively painless method of winning wars. To their credit, they made a very good run of it, but in the end the odds finally caught up with them in the form of the USSR.
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Fionn,
Another thing I forgot to add was on the type of offensive operations conducted by the Germans, and how that differed from the Soviets. I find the tendency of the Germans to focus armor into a minimum of attack axes as a weakness of their military art. Sure, it allowed for very massed armor attacks, but I don't think it outweighed the disadvantages:</font>
- the creation of huge pockets that seriously tied down already limited infantry formations with reducing these pockets.</font>
- the limited attack axes made the Red Army's response simpler to plan and conduct.</font>
The Soviets made sure after Stalingrad never to conduct huge encirclements, and to attack on quite a few axes to hinder a German response. The use of forward detachments by not only the mobile groups, but also the main forces did much to maintain a continuous link between the two groups. Granted, this concept didn't really evolve until the summer offensives of 1944, but it did much in reducing the German response - a capability of the Panzers the Soviets probably knew better than anyone else in WWII.
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I more or less agree with you, Fionn. As I stated towards the end of my above post, logistics was crucial to it all. By consciously raising the idea of successive operations, it almost followed in tow that the development and practice of operations, or operational art, would arise. Also, by bringing the study of continuous operations to the fore, the Soviets realized the need to reassess and redefine strategy and tactics. Strategy went from the maneuvering of forces to achieve victory in war to the process of mobilizing and conducting a nation to a war footing. Thus, strategy took on a much larger scope than in previous eras. It merged the planning and conduct of the civilian rear with that of the military front. Thus, decisions on the development of operational art and tactics rippled up and over into civilian sector production, impacting not only types and number of equipment, but analyses to determine a balance between mobilization percentages with personnel needed for optimal wartime production capacity. Lastly, as you state, it also had a huge effect on how all this was to be supplied, and the development and practice of logistics was crucial to the concept of operational art. As you know, Triandafillov makes that perfectly clear.
Now, as to what comes first, the chicken or the egg, I tend to disagree with you, if I understand you correctly. In WWII, it became quickly apparent to all combatant nations just how important logistics was to success in warfare. However, by recognizing operational art, the Soviets were able to refine their wartime production to better match the progression of military operations. Through operational art the Soviets brought logistics to the fore. Because of this, I believe it was their development of operational art that was most important toward Soviet victory in WWII. Its recognition forced the Soviets to address, reassess, and redefine many other corollary issues, not the least of which was logistics.
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Originally posted by HOFMAN:
HOFMAN,This tantrum of yours serves to no ones advantage, least of all, the Russians. Lighten up. If you want to help spread knowledge of the Red Army, then do so in a manner that will increase interest. All I see you doing is burning bridges.
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Privet, VolodyaOriginally posted by Leit:Hello!!!
I am from russia. Samara city.
I'm sure there are mistakes in some of the mods. This is inevitable, given the lack of information here in the west. However, remember that these people making Soviet mods are doing this out of interest in the Red Army. Do you want to end this interest by ridiculing people who are trying to improve Soviet graphics? Or, do you think it might be better to offer assistance by making pictures and references available for interested westerners? Tak, tak, tak
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Actually, the Soviets had a combined arms concept fully developed by the end of the 1920s, called deep battle. With the Soviet industrial revolution occurring from the late 1920s till the early 1930s, the theory of deep operations began to develop, incorporating the entire spectrum of military weapons available at that time. This theory was never fully developed before the purge of the military in 1937-39 swept away the core of the Soviet military elite. Were the Germans the first to have a valid combined arms concept? No, it was the Soviets. Did the Germans have the first combat effective combined arms concept? Yes. One thing I wonder about is if there was any passing of knowledge between the USSR and Germany during the time following their 1922 treaty, since the Germans conducted much of their training in the Kazan region of the USSR – but, to be honest, I tend to doubt there was any of that. Due to a lack of experienced officers, and incorrect conclusions drawn concerning the use of armor from the Spanish Civil and Winter Wars, the Soviets actually regressed with their military theory until the German campaign in 1940 shook them out of their wishful thinking. At that point there was but one year to undo all that had been done to the Red Army since 1937. It was nowhere near enough time.Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:I cant beleive what I am hearing....Germans not learning from the Russians??!! It was the German armed forces that pioneered combined arms tactics in which tanks, infantry and artillary(ground or air), worked together to smash through the enemy front lines. The Russians eventually learned these lessons and put them to use with their own style.
Once Barbarossa began, the Soviets had two means of developing their military art to the point where it would be effective against the Germans: one, an unspoken reference to the brilliant works of those Soviet military analysts who died in the 1937 purge, and two, the collection and analysis of war experience. By winter of 1942/43, this approach was making its effects felt. By 1944, Soviet operational art (In the modern examination of military art, there are three levels of war: tactics, operations, and strategy. The Soviets pioneered the development and practice of operational art during WWII) was reaching refinement.
What the Soviets witnessed of the German combined arms concept during WWII no doubt helped to further develop their own theories on deep battle and, more importantly, deep operations. But, the Soviets also knew what to discard of German military art, since the Soviets were basically alone in correctly understanding the true scale of war at that time. By developing and refining the concept of successive and continuous operations, the Soviets recognized the necessity for a newer middle level of military art, called operational art. This was no small event, since it impacted both strategy and tactics, redefining and expanding on their more traditional meanings. The result was that the Soviets determined ongoing victory or defeat from the operational level, rather than from the tactical. Incidentally, the concept of operational art first appeared in Soviet military works in the mid 1920s, roughly.
Strategically speaking, the Soviets didn’t solidly reach a 3:1 numerical superiority until October 1944. A 2:1 advantage didn’t occur until either late 1942, or early 1943, I believe. And while Soviet airpower could attain large numerical odds against the Luftwaffe, one has to remember that the VVS (term for the Soviet air force) was subordinated to the ground campaign, and only operated in numbers over main attack sectors. This allowed the Luftwaffe to exist and even operate on the Russian front until the end of the war. Had the VVS been given the task of an unfettered air superiority operation, I’m sure they would’ve sweep the skies of the Luftwaffe much like the USAAF did in May-June 1944.The problem the Germans faced as the war dragged on, was massive numerical superiority of their opponents in every department, especially the air.That being said, in main attack sectors the Soviet did achieve large, sometimes very large, numerical odds. This was achieved through deception of both a demonstrative and passive nature. In fact, by the time of the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945, literally half of all Soviet forces assigned to this operation were not identified by German intelligence before the attack (that equates to about a million men).
However, the Soviets didn’t stop there. Rather then rely on such massive odds, the Soviets also conducted extensive reconnaissance/intelligence operations to insure that major offensives had around 60% of German defense systems, dispositions, and reserves in the tactical depths (and operational depths to a degree) mapped and identified.
Actually, Kursk absolutely failed on the northern pincer much earlier, around 9 July, I believe. This means von Manstein was operating from a single, narrow front. The prospects of making any sort of major victory from a single pincer were slim to none. Regarding the mention of numbers, the point at which the Soviets would have numbers would be after the reserves has responded to the attack. Before that time, it is more accurate to say that German armor attacks at Kursk were initially conducted with numerical supremacy, if for only a number of hours. Finally, I should also contribute one last point regarding von Manstein’s south pincer at Kursk. Throughout that entire operation, three rifle armies were not only not committed to the front from the Steppe Front, but they were also unidentified by German intelligence. A tank and mech corps were also uncommitted, though their location was more or less known by the Germans. Just as Hitler called off Zitadelle, this entire force was deploying just northeast and east of Prokhorovka in anticipation of further German attempts to advance.During the Kursk offensive, Model, (having only a few Pz Dvs), attempted to use his infantry Divisions to breach soviet lines for his armour, but they were simply outnumbered. Manstein had much more armour to play with and attacked with his Pz units which broke through to the last defensive lines. Although the offensive failed, the Russians suffered 850,000 casualties to the Germans 100,000. Inflicting an 8.5 to 1 casualty ratio attacking against a well prepared superior forces and coming close to victory is not indicative of faulty tactics.
Hitler had a telling impact on the conduct of German forces, no doubt. Especially later in the war, after Kursk. But, while Hitler’s influence can’t be ignored, German military art must also be blamed. Why? Because it relied on the campaign of annihilation, the quick war. It was a short-cut method to winning wars, dependent on a preset condition to attain victory: that it invade a country that could be overpowered within a single campaign, or operation. This placed self-imposed limits not only on equipment capabilities, but also logistical support. Of vital importance, it placed a limit on how a nation prepares and conducts war. Finally, by requiring this condition for successful war, it made further study of the higher levels of war, such as operations and strategy, seemingly superfluous.The biggest problem facing the Germans was Mr Adolf. Not allowing withdrawls cost huge numbers of troops and equipment, sapping the strength of the army. Generals did the best they could to cope under the circumstances. With ever increasing losses in men and material throughout the bulk of the army, The panzer and panzer grenadier divisions were given priority in men and equipment, making them the only units with the strength for offensive operations, and yet many were still really to weak to be effective. During the bulge, the hurridly raised volksgrenadier divisions did poorly, forcing the pz units into action prematurely. Most did well, but were too weak to maintain combat for long. Too summarize; when Pz Dvs were at a good strength level, their combined arms attacks were effective at breakthroughs, and pursuits, but deprived of manpower, vehicles, fuel and under air attack, success was fleeting.So, for all their tactical and lower operational excellence, German military forces were never truly prepared for a war with the Soviet Union. They almost pulled it off (the Soviets did everything possible to make the task easier in summer 1941 through a series of continuous blunders beginning with the purges in 1937), but didn’t. Once the USSR had acquired an equilibrium from an economic and military perspective, their more advanced knowledge of modern warfare insured Germany’s defeat.
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I was preparing to respond to your original post, but it seems you might not be too interested in a serious discussion. If I'm incorrect, please let me know.Originally posted by KG ThorsHammer:hmm,,,the question was armoured fist or combined arms and how the germans should have learned from the russians and used combined arms. I havnt read the Russian books you listed, but if you are saying the Russians invented combined arms I will have to ask you to put down the crack pipe .
[ December 25, 2002, 08:09 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]
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Hmm ... a number of incorrect assumptions in your post, some of it based on too narrow a view of military art, and some of it just incorrect. KG, have you read any Soviet-based material, such as Erickson, Glantz, Armstrong, Sharp, or Zaloga? Also, Ziemke, while focusing primarily on the Germans does do a good job of shedding light on Soviet capabilities and abilities. But, for now I'll have to pass on this post - for it's Christmas, and I want to get my rest to see my 3 year old son's face when he looks at all the presents under the treeOriginally posted by KG ThorsHammer:I cant beleive what I am hearing....Germans not learning from the Russians??!! . . .
However, I will come back to this post and give a suitable reply.
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Oh jeez. Sorry for bringing this all up. I totally missed that the M5 is available from January 1943. Sorry for the fuss
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[ December 24, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]
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Okay, I decided to use Glantz to explain the complexity of the Soviet Summer Offensive of 1944. The following is an excerpt from his book, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War:Originally posted by coe:By the way, enlighten me, since alot of the Panzers were shifted to the South in anticipation of an offensive there, what did they do once Bagration started? What was the role of Army Groups North and South during July-Aug, 1944?
SUMMER OFFENSIVE, 1944
Background
The Soviet winter offensive continued well into the spring. The successive and, finally, simultaneous front operations across southern Russia ultimately drove German forces from the Ukraine up to the Polish and Rumanian borders. By late April the momentum of that offensive had ebbed, and the Soviets were confronted with the task of deciding where to focus their next strategic offensive efforts.
There were several enticing options. They could continue their offensive southward into the Balkans and reap considerable political as well as military rewards. This option, however, would extend Soviet forces and leave large areas of the Soviet Union under German control which could also threaten the northern flank of potentially over-extended Soviet forces. The Soviets could also launch a major offensive from the northern Ukraine across central and eastern Poland to the Baltic Sea, entrapping both German Army Groups Center and North. But that option would involve maneuvers of a strategic scale, perhaps beyond the capabilities of Soviet forces. It would also leave large German forces on the Soviet flanks. Moreover, selection of this option would require the Soviets to disregard strategic maskirovka and continue the offensive along previously established lines. Shtemenko noted the STAVKA concern:
“It was considered impossible to continue the offensive in the Ukraine and Moldavia because powerful enemy groupings equal to our own in strength had been encountered in the L'vov, Yassy and Kishinev sectors of the front. All six of our tank armies were embroiled here in combat with the main German armor. The troops were tired and their supplies were badly in need of replenishment. Surprise action was out of the question. If we tried to press forward at once on these lines of advance, we should be faced with a long and bloody struggle in unfavorable conditions and with doubtful chances of success.”
A third option could involve a continuation of the offensive on the northern flank toward the Baltic States and into Finland. Shtemenko explained the reasons for rejecting that option:
“Nor were there yet any great prospects of breaking through to the frontiers of the Baltic republics. Surprise was not to be counted on here either. The enemy was expecting a big push by the Soviet Army and was taking steps to stop it. He had the advantage of internal maneuverability on a well-developed network of roads and railways, while our tanks were confronted by numerous obstacles. The terrain was clearly not in our favor. Troop concentration and supply presented serious difficulties. GHQ was convinced that under the circumstances the Baltic area could not provide the target for our main efforts.”
As a fourth option, the Soviets could crush German Army Group "Center" in the so-called Belorussian balcony (jutting westward north of the Pripyat marshes); penetrate into Poland and East Prussia; and, perhaps, reach the Baltic Sea and isolate German Army Group North as well. This would clear German troops from Belorussia and create conditions conducive to future operations in Poland on the direct route to East Prussia and, ultimately, Berlin The Soviets selected this option because, as Shtemenko noted:
“Analysis and re-analysis of the strategic situation gave us the growing conviction that success in the summer campaign of 1944 was to be sought in Belorussia and the western Ukraine. A major victory in the area would bring Soviet troops out on the vital frontiers of the Third Reich by the shortest possible route. At the same time more favorable conditions would be created for hitting the enemy hard on all other sectors, primarily, in the south, where there was already a strong buildup of our forces.”
In planning this strategic offensive the Soviets sought to capitalize on the deception potential of the other options by employing an extensive strategic maskirovka plan, by organizing extensive regrouping of their forces, and by carefully time-phasing all offensive activities.
During April the STAVKA, general staff, and STAVKA representatives worked on a concept of operations in close consultation with front commanders. By 12 April the STAVKA had decided to give priority to an offensive along the Belorussian direction and then, by 28 April, had worked out the sequencing of the summer's operations. The offensive would begin in early June with the Leningrad Front attacking toward Vyburg on the Karelian Isthmus. Soon after, the Karelian Front would commence operations north of Lake Ladoga. When German attention had turned north Soviet forces would strike in Belorussia, and after German reserves had sped north from eastern Poland to deal with these Soviet attacks, Soviet forces in the northern Ukraine would attack toward L'vov and the Vistula River in eastern Poland. Simultaneously the 2d Baltic Front would attack to tie down German Army Group North forces in the Baltic. After defeat of German forces in Belorussia and eastern Poland, the Soviets would cap their success with an advance into Rumania, which by then should have been denuded of German reserves.
As the offensive unfolded it would cover five distinct operations follows:
Karelian Isthmus-south Karelia - 10 June-9 August 1944
Belorussia - 23 June-29 August 1944
L'vov-Sandomierz - 13 July-29 August 1944
Lublin-Brest - 18 July-2 August 1944 (technically part of the Belorussian operation, but in reality a link between that operation and the L'vov-Sandomierz operation)
Yassy-Kishinev - 20 August-7 September 1944
Each operation would take advantage of conditions created by earlier operations, a principal feature of any strategic operational plan.
During preliminary planning the STAVKA re-organized the structure of its operating fronts so that they matched the requirements of the upcoming offensive. The Western Front, operating on the Vitebsk, Orsha, and Mogilev directions was subdivided into the 2d and 3d Belorussian Fronts; and the Belorussian Front, operating on the Rogachev and Mozyr direction, became the lst Belorussian Front and, in so doing, absorbed the three Soviet armies of the former 2d Belorussian Front in the Kovel' area. This reorganization created three fronts which would cooperate with a fourth (1st Baltic) in the critical Belorussian operation. Subsequently, elements of two fronts (1st Belorussian left wing and 2d Ukrainian) would conduct the operations through central and southern Poland: and two fronts (2d and 3d Ukrainian) would advance into Rumania. The successive summer strategic offensives would be far more powerful than those which had occurred in the winter across the Ukraine.
Soviet success in the upcoming operations depended to a large degree on their ability to move and concentrate strategic reserves secretly between strategic directions and transfer armies between fronts. The strategic plan required the movement of 5th Guards Tank Army from the southern Ukraine to Belorussia, movement of 2d Guards and 51st Armies from the Crimea to Belorussia, transfer of 28th Army from the southern Ukraine to Belorussia, shifting of 8th Guards Army and 2d Tank Army from Moldavia to the northern Ukraine, and the lateral transfer of 6th Guards Army from the 2d to the 1st Baltic Front. These regroupings would provide the force necessary to carry out the projected offensives. It was, however, absolutely necessary for the Soviets to conceal these movements, for their strategic maskirovka plan required German identification (if these armies elsewhere.
Both the earlier offensive successes of Soviet forces and the strategic positioning of those forces in late spring facilitated Soviet use of strategic deception on an unprecedented scale. Very simply, the Soviet's strategic maskirovka plan sought to play upon German fears about future Soviet offensive operations against central and southeastern Europe. By capitalizing on the situation which had persisted from January to May 1944, the Soviets actively advertised their intent to continue operations along previous lines into southern Poland and Rumania. Shtemenko described Soviet intent, writing:
“During the preparations for the Belorussian operation the General Staff wanted to somehow convince the Hitlerite command that the main Red Army attacks in the summer of 1944 would come in the south and the Baltic. Already, on 3 May, the 3d Ukrainian Front commander had been given the following order: You are charged with conducting operational maskirovka measures for the purpose of misinforming the enemy. It is necessary to show a concentration of eight-nine rifle divisions, reinforced with tanks and artillery, beyond the right flank of the front .... The false region of concentration should be animated, showing the movement and disposition of separate groups of men, vehicles, tanks and guns, and the equipping of the region; anti-aircraft guns should be placed at the locations of tank and artillery mock-ups, simultaneously designating the air defense of the entire region by the installation of anti-aircraft systems and patrolling by fighters.
“The visibility and plausibility of the false objectives would be verified by observation and photographing from the air .... The period of conduct of operational maskirovka is from 5-15 June of this year.”
In accordance with this order the 3d Ukrainian Front created a false concentration area on the Kishinev direction of eight to nine rifle divisions, two artillery divisions, one tank corps, and a complete army rear area. From 29 May to 14 June forces were moved from four rail stations to the appointed area. From 15 June to 5 July the front simulated concentration of these forces and attack preparations. All concentration areas were animated with mockups, false radio nets and unit numbers and even air cover.
A similar order went to the 3d Baltic Front. In addition, the STAVKA ordered all fronts in the south to remain as active as possible and demonstrate the presence of the bulk of Soviet tank armies in that region. Vasilevsky later wrote:
“In order to reinforce the German opinion [that we would attack in the south], we demonstratively "left in the south" the majority of our tank armies. During daytime in the central sector of the .. front we conducted feverish "defensive" work (on the southern sector defensive work went on at night) and so forth.”
In addition the STAVKA ordered forces in the eastern and southern Ukraine to conduct limited objective attacks during May, in accordance with earlier operational objectives, to convince the German command that this was the region of continuing Soviet strategic interest. Consequently, on 1 May Konev (2d Ukrainian Front) launched an attack with 27th and 2d Tank Armies across the Prut River, toward Yassy, which culminated in a Soviet defeat at Tyrgu-Frumos. The fact that the operation to this day has been considered a major Soviet effort attests to the success of the Soviet maskirovka plan. It, in fact, perpetuated German concerns for their position in Rumania and kept German reserves rooted to Rumania. The Soviets undertook similar efforts along the front in the southern Ukraine. In actuality, the large concentration of forces in the 1st Ukrainian Front sector had a dual purpose: to deceive the Germans regarding an attack in June and, thereafter, to conduct a real attack in July. The STAVKA itself adopted strict security measures to insure planning secrecy which Shtemenko later described:
“Precautions were taken to keep our intentions secret. Only a very narrow circle of people were directly engaged in working out the plans of the summer campaign as a whole and the Belorussian operation, in particular. They were, in fact, fully known only to five people: the Supreme Commander's First Deputy, the Chief of the General Staff and his deputy, the Chief of the Operations Department and one of his deputies. All correspondence on this subject as well as telephone conversations or telegraph messages were strictly forbidden and a very strict check was kept on this. Proposals from the fronts concerning operations were also dealt with by only two or three people, were usually written by hand and reported, as a rule, by the commanders in person. The troops were set to work on perfecting their defences. Front, army and divisional newspapers published material only on defence matters. All talks to the troops were about maintaining a firm hold on present positions. Powerful radio stations were temporarily closed down. Only low-power transmitters not less than 60 kilometres from the front-line and using shortened aerials under special radio control were used for the training radio network.”
Meanwhile the Soviets prepared to undertake the massive job of redeployment -concealed from German observation. A STAVKA directive of 29 May required that front commanders move all troops and equipment at night, observing strict light and march discipline. Daytime movement of small groups was permitted only during inclement weather or outside the range of enemy air observation. During pauses in troop movements, all forces were to be dispersed and camouflaged and kept isolated from contact with the civilian population. In general, road movement was kept to a minimum, and rail was used whenever possible. Of particular importance was the concealment of the relief of front line units. This was done at night as close to the time of attack as feasible without interfering with last-minute attack preparations.
To conceal regroupment northward by rail and road, the Soviets simulated heavy rail and road movements to the south and southwest, using false dispatcher transmissions, and some actual movements. Meanwhile, traffic to real concentration areas was cloaked in maximum secrecy. Unloading of units and equipment occurred at numerous stations up to 100 or more kilometers from the front, and all unloading took place at night. STAVKA reserve units moved to assembly areas no closer than 50-100 kilometers from the front. Movement of units to forward positions occurred 5-7 days before the offensive to heavily concealed areas 12-20 kilometers from the front. Final deployments occurred one or two nights prior to the attack.
By the end of April the STAVKA had ordered all fronts to go on the defense (except those specifically conducting deception) and had completed the outline for the summer offensive. Now work began on detailed planning to realize the basic concept of the operation, the first task of which was to plan the Belorussian operation.
Thus, the Soviet concept for the 1944 summer offensive was grander in scale than that of 1943. First, it was offensive in nature from the very start. Rather than involving a strategic offensive on one primary direction it envisioned the conduct of a series of powerful multi-front strategic offensives, successively along several strategic directions with the objective of destroying several German army groups. The strategic maskirovka plan was also more ambitious. In 1943 the Soviets had sought to conceal portions of one front (Steppe) in strategic reserve and then use that front to launch a counter-offensive. Elsewhere, the Soviets had sought to regroup secretly individual armies within fronts to maintain the momentum of the attack. In 1943 they had achieved mixed success. In 1944, however, the Soviets sought to regroup large strategic reserves between fronts and strategic directions as well. Simultaneously, the Soviets frequently would attempt to regroup armies within fronts. Maskirovka plans at STAVKA level and within fronts and armies were far more sophisticated in 1944 than they had been in 1943, as events would bear out.
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[ December 24, 2002, 05:04 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]
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I'll give you an answer on this when I get home to my precious booksOriginally posted by coe:By the way, enlighten me, since alot of the Panzers were shifted to the South in anticipation of an offensive there, what did they do once Bagration started? What was the role of Army Groups North and South during July-Aug, 1944?
Andreas gives a good idea of the different outcomes of the various German army groups, but I'd like to elaborate from the Soviet side, since much of what happened, when it happened, and why it happened was a result of Soviet strategic planning for the summer of 1944.
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[ December 24, 2002, 05:03 PM: Message edited by: Grisha ]
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Exactly. Sorry to be the bearer of bad news.Originally posted by manchildstein II:i thought the berkeley maps were from '42?
at first i saw...
--Gauss-Krasovskii grid projection system based on Pulkovo 1942 datum Krasovskii spheroid--
now i see... it actually reads:
1972-2000
Gauss-Krasovskii grid projection system based on Pulkovo 1942 datum Krasovskii spheroid
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so the '1942 datum krasovskii spheroid' in no way means the maps are from '42?... shucky darns...
makes sense though...
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Many thanks, Andrew! They look great
Kursk
in Combat Mission: Barbarossa to Berlin
Posted
Lt. Hortlund,
All the disputing aside, thanks for the discussion. I understand your points and find them reasonable and valid points to be addressed on this topic. I may not agree with them, having my own set of arguments, but it's discussions like these that force me - well, all of us really - to dig deeper into it all. Only good can come from that - and knowledge.
Take care